Evidence of meeting #145 for Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was data.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Peter Davis  Associate Vice-President, Government and Stakeholder Relations, H&R Block Canada Inc.
Clerk of the Committee  Ms. Nancy Vohl
Daniel Rogers  Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Paul Lynd  Assistant Deputy Minister, Intelligence Collection, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

In your investigation on behalf of the department, did you collaborate with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada?

5:40 p.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Daniel Rogers

We speak with the Privacy Commissioner regularly. In the context of these reviews, typically the assessment is done by CSIS based on its intelligence knowledge and threat assessments.

René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

Does this type of review take place more often than others, for example?

5:40 p.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Daniel Rogers

Yes, I think CSIS did over 1,000 last year.

René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

Okay, that's a lot.

Is the final report now available?

5:40 p.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Daniel Rogers

Our advice to the government?

René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

Yes.

5:40 p.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Daniel Rogers

No, it's not publicly available.

It's part of our advice to government. It is often subject to other provisions, like cabinet confidence, in the decision-making process, and as I mentioned earlier, it will contain classified information and sometime private information from the company.

René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

My concern is similar to Mr. Cooper's. We're being told both that we need to ban TikTok and that we can continue to use it, that's our choice. I find it ironic.

Were you involved in the Government of Canada's decision to ban TikTok from government devices?

5:40 p.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Daniel Rogers

Banning TikTok on government devices was a decision made by the Treasury Board of Canada. From our point of view, data collection by TikTok, particularly from government devices, could cause national security concerns, and I think those are on some level different from the general use of TikTok.

I should say that the decision-making process for many of these decisions, not just with the Investment Canada Act but in the Government of Canada's decision to ban TikTok on government devices, takes into account many different factors, not just national security. They can include economic factors, social factors and others. When it comes to government decisions, we think about government data particularly and the national security concerns that would be inherent in the data.

René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

Do you use TikTok?

5:40 p.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

Mr. Lynd, do you use TikTok?

Paul Lynd Assistant Deputy Minister, Intelligence Collection, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

No.

René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

5:40 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative John Brassard

I don't use TikTok either. I don't see the point of it.

Mr. Green, go ahead for six minutes. Do you use TikTok?

Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON

Yes, I did quite regularly, but stopped once the Canada-China investigations revealed the targeting of MPs. Certainly, the instances of social media interference or influence within democratic political election processes are well noted and well documented. To go back to 2016, you'll recall Cambridge Analytica, and there are lots of instances with Elon Musk's participation in the most recent election in the States.

Mr. Rogers, first of all, well welcome to committee. I think this might be the first time I've had a chance to chat with you. In your opinion, how does TikTok differ materially from other social media platforms in the way user information, data, algorithms and profiles are used?

5:40 p.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Daniel Rogers

To the extent that I can answer the question, I will say there are general concerns that Canadians and others have about the social media platforms we're engaged in. These are things like the spread of disinformation and the ability for platforms to be used by people to radicalize Canadians or by those who seek to do harm to Canada. That's not something unique to TikTok. It's generally done across social media platforms.

The concerns that tend to be particular to TikTok have to do with the regime that it can operate under, because it is hosted and controlled, in theory, by China and their national security laws. We know that one important factor for data is how it can be used, and in Canada and other countries there are differing privacy protections. There's legal recourse in Canada and we have charter protections. Many things are inherent in our country that are not the same in China.

Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON

From your review, do you have any evidence or intelligence you're able to share publicly that would indicate TikTok has broken any Canadian laws?

5:45 p.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Daniel Rogers

In our review, we were clear in the decision-making process that the national security concerns related to TikTok Canada were an element of our decision-making. I can't speak to specifics on those, but I will say that we don't require TikTok to have broken Canadian laws for us to have national security concerns and—

Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON

I'm sorry. My time is limited, so I have to take it back.

Do you have concerns about other platforms, such as, for instance, Truth Social, X, Discord and WhatsApp? We're talking about this in hopefully a more comprehensive way than just targeting one platform. Would you care to comment on the threats for radicalization, as you've mentioned numerous times at committee, from the other platforms?

5:45 p.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Daniel Rogers

Our concerns around the spread of information and radicalization are not specific to a particular platform, nor have we, at least to my knowledge—I've only been the director for six weeks—conducted a similar review of any of those platforms at this stage, certainly not as part of the ICA process. As I've said, our concerns are more to do with content and the potential for Canadians to be radicalized on those platforms—

Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON

Define “radicalization”. You use the term, but what does it mean legally?

5:45 p.m.

Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Daniel Rogers

Thank you for asking. In our context, that typically means.... I use it as shorthand for “radicalization to violence”.

There is a threshold. People are allowed to have freedom of expression in Canada. People can say what they wish on social media, and they can consume the information they wish, but radicalization, for us, is the process that someone goes through to take what are beliefs and translate them into the intention to commit violence and harm people here in Canada.

Paul, I don't know if you have anything else you want to add on radicalization.

5:45 p.m.

Assistant Deputy Minister, Intelligence Collection, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Paul Lynd

That's essentially accurate: It's mobilizing towards providing support to violence or conducting a violent act.