Foreign Affairs Committee on March 11th, 2008

[John Manley]

Let me take a crack at those questions, Mr. Obhrai.

First of all, as I know very well, this city is full of bookshelves containing reports done by royal commissions, panels, committees, special task forces, and dare I say, parliamentary committees, which have never been reread, let alone acted upon.

So, in general, I would have to say, speaking for myself and I think my colleagues, we're delighted that the government has adopted much of what we recommended. We're especially delighted that it appears that Parliament has proven one of the ways it can work to reach a consensus, at least a majority consensus, on an issue that is of great importance to Canadians and on which the country's prestige and international respect has so much at stake. So we're very happy at that.

It was our belief from the outset, and certainly mine in taking on this task, that when we asked our young men and women to put their lives at risk, we must put a little bit of partisanship in the background and look to the interests of the country. Whether I might agree or disagree, when our kids are putting their lives on the line, we just have to find a way to make sure we authenticate them in the task they've taken on.

With respect to going to see, I've made three visits to Afghanistan, once as the minister back in January 2002. I was the first Canadian minister, I think, in over 40 years to visit Afghanistan. Mr. Mulroney was accompanying me at the time as one of our officials. I was there again as a director of CARE Canada prior to taking on this task, and then I went with my colleagues on the panel. Each time I've learned a great deal, and I've been able therefore to observe some of the progress that's being made.

Canadians need to understand that Afghanistan is devastatingly poor. We think of Haiti as the poorest country in the western hemisphere. The per capita income in Afghanistan is one-half that of Haiti. Progress is being made little by little, bit by bit, and it's about water, electricity, housing, schools for kids, and hospitals to take care of people.

If you go—I spoke to your chairman, and I hope this committee will have an opportunity to go, although I'd suggest that you maybe go in a couple of groups rather than arriving in a caravan—you will hear from people that while they aspire to more, they recognize the progress that has been made and is being made.

Yes, it's a military mission, and, yes, Canadians are not accustomed to seeing our soldiers in battle scenes. But underlying the military mission is the fundamental task of improving the lives of some of the world's poorest and most disadvantaged people, and Canadians will be able to see the progress if they go to visit.

[Pamela Wallin]

Some of the people who said that mostly eloquently were our soldiers, our troops. People phoned me at home before we even left on our trip--soldiers who had done one, two, or even three tours voluntarily because they believed in the mission--that is, the larger mission of improving people's lives.

One soldier called me and started describing the schools and what it was like to walk into those schools and see the faces of the young girls. We got the opportunity to do just that. When you see their faces looking eagerly at these strange creatures from afar, and they reach out to you, you know that is just as much a part of this mission in every soldier's mind, every development worker's mind, as keeping the enemy at bay.

So on that side it was truly rewarding to see the progress--and you can see it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

We have about three minutes.

Mr. Goldring.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

I'd like to thank and congratulate you for the work you have done and the effort you have put into this very exhaustive report. I'm sure it was very tiring. I understand you travelled into some of the remote areas to do this, so I congratulate you on it.

I want to comment on one part of the report where it's talking about a premature military withdrawal or an ill-prepared partial withdrawal.

Ms. Wallin, we had a conversation just before the committee began, and there has been some talk of negotiating with the Taliban. My concern is that you never negotiate from a point of weakness; you negotiate from a point of strength. Wars come to an end, and many who were the enemy are brought into the friendship of the government if they're willing and able to participate--not all, but most are.

On the concern about this negotiation or leaving too early, what is the feeling of the women of Afghanistan, the parliamentarians, about this issue of the Taliban? Are you convinced that they, to a person, do not want to return to the old regime of the Taliban? Is this something that is just not negotiable to them? Where do you start? Do you remove women from Parliament? Do you take away women's rights?

So are you convinced that from a woman's perspective there is much work to be done yet, and it's just too early to leave that issue until that part of it is complete?

[Pamela Wallin]

Yes, it would be absolutely fair to say that we did not meet anybody who thought it would be in any way acceptable to see a return of the Taliban regime. We drove past a stadium in Kabul where hundreds of women had been lined up and shot, merely because they were women. This is still very real. They were mothers, sisters, daughters, or relatives of some kind. So that reality and those images do not leave you soon.

