I'll speak to it in the meantime.
We have heard from many stakeholders the concern about regulators being overrrepresented within the review panels and within the agency. Our government has set out to separate the agency and the regulatory function. We recognize that there is expertise within the regulators. Therefore, it makes sense to have regulator representation within the panel, but not a majority of the representation. I truly believe that if we want to restore the public trust, we need to also ensure that the regulator is not the chair of those panels.
This subamendment would set out that the regulator would not be the chair of the panel. We've seen, as I've said, a lot of testimony around this, including from the expert panel itself. It made it very clear that the accountability of the commission would be for assessment alone and would not be mixed up with regulatory accountability. The resulting transparency would make it easier for the federal government, proponents, and participants to hold the single authority to account. For financial discipline, there should be one independent agency that conducts and oversees federal EA, and that agency should not be the regulator.
To obtain more credibility and regain public trust, participants proposed that EAs be conducted free from political and proponent influence by an independent and impartial body.
Once again, there is evidence after evidence that supports this. I hope that the members will support this subamendment.