Information & Ethics Committee on Nov. 3rd, 2025

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Good morning, everyone. I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 13 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(h) and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, September 17, 2025, the committee is resuming its review of the Conflict of Interest Act.

I would like to welcome our witnesses for today.

We have with us Ariane Mignolet, ethics commissioner of Quebec.

From the Office of the Integrity Commissioner of Ontario, we have Cathryn Motherwell, who is the Integrity Commissioner of Ontario.

I'd like to welcome you both to the committee.

Ms. Mignolet, we'll start with you. You have five minutes.

[Ariane Mignolet, Ethics commissioner of Québec, Commissaire à l’éthique et à la déontologie du Québec]

Mr. Chair and members of Parliament, I want to begin by thanking you for your invitation to participate in the review of the Conflict of Interest Act.

The democratic exercise that you've invited us to take part in is essential to ensuring the healthy development of the rules governing the conduct of public office holders so that they reflect the high expectations of the public in terms of integrity.

As ethics commissioner for the Quebec National Assembly, it gives me great pleasure to contribute to your deliberations. First, I would like to emphasize that I am here to share my thoughts on the subject of your review, as well as my experience as Quebec commissioner. My comments will be limited to this and, as you will no doubt understand, I will not comment on any specific cases.

The integrity of public office holders, such as a member of Parliament, is an essential condition for maintaining and strengthening the public's trust in the Crown and its institutions. It is therefore closely linked to democratic legitimacy. Integrity, even the appearance of integrity, is of paramount importance.

As Quebec's ethics commissioner, I am responsible for overseeing the ethics and professional conduct of members, ministers and their staff. Unlike my federal counterpart, I do not, however, exercise such a responsibility with respect to other public office holders.

The Code of Ethics and Conduct of the Members of the National Assembly of Quebec sets out the values and ethical principles that must guide the actions of Quebec members, as well as the rules that govern the exercise of their duties. These rules include functional incompatibilities, conflicts of interest, gifts and benefits, and the use of government property and services. In addition, the code contains specific rules that apply only to ministers. Staff of members and ministers are subject to substantially similar statutory instruments.

Like the Quebec code, the Conflict of Interest Act contains several rules that aim to ensure this integrity by governing the conduct of public office holders. More specifically, they seek to prevent conflicts of interest at the same time as they seek to ensure proper management of those that will inevitably occur. It's important not to lose sight of the fact that every person, regardless of their background and experience, has personal interests, and conflicts, or at least interference between those interests, are inevitable. It is important that conflicts that arise be resolved in the public interest and the common good, not in favour of personal interests.

The rules governing conflicts of interest are designed to ensure that the public interest is always at the heart of the decisions made by those in whom the public places its trust. They provide a common framework that applies to everyone, regardless of experience or skill. However, these rules are not intended to deter individuals from participating in public life. On the contrary, they help put everyone on an equal footing and ensure that the rules of the game are the same for all, given that the state benefits from having people with diverse backgrounds working for the common good.

While ethical rules are very important, they are not the only tool for ensuring the integrity of public office holders and members. Acting with integrity refers primarily to ethics, which involves a moral judgment and reflection on what should be done or what is best in a given situation. In a parliamentary or governmental context, ethics refers to the values and principles that must guide the actions of members or public office holders in the performance of their duties. The Quebec code also places great importance on ethics, which is essential for preventing problematic or inappropriate situations.

Values should be used, on the one hand, to assess what is appropriate in a given situation and, on the other hand, to interpret applicable standards and rules. Public office holders and members should always strive to ensure that their actions are consistent with these values, even if their actions do not contravene the rules that apply to them. This is an essential condition to maintaining public confidence in them and in democratic institutions.

Ethics, professional conduct, values and standards are therefore complementary. All are necessary to ensure the integrity of those who play a role in government and to strengthen the public's trust in them.

