Foreign Affairs Committee on March 11th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Lunney.

We'll move to Mr. Dewar.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to our witnesses for their presentations today. Mr. Granatstein, I've read most of your books—

[Dr. Jack Granatstein]

There will be a test.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

There will be. Make sure you include Creighton and some others in there--having taken some history courses and a degree in some of our institutions.

You mentioned this notion of Canadian values, and you talked about freedom and democracy. I don't think anyone would argue with that. But there are also the Canadian values of peace, order, and good government. What we see presently is that—particularly when you juxtapose our governance structure with that of the American structure—when it comes to regulation, certainly we're the envy when you look at our banking system.

I have to say, just for the record, I know our government likes to declare that this is something that is an advantage--I agree with them--but I also note that in the 1980s the present government wanted to deregulate. So I think we have to be clear about how we remain a strong system that people envy.

I want to just lay that out, because if we're going to remain with the kind of dichotomy you presented, of being independent—but of course geography dictates that we're together—when it comes to regulation and policy, what pitfalls do we have to be aware of?

I couldn't agree with you more in terms of it being easy to bash the Americans for this or that. That doesn't get us anywhere. It also insults my cousins who live there. But it is something we have to be smart about. When it comes to both foreign policy and continental policy, it's not all-in. We don't want to just tip the hat.

So what are some of the pitfalls and things that we should be really cautious about when it comes to our relations with Washington?

[Dr. Jack Granatstein]

That's a good question.

If we did what I suggested we do, which is to have a consistent application of our national interests to the choices we have to make in defence, foreign policy, and economics, then at least we have guidelines. I don't think we have applied a national interest test to what we do. We wouldn't have done some of the things we do if we did. I think that is the key way for us to operate. We have to recognize we can win a lot of the battles with the United States on individual issues, but we have no hope of winning the war. They are always going to be bigger, and their will will prevail, if it comes down to it. So we have to be very shrewd when we want to fight and when we want to back off. In other words, we need to know what we must protect, advance, defend. If we have that clearly in mind, we can do very well in any negotiation with the Americans.

But we also need to recognize, as I suggested, that if it gets down to a real slugfest, we cannot win. The big battalions always prevail. That's the reality of life. It's still in our interest to negotiate with the Americans. We have no choice; we must. It's always in our interest to do that, but we need to recognize that sometimes we're not going to win. Sometimes we will get half victories; sometimes we might even get a complete victory, but that will be a rare occasion.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Douglas, quickly, because I think I'm running out of time, you mentioned the green economy. We've been looking to the new administration, and some of us very happily see a change there. Cap and trade is a policy that many of us advanced in the past. We're looking to see that happen in North America.

What are some of the advantages along the border in particular around developing green initiatives, and maybe give some examples you're already working on right now between the two countries?

[Garry Douglas]

This green agenda I think is an example of something that has become very popular, but nobody has quite defined it yet. You can talk to six people and they'll give you six definitions of what it means. It means cap and trade and carbon footprint, it means clean technology, it means alternative energy--it means all those things. It's becoming defined. Canada has a chance to help define that, because again, I think virtually every policy-maker, decision-maker, media mogul, whatever, on the U.S. side of the border is hot on the topic right now, and Canada has a lot to offer.

I'm particularly familiar with the Quebec situation, because those are the folks we most closely work with. The hydro power has an enormous potential. It's already a huge supplier. It has enormous potential for much more, to meet the northeast U.S. electricity needs through a renewable clean source in the future. An awful lot needs to be done with the grid to get it from where it is to where it would need to be in the future.

I think there's some real synergy with wind energy development. It's occurring in New York; it's occurring in my region of New York in a very big way. A lot of the equipment is coming down from Canada. I think there is a technology base in Canada that can be very supportive of that.

There's a lot of university research, a lot of academic research, a lot of R and D work going on. Canada, particularly, tends to be more advanced than the U.S. many times on the R and D end of things. It puts a lot more value on that than we do in the U.S., so it therefore has a contribution to make to new, clean technologies.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

We want to thank both of you for appearing here today.

We do apologize for the little bit of a late start we had. We had a death last night in the press folks, a colleague and friend of many of us, so there was a tribute paid in the House of Commons. I think I need to explain why we were about five minutes late starting.

