Bill C-70

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

Countering Foreign Interference Act

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Madam Speaker, now that Bill C-70 is back in the House for third reading, I would like to take this opportunity to outline the long journey it took to get to this point.

In 2018, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, David Vigneault, advised the government about threats presented by the People's Republic of China. That year, he warned the Prime Minister that PRC activities related to the threat of foreign interference were an existential threat for Parliament and the elections.

Also in 2018, the government was advised that the measures then in place were not sufficient to counter these threats to Parliament and to our elections. We know that because it was the second finding of fact on page 73 of the NSICOP report.

Also back in 2018, national security agencies advised the government to introduce a range of measures to counter these threats, including new legislation.

It is also notable that in 2018, the CSIS director also advised the government of another threat from the PRC, which was the threat of espionage. We know that because, for the first time ever, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service gave a public speech in December of that year. In that speech, he warned of serious threats from the PRC closely related to foreign interference, which were those of espionage. These threats came in the form of espionage targeting Canadian companies and Canadian universities in the five sensitive areas he outlined at that time: artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G telecommunications technology, biopharma and clean tech.

Subsequently, in 2019, the Clerk of the Privy Council sought the Prime Minister's approval for an action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. The Prime Minister did not approve that plan.

Again, a year later, in December 2020, the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister sought the Prime Minister's approval again for that action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. Again, the Prime Minister did not approve the plan.

For the third time, in February 2022, the national security and intelligence adviser resurrected this initiative, and again, the Prime Minister did not approve an action plan.

In all three occasions over several years, the Prime Minister did not approve actions that would have protected Parliament and our elections.

On November 18, 2020, the House adopted a motion calling on the government to produce a robust plan to counter foreign interference threat activities here on Canadian soil. Despite all of this advice, despite the call of the House of Commons to the government to enact a robust plan to counter foreign interference and to take additional measures to protect Canadian democracy, little was done.

Then, because the Prime Minister did not approve actions to protect Parliament and our elections, and because the government failed to heed the call of the House in the motion adopted on November 18, 2020, foreign interference threats increased from 2018 to present.

As Justice Hogue said in her initial report of May 3, the risk from the impacts of foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken.

Then, subsequent to all of this, in the fall of 2022, explosive media reports about foreign interference threats broke. These reports raised questions about what the Prime Minister knew, when he knew it and why he did not act on the intelligence and the advice he was given by the senior civil service. Further explosive revelations in the subsequent months followed in the media. Finally, on March 6, 2023, the government promised to look at introducing measures in law to counter these threats.

It took years for the government to take the advice of CSIS, the senior civil service and countless reports. It took years for the government to introduce legislation. Finally, after much urging, many controversies and a lot of work done by a great many people, the government reluctantly introduced Bill C‑70.

That brings us to the debate today on Bill C-70 at third reading. Bill C-70 is a much-needed response to the existential threat to our democracy from foreign interference. It would modernize the CSIS Act, allowing CSIS to better obtain preservation and production orders, and national security warrants for obtaining information, records or documents, through a single attempt. It would better allow CSIS to collect, retain and analyze data for intelligence purposes. It would allow CSIS to collect foreign intelligence and to disclose classified information outside of the Government of Canada to provinces, municipalities, universities, companies and individuals being targeted.

It would create new criminal offences for those who would engage in foreign interference here in Canada on behalf of a foreign state, ensuring that we could better protect Canadians against these corrosive, clandestine, corrupting and coercive activities, especially Canadians in diaspora communities who have suffered for so long in silence and isolation. It would also make it easier to prosecute these offences by removing the requirement to prove harm to the interests of Canada when a Canadian is targeted by foreign interference.

It would create a new criminal offence that would better protect essential infrastructure in Canada, including stiff penalties for those who would sabotage essential infrastructure on behalf of a foreign state or a foreign government. It would amend the Canada Evidence Act and would make consequential to other acts so that it would allow information relating to foreign affairs, national defence or national security in Federal Court proceedings to be better handled.

Finally, the bill would establish a foreign influence, transparency and accountability act, which would create a foreign influence registry and a new foreign influence transparency commissioner. The new foreign influence transparency commissioner would oversee a public registry containing information on individuals in Canada engaged in legitimate influence activities on behalf of a foreign principal.