But perhaps even more strongly than we understand it as outsiders coming in, the Afghans themselves realize the gradations and differences inside the Taliban. This is not some monolithic group. At one end there are the serious hardliners who are responsible for, or at least involved in, acts like 9/11--those kinds of people who are fervent and dedicated on that level. But you also have people at the other end of the spectrum who are Taliban of convenience. Because they could not receive a paycheque from our system or we weren't efficient enough in delivering it through NATO or the UN, they ended up taking money from a drug lord or a Taliban leader to feed their family and for sustenance.

So there's every gradation. You have to keep your options open in being able to talk with those further down the road who have renounced the violence and the activities and have participated in the reconstruction and rebuilding of that country. But it's hard to judge that from afar. That's why we have all kinds of people on the ground--diplomatic, development, military--who can help us assess that, so when we get to those points, if we do, we're talking to the right people about the right things.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you again.

[John Manley]

I would just add a couple of thoughts, Mr. Chairman.

I think it's really important to recognize that this insurgency, unless it's the first time ever, will not end in military success. It will end because of a political agreement that will resolve some of the issues there. As we said in our report, some of the Taliban committed very serious offences. Some of them, quite frankly, should be taken to the International Criminal Court in The Hague for things they did, for example, in Bamyan province to the Hazaras people, who are Shiite, and some of them for other incredible atrocities that were committed.

We must not lose sight of the fact that ultimately a political solution must be found. It must be conditioned, of course, upon appropriate respect for human rights, including the rights of women and others. It must be conditioned on the renunciation of violence. We mustn't get ourselves into the position where we think no political reconciliation is possible and that we're prepared to fight to the last Taliban, because quite frankly, we will never reach that point.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Manley.

We'll go to Mr. Dewar.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to our guests for the work they have done and for being here today.

Just to clear the record--and I'll speak for myself as an opposition member--it wasn't not wanting to have you at committee, it was the way in which you would present yourself at committee. Initially, the government came forward and said we should have a joint committee of defence and foreign affairs and have you present as well as government members and be televised and then go to the House. We said no thank you; we have our work as a committee, and we are independent from the government. This is how we arrived at your being here today. I thank my colleague for his comments on that.

Let's turn to the task of your report. I echo my leader and others who have said they encourage all Canadians to read this report. It's extremely important for the aforementioned reasons.

I think it's safe to say that the question before us, before Canadians, before Parliament, is not whether Canada should help Afghanistan, but how. I say that as someone who is from a party that has a different view from the government and the official opposition on how to do that. One of the recommendations we've already touched on is to provide a thousand more troops from another NATO country. It's not a surprise to me, and I think this has already been agreed upon, by the way. I think it's a matter of where they come from. If not France, it looks as if it's probably the United States.

One of the concerns I have is command and control. I'm a new member of Parliament, and one of the first debates we had was on the extension of the war to the current deadline, which we'll vote on tomorrow, and it looks as if there will be an extension to 2011. During that debate, many people were not aware, and I include members of Parliament, that we were under Operation Enduring Freedom command and control, and that didn't end until July, you noted in your report.

My first question is, if we receive the extra thousand troops and they happen to be from the United States, how does that work in command and control? We know the Americans will not go under the command and control of another country. Does that mean that Canada will then be under American command and control, or will they have a separate command and control? This leads to other questions about the comprehensive nature of how the mission is going. Of course, that's one of the issues you've touched on.

Mr. Manley, maybe to you first.

[John Manley]

Thank you.

We were first of all seized with the ability to succeed in the mission defined for us there, which in order to achieve the development objectives required an improved security situation, and that required the additional troops. The organizational structure of Operation Enduring Freedom prevailed until NATO took over, but at an operational level, if I understand correctly, it has been a long time since we have put our troops under the direct command and control of another country. We had a rather unfortunate experience with that at Dieppe, and we've sought to maintain our own command and control of our forces since that time. I think what you point to will inevitably be an issue around coordination of effort.

Clearly, we think Canadian Forces should be going toward a greater effort on training and development of the Afghan security forces. That is going to require coordination in order to make sure the hold and development efforts are proceeding apace. But there will need to be a coordinated effort.

There are command structures for the regional command south, which we're part of. Currently it happens to be a Canadian in charge; prior to that, it was a Brit. But that doesn't mean they tell the Canadian troops where to go or what to do or how to conduct themselves.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

I appreciate that.

