Bill C-70

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

Opposition Motion—Foreign Interference in Democratic Institutions

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

Madam Speaker, as the members opposite and all hon. colleagues know, the Government of Canada is deeply focused on combatting foreign interference. Today, foreign interference poses one of the greatest threats to our Canadian society, our economic prosperity and our sovereignty.

Following the tragic killing of Mr. Hardeep Singh Nijjar at a place of worship in my riding of Surrey—Newton, a Canadian who was assassinated on Canadian soil, I introduced private member's Motion No. 112, which called for the government to protect diaspora communities from acts of political interference, violence and intimidation on Canadian soil by persons or agents of foreign states.

With Motion No. 112 receiving support from all members who had voted, our government also introduced Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act, to further combat foreign interference. By giving our law enforcement and intelligence agencies enhanced tools and authorities, the countering foreign interference act would strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats to our national security.

Activities such as spreading misinformation and disinformation through traditional and digital means undermine public confidence and spread doubt in our fundamental institutions, mainstream media and the legitimacy of elections. Not only are they spreading misinformation, but, as we know from testimony at the public hearings of the foreign interference commission, foreign state actors are monitoring, intimidating and harassing diaspora communities across Canada.

We also know from our security and intelligence community that a growing number of states have built and deployed programs dedicated to undertaking online influence as part of their everyday activities. Public Safety Canada is leading work across this community to identify and develop the right solutions for Canada. As well, we have this knowledge from numerous reports, such as from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service entitled “CSIS Public Report 2023”, Justice Hogue’s interim report of the foreign interference commission and, most recently, studies from the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Through their deceptive online campaigns, foreign actors are attempting to reshape our policy-makers’ choices, our government relationships, and the reputation of our politicians and our country. The countering foreign interference act would further strengthen Canada’s ability to counter the foreign interference threat, while upholding Canadian interests, values and the need for transparency.

One of the main pillars of this bill and its commitment to transparency is the creation of a foreign influence transparency registry. This registry would require that all individuals or entities who enter into an arrangement with a foreign principal and who undertake activities to influence a government or political process in Canada would be required to publicly register these activities. The goal of a foreign registry would be to promote transparency from all people who advocate on behalf of foreign governments or entities, as well as to ensure accountability from those who would seek to do so in secret ways.

This would reinforce the seriousness with which we take the protection of our political and democratic processes and would align Canada with international best practices. This is what we would like to see for Canada. By aligning with international best practices, we could reassure our allies that our mutual security would be upheld and our shared values of democracy, openness and human rights would be defended.

Canada has remained open to learning from the experiences of our international partners. Many other nations have already adopted a similar foreign registry of their own. For example, foreign agent registries already exist in other Five Eyes countries, including the United States and Australia.

In Bill C-70, the government proposes Canada's registry be overseen by an independent foreign influence transparency commissioner, who would be responsible to independently administer and promote compliance with the act. However, the act is by no means a single solution to foreign interference. It is a complex national security threat that requires a multipronged approach.

This said, a foreign registry would build on the government's ongoing and long-standing efforts to protect our democratic institutions against the threat of foreign interference. While our security and intelligence community has been doing the hard work of detecting and countering threats and developing strategies to protect our country, we cannot become content or overly optimistic that these threats will decrease given the current geopolitical environment.

Targeted amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act would better equip the government and other Canadian institutions and entities to build resilience and to counter the modern threats Canada faces today.

When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was first created in 1984, the federal government was the primary target of our adversaries. However, as we know today, foreign interference is widespread across all facets of Canadian society. Our adversaries boldly target not just the federal government, but provincial, territorial and indigenous governments, industry, academics, community groups and individual Canadians, both online and in person.

Among other changes, Bill C-70 would enable a broader disclosure of Canadian Security Intelligence Service information to those outside the Government of Canada. With appropriate safeguards, this information would help Canadians build resiliency to threats. This legislation would also increase the ability of CSIS to be more agile and effective in its investigation, by introducing new Federal Court orders and warrants. It would also enhance the capacity of CSIS to use datasets. These proposed changes incorporate the input we received during the consultations with individuals and entities across Canada and from diverse communities, industries and entities.

People in Canada have a high expectation of privacy, including the protection provided by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These proposals have been developed with that in mind. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service already has multiple layers of protection to ensure it is accountable and that the rights of people in Canada are protected. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians also provide an important review function for CSIS activities.

I want to reassure my colleagues in the House and Canadians the government is and will be using every possible tool at our disposal to keep them safe.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Fine.

Shall the decision of the chair be sustained?

(Ruling of the chair sustained: yeas 6; nays 4)

That brings us to BQ-6.

Mr. Villemure, you can move it, but I also have to rule on this one.

Bill C-70 amends several acts and so on and so forth. Once again, the amendment creates a new concept that is beyond the scope of the bill as adopted by the House at second reading.

Therefore, I rule the amendment inadmissible.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Villemure.