The bill was strengthened in committee, particularly with respect to the appointment of a commissioner. The commissioner would be appointed by the Governor in Council after consultation with leaders in the House of Commons and in the Senate, and after resolutions in the House of Commons and in the Senate are adopted. This would ensure that while the commissioner is situated within the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, within the machinery of government, the commissioner would have a degree of independence to manage and to interpret the act, to issue notices of compliance, to issue administrative monetary penalties and to refer matters to law enforcement for criminal prosecution.

Time is of the essence. We must ensure that our democratic institutions and elections are protected from the threats of foreign interference. Inaction and delay cannot continue. As Justice Hogue noted in her initial report, the risk of the impacts from foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken. She also concluded that “foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 [general] elections” undermined “public confidence in Canada's democracy”.

As the general election draws closer, time is running out to strengthen the confidence Canadians have in our elections. Time is running out to combat the rising threat of foreign interference. Canadians need to be able to go to the polls in the next election and to be confident not only in the integrity of the overall election but also in the integrity of each of the elections that take place in each of the 338 electoral districts in Canada. This bill must pass, and I encourage all of my parliamentary colleagues, in this place and in the other place, to support this bill and to see its adoption into law before we adjourn for the summer.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, it was a long slog through committee last week with Bill C-70, and ultimately this legislation is needed. We need to bring up to speed our analog laws so that they can thrive in a digital era.

My question to my hon. colleague is this: The National Council of Canadian Muslims is publicly releasing a concerning statement about the definition of “intimidation” in the Security of Information Act amendments in the bill. I am just wondering if the parliamentary secretary could reply here on the floor of the House to those concerns from NCCM.

[Monique Pauzé, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Madam Speaker, the member talked about priorities. She said that it was very important for the government to take action on this issue.

Let us go back in time a bit. A year ago, the Prime Minister did everything he could to slow things down. Instead of calling for a public inquiry, which all parties in the House were asking questions about, he launched an investigation into the CSIS leaks, calling them racist.

The bill we are studying, Bill C-70, is interesting. The Bloc Québécois brought forward some amendments that were adopted. We will be supporting the bill.

I have one question, though. Why was the security of Canada's democratic system not a priority for the government for six, seven, eight months?

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak in support of Bill C-70, which proposes, among other things, to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

I hope that the report stage amendment offered today has the support of all parties. The amendment would permit CSIS to disclose, as part of a disclosure for the purpose of building resiliency against threat to the security of Canada, information specifically about a company with that company. The amendment would allow CSIS to be more candid and transparent with Canadian corporations and entities by disclosing information around specific threats and vulnerabilities affecting them. An example of this would be information about a foreign state's interest in acquiring the company's unique and proprietary information or technology. The reason the amendment is important is that this precision would ensure that companies, community organizations and universities have parity with individuals. The amendment is needed to ensure that the information sharing provisions found in the bill are the same for individuals and entities.

As members know, on May 30, we passed a motion that sped up the committee's study and clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-70 at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Events moved quickly, and when one part of the bill was amended to provide enhanced information sharing authority for individuals, the same was not done for companies or community organizations and universities, as there was not enough time to properly craft the appropriate amendment. As such, there now exists an imbalance in the legislation, and this important amendment addresses it. It is essential that we pass this report stage amendment to ensure that CSIS can make authorized disclosures to both individuals and entities to better equip Canadians and Canadian society with the information and tools they need to build resiliency against foreign threats. We know that state actors exploit Canada's vulnerabilities by targeting federal, provincial, territorial, municipal and indigenous governments; our open academic systems; private enterprises; and even communities and individuals.

The government has no obligation more important than the protection of its citizens. Unfortunately, we have seen a rise in the number of Canadians being threatened and harassed by foreign state actors, as well as a rise in foreign interference in our democratic institutions and our economy. The government's priority remains to protect Canada and Canadians against activities that undermine democratic values, economic interests, sovereignty and national security. In order to combat foreign interference, a whole of government and society response is required. The first step to combatting foreign interference is detecting it, which is why the bill introduces amendments to the CSIS Act.

