Bill C-2 (39th Parliament, 2nd Session) Committee on Nov. 14th, 2007

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Dykstra]

Mr. Lee has given me a pretty stern look, and a fair one, to say that we should get started.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Friday, October 26, 2007, Bill C-2, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, I want to welcome everyone back to committee.

We will spend our time this afternoon dealing with witnesses from the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, the John Howard Society, and, as an individual, Isabel Schurman from the Faculty of Law.

I want to welcome all of our witnesses this afternoon. Just as a brief overview—I think most of you have actually been here before, so you know the rules, but let me just review them for everyone's sake—each of you has 10 minutes to make your presentation. We have a small timer up here, so once you get a little bit close to the end, I'll just give you an indication to wrap things up. We will then begin rounds of questioning. The first round will be seven minutes in length, and it will start with the Liberals, then go to the Bloc, then the NDP, then the Conservatives. Then we'll go to five-minute rounds from each of the parties.

I would like to indicate that we try to keep things as concise as possible to get in as many questions as possible, so if that's something that all members of the committee can do, and also witnesses, it would be much appreciated, and I think we'll have a solid afternoon.

With that, I would ask Mr. Pichette to begin.

[Pierre-Paul Pichette, Co-Chair, Law Amendments Committee, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ladies and gentlemen, honourable members of the committee, allow me to introduce myself: my name is Pierre-Paul Pichette and I am the assistant-director, chief of corporate services for the Montreal Urban Community Police. With me today is my colleague, Mr. Clayton Pecknold, who is the deputy chief for the Saanich police service in British Columbia. We are appearing before you today as representatives for the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, since we are the two co-chairs of the Law Amendments Committee for the organization. I would also like to take this opportunity to greet you on behalf of our president, Mr. Steven Chabot, deputy director general of the Sûreté du Québec.

The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police represents the administrative arm of Canada's police forces. Ninety per cent of its members are directors, deputy directors or other senior managers from various Canadian police forces at the municipal, provincial and federal levels. The mandate of our mission is to effectively enforce provincial and federal laws and regulations to protect the Canadian public. We are therefore regularly called upon to give our position on legislative reform, and we always take part with enthusiasm in consultations with governments on the reform of the Criminal Code, much as we are doing today.

I will now ask my colleague Mr. Pecknold to comment on Bill C-2. Mr. Pecknold will speak in English, and I will then conclude in French.

[Clayton Pecknold, Co-Chair, Law Amendments Committee, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police]

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair, honourable members. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today.

Many of you will know that the CACP appears before your committee and before the Senate on a wide range of bills. In fact, members of our association have appeared before this committee on several of the bills that now find themselves part of Bill C-2.

Before we comment on Bill C-2, we would reiterate a general comment that we have made before you on a previous occasion with respect to the complexity of criminal law and the public's general faith in the justice system. As with many aspects of the Criminal Code, the CACP believes quick fixes and band-aids are no longer sufficient.

We offer two quick points. First, we believe criminal law, including the law of sentencing, is in need of a sustained and comprehensive overhaul if the criminal justice system is to regain the eroding confidence of the public. Second, we believe much more could be done to give police the tools they need to detect and apprehend violent offenders. I will elaborate in a few moments.

As you know, the short title of Bill C-2 is the Tackling Violent Crime Act. We at the CACP join Parliament in saying that we must put an end to the violent crime we are seeing in our communities.

Before appearing here today, I had occasion to speak to my colleagues at the Vancouver police department, who are struggling with a wave of gun violence in their city. They, like all of us in the policing community, recognize that no one piece of legislation is going to solve what is a complex social problem underlying gang activity and the culture of violence it instills in our young people. A comprehensive, nationally focused, and locally resourced strategy is required. Much is being done, but much more can be done.

In terms of Bill C-2, the CACP supports the bill as one step of an overall crime reduction strategy. We believe Canadians are very concerned with the areas addressed in the bill. Gun violence, drugs, and the exploitation of our children rate high on the public's list of public safety concerns for very good reason.

We are also pleased to see Parliament help the courts keep those persons who pose a danger to our society in jail and away from the public. Examples of offenders reoffending while on judicial interim release, or escaping justice by fleeing to other jurisdictions in Canada, go far to erode the public's confidence and faith in the ability of the criminal justice system to protect them.