I meant to interrupt you after you moved this amendment. I have to make a ruling on it.

Bill C-70 amends several acts and enacts a foreign influence transparency and accountability act. The bill provides that persons who enter into an arrangement with a foreign principal under which they undertake to carry out certain activities are required to provide the commissioner with the information specified in the regulations.

The amendment seeks to add that even if no arrangement has been entered into, any individual other than a public office holder must file a return with the commissioner if that individual receives a communication from a foreign principal requesting that the individual take certain actions.

In the opinion of the Chair, the amendment adds a new concept that is beyond the scope of the bill as adopted by the House at second reading. Therefore, I rule the amendment inadmissible.

Go ahead, Mr. Villemure.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Yes, Mr. Chair.

Overall, even if Bill C‑70 is, in my opinion, aimed at solving a problem, it is difficult to apply in certain cases and we will have to discuss its application. Furthermore, we are told that the aim of the bill is to increase transparency in order to reduce, if not eliminate, foreign interference, which seems a little ambitious to me.

The fact remains that universities that receive federal funding are currently targets of foreign interference, despite the presence of programs like those named by Mr. Bilodeau. If we want to reduce the damage done by foreign interference, then we can't ignore universities.

[Richard Bilodeau]

Thank you, Chair, for that question.

On the proposed amendment in relation to paragraph (d), “the political or governmental processes of a federal or provincial Crown corporation”, the intent and interpretation is that the current definitions in Bill C-70 include Crown corporations, so our interpretation—which would be subject to the commissioner's interpretation, obviously—is that those are already included in the definition.

In terms of “the political or governmental processes of a university or government research centre”, I would say that the proposed amendment goes beyond what we intended in terms of the transparency registry. It was intended to increase transparency in activities related to governmental and political processes, whether processes of the federal, provincial-territorial or indigenous governments, but this would go far beyond that.

I would say that in terms of research in universities, again, it would significantly expand the scope. I would say that there are already a number of initiatives and programs in place, such as the safeguarding science initiative, the outreach program at the service and new national security guidelines for research partnerships that are aimed at tackling the problem of research security.

The transparency proposals here as they relate to the government would be very difficult to apply in the context of a university, because they would target the governmental and political process of the university, which is very different from the governmental or political process of a government.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Mr. Speaker, democracy is a very meaningful word. It signifies power by the people, and I would add that it is also power for the people. Democracy has gone through changes since its very early days in ancient Greece, but the foundations remain. The people should be the ones making choices about their own future.

In light of the report on foreign interference, it behooves us to ask which people we are talking about, when we get right down to it. We may think that Quebec and Canadian parliamentarians represent the people of Quebec and Canada, but the report on foreign interference raises an important question: Are some members here for their constituents on Quebec and Canadian soil, or for foreign countries?

I think it is important first and foremost to clarify the difference between diplomacy and interference. Next, I will discuss certain troubling parts of the report. I will not discuss all of them, because we would be here until tomorrow morning. Lastly, I will go over some of the repercussions of this report.

Diplomacy is the branch of politics that concerns relations between nations. It involves representing a government's interests abroad, administering international affairs, and leading and conducting negotiations between nations. Diplomacy is the ability to resolve disputes. Diplomacy is also a skill. It is the tact involved in conducting state business effectively. Both definitions are important in our current situation. When we travel abroad for bilateral meetings with parliamentarians from other countries, we engage in diplomacy. We talk together to explain our realities. We share points of view and emphasize the important items to consider during negotiations between the governments concerned. Our ambassadors have the same duty to discuss and negotiate. Diplomacy serves the interests of nations and their people.

Interference occurs when one nation attempts to influence the domestic affairs of another nation. This definition illustrates the difference between diplomacy and interference. Interference is when one foreign state intervenes in another's domestic affairs. If we were to look a little closer at the history of humanity as a whole, we would see that several wars over the centuries have come about because of one country interfering in the affairs of another. Whereas diplomacy serves the interests of nations and their people, interference serves the interests of just one nation, and sometimes not the interests of any citizens.

With these two definitions in mind, we can only conclude that Canada has truly been a victim of interference, as have other countries around the world. Certain people have attempted to influence this country's domestic affairs, either wittingly or unwittingly. The report contains a number of elements, but I will focus on two or three of them. On page 25, paragraph 55 states:

Some elected officials, however, began wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election. [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described examples of members of Parliament who worked to influence their colleagues on India's behalf and proactively provided confidential information to Indian officials. ***]

It says that they provided confidential information. That is worrisome. Despite the redactions, we understand that members helped facilitate Indian interference. We also found out that consulates and embassies would coordinate the actions of their networks. During the 2019 federal election, 11 candidates and 13 campaign staffers had close ties to China, including several who appeared to be wittingly working for the People's Republic of China. Despite the redactions, we understand that candidates and staffers had close ties to China. In this particular case, the involvement of consulates and embassies is worrisome since they breached their duty, which is to promote diplomacy.

