Evidence of meeting #8 for Canada-China Relations in the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was countries.
A video is available from Parliament.
12:10 p.m.
Liberal
Jean Yip Liberal Scarborough—Agincourt, ON
How do you think this would continue with a Democratic president and its impact on Canada?
12:10 p.m.
Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, As an Individual
If a Democrat were to win in November and the majority of the tariffs that the United States has placed on China remain in place—and I think it is highly likely that they would not be lifted by the end of this year—then it is unlikely that any Democratic president is going to come into office and simply lift those tariffs. There would have to be negotiations. China would have to make concessions in order to get those tariffs lifted.
I think an incoming Democrat is likely to continue being tough on trade. They might use some different levers and, hopefully, as David just said, work multilaterally with other like-minded countries, OECD countries, and work perhaps within the World Trade Organization to update that organization and its rules, so that we can use the common efforts of countries to reach shared goals.
12:10 p.m.
Professor and Director, China Policy Program, The George Washington University, As an Individual
I would just add briefly that beyond the trade realm, if there is a Democratic administration after next January, I don't think there's going to be a great deal of change in the American approach to China. If it's Biden, I submit to you to read his article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs and what he has to say about China there, which is at variance with his previous positions, to be sure. Nonetheless, he uses pretty tough language in that article about his views. Bernie Sanders is still a work in progress on many things, including China, so I'm not sure.
There has been a sea change, and what I want you north of the border to know is that there has been a fundamental sea change in American thinking about China, and it's bipartisan across the aisle and across the United States. You're not going to see a lot of change if the Democrats gain the White House next year. In fact, you can see—
12:10 p.m.
Liberal
Jean Yip Liberal Scarborough—Agincourt, ON
This is a question for Ms. Sun.
Norway and China had a period during which it took six years for relations to be normalized. Do you believe it will be the same for Canada? What can we do to alleviate the current strain in relations? I think you talked about leverages for Canada.
12:10 p.m.
Liberal
12:10 p.m.
Director, China Program, The Stimson Center, As an Individual
It was the long winter of diplomatic freeze between Beijing and Oslo for about nine years following the Liu Xiaobo case. Eventually the Chinese were able to move on from that case, not only because China needed the Nordic countries' help in terms of their Arctic policy and other matters in the international arena, but also because there was this sense that after nine years the issue of Liu Xiaobo was no longer as pressing for the Chinese government. Canada could wait for this issue to go away.
12:15 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
Thank you Mr. Chair.
I'd like to thank our witnesses for their most enlightening contributions to our work.
I understand from the various testimonies we've heard so far that Canada must seek to work multilaterally to try to find solutions, since individual states, in isolation, are generally not able to stand up to Chinese pressure. We must therefore work multilaterally so that there is a sufficiently strong or important counterpart to eventually make the Chinese government move.
I also understand that China is seeking to challenge the alliance system inherited from World War II. At the same time, we can see that the current administration in Washington has a variable-geometry attitude toward its allies, whether they are NATO allies or G7 allies.
I'm addressing our three witnesses. First, is China taking advantage of Washington's variable-geometry attitude toward its allies?
Furthermore, is it seeking to use divisions among the allies to score points with each of them?
12:15 p.m.
Professor and Director, China Policy Program, The George Washington University, As an Individual
I would say the answer is, absolutely. This is not new. China has never accepted these alliances. It may have been quieter about its opposition, particularly after 1998-99, when it got push-back from the United States about its criticism, but it has always opposed these alliances. It's constantly sought to probe them, undermine them and split American allies off from the United States, and even from one another. There is nothing new, I would say, in that regard. What is new is the current American administration, which has also called into question NATO, at least, and has not worked nearly as effectively as it could have to bolster the alliances in East Asia and other parts of the world.
12:15 p.m.
Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, As an Individual
I would just add that the Chinese, I think, are ambivalent about the Trump administration. They don't like its approach, of course, to imposing tariffs on China, but they see the Trump administration policy towards allies and towards multilateral organizations as the gift that keeps on giving. The U.S. withdrawal from the Paris climate change agreement, its not going forward with the trans-Pacific partnership, its undermining of the World Trade Organization, and a host of other examples have allowed Xi Jinping to present China as the champion of globalization and of liberalization of trade, and also to persuade countries that China, as opposed to the United States, is the rule-abiding member of the international system. This has been an unfortunate set of advantages that China is taking as a result of the Trump administration's policies.
12:15 p.m.
Director, China Program, The Stimson Center, As an Individual
The strategy of the Trump administration in the western Pacific region has led to obvious patching-up behaviours by both Japan and South Korea when it comes to their relationship with China. In South Asia, we're seeing India demonstrating similar patterns of behaviours as well. This almost release of the international system or the international space provides China with the alternative model and the alternative paths to claim China's leadership in these spaces.
12:20 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
The Government of Canada was reduced, in the arrest of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, to calling for U.S. intervention. Although there can be no doubt that the U.S. was sympathetic to Canada's situation, and even intervened with the Chinese authorities—something they did not particularly appreciate—it must be recognized that in the last agreement between the United States and China, the United States and China essentially sought to preserve their interests and not those of the western world—let us call it that for the sake of argument.
