Information & Ethics Committee on Dec. 12th, 2024

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Okay.

Unfortunately, I'll need an amendment for that, unless there's unanimous consent on the part of the committee to adopt that no more than two meetings will be granted on this. That way we have some clarity on it.

There is nothing in this motion that says how many meetings. I'm going to ask for clarity and say that no more than two meetings be deemed for this particular motion.

[Francis Drouin, Liberal, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

Mr. Chair, maybe we want to hear from everybody else before we entertain how many meetings we want to have.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

We can do that.

[Francis Drouin, Liberal, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

We're still not sure if we're good to go.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

For the sake of clarity, I will need somebody to tell me how many meetings they want on this. It was my suggestion to do that in advance of hearing from people, but I will leave it at that.

Go ahead, Mr. Drouin.

[Francis Drouin, Liberal, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

I commend the efforts of my dear colleague Mr. Barrett. At the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, we're conducting a study on the issue of the Canada emergency business account. He knows that because he appeared before this committee. In fact, we're trying to do a study on the public accounts. For a few days now, we've been trying to schedule it, but the Conservatives are filibustering to not even hear from the witnesses. We had the Auditor General before us yesterday, and we had other witnesses as well, but the Conservatives filibustered.

Before voting on this motion, I would invite Mr. Barrett to speak with Mr. Perkins and Mr. Genuis, as well as Mr. Cooper, who also sometimes sits on the Standing Committee on Public Accounts. I therefore invite Mr. Barrett to speak with his colleagues. I'm all for effective parliamentary committees. If the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics decides to conduct this study on the Canada emergency business account program, you can rest assured that I will not be in favour of wasting taxpayers' money by conducting the same study at the Standing Committee on Public Accounts.

I know it's Christmas and we're all in a hurry to pass motions and go home and say that we've accomplished things, but I invite my colleagues to have a discussion with their other parliamentary colleagues.

In that spirit, Mr. Chair, I want to make sure we're not doubling services or parliamentary accountability. I truly believe in it, but we had many reports tabled in the House by the Auditor General on December 2. We had one on seniors. We had one on Canada summer jobs. Let's make sure our parliamentary committees function in a way that is efficient and that gets to the bottom of the issues. Let's not get stuck like we did with SDTC, where the industry committee was doing the same study at the same time, with the same members asking the same questions at both committees, and with the same witnesses.

I enjoy this idea, and I'm not a regular member of the ethics committee, but we're getting into a doubling of services. I'm sure the Conservatives would agree that this is not an efficient use of taxpayers' dollars when the public accounts committee...unless they can convince their folks at public accounts to let ethics do this particular study and let public accounts focus on other reports of the Auditor General. That way, I will be satisfied in terms of the way it's functioning.

I'm sure the honourable members, as they want to form government, would already have had these conversations with their colleagues to ensure greater efficiency of taxpayer dollars and how they are spent. We, too, spend dollars, and it's important that we show taxpayers respect.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Drouin.

We're obligated to deal with the motion that's in front of us. The motion is in order. It deals with data privacy and the potential of.... Well, we don't know; we'll certainly find out, if the motion is adopted, by having these witnesses in.

I see it as separate and distinct from what other committees are dealing with right now. This is a data privacy motion. It's well within the mandate of this committee.

Go ahead, please, Mrs. Shanahan.

[Brenda Shanahan, Liberal, Châteauguay—Lacolle, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm sorry that I didn't have the motion handy. I have a folder here, as you can see, with all the motions that have been presented in this committee. I do try to keep track. It is not easy to do so. I suppose we can dispense with those ones for now or keep them for a later date. Maybe they'll be revived. I don't know if anyone has any way...because it's just getting heavier and heavier. That's not good for my back, I can tell you that.

I'm sorry. I am old school. I do like paper. It allows me to read, analyze, take notes and so on.

I listened with great interest to my colleague from the public accounts committee. I think there is something to be said here. This is a topic that has come up on many an occasion, even in this committee: that we shouldn't be duplicating work.

You know, by all accounts, there's only a limited time left on our mandate here to the 44th Parliament. We should make the best use of it. There are many issues that we need to be discussing. I'd like to have an update on reports, perhaps, that have been left unfinished and work that needs to be continued from other motions that apparently other members are interested in pursuing.

I appreciate the offer of limiting this study to two meetings, but how about zero meetings? Let's let the public accounts committee do its work.