CSIS is mandated to protect Canada's national security. The CSIS Act came into force in 1984, well before the prolific use of digital technology that we see today. Technological innovations make it more difficult to detect and identify threat actors, including those engaged in foreign interference activities. These innovations have created new avenues for threat to interfere in Canadian society and institutions, especially in the online space. The bill introduces several new powers to assist CSIS in its investigation of foreign interference. These will close gaps in CSIS's authorities, which have become more acute with the global shift towards digital communication and technology.

Throughout the consultation process, the government heard that we need to do more to protect vulnerable communities that are the targets of harassment and intimidation of foreign state actors. At the same time, we heard that any changes to the law need to be based on a real need and to continue to respect Canadian values. These changes do just that. In addition to the safeguards built into the bill itself, there are still robust review and oversight measures to which CSIS is subject. These were brought in by the government in 2019.

Both the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians provide a robust review function of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's activities to ensure they are effective and compliant with the law. The two objectives of effectiveness and compliance with the law are guiding the government's response.

While technology has brought enormous benefits to society, it has also changed the way threat activity is conducted and how information flows. That is why, in addition to these new powers, the government is making other changes to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to ensure we have the intelligence we need. This means updating the foreign intelligence provisions of the CSIS Act to account for changing technology. It also means we are making sure that CSIS can effectively use data to identify patterns of hostile activity, which may not be immediately obvious.

Finally, this means introducing a requirement that Parliament review the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act every five years. This would ensure that we are continually evaluating the tools we have and the ones we may need, as well as that we have a robust and open public debate about them. Such a debate would allow Canadians to weigh in regularly to ensure that we are meeting our two objectives of effectiveness and compliance with the law.

The threat of foreign interference is complex, but in order to counter it, we must detect it first. That is why these changes to the CSIS Act, when considered as part of a whole-of-government response to foreign interference, are so important.

[Randy Boissonnault, Liberal, Edmonton Centre, AB]

moved that Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, be read the third time and passed.

Business of the House

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Housing]

Madam Speaker, there have been discussions among the parties and, if you seek it, I believe you will find unanimous consent for the following motion:

That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order, or usual practice of the House, when Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, is called later today, it shall be disposed of as follows:

(a) the report stage motion in amendment, standing on the Notice Paper in the name of the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, be deemed adopted;

(b) the bill, as amended, be deemed concurred in at report stage with a further amendment;

(c) the bill shall be taken up immediately at the third reading stage and a member of each recognized party and a member of the Green Party each speak for not more than 10 minutes followed by five minutes for questions and comments, provided, if required, that Government Orders be extended to complete the said stage of the Bill; and

(d) at the expiry of the time provided for the debate at third reading later today, or when no member wishes to speak, whichever is earlier, any proceedings before the House shall be interrupted, and in turn every question necessary for the disposal of the said stage of the bill shall be put forthwith and successively, without further debate or amendment, and a recorded division shall be deemed requested and deferred until tomorrow after Oral Questions.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I'm somewhat worried about how long the legislative process takes. We are now working on Bill C‑70. By the time the amendments come into force, will the act still be effective and will it still address our needs?

It's urgent to do something right now. I believe we all agree on that. Can we succeed in providing measures as quickly as possible so that you have the tools you need?

At our most recent meetings, witnesses told us that they were all restricted to their respective sandboxes, in isolation, without being able to speak to the others. I even told a few of them last week that I'd like to be their client, because then I'd be able to get some information. I'm certainly not getting it now from House Administration, and I don't know if they're ever going to give us any information.

We need recommendations because I feel that Bill C-70 will be outdated by the time it's adopted.

What do you think?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, the House is indeed currently studying a bill to modernize certain aspects of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, Bill C‑70.

It's interesting to look at things with a bit of hindsight. The act came into force in 1984, in the middle of the Cold War, following a commission of inquiry whose role was to review certain activities of the organization that had been responsible for national security at the time. To me, it looked like a rather defensive bill. Its purpose was to prevent certain lapses from recurring.

In my humble opinion, the circumstances that existed in 1984 no longer apply in 2024. The world has changed. Canada's image has changed and the threats we are facing have changed, not only in terms of complexity and the number of stakeholders responsible, but also the impact they have on the everyday lives of Canadians and Quebeckers.

