Thank you so much.
Good evening, everyone. I'm sorry I can't be there in person with you. Let me start by thanking the members of this committee for inviting me to contribute to this review of the act.
The issues outlined in the motion are very familiar to me. I've had occasion to think about them quite a bit over the past four or five months. I'm glad to see that you've also had a chance to speak to Dr. Conacher. That's nice. There are some matters on which I will align with your other witnesses, including both Dr. Conacher and Dr. Turnbull, and there are some on which I have a different perspective to offer.
Let me start by saying that I think that every elected official needs to care about avoiding the perception of being in a conflict of interest. It's no longer good enough to do good; you must—and I'm sure I don't have to tell anyone here this—be seen to be doing good.
Should the commissioner be given the power to investigate allegations of potential or apparent conflicts? Eventually, yes, is my opinion, but I think that this should be a multistep development. I would first like to see the act amended so that it is clear that the commissioner can and should be giving advice about potential and apparent conflicts. I think we need to establish some strong behavioural customs, and then we should revisit whether and how to enforce the avoidance of potential or apparent conflicts.
First, we have to socialize the new standard quite well—advice now, enforcement later.
This ability to give advice about compliance with the act and about avoidance of conflicts—whether real, perceived or potential—could extend to candidates for public office. The commissioner's office should be available for consultation with candidates, and parties should encourage, if not require, that serious candidates consult with the office. In making that recommendation, I do worry about overburdening the commissioner's office without also providing that office with adequate resources. However, I think the office should definitely be available for anyone seriously considering becoming a candidate or taking a position or an appointment.
The commissioner's office would be able to tell people what is and isn't covered in the ethics rules, but then it could also give them advice about how to get their affairs in order and advice about what being seen to be doing good might look like for them in particular. I would hate to think that some people are becoming candidates or accepting positions without having their eyes wide open to the unique challenges of public life, which your previous witness explained quite a bit about.
Speaking of candidates, I do think that the ability to get this kind of advice should also apply to leadership candidates, even if they don't currently hold a seat. Of course, the Ethics Commissioner should be expected to meet with them to discuss their obligations, and those obligations should be at least the same as they are for elected officials currently under the act.
Should the rules for leaders be more onerous? That's probably the biggest question everyone has been trying to wrap their head around lately. Are blind trusts good enough? That was very much the theme of the previous hour. This is where I might differ from your other witnesses.
I don't think that blind trusts are enough to make it so that a public office holder can no longer make decisions that they will benefit from. As Dr. Conacher noted, the only way to do that is to have no assets at all and, as Mr. Poilievre suggested, to force all market assets to be liquidated and the resulting cash put in a blind trust for an arm's-length trustee to then reinvest. That's the only way the public office holder would not know what's going on. I think that this should be an option, but I don't actually think it's an appropriate or suitable approach for every circumstance.
Currently, we do have a very interesting case of a Prime Minister having options in a company that has an interest in basically every major industry of our economy. Depending on the potential value of those options, is someone really going to give them up for the privilege of taking on public office? I think that's a tough question, and we really don't have much data on it. As Dr. Conacher noted, we haven't had anything like this in the past that we can point to. We haven't learned from anything similar. My guess is that forcing the sale of assets, particularly a robust portfolio of unique assets, might serve as a disincentive to people running for office.
For me, the better route is to educate all candidates about what makes public service ethics different from other domains of ethics so that they can understand what the risks are and make informed choices about what kind of scrutiny might be coming their way if they take office with their assets in their current order.
Next, let me address the question of whether we should enhance transparency.
My answer to this is always going to be yes, but I do think it has to be within reason. As a member of the general public, I don't need to know what a member's brother's father-in-law does for a living, but I do need to be reassured that the member knows they're not to make decisions that improperly benefit their brother's father-in-law. I need to be reassured that they have received adequate education about the expectations we have of them so I can feel like it's okay to be angry with them and hold them accountable if they do the wrong thing.