My colleague and I will be pleased to answer specific questions on Bill C-2, but before we do, permit us to elaborate on what we mean when we say that it is but one step in an overall strategy.

The CACP has several legislative priorities, and has, as one example, for some years now been advocating for modern tools to deal with modern crimes. Bill C-2 is directed in part to three important dangers to society: guns and gangs, child exploitation, and drugs. Your police struggle every day to stop the violence, disrupt the gangs, apprehend child sexual predators, and interdict drug dealers. These investigations are often made more difficult by the offender's success at exploiting the new technologies, such as digital communications and the Internet, to further their interests.

The CACP has been asking and pleading with government to modernize our investigative abilities for many years in this area, under the auspices of the lawful access initiative. As you know, the previous government introduced the Modernization of Investigative Techniques Act, which did not get passed before Parliament dissolved. We were pleased to see a private member's bill come forth reintroducing MITA and take that as a sign that all parliamentarians are concerned, as we are, with the eroding interception capabilities of your police.

With due respect to all, the time has come—it is past due—for action on this front. We ask you to act decisively on this matter, and act soon.

You need not be reminded, I'm sure, that it is your police who must find their way through an increasingly complex society using only those tools you allow them to keep the streets safe. For our part, the CACP will continue to offer you the voice of Canadian police leadership as you move forward with your work on this bill and hopefully the many others to come.

Thank you for the opportunity.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Dykstra]

Thank you.

[Pierre-Paul Pichette]

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to briefly conclude.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Dykstra]

Mr. Pichette, you have three and a half minutes, so no problem.

[Pierre-Paul Pichette]

All right.

To follow up on what my colleague has just said, I would like to remind committee members that every Canadian police force is concerned with enforcing existing laws and regulations in an appropriate manner. Clear, unambiguous laws make our lives much easier on the ground, and are easier for the public to understand and support.

I would also like to thank you for having given us the opportunity to comment on this issue, and please understand that we are available to answer any questions our presentation may have raised.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Dykstra]

Merci.

Mr. Jones, I'll give you the floor.

[Craig Jones, Executive Director, John Howard Society of Canada]

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, and honoured guests, for the opportunity to comment on this legislation.

The John Howard Society of Canada is driven by its mission statement, which calls for effective, just, and humane responses to the causes and consequences of crime. Our 70 offices across Canada deliver evidence-based programs to released prisoners and their families, including preparation for release and a range of programs to more effectively ensure the successful reintegration of prisoners into their communities. We put great stock in the expert evidence.

The John Howard Society aspires to be smart on crime rather than tough. We advocate for evidence-based policies that actually work to reduce crime and recidivism.

I wish to make four points in this short submission. Number one, the preamble to Bill C-2 states, “whereas those laws should ensure that violent offenders are kept in prison...”. This clause announces a fundamental reorientation in Canada's philosophy and practice of incarceration, and to introduce it as the last of seven introductory clauses—making it seem thereby innocuous—is a demonstration of legislative overreach of a particularly egregious kind.

Nowhere does the CCRA warrant that offenders are to be kept in prison, or for that matter punished. In Canada, we send people to prison as punishment, not for punishment. This has been a long tradition in this country, a tradition grounded in the evidence-based finding that prison simply hardens people and renders them less suitable to live among us.

In fact, as CSC's experts will attest, evidence-based community centre programs are more cost-effective and work better to lower recidivism. Unlimited incapacitation offends the principles of the CCRA and the values of Canadian society, which endorses moderation and restraint in the application of our most draconian state-authorized sanction. This preamble announces the abandonment of the principle of restraint in the use of incarceration.

In fact, the theme running through Bill C-2 is that, the evidence notwithstanding, Canada is going to import from the United States the worst of what has not worked to lower crime rates and make communities safer. A philosophical change of this magnitude—which should properly be the object of sustained and expert deliberation—ought not be secreted into an act, which, taken as a whole, is likely to have far-reaching implications for the philosophy and practice of incarceration across Canada.

The implications of this preamble are numerous and significant, and I have neither time nor expertise to detail them for you. I only wish to go on the record with our profound concerns that Canadians ought to know that Bill C-2 is changing the foundations of our correctional principles without adequate or even expert deliberation.

Number two, I want to address the process of deliberation.

