Canada-China Relations Committee on Feb. 25th, 2021

[Emmanuel Dubourg, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Thank you very much.

We're aware that many Canadian agencies have different mandates, at home and abroad.

Since, as you say, China has a very strong presence here, please reassure us about information sharing between our various agencies, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment.

Is threat data working properly within Canadian agencies?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Dubourg, I will tell you that our work is never done in that area. Based on my experience over the years, I can tell you that we do a fine job sharing information. Of course, we do have different mandates to which we must adhere. When we have to provide some of our information to law enforcement agencies, for example, we need to go through a whole process. Using intelligence as evidence can become extremely complex at times.

Having said that, we have implemented some very specific initiatives. For example, the RCMP, Global Affairs Canada, Communications Security Establishment and we at CSIS have established the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force. This process, which deals specifically with election-related threats, lets us share real-time intelligence and analysis and provide concrete advice to the government.

Based on our respective mandates, it's also very important that we take concrete and very direct steps to reduce the threat. That includes our colleagues at CSE when they have to block cyber threats, or CSIS, which must take very concrete action to reduce the threat to the democratic process, which affects Canadians.

[Emmanuel Dubourg, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Thank you. This will be my last question, because time is running out.

The NSICP came to a certain number of conclusions, but one of them in particular concerns foreign interference.The Canadian government's response to foreign interference is said to be limited. Its engagement is limited in part because we do not have enough people with adequate international security clearances. We have no public strategy to deal with foreign interference, or public reporting like those dealing with terrorism and security.

Have there been any developments since the NSICP released its report in 2019?

[David Vigneault]

I will say a few words about it. My colleague Mr. Stewart, from Public Safety Canada, may want to say something as well.

Over the past few years, the work has really evolved, whether it's strategic thinking about foreign interference methods, possible courses of action, coordination of activities, information sharing—as I mentioned on your last question—among Canadian agencies and with those of our allies, to find the best possible ways to protect Canadians.

[Emmanuel Dubourg, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Vigneault.

My time is up. I'd like to take this opportunity to greet the other witnesses as well.

Good evening.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Mr. Dubourg.

I will now go to Mr. Bergeron, who has six minutes.

Mr. Bergeron, you have the floor.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to begin by addressing the RCMP Commissioner, Ms. Lucki. She has acknowledged that there may be communication gaps, but I will give her the opportunity to correct some of the gaps.

We have spoken several times tonight about the 1-800 number. It would likely be helpful to better inform those watching or listening tonight if we could provide the entire number rather than just the first three digits. The fact that we don't give out all the information may be the first indication of communication issues.

[Commr Brenda Lucki]

I would love to give you a better answer and give you the full 1-800 number, but unfortunately I do not have that with me. I will send it to the committee.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

At the right time. So we will make sure that we make it public as part of our discussions in the coming weeks, Madam Commissioner.

I'd like to come back to the visa application centres. It's clear from Ms. Bruce's response that her organization was not really involved in implementing security measures to ensure that the information collected could not be shared with the Chinese government.

Several times during his testimony, the Minister referred to advice he received from his officials. Since that was not the Communications Security Establishment, I would like to know if any of you advised or briefed the Minister on security measures in place at the visa application centres to prevent information from being shared with the Chinese government.

[Rob Stewart, Deputy Minister, Public Safety Canada]

I may be in the best position to answer the question, but I can't tell you more than what the Minister has already said.

The information the Minister gave us came from the people at Citizenship and Immigration. They are responsible for passing on the information regarding the process to ensure that their contracts and the systems involved are secure.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you for your answer, but that appears to me to be of concern, to say the least.

So you are saying that departments and agencies of the Government of Canada can contract freely by providing security measures themselves, without necessarily referring to the various federal agencies responsible for national security and intelligence.

Is that correct?

[Rob Stewart]

No, not quite.

We have a process for entering into a contract. The process naturally includes policies that take national security into account. Another department, Public Services and Supply Canada, is also responsible for providing guidelines for the process to which I'm referring.

