Good afternoon, everyone. At the outset, I'd like to beg your indulgence. I arrived last night from Madrid where I gave a talk involving Spain and Canada and dealing with cooperation with Latin America. I'm suffering a bit from jet lag. One interesting point for this committee, there were a number of discussions on the role of Spain in Haiti. Spain expressed its will to deploy more efforts in this regard.
I can return to that in the question and answer period, as I just returned. It's not in my prepared remarks, which will be distributed.
I would like to start off by again thanking the committee for their interest and their invitation to appear, but I would also like to start by drawing attention to something we mentioned the last time I came before the committee two years ago, something that was lost in the plethora of issues that were on the table at the time.
FOCAL, as well as other institutions and analysts involved in Haiti, was concerned with a multitude of issues at the time, and some of the most salient and pressing ones I think were lost a couple of years ago. In order for that not to happen again, I would like to start out by stressing something, which I will return to at the end, and that's the fundamental importance of significant work on the economic growth and job creation front. This is something that really has gotten lost. We've spent a lot of time working on the very important issues of governance, democracy, and promoting elections. I do not want to take away from the work that we have done here, especially that Canada has done in this area. It is critically important. However, we cannot forget the economic growth and the job creation side.
I don't know if anyone saw The New York Times Sunday edition two Sundays ago. There was an article about the impact of the commodity boom and the resulting macro-shocks that have hit small island states especially hard. We've seen food riots throughout the developing world, but in the Caribbean the effects of the commodity boom and the resulting macro-shocks have really been quite severe. They've hit Haiti too. Interestingly, though, in the article that focused on Haiti, they talked about the rehabilitation of the Duvalier legacy in Haiti. There was a certain nostalgia in looking to the past. Given the lack of economic progress, the lack of real improvements in the everyday conditions of people's lives, we're seeing a questioning of the gains that have been made.
I'd also like to point out that on the political side, while we have seen impressive gains with governance and with democracy, still a lot needs to be done. We've recently witnessed the vice-president of the Senate of Haiti being forced to leave the country under somewhat difficult circumstances. This is an issue that, again, warrants our attention, but I will return to economic growth and job creation at the end.
I would like to meet the mandate of the committee meeting by talking about the present situation in Haiti. My colleagues have done an excellent job reviewing the governance issues and the human rights issues, so I'd like to explore some of the other areas that are critical and that will be increasingly critical for Canada. The first of these is a reflection on MINUSTAH, and the role of MINUSTAH and what's been accomplished. This is the United Nations peacekeeping force in Haiti.
I was just in New York, at the UN, at a meeting organized by a Spanish think tank for an analysis of how well MINUSTAH's done and where it's going in the future. Two interesting points emerged for our consideration here. One is to think about what has actually occurred with MINUSTAH and what this means for the future of the hemisphere and future peacekeeping operations in the hemisphere.
We've had a mission in Haiti for over four years, with thousands of troops on the ground, essentially for one purpose, and that is to chase down a few gangs with guns. The major part of what we would think of as a traditional peacekeeping operation—going after insurgents and separating armed parties with political agendas—was accomplished very quickly in Haiti. The first mission, Operation Secure Tomorrow, or, as we called it in Canada, Operation Halo, by the United States, Canada, Chile, and France, actually pretty much succeeded in disarming the insurgents who came across the border. What's remained in the ensuing years has been a domestic police operation.
If you think about this, the amount of money, the number of troops, and the amount of time going into Haiti to conduct what is essentially an operation against criminal gangs that, in comparison with other criminal gangs in the Caribbean, are not very strong, not very professional, and not very well armed, should give us real pause about the future of the hemisphere and our engagements and what we'll be looking at in the future should we face another situation with a weak—failing, failed, fragile, whatever term one wishes to use—state.
The situation of security in the hemisphere is changing drastically. Gone are the days of guerrilla insurgencies. Even the FARC in Colombia has transitioned into what has been called a terrorist organization or a narco organization. It is less a political movement and less a political ideology.
As we face this sort of situation more and more in the hemisphere and become engaged in future peacekeeping operations, we should not think that they will be what we traditionally think of—separating armed groups, removing guerillas, or separating armed combatants. They will be more domestic police-keeping operations. We need to keep that in mind as we look ahead.
Another issue with MINUSTAH is the role of Latin America. This is of profound significance. We faced the situation, when the United States, Canada, Chile, and France first went in, of neither the United States nor Canada being able to commit the number of troops needed, for as long as needed, in Haiti. We are extremely fortunate in this regard. We make a point at FOCAL of expressing this sort of gratitude and thanks every chance we get. We are extremely fortunate that the Brazilians, the Chileans, the Argentines, the Uruguayans, the Peruvians, and others were able to step up when we, the United States, and others could not. We're indeed fortunate that they were able to take on an unprecedented role for them, not simply participating in the UN peacekeeping operation but putting enough troops in to take leadership. This has had a profound impact on the region.
When Brazil first went in and led the mission going in, there was much apprehension in Brazil and in the southern cone, and some derision elsewhere in Latin America. No one thought the Brazilians were going to succeed. Everyone thought they were going to fail. It's turned out to be just the opposite. They've succeeded where others have failed. This success has emboldened them and Latin American countries to consider taking on more responsibility in Haiti. We need to be really aware of this, to encourage and thank the Brazilians, and to encourage the continued role they're playing in Haiti.