Although the components of Bill C-2 have been examined by this Parliament over the course of the prior session, there are important new features in this omnibus act. Speeding Bill C-2 to royal assent in the manner demonstrated in this committee process offends the fundamental principles of democratic practice in the Westminster system by cutting off deliberation and reflection. The least we owe to Canadians, if we're preparing to incarcerate more of them, is sustained deliberation on the consequences, coupled with a commitment to minimize the worst harms that will inevitably arise from a higher incarceration rate.

Although we have already submitted on aspects of prior bills, Bill C-2 is sufficiently complex and has enormous implications for—

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Dykstra]

Mr. Jones, I'm sorry to interrupt. One of the things that happens here, and I probably should have indicated this at the beginning, is that we do have translation happening simultaneously. So I would just ask you—and perhaps allow for a bit of extra time—to slow down a little bit so our translators have the opportunity to do the translation.

[Craig Jones]

Bill C-2 is sufficiently complex and has enormous implications for, among other things, the rate of incarceration; the overcrowding of existing prisons, including detention centres; the issue of double bunking for the safe management of inmate populations, including the consequences of an increase of inmates with mental disorders and substance abuse problems; the issue of overcrowding as it affects the working conditions of CSC staff; the accelerated transmission of blood-borne diseases among inmates and the spectre of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis; the already under-resourced range of treatment options, which are demonstrated to reduce recidivism; the expected termination of statutory release and its implications for the effective reintegration of offenders; the economic costs that will accrue from Bill C-2 combined with the national anti-drug strategy and the evidence-based opportunities thereby foregone; the asymmetric distribution of pain and suffering that will accompany implementation of Bill C-2 combined with the national anti-drug strategy, that is, more offenders from lower socio-economic circumstances, more aboriginal offenders, offenders with greater needs, including already overtaxed needs for mental health treatment, substance abuse, etc.; and finally, the implications of this punitive turn for the penal ecology of Canada’s criminal justice system, which has, until now, largely resisted the drift toward a meaner and more retributive Americanization of our correctional system.

Point number three is mandatory minimum sentences. It is no small irony that Bill C-2 seeks to extend the use of mandatory minimum sentences at precisely the same time as jurisdictions in the United States, notably Florida and California, are trying to extricate themselves from them. Mandatory minimums are sold to Canadians as part of a larger strategy to reduce crime. But as Professor Anthony Doob testified on December 6: “The best research on this is quite consistent. Mandatory minimum sentences will not reduce crime.”

Furthermore, Bill C-2 adds injury to insult by ignoring evidence-based approaches that do actually reduce crime and make communities safer.

Bill C-2, particularly in combination with the national anti-drug strategy, signals that the Government of Canada is prepared to tolerate even greater inequalities in the distribution of pain, denunciation, and punishment. It is as good as certain that mandatory minimum sentences will occasion disproportionate sentences for at least some offenders, likely those most marginalized and vulnerable to having their rights trampled. Canadians ought to be consulted on whether our current model of proportional sentencing should be reformed in this hasty and undemocratic manner, particularly if the reform offends against fundamental principles of distributive justice and targets those already most vulnerable to state-sanctioned discrimination.

I sense I'm running out of time, so I'm going to skip over the health consequences of greater incarceration and go directly to my conclusion.

In summation, I wish to reiterate what has long been known among criminologists, penologists, and historians of incarceration: prison is an expensive way to make people, most of whom come from disadvantaged and deprived social circumstances, worse than they already are. The evidence on this is by now so conclusive that it is no longer a point of contention. We ought not pretend that the last 200 years of research into prisons and their effects is irrelevant or ideologically inconvenient. Community-based programs are more effective and cost less. Community-based programs are not incubators of disease, cynicism, and despair as prisons are. They do not harden anti-social attitudes and behaviours as prisons do. Evidence-based community-based programs do not break apart families and poison the minds of young persons as prisons do. Prisons are the solution that is worse, in many cases, than the disease they are meant to treat. They ought to be the very last resort of a policy that aspires to democratic ideals of self-governance. If the government defies its own experts and the evidence base on prisons and proceeds down the path of growing Canada’s incarceration rate, it will bequeath to your children and grandchildren a curse that will be hundreds of years in the undoing.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Dykstra]

Thank you, Mr. Jones.

Ms. Schurman, I understand from the clerk that you may have to leave a bit early just to make sure you will have transportation.

[Isabel Schurman, Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University, As an Individual]

Thank you very much. My train is at 6:55, for which I've been told I should leave at 5:15.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Dykstra]

Okay.