How does interference happen? There is a list of methods, including the use of social media. Countries can intimidate the diaspora. Disinformation and misinformation are also used. Countries can use clandestine networks. They can even buy influence. That is just a short list of methods that can be used.

What worries me about all this is the lack of interest from successive governments of all stripes. The current Prime Minister's entourage dismisses intelligence reports on the pretext that they contain only unproven allegations, while the Prime Minister himself admitted when he appeared before the commission that he did not even read intelligence reports. That is worrisome. The least they could have done would have been to meet with the people who were mentioned, to ask for some explanations. How can they know that the allegations are unproven if the reports are systematically dismissed? If the RCMP or CSIS are not being questioned, how can they be sure that they are just allegations? How can they be sure, when the Prime Minister does not even read the reports?

When I first entered politics, one old-timer told me that a person cannot be accused of what they do not know. My own view is that, if I know about a problem, then I can act and improve it. Unfortunately, I see that the Prime Minister's team is very old school when it comes to a duty to act. They are like the three wise monkeys: see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil. However, now we all know, or at least, we know some things. The Minister of Public Safety raised an important point. We cannot mention people's names without making sure that the alleged offences are facts and not just unproven allegations. However, it is up to the RCMP and CSIS to determine that. It is not up to us.

I would like to know that these people will never again have the opportunity to facilitate foreign interference, either wittingly or unwittingly. I would like to know that real action is finally being taken to ensure the vitality of our democracy, without interference, without foreign interference. I want to be clearly, meaningfully and officially assured that the people of Quebec and Canada can have full confidence in their democracy. The current situation is just one more factor fuelling cynicism towards members who put their heart and soul into their work. The government is taking last-minute, urgent action because the report was released. The government quickly cobbled together Bill C-70. Here again, there was no planning, no preparation and no long-term vision.

In short, it is important to make sure that the people's elected representatives represent the people who elected them. They must be free from any collusion resulting in interference. This is essential to protecting our democracy. We are requesting that the terms of reference of the Hogue commission be expanded because we have a duty to protect our democracy. In doing so, we protect all the interests of our fellow citizens. In other words, we protect their confidence in us, and we protect our economy and its ability to provide good jobs and a bright future. We protect those who chose to make their home in Canada, far from strife. We protect people who left countries where they were being treated poorly.

Protecting our democracy transcends the walls of this House; it transcends politics. We must recognize that. I have said it before, and I will say it again: True statesmen and stateswomen protect human dignity, particularly the dignity of people of lesser means.

[Richard Bilodeau, Director General, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

The intent of the legislation is to be fairly broad with political processes. It is our interpretation and intent that those things would be captured under the current drafting of Bill C-70.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Good afternoon, everybody. Welcome to meeting number 114 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents. Please take note of the following preventative measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, particularly the interpreters.

Use only the approved black earpiece. The former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from the microphone at all times. When you're not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose. Thank you all for your co-operation.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.

Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

I would like to provide members of the committee with a few comments on how the committee will proceed with the clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-70. This will take a couple of minutes, so grab a cup of coffee.

As the name indicates, this is an examination of all the clauses in the order in which they appear in the bill. I will call each clause successively, and each clause is subject to debate and a vote. If there are amendments to the clause in question, I will recognize the member proposing it, who may then explain it.

I would like to remind committee members that pursuant to the order adopted by the House on Thursday, May 30, all amendments had to be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m. on Friday, June 7. As a result, the chair will only allow amendments submitted before that deadline to be moved and debated. In other words, only amendments contained in the distributed package of amendments will be considered.

When no further members wish to intervene, the amendment will be voted on. Amendments will be considered in the order in which they appear in the package of amendments.

In addition to having to be properly drafted in a legal sense, amendments must also be procedurally admissible. The chair may be called upon to rule amendments inadmissible if they go against the principle of the bill or beyond the scope of the bill—both of which were adopted by the House when it agreed to the bill at second reading—or if they offend the financial prerogative of the Crown.

Amendments have been given a number in the top right corner to indicate which party submitted them. There is no need for a seconder to move an amendment. Once moved, you will need unanimous consent to withdraw it.

During debate on an amendment, members are permitted to move subamendments. Approval from the mover of the amendment is not required. Subamendments must be provided in writing. Only one subamendment may be considered at a time and that subamendment cannot be amended. When a subamendment to an amendment is moved, it is voted on first and then another subamendment may be moved or the committee may consider the main amendment and vote on it.

Pursuant to the order adopted by the House, if the committee has not completed the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill by 6:30 p.m., the chair shall allot each party no more than five minutes for each of the remaining amendments and clauses. The committee shall not adjourn the meeting until it has disposed of the bill.

Finally, if members have any questions regarding the procedural admissibility of amendments, the legislative clerks are here to assist the committee. However, they are not legal drafters and cannot respond to legal questions.

I thank the members for their attention and wish everyone a productive clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-70, no matter how long it shall take.

I would like to now welcome the officials who are with us.