Indeed, while talking about letting somebody do their work, it has often been my observation that this committee attempts to do the work of our independent commissioners of Parliament, namely the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, not to mention other commissioners from time to time. However, it's chiefly the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. We try to get ahead of where he is if there is an issue. I'm sure that members are very capable of alerting the commissioner if they feel there's a conflict of interest issue, as are any members of the public. Anyone who is concerned about this situation could make that known to the commissioner.

We have seen him, in some cases repeatedly on the same complaint—one, two, three, four times—come back with the same conclusion. It apparently was not sufficient for members at that time, but it is still consistent with the role of an independent agent, an officer of Parliament. They do their work, their investigation, and make a report. That is something I certainly would suggest.

As it stands, I cannot support this motion.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mrs. Shanahan.

For the benefit of the committee, I will say that we do have the CSIS director and other officials from CSIS in the room to discuss TikTok in our next panel.

I am going to go to Mr. Fisher, because he's next on the list on the motion.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Out of respect to the witnesses who are here, I'll be quick.

This is being studied in another committee. I agree that it could be the purview of this committee. Two meetings already have happened at the public accounts committee. I've heard members of this committee state fairly emphatically that they don't support duplication, studying the same thing at two different committees. We'll see how they vote on this.

I'm not going to support this at the moment. That doesn't mean that I wouldn't support it down the road, maybe after the public accounts committee's study. At this point, I'd say that I'd vote against this today. Then we would get our witnesses in.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Go ahead, Mr. Housefather. You have the floor on the motion.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I will also be brief.

First of all, I have to say that I disagree with my dear colleague, Mrs. Shanahan, a little bit. I do believe very strongly in the oversight by committees of the work of the Auditor General and everybody else. I believe that is the role of parliamentarians. I have no issue with that.

My issue is that I've looked at this report and at the summary of the report, and there's not one thing about privacy that's even included in the summary of the report. This is a report about financial controls and contracts, which is not the purview of the ethics committee. It is the purview of the public accounts committee or OGGO. I don't understand why this is being brought to the ethics committee. I've looked through the summary. Privacy is not even mentioned as one topic in the entire summary of the report. For me, that really is the issue.

It's already being looked at by the public accounts committee. If the focus is not privacy, then I really don't think it's the purview of the committee. Although I think it would be fascinating to look at the contracting policies employed by EDC, which are part of this motion, I just don't think it's the role of the ethics committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Housefather.

I have nobody else on my list, so I'm going to ask—and I suspect I know the answer—whether we have unanimous consent on this motion.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

I'd like a recorded division.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

We'll have a recorded division on the motion.

Go ahead, Madam Clerk.

We have a tie vote, so I will vote yes.

(Motion agreed to: yeas 6; nays 5)

I'm going to suspend for a couple of minutes until we get the next panel in line here.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Welcome back, everyone.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(h) and the motion adopted by the committee on Thursday, November 21, 2024, the committee is resuming its study of the wind-up of TikTok Technology Canada, Inc.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses for the second hour today.

From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Daniel Rogers is here as director, with Paul Lynd, assistant deputy minister of intelligence collection.

I'm going to go to you, Mr. Rogers. You have up to five minutes to address the committee. Go ahead, sir.

[Daniel Rogers, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

I have a couple of points, and I'll try to make them fairly quickly.

My name is Daniel Rogers, and I am the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS. I am joined by my colleague Paul Lynd, the assistant deputy minister responsible for intelligence collection.

It is an honour to join you today and to have the opportunity to contribute to your important discussion on the winding up of TikTok Canada. Today, I hope to provide insights on CSIS's role plays in ensuring the protection of Canada's national security interests, the safety of Canadians and Canada's prosperity.

The Investment Canada Act, or ICA, which is administered by Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, ensures that significant investments in Canada made by non-Canadians benefit Canada's economy. To this end, the act allows the government to review foreign investments to ensure they are not harmful to Canada's national security.

The act aims to strike a balance promoting economic prosperity and safeguarding Canada from foreign actors seeking to gain ownership or control of sensitive Canadian goods, technology, infrastructure or personal data for purposes that could be injurious to Canada's national security.

In accordance with its mandate, CSIS regularly screens ICA notifications for security concerns, and we work with ISED, Public Safety Canada and federal granting councils to inform the GC’s decisions. This work is essential, as Canada is the target of a number of adversarial state actors looking to advance their own national interests at our expense through their investment activities.

Social media platforms in particular are of interest to threat actors because of the data they generate and collect. They run surveys, collate datasets and request access to users’ personal data through terms and conditions, enabling access to photo albums, messages and contact lists, among other sensitive details. Although some of this data is benign in isolation, when collected and collated on scale, it can provide detailed patterns and insights on populations, public opinion, communities and individual social and professional networks.