It's also important to consider that this probably spells the end of northern hegemony in terms of UN peacekeeping operations. The Brazilians and their allies have been successful once. There's a feeling that should the situation arise again and the conditions are right, they could probably play this sort of role again.
This presents for us an interesting opportunity, and one that I'm very glad the government has seen, I think, and CIDA especially has seized upon, in reaching out to the Brazilians, the Chileans, and the Mexicans, who, even though they cannot participate in peacekeeping operations, are interested in joining their Latin American colleagues in taking on more of a developmental role in Haiti.
As I'm sure CIDA will talk about when they come up, we're looking to have a visit of Latin American development officials in Ottawa next week, and to work with them in explaining how we do development in Canada and looking to reinforce what they're trying to do in Haiti.
Another issue we need to think about—moving from Latin America to focus on Canada—is the public commitment to our engagement in Haiti by the Canadian public. This is something we're extremely worried about, at FOCAL and elsewhere. It seems hard to imagine, but in some ways it seems we've done a worse job communicating on Haiti than we have on Afghanistan.
I travel quite a bit in Canada and talk to communities, NGOs, business leaders, and local government officials about Haiti. It's a sideline of mine, not an official poll. I'm just really curious about the perceptions on Haiti. This has come out of the work we've done, conferences we've had, and conversations with other think tanks.
There are essentially four questions I generally ask. I'll go through them very quickly.
First, what do you think is the current situation in Haiti? The answer I get to that uniformly is, “Oh, Haiti? It's a basket case. Nothing's going right. It's the most dangerous country in the hemisphere. People are being shot every day. Nothing positive is happening.”
Next, are you aware that security has improved, that there is a functioning government, that the homicide rate in Haiti is lower than next door in the Dominican Republic? The response I get to this is, Vous blaguez. C'est impossible. “You're joking. You've got to be kidding. This can't be true.”
Next, do you think Canada should be involved in Haiti? The answer I most often get is, “Well...I guess so.”
Finally, why do you think Canada should be involved in Haiti? The answer I most often get is, “I don't know. Because we've always been there? Because it's the poorest country in the hemisphere?”
These responses—“I don't know”, “I guess so”, and “Because”—are something you'd expect from your teenage son or daughter over dinner. They're not what you'd expect when asking the country about our second-largest aid commitment in the hemisphere.
So in the longer term, it may not be just the fragility of the state in Haiti that's worrying, but also the fragility of our commitment in this country. We really need to see Haiti become more than an all-Canadian government strategy or approach. It really has to become an all-of-Canada approach. That will mean an effective and persistent communication and outreach strategy on Haiti.
Finally, there are two other issues. You'll hear a lot about issues of disbursements, especially from the Haitian side. We've done extensive research and talked to folks at the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Our indication is that the disbursement issue is really not a major problem. The Inter-American Development Bank has bent over backwards, and then some, to move disbursements. They've applied resources, both financial and human, to make sure that disbursements in Haiti move faster than they do anyplace else in the hemisphere. There's really not much more they can do at their end. The problem and the holdup is at the Haitian end.
On the economic growth and job creation front there are two ideas. On the things we can do, a lot of this will be more of a symbolic nature. Our trade with Haiti is not very significant compared to that of the United States or the Dominican Republic. We would rank fifth or sixth in foreign trade. But there are things we can do that send very important signals, especially to the partners. Even though we have a very open trade regime for Haiti and we have granted exceptions and allowed Haitian goods to come in, we can do more.
We're suggesting a unilateral trade agreement with Haiti, with a complete opening on the Canadian side to all Haitian goods and imports—obviously the sanitary and other requirements would be left. On the Haitian side, the International Monetary Fund already ranks Haiti as the most open economy in the hemisphere, so there's not much more we could demand from them on their side. But we could take the lead by opening up completely. This would send an important signal to the United States, which is looking at the HOPE and HERO legislation—special trade exemptions for Haitian goods. The United States exemptions are very limited. I think 3.5% of Haitian exports would be subject to special tariffs.
From our end we can do more. Haiti is also the only country in the western hemisphere that has special WTO exemption for these types of agreements, as one of the poorest countries in the world. So we wouldn't have to worry about other Latin American countries piling in asking for the same thing. This is something that would apply only to Haiti.
Finally, on trade and aid, we've put a lot of emphasis on trade agreements promoting growth, economic development, and equality in the region, but we seem to have forgotten about Haiti. So this would address that issue.
On the Dominican Republic, we should look at our negotiations and discussions with them and ask if they can do more vis-à-vis Haiti. The United States did that with the Jordan free trade agreement; we could do something similar with the Dominican Republic. Would the Dominicans like it? They might not, but then the Peruvians probably weren't thrilled about the CSR agreement we put in on that agreement, and the Colombians probably aren't thrilled about the side agreements we're putting in on human rights, environment, and labour with that agreement. But we have a history of doing this. We can do this with the Dominican Republic agreement. This is something we should consider.
Finally, in two weeks, on the 16th and 17th, we have a delegation from the Haitian private sector coming to visit Ottawa. This is something that has never really happened before. Leaders of the progressive private sector visit Washington, D.C, every year on fact-finding missions to meet congressmen, senators, and U.S. government officials. This is the first time they're coming to Ottawa. Many of you have been contacted about that, and we hope to see you in two weeks.
Thank you very much.