The sharing of information amendments proposed in Bill C‑70, which is currently being studied by Parliament, are absolutely essential. Their purpose is to simplify part of our data system, and the way we obtain orders from the Federal Court, while maintaining judicial authorizations. I'm sure that these changes will have a very direct impact on Canadians.

As Minister LeBlanc said, it was a first step, and other efforts would be required in future to modernize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. Once again, when the time comes to protect Canadians against threats, it's important to know that the methods used by those who contrive them can change very quickly. We therefore have to make sure that we're not lagging behind these changes.

[David Vigneault]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The issues of cybersecurity, their nexus to national security, and attempts by adversaries to interfere in Canada, are becoming ever more complex. These issues require the full attention of the Government of Canada and all Canadians.

Increasingly, threats to the security of Canada take the form of cyber-threats. Malicious cyber-activity targeting Canada is growing in scale, complexity and sophistication, with cyber-threat actors seeking to advance their economic, political, security and ideological interests to the detriment of Canada and its allies. In short, the digital ecosystem has transformed the nature and conduct of warfare, espionage, diplomacy and trade.

Cyber-threat actors include those affiliated with foreign states, including military and intelligence services, as well as non-state actors.

CSIS actively investigates a variety of cyber-actors, including those from or associated with China, Russia, Iran and India. Regardless of who is directing their activities, cyber-threat actors employ a range of technologies and techniques to exploit weaknesses in information systems, target individuals to gain unauthorized access to systems and networks, or leverage infrastructure in Canada to achieve their broader strategic and geopolitical goals to the detriment of Canada.

CSIS is mandated to collect intelligence on threats to the security of Canada, to advise the government on those threats and, when appropriate, take measures to reduce them. This includes threats that emanate from the cyber-domain.

More specifically, when CSIS identifies national cybersecurity threats, it uses a variety of investigative techniques, including human sources, warranted collection and other methods to determine the scope, motivation, target and source of the threat.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, engages broadly with industry, academia, governments, and indigenous groups to help strengthen Canadians' alertness and resilience to a growing cyber-threat environment. For example, since 2021 alone, over 70 briefings have been provided to parliamentarians on foreign interference and espionage, in which security awareness, including cyber-hygiene, was a key discussion point.

Additionally, CSIS routinely provides intelligence assessments to our government partners, allowing them to make informed policy and operational decisions. CSIS also shares these assessments and investigative leads with our trusted foreign partners in order to assist them in ensuring the integrity of the global information infrastructure upon which Canadian security relies.

However, I would like you to know that CSIS is part of a community of agencies and departments seeking to protect Canada from cyber-threats. While CSIS plays a vital role in the team, it works closely with other key players such as the cybersecurity experts at the Communications Security Establishment, the cyber centre, Public Safety Canada and the RCMP, just to name a few. Together we work to safeguard Canada and its assets, information and national security from an array of cyber-threats.

Regarding the committee's specific study, our colleagues and cybersecurity experts at the CSE and CCCS, with CSIS, produced a chronology of events detailing the interactions between our organizations and the House of Commons.

I will note that CSIS learned of any issues with the House of Commons IT system from CSE in January 2021. Following this, our agency directly briefed the House of Commons IT staff with CSE. From there, we worked with CSE and the House of Commons from January through April 2021 to investigate this activity.

This work outlined that IPAC members were targeted, but importantly, it found no instance of compromise on the system, nor any follow-on activity.

CSIS broadly disseminated intelligence products to clients across the Government of Canada detailing APT31's email tracking attempts on IPAC members in Canada. CSIS's work with the House of Commons predates the FBI reporting that was shared with both CSIS and CSE on any information that was released to the public by the U.S. in 2024.

When this incident was uncovered in early 2021, CSIS followed the protocols that were in place at the time. CSIS worked directly with CSE and the House of Commons to better understand the incident and its impact. Our investigation, alongside CSE's work, helped to inform the House of Commons on the specific technical measures that could be taken to mitigate the incident.

In 2023, the Prime Minister issued a ministerial directive to CSIS, which outlined and clarified CSIS’s role and responsibilities in relation to the investigation, notification and reduction of threats to parliamentarians. The directive outlines that, wherever possible within the law, CSIS must ensure that parliamentarians are informed of threats to the security of Canada directed at them.

