Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.
It is an honour to address you as part of the very important statutory review of the Lobbying Act. I'm accompanied by my colleague Jacques Shore. My testimony today represents my own point of view, and not that of my law firm, my clients or any third party.
I was a salaried lobbyist and I am now a consultant lobbyist. As a public law attorney, I advise businesses and non-profit organizations on lobbying laws at the federal, provincial, territorial and municipal levels.
I work at the intersection of conflicts of interest, ethics, election lobbying and the connections between the Lobbying Act and the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act.
The scope of the Lobbying Act is very broad. The changes proposed by the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada must be evaluated to balance genuine transparency with accessibility, openness and the democratic participation intended by the act.
I will now talk about the proposed changes.
First, I have no objection to default registration being the standard established by law. In my view, any change to the registration threshold must be made by Parliament, not through an administrative directive from the commissioner.
The changes made in 2023 to the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct raise similar concerns. The code treats sponsorship of public forums in the same way as the rules on low-value gifts and low-value hospitality, which risks stifling legitimate dialogue. I must admit that I have taken an in-depth look at the subject over the past two years.
These limits would hinder the essential dialogue in public forums where various stakeholders from the public, private, academic and community sectors debate policy. Rather than limiting undue influence, the rather strict limits risk reducing transparency.
In my opinion, the right approach would be to prioritize transparency through responsible and clear standards, while avoiding restrictions on legitimate engagement, provided that everything is disclosed under simple guidelines and following public consultation. The exclusion provided for in the act concerning briefs submitted to parliamentary committees offers a model to follow.
Second, the reforms impose a heavy administrative burden that affects all stakeholders, not just large companies with multiple lobbying mandates. It is not enough to deal with the compliance officers of the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada or with the compliance officers of Carrefour Lobby Québec, and so on, to complete and submit a declaration to the public registry. Compliance requires an ongoing monitoring process to account for internal changes, update disclosures and reconcile disclosures with monthly communication reports in the prescribed format and by deadlines prescribed by the act.
All my clients recognize the importance of the Lobbying Act and comply with it.
As Imagine Canada's brief states, the non-profit sector includes more than 170,000 charities and non-profit organizations, many of which engage with government regarding grants and contributions as part of their work. The reforms must include a reasonable de minimis threshold to avoid imposing disproportionate compliance burdens on routine administrative interactions. Otherwise, organizations would be subject to the same registration and reporting obligations as those seeking to obtain major government contracts or policy changes. This would create an incongruous result that would not reflect the relative importance of the underlying activity.
Third, several reforms raise questions of procedural fairness and limits on administrative power.
British Columbia's Lobbyists Transparency Act is a model for additional compliance measures as it sets out clear procedural steps, legal protections for the administrative process, public guidelines and a timeline for judicial review.
Furthermore, granting the commissioner independent regulatory authority is incompatible with parliamentary accountability and the fundamental principles of Canadian administrative law. As you know, those who enforce the law should not also make it.
Lastly, several of the reforms would create a super-registry that would encompass too many things and obscure important interactions for public accountability rather than clarify them, which could harm democratic governance rather than strengthen it.
For example, including director generals as designated public office holders would significantly broaden the disclosure framework and post-employment restrictions, which would dilute the targeted oversight of senior officials.
Requiring monthly communication reports for all lobbying with public office holders, such as a Crown minister, whether oral, written, informal or pre-arranged, is fundamentally impractical. This eliminates room for reasonable judgment by office holders who are elected, appointed and recruited precisely because they are expected to exercise informed discretionary power in the public interest, and in doing so, it risks overwhelming the system with low-value disclosures that obscure significant regulatory activity.
Lastly, requiring the disclosure of all lobbyists present at meetings imposes a heavy compliance burden while diverting attention from the main lobbying officials. As our report points out, a system that tracks everything tracks nothing particularly significant. The current system has struck the right balance.
With that, I would be pleased to answer your questions.