Evidence of meeting #18 for Canada-China Relations in the 43rd Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was information.
A video is available from Parliament.
7:55 p.m.
NDP
Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL
Thank you.
We did have one representation that the significant funding of researchers in Canada can be used by the Chinese government to influence Canadian researchers in a way to obtain information and transfer it to China. Are you experienced with that as well?
7:55 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Yes, we are. We have seen indications of that. We have seen indications also of how the funding is, in other areas, targeted to push research in an area that will not be contrary to another country's interests. Sometimes it's about protecting the reputation of a country. We've seen that as well.
7:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Harris.
We are now starting the second round.
Mr. Paul-Hus, the floor is yours for five minutes.
7:55 p.m.
Conservative
Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Lucki, in March 2020, you mentioned in your report that you did not have enough resources for terrorism, foreign interference and cybercrime.
If we set terrorism aside, do you have the same problem with foreign interference and cybercrime a year later?
8 p.m.
Commr Brenda Lucki
Yes, we are constantly working on foreign interference. It's one of our priorities.
In the national security programme, we have the primary responsibility for investigations of that nature, and obviously we work with our domestic and international partners to investigate those illegal activities where such foreign interference is suspected. We also work with our security and intelligence partners to detect and disrupt the interference activity of these foreign actors. This type of activity can manifest itself in different ways.
8 p.m.
Conservative
Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC
Resources were a problem for you. Have you obtained additional resources, or are you at the same point as in 2020?
8 p.m.
Commr Brenda Lucki
We have not increased our resources in this area.
8 p.m.
Commr Brenda Lucki
But in the federal policing program we have the flexibility that if such a file raises itself.... For example, when we had the terrorist file in Kingston, we were able—and that's the beauty of the RCMP—to move the experts into the area from across Canada and get those specialized resources into that area to investigate those files.
8 p.m.
Conservative
Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC
Thank you.
Mr. Vigneault, you confirmed earlier that there are many threats. In the case of cyber threats, it has previously been confirmed that the Communications Security Establishment can help to put countermeasures into place. I know that these organizations do not always communicate with each other, but have you set up any collaboration with Special Forces and the Canadian Armed Forces in recent years?
8 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Thank you for your question, Mr. Paul-Hus.
Yes, we work closely with our colleagues in the Canadian Armed Forces in general and with Special Forces in particular in various theatres of operations. Of course, these are very sensitive operations that we cannot talk about in public, but we have memoranda of understanding and we work very closely with them.
8 p.m.
Conservative
Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC
But legislation is public by nature. I know that, two years ago, we passed Bill C-59 that laid out some new measures. However, you recently mentioned in your report that the act still presented a number of problems that were making your work more difficult. Can you provide some specifics on what would really make your work easier?
8 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Thank you, Mr. Paul-Hus.
The argument that we are making is that technology, national security threats, and attacks on the privacy of Canadians are creating a very complex environment that is always evolving. For the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to be able to fulfil its mandate, it must always be evaluating the powers it has been given so as not to break the law. Clearly, we do our best to abide by the law. So we work with the government, with our colleagues in Public Safety and the Department of Justice to examine some very specific items in the act.
8 p.m.
Conservative
Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC
If you want to send us the points in the legislation that should be improved, it would be very helpful.
In December 2018, you mentioned that some states are financing espionage through the 5G network. Are you still of the same opinion?
8 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Yes.
Actually, as my colleague Shelly Bruce said earlier, we have to examine all aspects of technology. In the world of espionage, people are very ingenious. They find ways to seek out the information they want, wherever it may be. So we absolutely have to strengthen our defences everywhere. Given that the 5G network will be in such demand and will be used for so many functions, some innocuous and others very sensitive, we will have to pay attention. CSIS is working jointly with the CSE and its partners to provide warnings and advice to the government on the measures that need to be taken.
8 p.m.
Conservative
Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC
I have one last question.
Had you been made aware that those in charge of CanSino Biologics were part of the “Thousand Talents Plan”?
8 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Unfortunately, I cannot answer your question directly, Mr. Paul-Hus. I'm sorry.
8 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan
Thank you very much, Mr. Paul-Hus.
We go on now to Ms. Zann for five minutes.
Ms. Zann, go ahead, please.
8 p.m.
Liberal
Lenore Zann Liberal Cumberland—Colchester, NS
Thank you.
I want to ask a question regarding the stories of the importation of goods created by forced labour. The minister mentioned it a little earlier, but I want more specifics, please, for instance by ethnic minorities in China such as the Uighurs. Earlier this year, Canada did join our international partners in cracking down on companies doing business with certain firms based in China's Xinjiang province and region, following the credible reports of human rights violations affecting Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in the region.
I'd like to hear a little more about how our Canada Border Services Agency and others work to prohibit such goods from entering our borders. How do you know which goods and parts of goods are made in such a fashion?
8:05 p.m.
President, Canada Border Services Agency
As I mentioned earlier, Employment and Social Development Canada is the lead government department for labour-related programs. We work closely with ESDC to identify goods that have been produced by forced labour and prevent their entry into Canada.
Generally speaking, all goods entering Canada, including shipments from China, may be subject to more in-depth secondary examination. We use a risk management approach to determine which goods entering Canada require a deeper examination. As the minister said, anything that's mined, manufactured, produced wholly or in part by forced labour—
