Those are good questions. I'll try to respond to a couple of them.
It was quite shocking to see in the aftermath of September 11—which was the most viewed event in Canadian history as well as American history.... People were riveted to this for the immediate period and thereafter. It had an enormously profound impact, which all the evidence suggests was generational—it didn't dissipate. To best sum up the view, Canadians almost felt embarrassed about any of the more churlish or negative views they had about the United States. The overall sentiment was that we were all Americans now.
That sustained the strong support we had for such things as going to Iraq and Afghanistan. But we also saw it dissipate considerably, some time out, as we became much less convinced that Americans were going the right way. Now there is a greater sense of a common plight, with the economic woes that confront both countries. Despite the fact that there are some differences, there's also a greater sense of resonance or sympathy for the political administration in the United States right now.
Do I think this poses a danger that Canadians will perhaps relinquish or sacrifice their sense of their unique identity? I think we should be mindful of that possibility, but I also think the more likely answer is that it won't. Part of the maturing of the Canadian sense of identity that has occurred over the last 20 years has been a sense that we don't necessarily need to define ourselves now as not being American; we have a positive sense of what it means to be Canadian. It's more a sense of what we understand to be a positive conception: of being Canadian rather than of not being American. We see some evidence of that in our data.
Another point worth noting is that when free trade came into existence, the arguments were that both a pre-condition and a result of free trade would be a greater unification of values and subsequently of identity. In fact, we saw in Maastricht—in Europe—that precisely that happened, although there were different reasons. In Europe now, the instance of people who see themselves as both French, say, and European is almost equal, whereas at the outset of free trade the numbers were dramatically different.
What we've seen in North America is quite startlingly different. In North America, despite the fact that the levels of economic interdependence are as high as or higher than in Europe, national identities have actually been increasing through time. If we measure them over the last 20 to 30 years, the incidence of people who see their principal identification as being with their country, in Canada and the United States and probably Mexico, is much higher now than it was at the outset. What has declined is attachment to local community. In Europe, attachment to continent and local community have been rising. In Canada, attachment to North America has been relatively trivial, unlike the case in Europe.
It really is a different sort of trajectory. I would describe it more as a mosaic of strong identities co-existing within a common market. I don't see anything that will disrupt this in the near future. Perhaps another huge security shock is something that could do it, but I personally think that identities in Canada, the United States, and Mexico are relatively robust.
For the kinds of risk that were predicted by a lot of Canadian nationalists in the 1980s, the evidence is that we've sustained a very strong—in fact, perhaps a stronger—sense of identity during this period of trade liberalization. It's one that is in some respects improbable, but I think it answers the question: there's a good chance we'll be just fine, and our flirtation with the new administration does not mean we're going to be surrendering a sense of sovereignty or identity.