Is this in addition to the difficulties we are currently experiencing with the multilateral intervention you are suggesting, particularly through a fund to protect companies doing business with China, for example?
12:20 p.m.
Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, As an Individual
The suggestion put forward was mine. I think that when countries have been subject to Chinese coercion, nobody has been there to help them. Even with South Korea, a close U.S. ally, when China stopped buying so many of the goods of the Lotte company and put a lot of political pressure on South Korea, the United States did not stand up and help.
So I think this is an opportunity for like-minded countries to build a fund that, even if it were never used, would signal to Beijing that countries that are targeted by this kind of economic coercion from China are willing to work together. They're willing to stand up to China, and Beijing fears—
12:20 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan
I'm afraid I have to interrupt. I'm sorry.
Mr. Bergeron, your time is up.
Ms. McPherson, please go ahead for six minutes.
March 9th, 2020 / 12:20 p.m.
NDP
Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB
Thank you, Chair.
I'd like to thank the people who have come and who are sharing their expertise with us.
Bonnie, I will give you a bit of an opportunity to finish some of those thoughts if you'd like.
We talk about China using its economic leverage and we talk about China detaining citizens of other countries, including Canada, of course. I hear what you're saying when you speak about China respecting strength, but knowing where Canada sits and knowing that we have limited strength and knowing that our opportunities to work multilaterally have some limitations of course, globally, can you talk a little bit more—and maybe, Bonnie, you could finish off what you were saying earlier—about those things that you think would work? The idea of a tougher approach is what I think I'm hearing, and there's this idea that China does respect strength. What are the risks of that?
Could you also talk about where you've seen successes for other countries, particularly countries other than the U.S., countries that are not superpowers but middle powers like Canada?
12:20 p.m.
Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, As an Individual
That's a very important question.
To quickly finish my thought, Beijing fears the formation of an anti-China coalition of other countries working together to push back against China. I really do feel that this is an area that should be exploited.
I'll cite the example of one country that I think has done particularly well, and that is Japan. Japan has basically been in the doghouse since 2012, when the government purchased some of the disputed Senkaku islands from some private Japanese citizens. The Chinese started introducing law enforcement ships in the territorial waters around these disputed islands. There were other pressures put on Japan, but the Chinese goal was to get the government in Tokyo, led by Prime Minister Abe, to acknowledge that a territorial dispute exists, because Japan has long said there is no dispute.
Fast-forward to today, and here we are eight years later. Yes, it has taken a long time, although the relationship gradually began to improve, and I would say the turn was in December 2014. Xi Jinping was supposed to go for a summit next month, which has been postponed only because of the COVID-19 virus, but these relations have improved, and Prime Minister Abe has not made core concessions on this territorial issue that China really cares about.
Does Japan have leverage? Certainly. Japan probably has more investment in China and more trade with China than Canada has, but ultimately I think Beijing saw that this prolonged downturn in relations did not serve its interests, and it looked for common ground with Japan and Prime Minister Abe.
12:25 p.m.
Professor and Director, China Policy Program, The George Washington University, As an Individual
Could I add to that?
12:25 p.m.
Professor and Director, China Policy Program, The George Washington University, As an Individual
I very much believe in solidarity amongst like-minded democracies when approaching China in all issue areas. It's absolutely crucial to work together, side by side and not in parallel. I was very interested to read the annexes that Global Affairs Canada provided, in response to previous testimony, in which they claimed they had over a thousand communications with foreign governments in trying to get public support for the two Michaels case. They got 14 countries to speak out. Then there is an interesting list of how they spoke out. Most of those were via tweets. If you're not on Twitter, you don't see them anyway.
This is really lamentable, I think, if not shameful, frankly. It all shows China's real economic power and leverage over other countries. Second, it shows the fear of departing from the engagement paradigm that we have all pursued with China over the last four decades. Whether it's the two Michaels or a number of other issues that are of common concern to OECD countries...and I would again go beyond; this is not just the west we're talking about. Many countries in the global south have difficulties through China's mercantilist trading practices. On a number of security issues in other areas we need to really stand together. Maybe we need an international China summit or something.
China, however, wants to keep these issues behind closed doors. I notice that many of the diplomats who testified here previously said that they were working very hard behind closed doors to press the case of the two Michaels and other issues. Well, that's exactly where China wants to keep it—behind closed doors. Personally, I think going public about China's egregious behaviour on a wide range of issues, whether it be Tibet, the Uighurs, the two Michaels, Liu Xiaobo or you name it.... China just hates being internationally called out publicly and shamed. You have to keep this issue—
12:25 p.m.
NDP
Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB
I have very little time left, so could you talk a little bit about the fact that when we actually bring this out in front, in public, the possibility of retaliation is so much greater?
You have 10 seconds. Good luck.
12:25 p.m.
Professor and Director, China Policy Program, The George Washington University, As an Individual
Yes, absolutely, retaliation is greater. It will happen. We have to enter into it with the expectation that there will be further Chinese retaliation. That's the big choice: Do we go public and confront China on these issues despite the retaliation, or do we not?