This is uncharted territory for CSIS, and is providing an opportunity for reflection, learning and improvement. What is different today under this directive is that it compels us to have the conversation with our partners on how best to ensure that parliamentarians are informed on the potential threats they face. It may not be CSIS, for example, when we are not the lead department responsible for the issue at hand, but because the ministerial directive was issued to CSIS, we will lead the discussion on the process.

Mr. Chair, I think I will skip the recap of the chronology because of time. I will speak quickly to some legislative authorities.

Members of the committee, I think you all understand that the CSIS mandate is guided by legislation that is nearly 40 years old. In the face of rapid technological change and an increasingly complex cyber-ecosystem, gaps in CSIS authorities that limit its ability to detect, investigate and respond to foreign interference, including by sharing information, have become more pronounced.

Bill C-70, which currently sits before the House, proposes a set of focused amendments that will improve CSIS's operational response to foreign interference.

Among these amendments is a proposal to enable information sharing outside the federal government to build resiliency to national security threats, including foreign interference. This will help to build resilience before the threats materialize and will directly enable parliamentarians to make decisions that are more informed.

More broadly, Bill C-70 will ensure CSIS investigations are nimble and responsive, resulting in better collection of intelligence and advice, including for parliamentarians.

The last thing I would say, Mr. Chair, is that in reflecting on this situation in preparation for this appearance, I think my analysis with my colleagues is that everybody did the work they were supposed to do. However, the outcome for parliamentarians is not, I think everybody will agree now, in hindsight, what was desired.

I welcome the work of this committee. I welcome the work that CSIS can do to make sure that in the future we learn from this, and that the outcome for parliamentarians and for Canadians is a different one.

Thank you.

Opposition Motion—Foreign Interference in Democratic Institutions

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question and the context she provided. As we can see, the government did take steps to set up the Hogue commission and ensure that the mandate it was given had parameters.

These parameters are numerous, and they are being followed. We will leave it to Commissioner Hogue to continue to write her report and make recommendations. The government is taking action. We see that with the introduction of Bill C‑70 and Bill C‑65.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House to discuss the government's efforts to protect our democratic institutions. As members know, Canada has an enviable international reputation because of the stability of its system and democratic institutions. It is important to remember that we have a strong electoral system built on a proven legal framework, and that Elections Canada is a high-calibre election administration agency that is the envy of many.

Obviously, we do not take the threat of foreign interference lightly, and it is essential that we continue to improve our approach. Last year was eventful to say the least, and a lot of attention was drawn to these important concerns. Just in the last few weeks, in addition to the Hogue commission's initial report, reports were also published by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.

I would like to remind members that these two agencies began their respective studies following the Prime Minister's announcement in March 2023. These accountability mechanisms are essential to ensure transparency and contribute directly to the government's commitment to continue to improve its response to this threat, which is also constantly evolving.

In that same announcement, the Prime Minister asked the hon. Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs and Janice Charette, the former clerk of the Privy Council, to present a report on the government's approach to implement certain recommendations on foreign interference. That report was presented to the Prime Minister a month later. The approach set out in that report centres on four specific themes.

The first of these themes is communication with the Canadian public, meaning the need for transparency and the need to equip citizens with knowledge in this area. Communication is a key element in the fight against attempted interference in Canadian democracy. The government recognizes the importance of better communicating information about the threat of foreign interference and the measures taken by the government to deal with it. Much has already been done in this regard. For example, intelligence agencies have been publishing reports on foreign interference in elections since 2017. In addition, one component of the plan to protect Canada's democracy is the digital citizen initiative, overseen by Canadian Heritage, which aims to build the resilience of citizens and Canadian society against online disinformation.

Our work did not stop there. Since the release of this report, rapid response mechanism Canada, located at Global Affairs Canada, has released two reports exposing foreign actors' disinformation campaigns targeting elected members of the House. The Minister of Public Safety also announced details on the funding for the Canadian digital media research network to further strengthen Canadians' resilience to the increasingly complex information ecosystem. The minister also released tool kits to resist disinformation and foreign interference for elected officials, public servants and community leaders. These tools have been shared with several partners, including provincial and territorial ministers.

