Thank you.
I wish to acknowledge that it's a great honour to be invited to address this committee. At the outset I have to make it clear I'm speaking today in my personal capacity as a professor. My comments should in no way be seen as reflecting the policy or views of the various organizations with which I'm affiliated--it's the usual disclaimer--especially as I'm a member of the board of directors of Rights and Democracy and president of the Canadian Friends of Sri Lanka. So I'm just me today.
It may be useful to spend a few moments providing a broad perspective on how we arrived at the current situation. Then I'd like to spend the remainder of the time speculating on constructive ways to address the situation we're in.
I will provide some information on the political and historical context—one of the previous witnesses gave you some background on this, but I have my own take on it. Two specific points from the long history of Sri Lanka might help clarify how we got to be where we are today.
I know there are members present with great knowledge of Sri Lanka. I'd like to provide an interpretation of the political and historical context from a very broad sweep of South Asia's political experience. It may be helpful to summarize two important dimensions in the struggle in Sri Lanka today.
The first is what I call a double minority complex. The small, beautiful island--and some of you have had the pleasure of being there--has only 20 million inhabitants but is divided into numerous communities. As you know, the majority Sinhalese population forms about 74%. It is predominantly, but not exclusively, Buddhist, while the Sri Lankan Tamil population is approximately 12% and predominantly Hindu. There are another 7% who are called Indian Tamils and who were brought in later just to work on the tea plantations.
This division between Buddhist and Hindu, Tamil and Sinhalese, is central to what we understand about the conflict. Both populations have been on the island since antiquity. The Sinhalese population, a majority on the island, strongly centre their identity as a Sinhalese people on Buddhism, and you just heard some of that a moment ago. They perceive themselves as a minority in the broader South Asian region. They are Sinhalese in a Tamil sea, because just across the Palk Strait, the very narrow strait separating Sri Lanka from India, lies the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. It's now approaching 70 million Tamils. So the Sinhalese population sees that and feels it. On the other hand, the Tamil population of Sri Lanka rightly sees itself as a small minority within the island; therefore, both of these communities can be described as having something of a minority complex. They see the need to defend themselves as communities, and they behave accordingly. I think a lot of that perception of threat can explain the underlying causes of the current situation.
The second dimension of history, which I will draw your attention to briefly, is what I call the delayed anti-colonial struggle. Sri Lanka sailed very calmly to its independence in 1948 without any of the mass anti-colonial movements and the nationalism that we saw associated with, for example, India or other colonial situations around the world.
However, there was turbulence simmering below that calm surface. During the prolonged British era the two major communities, either by British colonial intent of divide and rule or perhaps for convenience, reacted quite differently to British rule. The talented minority community took very quickly to English education and to all the avenues opened up within the colonial apparatus by the presence of the British. This was, of course, resented by the Sinhalese majority.
Years after independence, in 1956, a politician broke away from the ruling party, from the long-governing, what could be called a “gentlemen's” party. That was S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, whose name you heard a few moments ago. He formed his own party and stormed to power under the banner of Buddhist nationalism and Sinhala language superiority.
After that came all of those measures that you've heard a little about. The government imposed numerous measures to favour the majority at the expense of what it saw as an overpowered minority. So it thought it was taking actions redressing a colonial experience.
In keeping with the double minority complex, each of the communities has produced leaders to defend its interests. Today we see the long-term results of this political history—a defensive movement by the Tamil population to overcome discrimination, a movement that has shifted from being a moderate and constitutional one to a violent separatist and terrorist one under the leadership of the LTTE.
On the other side, the Government of Sri Lanka has responded in the name of all communities to preserve the unity of the island. It has responded in ways that have led to criticism, criticism that one finds throughout the world when a government is engaged in asymmetrical warfare.
You are all familiar with the results of the long civil war, the failed peace talks, the numerous deaths leading up to the present military endgame, and the humanitarian catastrophe, which you've already heard about today, particularly from the Red Cross.
The issue before us is what can be done? What role can Canada play, if any, in the current political and humanitarian situation?
Everyone agrees there should be a ceasefire, immediate humanitarian relief for the affected civilian population, and a return by the belligerents to the bargaining table. The goal is to hammer out an equitable, binding political solution based on some sort of power-sharing formula. However, there are severe obstacles to achieving this global consensus. They centre broadly around that double minority complex I've referred to—that mutual sense of discrimination of the major communities—and they centre more narrowly and specifically around personalities, tactics, and interests within Sri Lanka and abroad.
Because our time is short, I would like to move directly to some assumptions, and then to some suggestions for the near-term and the long-term future of Sri Lanka.
The short-term assumptions are these.
First, a military solution, with a territorial dimension attached, may soon succeed. This is just a fancy way of saying that the endgame may be approaching in regard to the territorial holding of power by the Tigers. If the Tigers are removed from their last enclave, there will likely be some repercussions and opportunities.
We know that the humanitarian situation may become worse in the immediate future, but then again, after that, it may improve. Members are familiar with the stories of Tamil Tigers forcing civilian populations to retreat with them, as they yield territory, and then constraining them from fleeing to safety. The government forces are accused of shelling civilians, even in the safe zones provided for them.
In the near term, a humanitarian ceasefire or military victory will offer opportunities for immediate short-term humanitarian relief. Canada and other states have already pledged to be in position to assist when this happens. This will be gratifying if it happens, but it should not be seen as the end of the story.
The second assumption is this. Seizing the final LTTE territorial enclave will not end violence in Sri Lanka. The Tamil Tigers are among the most resilient and resourceful terrorist organizations on earth. Among other things, they invented suicide bombings—and IEDs have become an export product, unfortunately; they badly bloodied a substantial Indian military force; and they fought the Government of Sri Lanka to a standstill repeatedly, at least up until the LTTE split in 2004. Reportedly they are much better organized among diaspora populations abroad than any other similar organization. The likelihood is that Sri Lanka will see a return to asymmetrical warfare, with deadly results.
The third assumption is this. A political solution is unlikely under the charismatic LTTE leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran. The highly respected International Crisis Group recently noted that, “The Tiger leadership, which has become as much a cult as a rational guerrilla force, will be highly averse to surrender.” Regrettably there's never been any tangible evidence that the leadership will accept anything short of total independence. It appears that only the departure of the charismatic Mr. Prabhakaran from operational control of the Tigers would change that situation.
Finally, the fourth assumption is that it is essential for policy purposes to make a clear demarcation between support for the Tamil people and support for the organization that purports to speak for them. The tendency to blur that distinction, perhaps deliberately encouraged, is a hindrance to effective policy clarity.
Moving from these assumptions, the following recommendations seem worth tabling for the members' consideration. They range from the most immediate to longer-term considerations. They deal with humanitarian, political, and developmental approaches. As well, these suggestions are offered keeping in mind that today's focus on Sri Lanka is part of a broader review by this committee of the conduct of Canadian foreign relations.