Bill C-70

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, committee members.

First of all, I want to start by thanking everyone who joined with me in signing the Standing Order 106(4) letter. As you can imagine, it's pretty rare that we get unanimous support for an emergency meeting, but I think the revelations from the RCMP that were delivered to the Canadian public on Thanksgiving Monday were nothing short of explosive, and I think they demand this committee's attention.

I will be moving a motion, Mr. Chair. I know that the clerk has both French and English copies available—hard copy and digital—for members who are participating in person and online.

Before I move the motion, I think it's important to add a bit of brief context, because of course this is not the first time that we have been witness to serious allegations involving the Government of India and its agents in Canada. In fact, it was more than a year ago, in September of 2023, that the Prime Minister stood in the House of Commons and levelled these accusations against the Government of India, accusing it and its agents of nefarious criminal activity, election interference and a whole host of things. Needless to say, the Prime Minister's rising in the House of Commons and making such a statement did make headlines around the world.

Since then, the Hogue commission has released an interim report. That was in May of 2023. If you read that report, you can see that there are broad mentions of India's interference in Canada throughout. Then, of course, in June 2024, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians released its special report on election interference, which again mentioned the activities of the Government of India throughout.

That brings us, Mr. Chair, to October 14, 2024, this past Monday. For the RCMP—indeed, for any police force that is conducting an active investigation—to come out with such explosive revelations I think underscores just how serious this is, and I think the RCMP made a point that they were doing this because some individuals in Canada have their lives directly in danger. The threat had reached such a level that they felt compelled to ignore the traditional way of going through the judicial process and made these accusations public so that particularly the members of the South Asian community whose lives might be in danger could be forewarned and so that we could remain extra vigilant.

I also think, Mr. Chair, that the House of Commons and the Senate came together quite quickly in June of this year to pass Bill C-70, which contained important legislative measures to deal with foreign interference.

With all of these events coming together and culminating in what we saw on Monday, I think it is quite appropriate for this committee to be seized with the matter. With that in mind, I would like to move the following motion:

That, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee undertake a study concerning the electoral interference and violent criminal activities carried out by agents of the Government of India, as identified by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians' report and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's report from October 14, 2024, and the subsequent expulsion of six diplomats from the Government of India.

As a part of this study, the committee hold no less than six meetings, ensuring an equal distribution of time for witnesses, and invite the following ministers, senior officials, and expert witnesses from impacted communities and academia to provide briefings:

1. Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Mélanie Joly.

2. Minister of Public Safety, the Honourable Dominic LeBlanc.

3. RCMP commissioner, Mike Duheme.

4. National security and intelligence adviser, Nathalie Drouin.

5. Experts from Canada's South Asian community.

6. Brampton mayor Patrick Brown and any former leadership candidates of the 2022 Conservative Party leadership race.

7. National security subject matter experts.

With that, Mr. Chair, the motion is moved. I hope that copies have been distributed to members.

I will give my time back to the chair. Thank you very much.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you for that.

It is my time and I can use it as I wish. I noted that the truth hurts for the Liberals. Mr. Gerretsen spread blatant disinformation for his political gain. As a result, he had to settle in a legal action that was taken against him.

We saw further disinformation from none other than a network that claims that it is the most trusted news network in Canada, which fraudulently doctored a video of Pierre Poilievre. We had ministers in this government, including Minister St-Onge and MP Noormohamed actually defend the doctoring of that video. It just goes to show that, when it comes to the Liberals, they're very much in favour of disinformation just so long as it isn't against them. In any event, the point is made.

Mr. Kushwaha, you spoke a little bit about Bill C-70. One of the tools in Bill C-70 is a foreign influence registry. Is that something that you see as being a useful tool to counter misinformation and disinformation from hostile foreign states?

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Seaboyer, one of the other areas of concern.... You mentioned some recommendations. In Canada, with the passage of and royal assent on Bill C-70, we were able to create a foreign agent registry.

Certainly, one of the things that came out of the U.S. indictment that actually initiated platforms to act was their Foreign Agents Registration Act. As our registry rolls out, could you speak to some of the sanctions models that you would like to see to punish those who break those rules?

[Neal Kushwaha]

I can speak to the justice side of things. My opinion is that I feel some positive work has been done there. I commend the work that was done on C-70, especially on the ability to deal with that in a legal form as well as expanding some capacity for CSIS to perform in certain ways.

To get into the intricacies, I feel it would be best to tear that apart another time, if you choose. There's some content in there that still limits Canada, but we have to take steps and we're taking good steps. That's positive, so I commend everyone who participated in that to make that happen.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

You may be aware of the recently passed Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference. One provision of the act was to expand the preparatory acts offence. If you have knowledge of this, can you expand on how it will help address espionage or new foreign interference offences?