These initiatives are just a few examples of how the government is communicating with Canadians on these important issues. We recognize that more work needs to be done in this regard, and we are continuing our efforts. It is important to remember that this kind of communication comes with significant challenges. While we recognize the need for transparency, it is important that it not come at the expense of national security and the safety of those who risk so much, sometimes even their lives, to enable the collection of intelligence that is essential to our efforts to combat foreign interference. In her recent report, Commissioner Hogue aptly explains how difficult it is to strike a balance.

As members of the House can see, we have already made considerable progress on this first theme, as highlighted by the minister and Ms. Charette. The same is true for the second theme, which concerns governance and legal frameworks. This report demonstrated the government's commitment to considering improvements to the legal framework supporting the capacity of intelligence agencies, in particular the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, and our electoral process.

The Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs recently introduced two important bills in the House in support of these commitments.

First, Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, proposes important measures, including an update to CSIS' mandate. I would like to highlight the addition of offences related to foreign interference in democratic processes to the Security of Information Act.

The minister also introduced Bill C-65, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act. This bill continues to improve our electoral processes, including by implementing many of the Chief Electoral Officer's recommendations. This bill builds on the 2018 Elections Modernization Act as part of our efforts to counter foreign interference in our elections. I hope that all members in the House will support this bill.

The minister promised to advance these priorities and he did. Now it is up to members of the House and the representatives at the other place to ensure that these bills are adopted swiftly. The government continues to advance the commitments in the report discussed this evening that was submitted to the Prime Minister in March 2023. Our work continues.

This brings me to the report's third theme. It highlights the requirement for the government to have the ability to evaluate risks and vulnerabilities resulting from the growing threat posed by foreign interference in order to be able to adapt the government's tool kit to the evolving threat.

The recent reports, as well as the deliberations of the public inquiry into foreign interference in federal electoral processes and democratic institutions, provide valuable information that we can use to further improve existing measures for countering the threat of foreign interference. Among other things, this includes measures introduced under the plan to protect Canada's democracy.

As the report states, our government will continue to explore further enhancements to this plan. This will include an examination of making the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force a permanent entity, with a mandate to conduct regular reporting on foreign interference activities.

Lastly, I would be remiss not to mention the final theme of the report, which involves engagement to raise awareness and improve resilience to foreign interference. I have already mentioned some of the government's efforts in this regard, including the publication of information kits to resist disinformation and foreign interference. The work on this is also ongoing, and resources have been invested to ensure active progress on these efforts.

The Government of Canada also created the Protecting Democracy Unit within the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop and implement government-wide measures. These teams are working with other agencies and partners within government and with stakeholders to advance these efforts.

Perhaps I should remind my colleagues that, when we swear our oath or affirmation of allegiance, we are swearing allegiance to democratic institutions and the principle of democracy. That means we have to take our responsibilities seriously, and I find it reassuring that the government is committed to better informing partners about the threat of foreign interference.

I am ready for questions.

[Francesco Sorbara, Liberal, Vaughan—Woodbridge, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is always an honour and privilege to rise in this honourable House. I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for the very near, and I say near because it is geographically near, riding of Ottawa—Vanier, who is a dear friend and great member of Parliament in the House.

We are having a debate on a very important topic, a topic none of us should take lightly and a topic we all need to think about, co-operate and opine on, because it impacts democracy in the country we live in. It is a topic that I know is very, very important to all of us and all of our citizens.

As the members opposite and all hon. senators know, the Government of Canada is firmly committed to combatting foreign interference.

Today, foreign interference poses one of the greatest threats to Canadian society, our economic prosperity, and our sovereignty. By giving law enforcement and intelligence agencies enhanced tools and powers, the countering foreign interference act will strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats to our national security.

Activities such as the dissemination of false information and misinformation through traditional and digital means undermine public trust and sow doubt in our fundamental institutions, traditional media, and the legitimacy of elections. Not only do these activities spread misinformation, but, as we learned from testimony heard during the foreign interference commission's public hearings, foreign state actors are monitoring, intimidating, and harassing diaspora communities across Canada.

We also know from Canada's security and intelligence community that a growing number of states have developed and deployed programs to exert influence online as part of their day-to-day activities. Public Safety Canada is leading the work of this community to identify and develop the right solutions for Canada.