Just so the committee is aware, if you do have any questions for Ms. Schurman, try to keep them at the front end so that you get a chance to ask them.

Thank you.

[Isabel Schurman]

I'd like to thank you all for the opportunity to come back and speak with you again.

I will limit the comments I'm making now to what was Bill C-27, given that the invitation I received indicated that this is of particular interest to you. Should anyone have questions on other parts of Bill C-2, I will try to address them.

The most troubling part of Bill C-27, which is now part of Bill C-2—Actually, there are two most troubling parts. First, it's not necessary. It doesn't cover any situation of dangerousness that the present law does not already cover. The second very troubling aspect is twofold. The removal of judicial discretion is disturbing, and it's a disturbing theme reoccurring in numerous criminal law bills. A second part of that is the reverse onus provisions contained in Bill C-27. These provisions will not survive a constitutional challenge if we rely on Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence over the last 20 years.

The bill resembles a kind of U.S. three strikes legislation. Although there are clear differences, copying the U.S. model, even a loose copy of it, is neither necessary nor workable.

As the present law stands, the crown “may” apply for an assessment to have someone declared a dangerous offender and the judge “may” order the assessment. The trigger is the conviction for a serious personal injury offence. The present law in that category includes all indictable offences with sex or violent components, all conduct that endangers individuals, even including psychological violence. It's vast coverage that we already have. Once the report comes back in the present law, the judge must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a serious personal injury offence, threats to others based on certain evidence—repetitive behaviour, aggressive behaviour—or evidence that the incident was of such a brutal nature.

Constitutionally, the deprivation of liberty will require proof beyond a reasonable doubt when that deprivation is to be for an indeterminate period of time. In fact, the burden at this stage is one element that saved the present articles from being declared unconstitutional in the past. Currently an application can be made at the time of sentencing, or even six months after sentencing, or even after that if new evidence comes to light. With the present law the way it is, we don't have to be letting dangerous offenders escape the claws of the law, if you will.

Currently, if the evidence is not enough to meet the dangerousness category, the individual may fall into the subcategory of long-term offender where there's substantial risk but a reasonable possibility of eventual control. This allows us to recuperate those we can when there's a real chance that we may do so.

A key sentencing principle in Canada is the use of less restrictive sanctions, when possible, to meet the goals of sentencing. That's why the case of Johnson in 2003 decided that when a judge is facing a dangerous offender hearing, he or she must look at whether the person could actually be a long-term offender, whether the long-term offender designation is enough. The present law gives us everything we need.

Part two of my representation is that the issues of the removal of judicial discretion and reversal of burdens are very troubling. Presently if a judge is convinced, by evidence, of dangerous offender status or long-term offender status, the code mandates that the judge “shall” give a certain sentence—indeterminate in the case of dangerous offender, others in the case of long-term. So there is no discretion to the sentence once the judge decides that you are a dangerous offender. But there is discretion; the judge does retain discretion in ordering a report to make an assessment, and the crown must prove the allegations they are making. In the new system, the judge will have to order the report, and the crown will have nothing to prove when the presumption applies.

Even though the crown has a burden to prove a certain number of things—the crown must prove, yes, the conviction and the elements of dangerousness as put out in the code—it should be noted that the crown has not been held to a burden of proving absolute hopelessness before someone is declared a dangerous offender. In some cases treatment was shown to be possible, but the person was still declared a dangerous offender. I'm referring to Pedden in British Columbia in 2005.

The crown right now can prove behaviour that would constitute dangerous offender behaviour without having to show the person had prior convictions. You can have someone determined a dangerous offender today based on the one incident he or she was convicted for.

The existing likelihood of future behaviour through the accused's failure to control his or her impulses is what the crown must prove. Brutal conduct can be one incident, and we saw that in the Ontario Court of Appeal in Langevin. Conduct has been interpreted to mean things such as sexually sadistic writings. Even writings could be considered conduct under the present law in some circumstances.

It is worth noting that removing judicial discretion and removing the burden on the crown would remove two important protections for individuals before the courts. Such a system is not likely to pass constitutional muster. The case of Lyons in 1987 upheld the present system because there was room for crown discretion and because the burdens were adequate to protect the rights of the person before the courts.