[C/Supt Denis Beaudoin]

Exactly. The biggest difference with Bill C-70 is that if it's a campaign of disinformation with the purpose of affecting government processes, it may become criminal. You won't find these terms under the Security of Information Act; they're not defined in there.

As the member alluded to, it may be something for the committee to see if there's value in defining them, but for police services, we're dealing with harassment, intimidation and threats. For disinformation, if somebody goes through this but at some point he crosses the path and there's a threat, then all of a sudden we investigate the threats, but not necessarily the "lying", as you called it, because oftentimes it may not be a crime.

[C/Supt Denis Beaudoin]

Let's look at misinformation activities targeting ethnic communities. As I mentioned, any such activities undertaken prior to an election or during the electoral process could be considered criminal.

We've publicized some of our community engagement activities. We try to educate communities and show them that Canadian police services are open and accessible. In other countries, the public can have a negative impression of police or a less favourable view of them.

We try to break the silo culture within communities. We try to educate them on new laws and criminal activity, which they can fall prey to. We also try to educate communities on Bill C‑70.

[C/Supt Denis Beaudoin]

I'm not familiar with the study, but there are several best practices that we use. One of them that we're trying to do right now on foreign interference is breaking the silos between police services. When I say "silos", it's really raising awareness of transnational repression, because officers on the street may not realize that they're dealing with such a crime, and they may just see it as a threat. For example, we're trying to utilize some of these committees that are already in existence to spread this information, including Bill C-70, to all our colleagues across Canada. That's one example of sharing information.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our respective director generals for joining us today.

I want to talk about Bill C-70. I think you mentioned that it's a welcome legislative change with some measures that it brought in. Can you talk about cybersecurity and how it intersects with security of information and signals intelligence? Do you feel sufficient improvements have been made through that legislation? Does it allow you to have more powers and more ability to do the work of targeting misinformation, disinformation or any foreign threats through information specifically?

[C/Supt Denis Beaudoin]

It's hard for the RCMP to comment on the government, Mr. Chair.

What we can say is that we welcome the new legislation, Bill C-70, which was recently enacted on August 19. We look forward to working with our partners at PPSC and testing this new legislation.

Your earlier question was on cybercrime, national security and foreign-actor interference. We received funding recently through the SIAMACT. Nonetheless, with the rise of violent extremism in Canada, it's certainly competing with our ability.

[C/Supt Denis Beaudoin, Director General, National Security and Chief Superintendent, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My name is Denis Beaudoin, and I am a chief superintendent and the director general responsible for foreign actor interference for the federal policing national security program at the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, RCMP. I am joined today by Richard Baylin, chief superintendent of federal policing criminal operations on cybercrime, and Greg O'Hayon, director general of federal policing security intelligence.

First, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss this issue. The malicious intrusion into Canada’s democratic processes by hostile foreign actors is one of the RCMP's highest priorities.

To be clear, foreign interference affects every aspect of society. This includes the very foundations of our democracy, the fundamental rights and values that define us as a society, our economic prosperity, the critical infrastructure essential to our well-being, and our sovereignty.

Foreign actors seek to advance their objectives through several tactics, including state-backed harassment and intimidation of communities in Canada, manipulating the discourse at every level of our political system, and using malicious and deceptive tactics to influence our democracy.

Make no mistake—foreign governments are conducting campaigns of online disinformation to undermine our democratic processes and institutions, as well as to erode citizens’ faith in democracy.

The RCMP has a broad mandate related to national security and cybercrime to ensure public safety by investigating, disrupting and preventing foreign interference. It draws upon provisions from various pieces of legislation, including those recently enacted in Bill C‑70, as well as other offences under the Criminal Code. When investigating disinformation campaigns, the RCMP works closely with domestic and international partners to identify relevant evidence but sometimes disinformation campaigns may not constitute criminal conduct.

With these considerations in mind, I will briefly summarize the RCMP’s role in contributing to the protection of Canada, its citizens, residents and elected officials from foreign interference activities.

In 2019, the Government of Canada announced its plan to protect democracy, to defend Canadian democratic institutions. This included measures to strengthen elections against various threats, including cyber threats and foreign interference. From the outset, the RCMP has been a committed contributor to these whole-of-government efforts.

Elected and public officials are central figures in our democracy's political system, as they shape our policies and laws. This role makes them key targets for foreign states, which may try to influence or coerce them to take policy positions that align with their interests. As such, the RCMP recently briefed parliamentarians, in partnership with other government agencies, on the threat of foreign interference. The RCMP is also leading initiatives to raise awareness with police forces across the country on the new legislation included in Bill C-70, as well as on the threat of foreign interference.