We are also aware of numerous reports, such as the “CSIS Public Report 2023”; the initial report of Justice Hogue's commission; and, more recently, the studies by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Through their insidious online campaigns, foreign actors are trying to realign our decision-makers' choices, our government relations, along with our politicians' and our country's reputations. The countering foreign interference act will strengthen Canada's ability to counter the threat of foreign interference while defending Canadian values and interests and respecting the need for transparency.

One of the key pillars of the act and its commitment to transparency is the creation of a foreign agent registry to ensure transparency when it comes to foreign influence. This registry will require the public registration of the activities of any person or corporation entering into an agreement with a foreign official and engaging in activities to influence a government or political process in Canada. The purpose of a foreign agent registry is to promote transparency for all those who advocate on behalf of foreign governments or entities, as well as to ensure accountability for those who seek to do so in secret. This will reinforce how seriously we take our political and democratic processes, and will align Canada's process with international best practices

By aligning ourselves with international best practices, we can assure our allies that our mutual security will be respected and that our shared values of democracy, openness and human rights will be defended.

Canada has remained open to learning from the experiences of our international partners. Many other countries have already adopted a similar foreign registry. For instance, foreign agent registries already exist in other Five Eyes countries, such as the United States and Australia.

With Bill C‑70, the government is proposing that Canada's registry be overseen by an independent foreign interference commissioner to independently administer and promote compliance with the act. The act is by no means a single solution to foreign interference. This is a complex national threat that requires a multi-pronged approach. That said, a foreign registry would build on our government's long-standing and ongoing efforts to protect our democratic institutions from the threat of foreign interference.

While our security intelligence community is working to identify and counter threats and develop strategies to protect our country and our citizens, we cannot become complacent or overly optimistic about mitigating these threats in the current geopolitical context. Targeted amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act would enable the government and other Canadian institutions and entities to better strengthen their resilience and counter the modern threats that Canada is facing today.

When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was established in 1984, the federal government was our adversaries' main target. However, as members know, foreign interference is now omnipresent in all spheres of Canadian society. Our adversaries boldly target not only the federal government, but also the provinces, territories, indigenous governments, industry, academics, community groups and individuals, both online and in person.

Among other changes, Bill C‑70 would allow wider disclosure of CSIS intelligence to those outside of the Government of Canada. With appropriate safeguards, this intelligence would help Canadians build resilience to threats. The bill would also allow CSIS to be more agile and effective in its investigations by introducing new Federal Court orders and warrants, and it would also improve the ability of CSIS to use data sets.

The proposed changes take into account the feedback received during consultations with individuals and entities from across Canada, and from various communities, industries and entities. Canadians have high expectations when it comes to the protection of personal information, including protection under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is with this in mind that these proposals have been developed. CSIS already has several layers of protection in place to ensure accountability and respect for the rights of Canadians.

I welcome any questions and comments that my colleagues may have.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Amendment BQ‑16 concerns the Commissioner's annual report and specifies that this report must be tabled in the House of Commons and the Senate instead of being given to the minister, in order to ensure greater transparency. This is a recommendation made by several witnesses, including Mr. Thomas Juneau, who said it would be a good practice.

The amendment proposes therefore that Bill C‑70, in clause 113, be amended by replacing lines 22 to 28 on page 85 with the following:the end of each fiscal year, prepare an annual report on their activities during that year and submit it to the Speakers of the Senate and the House of Commons, who must each table it in the House over which they preside without delay after receiving it or, if that House is not then sitting, on any of the first 15 days on which that House is sitting after they receive it.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Amendment BQ‑11 deals with the removal of the Commissioner. We propose to involve both the House of Commons and the Senate in the removal process.

Amendment BQ‑11 proposes:That Bill C‑70, in Clause 113, be amended by replacing line 22 on page 78 with the following:“at any time on address of the Senate and House of Commons.”

We therefore propose to add the Senate and the House of Commons to the revocation process.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

Madam Speaker, regarding the question from the hon. member for Mirabel, I already answered it when the member from Calgary East raised the issue.

I can tell the member what the Prime Minister and the government have done. We set up the national security and intelligence committee, which is made up of parliamentarians. Members from all parties sit on it, do the work, know exactly who these people are and know their boundaries. I have introduced Motion No. 112, which the Bloc Québécois supported, and our government put forward Bill C-70 to further protect Canadians and Canadian democratic institutions from foreign interference.