Authoritarian states like the PRC use big data, including from the private sector, to carry out foreign interference activities. While government use of data in Canada is subject to ethical, legal and privacy considerations, authoritarian states are not subject to these limitations. Through its 2017 National Intelligence Law, the PRC compels PRC citizens and entities to co-operate with PRC intelligence agencies upon request, which includes providing all information to the state and its intelligence apparatus. This policy supports, and is reflective of, the PRC’s attempts to interfere in Canada and like-minded democracies. Canada and its allies must therefore exercise heightened caution when agreeing to share their data with platforms linked to the PRC.

The ICA review process, which includes CSIS input, determined that allowing TikTok Canada to continue operating would cause injury to Canada’s national security. Although the provisions of the ICA limit what I am able to disclose about specific cases, I would note that the CSIS and Government of Canada assessment was consistent with the March 2024 policy statement on foreign investment review in the interactive digital media sector. Specifically, assessments consider factors such as reach and audience, the nature and extent of an investor's ties to a foreign government, and whether a Canadian business is likely to be used as a vehicle by a foreign state to propagate disinformation or censor information in a manner inconsistent with Canadian rights and values.

Use of social media platforms also raises national security concerns when they act as a breeding ground for extremist ideologies and radicalize users. The increasing volume of violent rhetoric online raises our concern that consumers of this content are more likely to mobilize to violence. Youth in particular can be especially vulnerable to becoming radicalized online due to their more frequent use of social media.

CSIS continues to actively investigate, advise on, and disrupt national security threats. CSIS is also committed to building resilience through our modernized authorities under Bill C‑70.

This new authority recognizes that protecting Canada's national security is a shared endeavour that includes partnering with all levels of government, Canadian communities, academia, the private sector, and others. We are committed to co‑operating with these groups in the national interest, including through increased sharing of detailed threat information.

I will conclude by noting that while CSIS cannot publicly comment on our specific operational activities or investigations, I welcome this opportunity to answer your questions.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Mr. Rogers, thank you for your presentation.

We will now begin the first round of questions.

Mr. Cooper, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Rogers.

With respect to personal data being shared with the Beijing-based regime, you cited the 2017 National Intelligence Law. Theoretically, it would seem to be true that there is a risk that the data of Canadian users of TikTok will be shared with the PRC. However, the evidence we heard from TikTok, when they came before this committee a few weeks ago, was that data had not been shared and that, indeed, a firewall had been set up to prevent the sharing of such data.

Can you speak about that?

[Daniel Rogers]

I can speak to the first point, which is that there is a concern about the risk of that data going to the PRC. As I think this committee has heard before, that data is not housed entirely in Canada. There are questions about the applicability of Chinese law to Chinese companies, including the parent company of TikTok, which is ByteDance. It is certainly foreseeable that data held by TikTok Canada could, as you suggested, end up in the hands of the People's Republic of China.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

At this point, it seems to me to be theoretical, and nothing more than that.

[Daniel Rogers]

I can't speak publicly to any specific instance of data that's gotten over there that we would have known about through intelligence, but that is a certain risk that many of us are concerned with from a national security standpoint.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

From the standpoint that it is a risk, how does shutting down the subsidiary of TikTok affect that in any way? It would seem to me that it is entirely unrelated. To the degree that there is a risk, the risk continues, does it not?

[Daniel Rogers]

I think it's a fair point. You're correct that the subsidiary, TikTok Canada, does not eliminate the use of the application here in Canada, nor the data that it holds. I would note, going back to my opening remarks about the consistency of the decision with previous policy statements, that the decision-making in that context is in an ICA process. Certain events trigger decisions and reviews by the ICA, which is administered by ISED. CSIS provides national security advice in the context of those triggered reviews.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you for that.

I will say that it is troubling to see the total lack of transparency on the part of this government with respect to this decision. The government, on one hand, is shutting down TikTok's subsidiary. At the same time, Canadians are free to use the app. I don't necessarily see why not, but there doesn't seem to be consistency. If the objective is concern, for example, about the use of personal information or about personal data being shared with the Chinese communist regime, the solution that the government has come up with doesn't seem to achieve that at all.

I would just try to at least understand, from the theoretical standpoint of personal data being shared with the PRC, that TikTok did set up Project Texas, which ensures that U.S. data stays in the United States.

I'm trying to understand. When you say that there is a risk and that some of that data could be shared and would not be housed entirely in Canada or would not remain in Canada, what do you mean by that? Could it be stored in the U.S., or what?