The RCMP is also an active member of the security and intelligence threats to elections task force—otherwise known as SITE—a working group that coordinates collection and analysis efforts concerning threats to Canada's federal election processes. This group is Canada's principal mechanism for monitoring threats of hostile state interference during elections and also consists of experts from CSIS, the CSE and Global Affairs Canada.

The RCMP's federal policing of cybercrime focuses investigative efforts on the highest level of cybercriminality and works closely with domestic and international partners to identify, disrupt and prosecute the most serious threats within the cybercrime ecosystem, which cause significant economic or other impacts to Canadian interests at home and abroad. The RCMP's federal policing cybercrime investigative teams and cyber liaison officers abroad focus on the prevention, enforcement and disruption of high-value threat actors and prolific cybercrime enablers who facilitate sophisticated crimes, such as malware, ransomware, espionage and foreign interference, as well as attacks against government institutions, key business assets and critical infrastructure of national importance.

As members of this committee are well aware, there has been an increase in threats to public officials in recent years. Because we recognize the personal impact of this trend, as well as the harm it causes to our democracy, this issue remains a key priority for the RCMP, and we will continue to counter these threats through our federal policing responsibilities, as well as through our engagement with other police forces and the diaspora communities.

With threats of this magnitude, collaboration between the public, the police of jurisdiction and the Government of Canada partners will continue to be an important aspect of protecting Canada against foreign interference.

The protection of Canada's democratic processes and the safety of its citizens and residents is paramount for the RCMP. It will be important for all aspects of society to work together to protect against foreign interference in this space.

Thank you.

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

Thank you for the question, Mr. Motz.

I could preface my answer by saying that I wear as a badge of honour the fact that I'm on the Russian sanctions list. That is not our list of sanctioned individuals, but theirs. I think I'm on that list partly because I have advocated for much more aggressive activity on the part of the Government of Canada in terms of Russian diplomats, who are engaging in activities that are not commensurate with their Geneva Convention duties, being declared persona non grata.

As Mr. Motz probably knows, Canada is almost unique among NATO and EU countries in not having expelled a single Russian diplomat from its establishment in Canada since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Frankly, I think there is no good argument to be made for that lack of action. I would distinguish that activity, which is fully within the federal government's capacity, from the broader question of dealing with Russian potential agents of influence, proxies and so on, in Canada.

Here, I think there is a twofold problem. One is that up until very recently, in Bill C-70, we really haven't had the legal tools to respond to that problem.

Secondly, I think there is, as I indicated in response to Madame Michaud's question, a genuine institutional lack of capacity, both on the intelligence side and the law enforcement side, to be able to respond to these threats.

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

Thank you, Madame Michaud. I'll respond in English.

In terms of tools, I think the first tool is the ability to detect these kinds of serious activities. That goes to the intelligence capacity. It goes to the disinformation monitoring capacity, which is too weak at the moment in Canada—and that was the burden of some of my remarks in the opening presentation.

In terms of responding to them—if you can detect them—I think the tool kit has been very limited up until recently. Bill C-70 will improve things. Bill C-59, before that, with its new powers given to CSE, may improve our capacities to respond to these disinformation campaigns and try to render them null and void.

The last thing that has to be said is that in no real universe will we be able to detect or counter all disinformation campaigns. At the end of the day, it comes down to Canadian citizens and consumers being able to respond to them in a sensible way.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the witnesses for being here.

I'll continue in the same vein; my questions are for Mr. Wark.

I wanted to get your opinion on Bill C‑70 that the House passed a few months ago to deal with foreign interference. I was asking the witnesses in the previous hour whether they thought Canada had the same tools at its disposal as the Americans with the FBI, for example, to uncover schemes like the one behind Tenet Media. I'd like to know what you think.

Do you think we have the same tools as the Americans to deal with this interference? Do we also have the right legislative tools in a context where everything is evolving so rapidly, technologically speaking?

We know that social networks are a powerful tool for disinformation. Right now, are these legislative tools to be found in Bill C‑70, or do we need to go further?

Will we have to constantly renew ourselves to be on the cutting edge of new tactics or stratagems used by people who want to make disinformation or propaganda for Russia's benefit? I imagine so.

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

Mr. Erskine-Smith, that's a great question.

Much will depend on how the foreign influence transparency registry is rolled out. We have the legislation. We don't have the registry, yet. The registry would have the capacity to do two things if it is effectively instituted. One would be to provide some degree of deterrent against so-called grey zone actors, and you might consider Tenet Media founders as an illustration of that. The other would be to pursue either monetary or criminal sanctions under either that legislation, or changes to the Criminal Code that were introduced, particularly changes to the Security of Information Act that were introduced in Bill C-70.

Hypothetically, in future, we might have a better capacity, as the United States has had for some time, to use criminal sanctions against such activities. At the moment, we don't really have that.