There are still 12,000 troops under Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, as you know. My concern, though, is that under the operational practice of the Americans.... It was brought to this committee by Colonel Capstick and others as a real concern--who we are following. I agree with you. I hope we don't follow the wrong direction and the wrong mission, which is solely the counter-insurgency. In simplistic language, it's find the bad guys, get them, and kill them. I don't want to see our folks in there.

I talked to a constitutent yesterday, whose son is serving, about making sure that we contemplate this thoroughly and seriously. She totally disagrees with the mission, and she is very concerned. She was actually calling me because of the vote coming up.

I'm concerned that if we don't understand the consequences of getting, in this case, a thousand troops from the United States, who actually gets to decide what's going on? And with the number of American troops there now, it has affected--I won't give you an opinion on it--what we're doing on the ground in the south. That's why I asked the question.

I would like to turn to what I think is a question on many people's minds, and you've already touched on it. There's a consensus that you can't win this militarily. We've heard it over and over again, from people in the military, in development, from the opposition side, from government--well, not so much the government side, but you hear it time and time again. The government seems to have taken from your report what I'm calling a “mini-surge”, that a thousand troops and more helicopters and drones will somehow get the job done. I didn't see that in your report.

I'm looking toward and our party has been pushing for how we open up other avenues, particularly around reconciliation and diplomacy. We don't have enough resources on the ground for that, and it's not balanced. In heaven's name, what are we to do? I don't think you were trying to say give us a thousand troops, helicopters and drones, and that's it. And that's what I'm hearing from the government.

[John Manley]

Yes, and I would hope that is not the way our report is read by anyone, because we've tried very hard to emphasize that this is an opportunity. When I was foreign minister we were then first talking about the three-D approach, that you have diplomacy and development as well as defence.

We can't win it militarily. We could lose it militarily, however. So we can't send the Salvation Army in; we have to send the Canadian army in. And they have to be equipped, capable, and able to do the job. But if that's all we do, you're right, this will not end happily. It will end in an awkward way and in a disappointing way.

What we've tried to say is that for the safety and security of our forces.... Nobody likes to take casualties, not that we should be afraid of taking casualties. But this is a tough place, and I would not like us to think that Canada does only the easy jobs in the world, that we go only to places where we can dispense aid and then take our vacation on the weekends off. This is a tough, tough environment.

But these are human beings who live there who we're trying to help. So we need the security. We need the ability to move our troops around so that they're safer, which is why we talked about helicopters. We need to be able to see what the insurgents are doing on the ground, which is why the drones are so important. These are all valuable tools to improve the security situation. But goodness, if we forget the fact that we're there to improve people's lives, to give them a government that can look after them when we're gone, then really we're wasting our time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Ms. Wallin.

[Pamela Wallin]

I have a couple of points.

You can't separate the equipment from the mission. It is our intention and it was our fervent belief, I think, on the part of the panel members that it is our responsibility as a country to look after our troops and those we ask to make this kind of sacrifice before, during, and after. But certainly during, they need that equipment. When you see the situation.... We were fortunate enough in some cases to be in helicopters. Our young soldiers are on roads that are filled with IEDs, and they are losing life and limb. We need to have better equipment into that area.

I want to just respond a little bit on the American side, too, because I think you may be misunderstanding. The OEF is not just a straight military operation. We met with representatives of OEF--

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

No, I understand. It's a separate one.

My only point was that it's not under the ISAP auspice; it's a separate command and control.

[Pamela Wallin]

Right, but they are very much involved with development.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

No, I take your point. Thank you.

[Pamela Wallin]

What we said also in the report was that we'd like to see NATO much better coordinated, and then the delivery of all of the things we're talking about would, I think, come faster and be a little bit more efficient.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

We'll move back to the government side. Mr. Khan, please, for five minutes.

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, panel.

I'm delighted to see the report. I read it with interest, and I'm glad that finally we will not be debating from the superficial information that we've had in the past.

I would like to bring your attention to and receive your comment on how you envisage the type of engagement we can have with Pakistan. Your report calls for a forceful representation with Afghanistan's neighbours, and in particular Pakistan, to reduce the risk posed to regional stability and security. In your assessment, to what extent does the security of Afghanistan, particularly in Kandahar, depend on developments in Pakistan?