From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Sarah Estabrooks, director general, policy and foreign relations.

We also have Maria R., senior analyst, strategic policy.

From the Department of Justice, we have Jennifer Poirier, senior counsel; Mark Scrivens, senior counsel; Karine Bolduc, counsel, and Kieran Dyer, counsel.

From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Richard Bilodeau, director general; Saskia Van Battum, director; David McIntyre, acting director; and Fenton Ho, acting director general, who is in the public gallery, apparently.

We're at clause-by-clause consideration.

Pursuant to Standing Order 75(1), on the consideration of clause 1, the short title is postponed.

The chair calls clause 2.

There have been no amendments submitted for clauses 2 through 33. Do we have unanimous consent to group them?

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Madam Speaker, the hon. member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford made reference to Bill C-70 on a foreign interference registry, which we fast-tracked and which I supported. I have since heard from many concerned groups, and I wonder if he has as well, that in our collaborative spirit, which is so rare in this place, to get the bill through and be heard so that we would have a foreign interference registry, I think we made a mistake in not allowing the bill to be properly studied. There are a lot of concerns being raised now.

I wonder if the hon. member has any concerns as well, as a member of the committee, as to how we might be able, in a future Parliament, to hear expert witnesses and amend the bill.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, “I...do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.” I have uttered those words three times now: once in 2015, once in 2019 and again in 2021. Of course now our allegiance lies with His Majesty King Charles II.

It is important to note we are not giving our oath to the person. It is really given to the embodiment of the Crown as an institution, which is, of course, a symbol of the Canadian state, a ship that continues to sail on despite the occasional changing of its captain.

I never thought I would arrive at a moment in time when I had to seriously doubt the sincerity of that affirmation or oath from fellow members of Parliament, but given the astounding report we received last week from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, that is the moment we have all arrived at.

I do want to note that I am incredibly proud to be a member of a caucus that has consistently led the way on trying to get results on the file we are considering. I take members back to just over a year ago, when, on May 30, 2023, my hon. colleague, the member for Vancouver East, used our opposition day in the House of Commons to make sure we debated a motion calling for a public inquiry.

As members will recall, at that time, the government had set up a special rapporteur, the right hon. David Johnston, but it was quite clear the faith in Mr. Johnston's abilities had become compromised because of his close relationship with the Prime Minister and the Liberal Party. That is why we felt at the time, as New Democrats, it was necessary for the House to call on Mr. Johnston to step aside in his role and for the government to finally get serious about the matter of foreign interference and urgently establish a public commission of inquiry.

I am pleased to report that, thanks to all of the opposition parties, the motion brought in by my party passed by a vote of 174 to 150; unfortunately, the Liberals were the ones who voted against it. It did have results, because Mr. Johnston resigned the following week. He understood at that moment in time that it was simply untenable for him to continue in his role while not enjoying the full confidence of the House of Commons. As well, we know that finally the foreign interference commission was set up on September 7, 2023.

I am a member of a caucus that has seen its leader, the NDP leader, the member for Burnaby South, being directly impacted by foreign interference. We know that my colleague, the member for Vancouver East, has also suffered the same. In our small, close-knit NDP caucus, we know all too well how pernicious foreign interference is, because we have seen it directly implicate, constrain and negatively affect two of our members. It is very personal for our caucus.

That brings me to the motion the Bloc Québécois has brought forward on its opposition day for the House to consider and eventually vote on. I want to break up my speech into several parts, looking at the various components of the motion.

Let us take a look at the first part of the motion, “that the House take note of the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.” Let us take note of the report. First of all, I want to note that in the opening paragraphs, the following appears: “the Committee noted the intelligence community’s consistent assessment that threat actors continue to consider Canada a permissive environment, viewing interference activities as a low-risk, high reward way to pursue strategic interests.”

At the end of the report, there is a litany of scathing conclusions against the Liberal government, complaining that the delays in developing policy demonstrated a lack of urgency commensurate with the gravity of threat, that delays in actions undermined the government's operational responses to the threat, and that a slow response to a known threat was a serious failure and one from which Canada may feel the consequences for years to come. Let that sink in, “for years to come”.

We are very much behind the eight ball on this issue. The warnings have been there, our country has been slow to act and those are the findings of NSICOP. Furthermore, we know now too that the Liberal government is withholding more than 1,000 pages of documents from the committee, just as it has withheld documents from the public inquiry. Those are hardly the actions of a government that is dedicated to transparency. I would argue that at this moment in time, what we need is transparency, we need to rebuild trust and we need accountability. This is an issue that rises above any one political party. This comes to the foundations of our democratic system itself. That is not full of hyperbole; that is the actual truth.

There is a real deficit in trust in the Canadian public right now and underpinning all of that is trust that we have faith that our democracy will continue through the turbulent times, that we can have faith that the people we elect to this place are doing their job honourably, on behalf of their constituents and in the best interests of the country we call Canada. It is clear that we have arrived at a moment where we must forcefully push back against hostile foreign powers that seek to undermine our democracy.