Transparency, that is to say disclosing information and making data accessible, is therefore essential. It helps preserve the appearance of integrity of public office holders and members, and it also strengthens the bond of trust between them and the public. Citizens must be able to know what a decision is based on in order to be able to assess whether that decision is in the public interest. This does not mean, however, that transparency is necessarily synonymous with full and systematic disclosure of all information.

I think full and absolute transparency would serve neither the objective of ensuring the integrity of public office holders nor the broader public interest.

As a society, we have chosen to give commissioners the responsibility of ensuring that public office holders and members conduct themselves in an ethical and professional manner. We must trust them and give them the flexibility they need to carry out their duties independently and impartially, taking into account the circumstances of each situation.

While there are always ways to strengthen transparency, it must be done with an eye to maintaining the delicate balance between citizens' expectations for transparency, respect for the privacy of public office holders and members, and the necessary independence with which they carry out their duties.

Thank you for listening. I am now ready to answer your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you for your statement, Madam Commissioner.

We're going next to Commissioner Motherwell from Ontario.

Welcome. You have up to five minutes to address the committee.

[Cathryn Motherwell, Integrity Commissioner of Ontario, Office of the Integrity Commissioner of Ontario]

Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today.

I appreciate the opportunity for many reasons, not least because I believe we must seize every chance available to talk about ethics and integrity in government and public service.

Where we see ethics and accountability offices under attack in other jurisdictions, it is time well spent to reflect on our frameworks to understand how they contribute to and strengthen government, provide critical guideposts for public servants, and make sure Canadians understand how these frameworks are deployed to ensure the integrity of the government decision-making process.

As you know, the Canadian structure is unique with each jurisdiction having an appointed commissioner. We go by different titles—conflict of interest commissioner, ethics commissioner, and in my case, integrity commissioner—but our responsibilities and roles have many common elements. Key among these is the concept of commissioner and the important role that entails. I am non-partisan, appointed by the assembly as a whole. Much of my work is confidential by law. This does not diminish its importance. It is essential that there is trust among the elected members and the public service that I will be fair and impartial and that my advice to them is grounded in the legislation and the facts presented. There must also be trust from the public that having taken the oath and stepped into this work, a commissioner will fulfill their duties fully mindful of the public interest.

I am pleased today to appear with Commissioner Mignolet. I am also pleased to support Commissioner von Finckenstein's call for a review of this legislation. I appreciate the value of regular and thoughtful reviews. This work is important and it matters.

That said, I will confine my remarks to Ontario's legislation and experience and provide a brief overview of certain features of the Members' Integrity Act, which sets out the conflict of interest rules and ethical obligations for members of Ontario's provincial parliament.

Ontario has 124 elected members. Each is required to comply with the Members' Integrity Act and its provisions on avoiding a conflict of interest, on not using insider information or improper influence, on gifts and more. The act also includes provisions for MPPs to ask for my confidential advice on how the rules apply to their work. All members must submit an annual financial disclosure, and they are required to meet with me to discuss that submission and their obligations under the act. Meeting individually with 124 MPPs certainly takes time, but in my view, as I said, any time spent discussing ethics is time well spent.

The act also contains restrictions for ministers. They are not permitted to hold or trade securities, stocks, futures or commodities. Permitted investments include broadly based mutual funds, fixed value securities and assets with a value of less than $2,500. Ministers are also not allowed to manage or hold an interest in a business. They cannot acquire land, with certain exceptions. These provisions exist to protect government decision-making, to make sure a member's private interest is separate from their public duties. Of course, many do have these holdings when they are elected. To assist them, we look to our ethical tool box.

Ontario's legislation explicitly provides the option of placing these restricted holdings into a trust. The details of each trust, as well as the selected trustee, must be approved by the integrity commissioner. Currently, eight Ontario ministers have trusts. Our experience has been positive. I am the one who receives the financial statements. Only high-level aggregate information is provided to the minister. Ministers cannot communicate with their trustees; they must go through me.