I'd also like to add that when you wrote these comments there was a lot of disturbance in Pakistan, and I agree--insurgency thrives in chaos. But since then there has been an election. The country seems to be on the road to democracy. If you talk to the Pakistanis, they will tell us--as they will tell you, probably--that they have a hundred thousand soldiers deployed, and they've taken heavy casualties. They have one full corps deployed in Peshawar.

I would like you to shed some light as to what type of engagement we're talking about. Are we talking about two different prisms--increasing the capacity to tackle the problem, or strictly a diplomatic offensive?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Khan.

Mr. Manley.

[John Manley]

I'm going to ask Mr. Burney to make some comment on this as well, from his experience. But I'd say, first of all, I think we observed the elections in Pakistan with the first sense of optimism about the state of affairs in that country in a long, long time. As we noted in our report, we were writing around the time of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and things looked very grim indeed. I think the defeat of the Islamic extremists in the election can only be described as a promising sign.

There is no question that the inability to secure the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, together with the financial assistance that has been so readily available to the insurgency—we think, as we said in our report, to some considerable extent from the gulf states and from citizens of Saudi Arabia—is undermining the safety and security of Canadian Forces and other ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Therefore, if there were a way to deal with this, needless to say, that would be very promising. Therefore, I think most of us on the panel would agree with the assessment that Pakistan has been perhaps the most dangerous place on the planet, and its future impacts directly on Afghanistan.

What can Canada do? Truly, we are limited in our relations with Pakistan to diplomatic measures. We are an aid provider to Pakistan. I think that should give us at least some leverage. But we need, more particularly, to act in concert with our allies in dealing with Pakistan, encouraging them and assisting them where they are willing, to help crack down on what's happening in the western provinces.

Derek.

[Derek Burney]

I would just reinforce the view that this is the most dangerous region in the world. You have nuclear weapon states surrounding Afghanistan—some actual, some potential. Unquestionably, the open border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is, next to the shortage of troops, probably the most serious deficiency in the mission to try to counter the insurgency in Afghanistan.

One of the reasons for the recommendation on augmenting troops is obviously to provide a capacity to help patrol that border with the Afghans that we don't have today. As long as that border is as wide open as it is, the insurgents will constantly be refinanced, retrained, and regrouped and will come back into Kandahar to create mischief.

I just want to emphasize, though, in addition, John's final comment.

Our first recommendation, the very first recommendation in the panel report, speaks to the need for a diplomatic effort, led by the Prime Minister, not only with respect directly to Afghanistan and the need for a more comprehensive strategy there and more coordination, but precisely so that we work in concert with our allies to exercise representations with Pakistan in a manner that is sensitive to Pakistan's sovereignty but helps address the root of the issue, a large part of which is in Pakistan.

As our chairman said, we are encouraged by the result of the election, particularly the result of the election in the border regions. We hope that's a promising sign, but everybody knows we're a long way from any kind of total joy about stability in Pakistan.

I would just want to re-emphasize to your committee that this is the most dangerous region in the world that we're talking about. This is not picnic grounds. A lot of people focus a lot of attention elsewhere, but when you consider the countries that surround Pakistan and the capacity for mischief that is in that region, you understand the complexity and the tension that goes with the mission we're performing.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Burney.

We will proceed back to the opposition side. Mr. Martin.

[Keith Martin, Liberal, Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm sharing my time with Mr. Chan.

Thank you all very much for being here and for your fine work.

I find it interesting that we went into Afghanistan to deal with al-Qaeda, but the real threats from a terrorism perspective are in other countries right now, and they're not being dealt with at all—but maybe that's a tale for another day.

We spend a lot of time talking about the military component in the mission, but what if I were to pose to you that the real end point for this mission is the sustainable development of the four pillars of Afghanistan's security—trained, equipped, and paid Afghan police, Afghan army, Afghan judiciary, and Afghan corrections—and that should be our end point? Maybe when we go to Bucharest our goal should be to tell our partners, let's roll up our sleeves and make sure that those four pillars are going to be having the investment and that we're going to have a coordinated, effective, sustainable approach to building those four pillars.

Lastly, perhaps you could shed some light onto what kind of concrete road map you could offer us to deal with the culture of impunity in Mr. Karzai's government, and secondly, developing the political reconciliation that has to occur within Afghanistan between the tribes, particularly between the Pashtun tribes and the non-Pashtun tribes.

Thank you.