Let us go to the second part of the motion, which states that the House “express concern that certain elected officials may be wittingly or unwittingly working in the interests of foreign powers”. The NSICOP report landed with the force of a bomb last week. Its allegations that sitting members of Parliament are working on behalf of foreign interests is an incredibly serious issue that this House must be seized with. For example, paragraph 55 in the report talks about “Some elected officials...wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election.” The paragraph was heavily redacted, but the description of the redacted elements make mention of “members of Parliament who worked to influence their colleagues on India’s behalf and proactively provided confidential information to Indian officials.”

Paragraph 56 talks about a foreign state, and it does not mention which one, supporting a witting politician. Again, it is heavily redacted. Paragraph 57 talks about the People's Republic of China establishing a quid pro quo relationship with MPs where it would mobilize its network in Canada in the members' favour in return for positive engagement with the PRC. On and on it goes, detailing clandestine networks influencing the political process, the use of proxies, covertly buying influence with candidates and elected officials, etc.

I want to take a moment to ask a question that I think is on a lot of Canadians' minds, and it is certainly on my mind. What is going on with the leader of the Conservative Party's ongoing refusal to get the clearance necessary for a top secret briefing on this matter? The NDP leader already has the clearance and is going to get the briefing on who these compromised politicians are. For the life of me, I cannot understand why there is ongoing refusal on the part of the leader of the Conservative Party. The only thing I can derive from that fact is it seems he would rather talk about things he does not know rather than know things that he cannot talk about. The report, specifically paragraphs 72 and 73, talks about where the People's Republic of China allegedly interfered in the leadership races of the Conservative Party of Canada and India allegedly interfered in the Conservative Party's leadership.

That is a five-alarm fire. That is something that all parties need to take seriously. We know, of course, of the allegations that exist out there with the Liberal Party. It has already impacted one of their sitting MPs, who is now sitting as an independent. Again, this is an issue that I think every single leader in this place needs to get up to speed on. I will tell us why.

Last week, as a member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, we were doing a thorough review of Bill C-70, which I will talk about later, which is designed to deal with foreign interference. One of our witnesses was David Vigneault, who is the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I asked him about this, about whether it is in the intelligence community's interest that key members of Parliament, i.e., leaders of parties, get briefed on this information. He said yes, that it is in their interest to make sure that as many key members of Parliament, of the whole Parliament of Canada, are briefed on this.

Again, I understand that there is a wide gulf between intelligence and evidence but there are other mechanisms that party leaders can make use of within their own caucuses, so that if a party leader learns the identity of a compromised MP, there are actions that leader can take within their caucus to make sure that the Canadian people do not have a compromised person on the ballot in the next election. That is one avenue that can be taken.

It is shameful, I think, that, so many times, there is a deliberate choice to play partisan games rather than become informed. In my opinion, that is simply not leadership. There is a veil of ignorance on the Conservative side, but on the Liberal side, their continued reliance on judicial process and the RCMP investigating is also a cover, because, again, there is that gulf between intelligence and evidence. The intelligence does not always meet the high standard that is necessary in a court of law. Often, intelligence agencies are very loathe to share that intelligence because it could compromise their sources that gathered the information in the first place. Again, to the CSIS director's point at committee, there are actions that party leaders can take, but they can only take them if they make the conscious choice to become properly informed. We have yet to see that from the Conservative Party leader.

The final part of the motion from the Bloc Québécois is asking that the terms of reference for the foreign interference commission, known as the Hogue commission, be expanded to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments, as well as senators.

I have listened to some of the debate thus far, and some members believe that the existing terms of reference already cover this. I would say that given the heightened attention and interest that there is on this issue and the very real concern that Canadians have with it, if there is any way we could ask the government to give more specificity and direction to what the terms of reference should be to the commission, then I, for one, would be in favour of it. I do think it is reasonable to ask for that because, again, we need to make sure that the inquiry has full access to all of the classified material. We cannot have cabinet confidences blocking the inquiry's search for the truth. That is very much a fact, and I think most Canadians would very much agree with that.

I think we are all very well aware of how serious this issue is and the attention that we need to pay to it from this point forward. The next question is: where do we go from here? I love reviewing Canadian statutes, and the statute, of course, that is most at play in these circumstances is the Security of Information Act. Anyone, under that act, who is permanently bound to secrecy commits an offence when they intentionally and without authority communicate or confirm special operational information.

In this case, that would be the names of these MPs. We are in a conundrum here. On one hand, we have the Security of Information Act, SOIA, with very stiff penalties. If one committed an offence under the SOIA, one could be found guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not more than 14 years. That is a serious punishment for breaching these conditions in the act. Again, members of NSICOP are members of Parliament, but, looking at the act that created that committee under section 12, no member of that committee can “claim immunity based on parliamentary privilege”. They have waived their parliamentary privilege to be a part of that committee. As a result, they are also bound by secrecy. They cannot utter the names because they would be found liable to imprisonment as well.