Speaking of judicial discretion, it's important for you, I think, as a group to realize that judges are not heard here. They don't come and speak to you because of their obligation of discretion

—obligation of discretion—

The application of sentencing principles requires proper weighing of a lot of different elements. Mandatory minimums in removing discretion, as we see here, tie the hands of judges and will keep them from coming to very just results.

My colleague spoke about the U.S. experience with mandatory minimums and sentences. They have in fact targeted the economically disadvantaged, the minorities, not to mention those with learning disabilities and lower education. We've already seen a disproportionate incarceration of first nations people in this country. Will this law exacerbate that situation?

I'll skip over speaking about the U.S. situation, but should anyone have questions, I have some comments on it.

Taking away the judicial discretion leaves a situation in which the threat of the dangerous offender application with an impossible burden for the accused person is going to put huge power into the hands of some crown prosecutors. Will it be used to force guilty pleas: “If you plead guilty, I won't make the application”? Is this a coercion that we want to see in our criminal justice system?

Those who are trapped will be the economically disadvantaged, minorities, and native offenders. How many times will the threat result in a plea to something else to avoid the application, and how good is that for us? We won't know what crime was actually committed. Before we even get to the dangerous offender application, lawyers will be trying to avoid the two-year mandatory minimum sentences on earlier offences, because every time you chalk up another two-year mandatory minimum, you're running the risk that the next time around your guy is going to be a dangerous offender. Will this just skew the entire system? It's a question that has to be asked.

Under the new system, there are 25 designated offences. They include assault, pointing a firearm, and what have you. Mandatory minimums may mean that many of these designated offences are going to become two-year offences, regardless of the objective seriousness of them. Is the youth with a drug problem who goes out with friends and commits two separate robberies really a dangerous offender because the two were committed in the six months of his life when he had a drug problem? Prior convictions for two designated offences with two two-year prison terms will trigger the crown's request for dangerous offender status.

Of the 12 primary designated offences—take a look at them--sexual assault was everything from a touch to something very serious. Discharging a firearm with intent has a mandatory minimum. We're looking at going back to old articles in the primary designated offences. You have all the old articles. How far back are we going to go? A conviction with two years twenty years ago is going to be conviction number one and a mandatory minimum a year ago is going to be number two, and then you're a dangerous offender. How real a portrait is that of the dangerousness of that person? The crown request will be triggered in these cases, and in these cases, for the primary designated offences, there is the reverse onus.

The new law includes that the reverse onus for primary designated offences and, arguably, that list of offences will be seen as arbitrary. Sexual assault is a broad category. Hostage-taking seems pretty dangerous, but hostage-taking is only a designated offence. Will that pass a constitutional test for arbitrariness? The arbitrariness will be key to the constitutional challenge.

Those in the primary designated category are the only ones to whom the first reverse onus is going to apply. There is a manifest unfairness that at the same dangerous offender hearing some people will benefit from the ordinary rules because the first reverse onus doesn't apply, no matter how violent and how disgusting their crime was, because they have no record. Yet other people will have a reverse onus and a burden that they can't possibly hope to meet in some circumstances. So under the operation of the presumption for the list of 12 selected offences, for no particular reason, because they're not even selected according to the fact that they're all punishable by the same maximum, this limited group of people, or offenders, if you will, would lose the benefit of the ordinary rules. The inequality will be key to the constitutional debate.

Mr. Chair, I will go rapidly now.

The justification and jurisprudence showing the need for reverse onus is exceptional. I have a number of comments to do with reverse onus and with what would pass constitutional muster, and I will keep them for questions from people here.

At the dangerous offender hearing, the reverse onus will raise other questions. The accused will attempt to prove he's not a danger. He'll bring experts. The experts will have interviewed him. The crown can't compel him. How is the crown going to contest that evidence? These are practical problems that no one has really properly considered.

Likewise, when there's a second reverse onus, and that is when the court finds that the accused is a dangerous offender, the court must decide in favour of indeterminate detention unless satisfied that something lesser would protect the public. This second reverse onus is also unnecessary, and we don't seem to have compelling evidence to show that dangerous offenders with priors are not being picked up by the system.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Dykstra]

Ms. Schurman, I know you have a lot to get out there, and I'm sure our committee is going to give you the chance to do that, but we do need to get to questions. Thank you.

Madam Jennings.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Thank you, Chair.

I'd like to thank all of the witnesses for being here today, for agreeing to come before this committee on such short notice.