Trusts are essential tools, but they are also distinct from ethics screens. While trusts are used for financial interests, screens are generally used for conflicts related to relationships, for example, family, friends and previous employers. I advise on the use of screens across all roles: ministers, parliamentary assistants, MPPs as well as ministers' staff.

In closing, I would like to note that my office is unique among the provinces and territories in that I wear many hats. I have the mandates and authority of three federal independent officers, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, the Commissioner of Lobbying, and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner. I am also what we call the ethics executive, essentially the ethics adviser for ministers' staff, as well as the chairs and certain executive leaders in approximately 130 provincial public bodies.

Thank you again for the opportunity. Like Commissioner Mignolet, I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Commissioner.

We're going to start our first six-minute round with Mr. Barrett from the Conservative Party of Canada.

Go ahead, Mr. Barrett.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

Good afternoon, Ms. Mignolet.

I have some questions for you, and I'll ask them in English.

I appreciate your being here.

I'm looking to draw on your experience and some of the parallels and contrasts with respect to the legislation that empowers your office.

The Conflict of Interest Act does not allow for the recommendation of the removal of the Prime Minister or ministers from office for ethics violations, even in the case of using offshore tax havens or serious breaches of the act.

Do you believe that having the ability to recommend removal of ministers from office is a necessary deterrent for serious breaches of the legislation that you oversee?

[Ariane Mignolet]

I understand that you want to know whether the act contains this type of measure in Quebec. The Code of Ethics and Conduct of the Members of the National Assembly of Quebec applies to both members and ministers. The code I apply isn't a code of internal economy, but rather an act that applies to all elected officials. It allows me to recommend sanctions for a breach of the code. These sanctions are set out in the code and range from reprimand to loss of status as a member of the executive council, if applicable. So I have the option of recommending a sanction, including reimbursement penalties. There are several levels, and eight sanctions can be imposed.

Obviously, it's just a power to make recommendations. It would then be up to the House to decide whether sanctions apply. In the case of ministers, as in the case of members of the legislative assembly, I could recommend a sanction that is obviously proportional to the seriousness of the breach. In fact, there is a whole logic behind the appropriateness of such a sanction and a full analysis must be done on whether or not to recommend it. Finally, if a sanction is recommended, it is necessary to know which one to choose.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

You have the ability to recommend sanctions that include fines and monetary penalties and the ability to recommend removal from office for serious breaches. Do you think that contributes to the deterrent effect of that power and also to public confidence in the system that you're responsible for?

[Ariane Mignolet]

In Quebec, although the ethics commissioner only has the power to recommend sanctions, this power gives some weight to the findings in their reports. Obviously, each analysis is done on a case-by-case basis. A lot of thought goes into whether or not to recommend a sanction, and which one. That said, I can't comment on how the public perceives this. However, it's set out in the code and is something I have to navigate, whether or not the sanction is subsequently adopted.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

Should legislation concerning the conflicts of interest of reporting office-holders ensure that there is public reporting, for example, with ethics screens? Should there be reporting to the public on when the screen is used and what issue triggered the use of the screen?

[Ariane Mignolet]

Conflict of interest screens are certainly an excellent measure. I have recommended that this provision be applied and included in the code, since this isn't yet the case. Right now, I can ask a member of the National Assembly to implement measures, but they won't be made public. It's a good thing that these screens are made public. However, I'm not convinced that triggering each screen necessarily leads to greater public confidence.

The role of commissioners is to implement and recommend measures to ensure that the public interest is given priority over any particular interest. We also have a responsibility to investigate if there are reasonable grounds to believe that these measures haven't been applied, but this doesn't extend to constant monitoring. It's up to the people who are subject to these rules to make sure they comply with them.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Commissioner Mignolet.

Ms. Lapointe, from the Liberal Party, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Commissioners, welcome to our committee and our study.