I must return to the rights of the House of Commons itself, because I think we are setting up a battle here between the rights of the House versus existing statutes. We all know that two of the most powerful mechanisms that the House of Commons has are the regulation of its own internal affairs and the power to discipline. Those are the dominant rights and powers, among a few others, that the House of Commons has. I would submit to colleagues that breaking the oath of allegiance or the affirmation that we all made to have the privilege of sitting in this place is probably the most serious offence that I can think of. It is something that I think the House would be well-versed to seize itself with and to find the appropriate punishment. I am not sure where this battle is going to go, again, because we have rights as members of Parliament in that anything we say here on the floor of the House is protected by parliamentary privilege. We literally cannot be held liable for the things that we say on the floor of the House, because there can be no impediment to an MP doing their job. Members of Parliament cannot fear prosecution to be able to do their job. We have to find a way where this information becomes known. The ultimate goal I want is for no Canadian to face a possibility where there is a compromised politician on the ballot who may be working on behalf of a foreign power, rather than the interests of the community they represent or to our country as a whole.

In this last two minutes I have, I do want to mention that, in terms of where we go from here, Bill C-70 is going to go through clause-by-clause this afternoon. I am going to be there, at committee, reviewing every single one of those clauses. It is going to be reported back to the House, hopefully by Wednesday. I think there are some substantive measures in that bill. We are certainly happy to be supporting it. I think it is important that we set up a registry. I think it is important that the CSIS Act gets updated so that it can work in a digital world. I also think it is important that the Security of Information Act gets important updates so that for clandestine interference, we have appropriate punishments for people who are engaging in those kinds of activities.

However, let me say this. With every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. I think that foreign governments need to hear the message that their meddling in our internal affairs is now clearly on our radar and we are going to act. This is an item that the country is seized with, that this Parliament is seized with, and we are now prepared to take measures to make sure we root this problem out and get the perpetrators the justice that they so clearly deserve. The allegations that MPs knowingly received help from a foreign government are deeply disturbing. No one with those interests in mind should be sitting in this House of Commons. They should not be welcome in the Parliament of Canada. Canadians ultimately do deserve to know who these MPs are, who they are in undermining our democracy, and the government must find a way forward with this. All parliamentarians have an obligation to do everything they can to address foreign interference.

With that I will conclude by saying that we will support this motion. We will always be on the side of supporting efforts to get to the bottom of this issue and treating it with the seriousness that it deserves.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague from Laurentides—Labelle for raising this matter. Last week's special report from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians followed the testimony given by many witnesses at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security and the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, as well as numerous other reports. Communication was identified as a problem, along with siloing.

Bill C-70 seeks to solve part of this problem, but we will study that tomorrow. For now, I feel we should allow a culture of intelligence sharing, but above all, we should develop a culture of protecting ourselves and realizing that interference exists in 2024, that it is already here and that, whether we like it or not, it is spreading. I am in complete agreement with my colleague. I hope this type of procedure can be put in place.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague. We had the opportunity to work together to examine Bill C-70 in depth. His comments were always insightful.

At this time, we know that the NDP leader has gotten security clearance, that the Prime Minister has automatically received the information and the leader of the Bloc Québécois is completing the process to receive security clearance. Of course the Conservative Party does not want to do so. I like my colleague's expression, when he talks about a veil of ignorance. It reminds me of my studies in philosophy with John Rawls.

I think that we cannot afford not to push together. I repeat, interference has no political stripe. It is a real threat. It is financial, it is democratic. It is steamrolling everyone. Parliaments all over the world are interested in foreign interference. Last week, a law was passed unanimously in the European community. I think we cannot be against it. If we are against, I have serious doubts and I have a problem with that.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, first of all, it was a real pleasure working with the member for Trois-Rivières at committee last week. It was four days in a row of long sessions. I appreciated sitting next to him and getting through the important work of looking at Bill C-70.

When we look at the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, we see that the Liberals seem to be hiding behind judicial process and the need for the RCMP investigation. We know there is a big gulf between intelligence and evidence; we know intelligence cannot always make its way to satisfy judicial requirements.

The Conservatives seem to be hiding behind a veil of ignorance. Their party refuses to get briefed, the leader in particular. The member answered the questions of my Liberal colleague earlier about getting party leaders briefed. When the director of CSIS was before our committee, he talked specifically about the actions that party leaders can take with respect to who gets to sit in caucus and who is allowed to run under the party banner.

I would like my colleague to share his thoughts on the power of party leaders and the actions they can take here now if they are all properly briefed. This is a very serious issue, and we want the issues to be resolved as quickly as possible so we do not have compromised candidates on the ballot in the next election.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

moved:

That the House:

(a) take note of the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians;

(b) express concern that certain elected officials may be wittingly or unwittingly working in the interests of foreign powers; and

(c) request the terms of reference of the foreign interference commission (the Hogue Commission) to be expanded to allow it to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments as well as Senators.