I have some questions for the Association of Chiefs of Police. Mr. Pecknold, you talked about how it's no longer the time for quick fixes and band-aids just won't do it, that in fact a comprehensive overhaul of our criminal justice system is really required, urgently needed. You said you would be prepared to answer questions specifically about different sections of Bill C-27, so I do have a couple of questions about Bill C-27.

If the association had cognizance of the original Bill C-27 and has now examined the dangerous offender section of Bill C-2, you will see that the government has brought forth some significant amendments, one of which deals with the long-term offender, breaches of the long-term offender's supervision order. That actually was a Liberal proposal, because we felt that if someone had been deemed a long-term offender under the current system, it meant that in many cases they had gone through a long-term offender hearing, was found to be dangerous, but the judge examined whether or not a long-term offender designation and supervision order would be sufficient to control the level of dangerousness in the community, etc.

On the issue of the crown's discretion to either trigger or not trigger an application, under Bill C-27, as it now is in Bill C-2, do you not...? Has the association thought about whether, if we were truly interested in protecting Canadians, ensuring safer communities, a better way would be in fact to ensure that there are actual assessments made, that there's an actual trigger, that it becomes automatic—it could be on second or third conviction, taking care of the issues Maître Schurman raised about arbitrary offences—so that you actually have an expert assessment of the offender, a repeat offender in many cases? If that assessment shows that the individual should not be designated a dangerous offender, the assessment still will provide much information to correctional services, for instance, to ensure that they receive the proper programs, the proper therapy, whatever it is they need to enhance the chances of their actually being rehabilitated or to control the risk of dangerousness and the possibility of repeats. That would be rather than what we have now, which is if there's a third conviction, the crown might seek an application. There's no guarantee that the crown...and you could have then the situation that Maître Schurman is talking about, where they'll be pleaded down.

[Clayton Pecknold]

Neither of us would profess to be experts in this particular area of the criminal law, but I think there's a certain reality. I've heard our colleagues here talk about judicial discretion. We've alluded to what prosecutors may or may not do. This is a theme you're going to hear our association talk about a little bit more over coming days, and that is the capacity of the rest of the justice system, our partners in the justice system, to deal with some of these legislative changes and the downstream consequences of them. We recognize that. I've heard my colleague from the John Howard Society talk about that, the incarceration rates.

We're also concerned about our colleagues in the prosecutorial services and their ability to handle the workload, much like we have a challenge. You're going to hear us speak up about that a little bit. If we want to deal with some of these problems in a holistic way, a comprehensive way, then we need to deal with our capacity challenges a little bit.

The reality of that, of course, is that when they're faced with capacity challenges, their first priority, obviously, is to make decisions in the public interest, but the fact is you only have so many resources, you have to make decisions, and where there are areas that are discretionary and challenging, I would say, from the association's point of view, we would have a concern that the purposes of the bill may be frustrated by the realities.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

So even under the current system, a major challenge is the lack of resources, both for local police on the ground to deal with the issues of violent crime—

We know that the rate of violent crime is actually decreasing, except amongst young people. Statistics are showing that there is a rise in violent crime amongst our youth. It's my understanding, from the studies I've read, that the best deterrence is when people think they'll actually get caught, and that if they are caught, they will be charged and prosecuted quickly, with a good chance of conviction if they actually did the crime.

If all of the resources were in place to do all of that, we would in fact be making our communities and our children and Canadians safer. So why not start with that?

[Clayton Pecknold]

You're not going to get an argument from a chief of police or deputy chief of police about liking more resources.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Do I have any time left?

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Dykstra]

You have about 40 seconds.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

In that case, I'm just going to thank you.

Mr. Jones, Ms. Schurman, if you have comments on the questions I've asked, I would ask you to feel free to comment in another round.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Dykstra]

Thank you, Madam Jennings.

Mr. Ménard.

[Réal Ménard, Bloc, Hochelaga, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will begin with Ms. Schurman.

I would like you to provide us with further explanations so we can be sure we understand. Our main challenge is to ensure that Bill C-27 is constitutional.

You say, for example, that the judge will have to ask for the Crown's report and that there will be nothing left to prove. How, exactly, will this situation unfold in court, and how will the burden of proof and the evidence to be provided be affected? What are you trying to warn us about?

I understand that you are satisfied with the way the current system protects society, but can you tell us exactly why you are so concerned with the burden of proof and the way trials would be affected?

I then have a question for the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police.