Ms. Mignolet, I had the opportunity to serve in the National Assembly, and now I'm here in the House of Commons. In your opinion, what are the main strengths of the Quebec model, of the legislation you enforce as ethics commissioner, that the federal government could draw inspiration from?

[Ariane Mignolet]

First, I would answer that the presence of values and ethical principles in the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct of the Members of the National Assembly, which I am responsible for enforcing, is very important. The conduct of members of the National Assembly and public office holders is based as much on ethical rules as it is on personal reflection, appropriate conduct, ethical principles and values that must guide these individuals. That's a strong point. There isn't much in the Canadian model to provide all these details.

It allows us to both interpret the ethical rules and apply them when there are no specific provisions. This is important in a context where ethics and professional conduct are constantly changing. Citizens' expectations are constantly evolving and, without necessarily making changes on a regular basis, it still allows the code to stay up to date and, above all, to hold those subject to these rules accountable. That's the crux of it. We have slightly different statutes, and all codes refer to conflicts of interest, common measures, and similar things, but that's the biggest difference I would emphasize.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Ms. Motherwell said earlier that eight of the Ontario ministers had a blind trust. Can you tell us how many Quebec ministers have the same thing?

[Ariane Mignolet]

It's important to note that the Quebec code talks about blind trusts or blind management agreements. It can be one or the other. There are currently five ministers who have them. We had a few more in the last Parliament—eight. It varies between five and eight.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Thank you, it was to compare.

Has making ethics training mandatory had a positive effect on compliance with ethics and professional conduct rules in Quebec?

[Ariane Mignolet]

Unfortunately, despite several requests to this effect, training isn't yet mandatory in Quebec, so we are using a great deal of imagination to make training as attractive as possible and develop training programs, but it isn't mandatory, while it should be.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Do you think the fact that the commissioner is appointed by two thirds of the National Assembly of Quebec strengthens public trust?

[Ariane Mignolet]

Absolutely.

Beyond the fact that the appointment must be approved by two thirds of the Quebec National Assembly, it's important to note that the appointment of the ethics commissioner is very specific to Quebec. The process differs from the appointment process for other individuals designated by the Quebec National Assembly, such as the auditor general of Quebec or the chief electoral officer. Not only must the appointment be adopted by two thirds, but it must also be the result of a motion tabled jointly with the official opposition. I am the only person appointed by the assembly according to this appointment process. I think it's very relevant and makes the position even more independent and impartial.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Would the federal government benefit from adopting a more educational approach toward the public, like the one in Quebec?

[Ariane Mignolet]

I'm not an expert on what the federal government does in terms of communicating to the public. I think it's very important to raise awareness, and not just inform clients of the measures that apply to them.

However, I think it's very important to inform the public. We are making a lot of effort, and we have many partnerships with universities. We are trying to reach and educate the entire public service, as well as all those who engage from the sidelines with public office holders, members of Parliament and ministers, so that they are aware of the rules that apply to public office holders and ministers.

We are seeing that it is having an impact. For example, when we're responsible for enforcing post-mandate rules, we are increasingly finding that when ministers or members of ministers' offices try to find another job, they come to us and tell us that their new employer is asking for confirmation that they can take the job and under what conditions they can do so. They want something official from the commissioner. Those requests are made through the transmission of information.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Ms. Lapointe and Madam Commissioner.

Mr. Thériault from the Bloc Québécois, you have six minutes.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to both commissioners for being with us today.

Commissioner Mignolet, ethics analyzes what is based on what should be. In that sense, people always say that ethics are more demanding than the law. Based on your opening remarks, values and principles can be very useful insofar as just because the act doesn't contain specific provisions, that doesn't mean the conduct shouldn't be questioned or the immorality of the action shouldn't be taken up.

I wanted to come back to the issue of balance, which you were talking about earlier. You were saying that there are crucial expectations and that a balance must be struck between those expectations, privacy considerations and compliance with the code of ethics. How do you strike that balance?