Mr. Speaker, I am very proud to rise today to give the opening speech for today's Bloc Québécois opposition day, which is about foreign interference. I would like to take this opportunity to say hello to my constituents in Trois-Rivières. I often discuss this subject with them because they find it interesting. People are curious, and today we are going to try to satisfy that curiosity.

Here is the motion:

That the House:

(a) take note of the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians;

(b) express concern that certain elected officials may be wittingly or unwittingly working in the interests of foreign powers; and

(c) request the terms of reference of the foreign interference commission (the Hogue Commission) to be expanded to allow it to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments as well as Senators.

One week ago today, Canada, the Parliament of Canada and, undoubtedly, many of Canada's national security and intelligence allies lost their innocence. Despite the Liberal government's repeated denials, despite the ill-advised optimism of the so-called independent special rapporteur, despite the report by the ineffectual Rosenberg commission, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, published a devastating report on June 5. The report is not devastating in its tone. It is devastating because of what it contains, which was unknown to most although suspected by many.

Despite the redaction that comes with this type of report, it is obvious that there is a problem, that we are at risk. Throughout its 178 paragraphs, the report describes the concept of foreign interference. Incidentally, I would like to point out that the concept of foreign interference is not defined in Canadian law, nor is it included in Bill C‑70, which we are currently studying. The report also describes the identity of the rogue states, their tactics, their use of cybertools and the absence of a coordinated response to these threats by the Canadian government.

Paragraph 50 and the paragraphs that follow are the ones that make the reader's hair stand on end.

First, we learn that some parliamentarians have communicated “frequently with foreign missions before or during a political campaign to obtain support from community groups or businesses which the diplomatic missions promise to quietly mobilize in a candidate's favour”.

Second, we learn that some parliamentarians have accepted “knowingly or through willful blindness funds or benefits from foreign missions or their proxies which have been layered or otherwise disguised to conceal their source”.

Third, we learn that some parliamentarians have provided “foreign diplomatic officials with privileged information on the work or opinions of fellow Parliamentarians, knowing that such information will be used by those officials to inappropriately pressure Parliamentarians to change their positions”.

Fourth, we learn that some parliamentarians have responded “to the requests or direction of foreign officials to improperly influence Parliamentary colleagues or Parliamentary business to the advantage of a foreign state”.

Fifth, we learn that some parliamentarians have provided “information learned in confidence from the government to a known intelligence officer of a foreign state.”

These are five devastating findings. This report confirms that, right now, there are members of the House who have, in one way or another, colluded with rogue states against our national interest. It is right there in black and white. If that is not foreign interference, then what is?

We cannot and must not remain indifferent in light of such a revelation. I promise that we will not remain indifferent. Of course, the government did warn us. I will give three examples of what it said. The government told us that intelligence is not truth. That answer has merit. Intelligence is not necessarily the truth. The government also told us that sometimes we have to look at the whole picture to understand the meaning, the direction and the path and to know where we are going.

That is not wrong. It is an interesting point. The report also states that the information was top secret and could not be revealed upon penalty of life imprisonment, which is also true. These three points are factual. We can agree on that.

I would like to hear and understand the justifications or answers but, in the end, the report is clear. There is currently interference in our Parliament. Instead of trying to reassure us with empty rhetoric, what did they do? What are they doing? What are we going to do? These questions remain unanswered.

After hearing the lame justifications concerning the Trudeau Foundation given before the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, after reading the complacent report of the so-called independent special rapporteur and the damning report of the committee of parliamentarians, what are they doing? What will it take for them to do something?

Currently, the situation is tense. There is a sense of distrust. That is no good for anyone, for any party. Then, to add insult to injury, the committee of parliamentarians mentioned something very interesting in its 2023 report. The committee said that the government submitted only four of the thousand documents requested. That is four out of one thousand. That has to be read to be believed. In all fairness, I would say that some of the 996 missing documents were submitted in redacted form. Okay, but still, it is a curiously small sample.

Once the parliamentarians read the report of the Special Committee on the Canada–People's Republic of China Relationship on the Winnipeg laboratory, there were all sorts of debates in the House, and approximately 600 pages of the report were redacted, including the footnotes and page numbers.

A special committee was struck to analyze the situation alongside arbitrators, who used to serve as Federal Court judges. The arbitrators found that the redaction was excessive. It may have been preventive, but it was excessive. We saw that the report's redactions were nearly eliminated. They were not entirely eliminated because there was sensitive information in the report, but all in all, most of the redactions were done away with. We often come up against over-classification, which is to say that information is classified in too high a category. It goes from “confidential” to “secret”, from “secret” to “top secret”, and so on. It is done for preventive reasons, but perhaps not very accurately.

I would just echo the remarks of the Information Commissioner, who told us at a meeting of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, that this government clearly prefers darkness to light.