I assure you that national security is taken into consideration in our contract implementation process.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I hear what you are telling me and I thank you for it.

What I find particularly troubling, from what I understand or from what has been said and not said, is that this contract, which was negotiated by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration with a Chinese entity, was apparently negotiated with the advice of Public Services and Procurement Canada but without the advice of the various agencies that we have with us this evening, agencies whose mandate is to take care of intelligence and national security.

[Rob Stewart]

As I understand it, that is accurate. However, there is also another factor here.

The contract in China is a subcontract to the contract concluded by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. I'm not totally certain, but I believe that the general contract was before the Department of Citizenship and Immigration as a reference. The subcontractor was not known.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

You are telling me that the subcontractor is not known. Is that correct?

[Rob Stewart]

It was hired by VFS Global.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

You have five seconds left, Mr. Bergeron.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I think we will stop here. We will come back to this shortly.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Mr. Bergeron.

Now we have Mr. Harris for six minutes.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen and Ms. Lucki, for staying on, and Ms. Bruce as well.

I have a question about the dependence of Canadian universities on collaborative research or research funding from the PRC and PRC sources. There are two programs that have been.... Well, one program has changed its name. The thousand talents plan of the PRC, apparently renamed the national high-end foreign experts recruitment plan, has the Government of China involved.

My understanding is that, in 2018, CSIS began warning the universities about the dangers of research collaboration with China. We know that in the United States the FBI was doing a similar program, and charges were laid. There were indictments against American and Chinese academics for alleged fraud because they hid their participation in these plans.

I just want to know, first of all, what kind of advice you were giving the universities. What were you warning them of and what kind of program was it? Also, have you laid any charges? Have any charges been laid—I presume by the RCMP—in relation to this kind of academic work?

[David Vigneault]

I'm looking at my colleagues on the screen. Maybe I can start, Mr. Harris, and say a few things about the thousand talents program.

At CSIS, we have been talking both publicly and privately with universities about issues related to how high-end research could potentially be diverted. We are identifying threats that could be from a human perspective when you have individuals who did not declare their true affiliation with different institutions back in their own countries.

We have, in collaboration with CSE, warned about cyber-threats that are always possible. We, therefore, essentially try to provide advice that would make sure that the true “Crown jewels”, as we'd say, would be protected.

We also take pains to—

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

You referred to concerns about diversion. Could you say diversion of what? Is it intellectual property?

[David Vigneault]

Yes, exactly. It's the diversion of intellectual property. That's where we would have knowledge that is developed here in Canada, which would be surreptitiously brought to another country. Of course, the committee is concerned about China. We are, in fact, also concerned about a number of other entities that may do the same thing.

We also go to great lengths to make sure that we're not painting everybody with the same brush by saying that universities should not be collaborating with foreigners, because that is exactly not the case. We need to have innovation. We just need to make sure that people do it with their eyes wide open. They need to have the right information to protect their intellectual property and to protect what has been funded and will eventually accrue to and create Canada's future prosperity.

This is the line of approach we're taking.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Can I ask a question, please, just to differentiate?

Why would you be expressing a fear in relation to research funding from Chinese sources? If some international or transnational corporation is funding research in Canada—which many are, across the country—and intellectual property obviously would be shared with that entity, what is the difference? Why is it that academic institutions like universities need to be warned about this with respect to the PRC?

[David Vigneault]

There are a couple of items here. One is that when you have collaborative projects that are funded in part by a foreign company, as you mentioned, the terms should be very clear and transparent about who owns the intellectual property. There should be no ambiguity.

In terms of diversion, when you have researchers.... You provided examples about some arrests in the U.S. These are people who would be involved in different research and would not declare their other affiliations to state entities or military organizations. They would take some of the knowledge and some of the data that is being created through these projects and bring it back to their countries in a way that would likely be a threat to Canada in the future, especially when we look at high-end technology that may have dual-use purposes for both civilian and military applications.