It is in that spirit that the Bloc Québécois is moving its motion today. The situation is worse than we could have possibly imagined to date. The report tells us not only that foreign states are interfering in our democratic process, but that parliamentarians are colluding with these states. These elected representatives are not publicly named, and the members who serve on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, are bound to secrecy forever, as I was saying earlier, under penalty of imprisonment.

In other words, the names of the individuals working for foreign interests may not be revealed by the NSICOP, but they can be through other avenues, such as a broader inquiry by the Hogue commission. The commission could dig deeper and obtain new testimony as part of a broader investigation.

The Liberal government must understand that its duty is to protect us, not protect itself. It must cease its strategy of dodging serious questions and remove its rose-coloured glasses, because the year is no longer 2015. The government must also stop trivializing the situation, as the parliamentary secretary and member for Pickering—Uxbridge did last week. Before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, she replied, “Boo hoo, get over it” to a parliamentarian who was querying the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs about the foreign interference.

This trivialization is unacceptable and will not be tolerated any longer. The Liberal government must also understand that not everyone is nice, that not everyone is telling the truth and that the interference is real. To get to the bottom of things, some explanations are in order. It is a given that the “top secret” security classification binds parliamentarians to secrecy for life. This is a real thing.

There is also something called cabinet confidence. Its purpose is codified in the Westminster Parliament, and that is not a bad thing in and of itself. It allows participants to perhaps be more honest with each other, with no filters and without the risk of being smeared or whatnot.

Secrecy is not a bad thing in and of itself. Cabinet confidence is not a bad thing in and of itself either. The problem lies in cabinet confidence being abused, in a way that could be described as unethical, in this instance. To make sense of it, we have to be able to distinguish between secrecy and concealment, which are very different notions. Without going into the origin of the word, secrecy is that which must not be shared. It is in a different category. Concealment is simply deception to conceal what could be shared. Concealment is a form of manipulation, a type of lying that implies a certain superiority over others, based on the fact that one knows and believes the other does not need to know. It is not very egalitarian. However, lying is mostly making people believe something and do what they would not have done had they known. That is fundamental in an election.

All lies are secret, but not all secrets are lies. This is an important distinction, and I encourage my friends across the aisle to think about it. Concealment and lies are the enemies of trust, which, I would remind members, consists in putting one's future in someone else's hands. In an election, citizens put their future in the hands of their elected candidates and they have the right to expect those candidates to earn that trust. Citizens expect that the government will protect their interests, not those of a foreign power or, worse yet, partisan interests.

However, as it stands, when one looks at everything the Liberal government has done to address foreign interference, one can only be surprised by its casual approach and its elevation of concealment as a way of life. That is why we must push harder to do away with concealment and lies and restore the trust that Canadians deserve from elected officials.

After the failure of the so-called independent special rapporteur, the Bloc Québécois placed its trust in the Hogue commission. The Hogue commission was established by the four main parties, who worked together and unanimously agreed on the commissioner and the scope and nature of the commission's terms of reference.

For the benefit of those who may not know, I will list a few elements of those terms of reference. The commission will “examine and assess the interference by China, Russia and other foreign states or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, in order to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the 43rd and 44th general elections”. It will also “examine and assess the flow of information to senior decision-makers, including elected officials”. Thirdly, it will “examine and assess the capacity of relevant federal departments, agencies, institutional structures and governance processes to permit the Government of Canada to detect, deter and counter any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada's democratic processes.”

That is an extraordinary mission, and as they say, extraordinary problems require extraordinary remedies. The Hogue commission has extraordinary powers: It can adopt any procedures or methods it sees fit to effectively conduct the public inquiry, and it can receive and examine all pertinent documents, classified or not. That is the problem, because the commissioner admitted that she had not received certain documents or that she received redacted documents when they should not have been redacted, which brings me back to the issue of over-classification. We need to stop being afraid of being afraid. The four parties unanimously appointed a commissioner and gave her a mandate. The commissioner should be able to obtain these documents.

Foreign interference has no political stripe. Foreign interference affects every parliamentarian here in the House, every political party and every citizen. Tens of billions of dollars are stolen every year. Members of many diasporas are threatened on Canadian soil every year. The threats are real, now, here in the House. Doing nothing is not an option anymore. We must stop looking the other way and believing that the danger will go away on its own.

That is why the Bloc Québécois “request[s] the terms of reference of the foreign interference commission…to be expanded to allow it to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments as well as Senators.”

We must choose to make history rather than endure it. Great danger calls for great courage. The Bloc Québécois is moving this motion so that trust can be restored. I ask all my colleagues to have courage.

Democratic Institutions

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate that the Bloc members on the committee have been working hard and diligently with us, in good faith, on foreign interference. It is disappointing when Conservative mis-characterization of meetings takes place.

What is most important is that we are working hard to ensure that our democratic institutions are resilient and that we are combatting foreign interference. This is not a partisan issue, and it is why we have introduced a number of measures to strengthen our democratic institutions. This includes Bill C-70, which we are working on in committee.