Certainly we do thank you for your presentations. Let me say that what you have said goes into the blues, and we will all have the opportunity to review the comments you've made. If you would like to forward other ideas, what we are studying in our committee now is a review of Canadian foreign policy, with different key elements, and of course this first one being Canada-U.S. So if you have other thoughts you would like to supply our committee with, we would very much appreciate it.

We're going to suspend for one minute. We'll allow our guests to take leave and the three other guests to take the seats, please.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

We'd like to call this committee back to order.

In our second hour today, continuing on our review of key elements of Canadian foreign policy, we have, from the University of Quebec in Montreal, Professor Stéphane Roussel. He holds the Canada research chair in Canadian foreign and defence policy...Canada-U.S. relations in the Arctic.

We also have Steven Staples, chair of the Rideau Institute on International Affairs.

From the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Colin Robertson is distinguished senior fellow and director of the Canada-U.S. project at the Centre for Trade Policy and Law.

Our committee provides time for each witness to make an opening statement, and then we go into the first round of questioning. We're going to look forward to your comments.

I think Madame Deschamps, who is a valued member of our committee—

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I would like to transmit a message, with your permission, and welcome a group of visitors. I know they will be leaving soon, but a group from the École nationale d'administration publique in Montreal has attended our committee meeting today. I would like to thank them for their interest in our business.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

Every once in a while we have a number of students who come to take in our committee.

We welcome you to Parliament Hill. As you visit here today, be assured that you have a very good colleague in Madame Deschamps. I'm glad she's been able to show you around a bit. Enjoy the rest of your day.

We'll move into the first round, and we'll begin with Mr. Robertson. If you keep it to approximately 10 minutes, then we'll get a little more questioning in. Again, we're running late, and we will have bells starting at 5:30.

Mr. Robertson, welcome back.

[Dr. Colin Robertson, Distinguished Senior Fellow and Director, Canada-U.S. Project, Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Last year, the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and its Centre for Trade Policy and Law formed an expert panel to consider how Canada could best defend its interests through more productive relations with the new Obama government and Congress in Washington. That blueprint reflects our discussions and offers suggestions to Canadians, governments, both national and provincial, for the development of a bilateral program for sustained engagement. Here are our conclusions.

The time for re-engagement is opportune. First, the international financial crisis requires rapid and sustained cooperation. The interconnections between the financial and manufacturing sectors of the two countries, the problems in the automotive sector, for example, would cause any effort directed at purely Canadian situations to fail.

It is particularly important for Canada to be bold and confident to make the best of its unique position next door to the United States. The solution lies in leadership and mutual respect. Personal relations between the heads of government are essential to any good relationship. This has been emphasized a number of times by our American counterparts. The Prime Minister will first of all have to propose to the President that we re-establish annual summits. The agenda is clear, but we must move beyond the incrementalism and irritants management that have characterized the recent past and focus on an integrated and mutually beneficial agenda of major unresolved issues. That means that the most pressing bilateral problem will be to rethink how we manage the North American economic area, energy security and sustainable development; to “rethink” the border; to adopt a single regulatory framework applicable to both sides of the border; and to increase joint regulatory capability.

We believe that Canadians are ready. According to the surveys—and I know that Frank Graves was here—Canadians are generally comfortable with a relationship that works to their benefit and are prepared to support government efforts to gain greater economic and security benefits. There is already a broad range of transborder institutional contact at the federal level. There are also hidden connections between the states and the provinces, particularly between premiers and governors, between businesses and between parliamentarians. That can reinforce national goals and objectives.

The founders constructed the American system on what James Madison called competing interests and public passions. Traditional diplomatic practice was its ritual and protocol.

Relying on the State Department, and occasionally the executive branch, to look out for interests is neither sufficient nor relevant to our circumstances. To advance and defend Canadian interests in a relationship that daily grows more “intermestic” requires a permanent campaign, with a role for all.

As parliamentarians, you have a place in standing with your fellow legislators, members of Congress in both the House and Senate. Congress is the source of most of our problems, sometimes by design, on issues like lumber, beef, and the requirement for passports, but just as often as collateral damage, on trade action directed at others but affecting Canada because the relationship is so close.

As head of the advocacy secretariat in Washington, I worked with the Canada-U.S. Inter-Parliamentary Group co-chairs, MPs Greg Thompson and then Rob Merrifield, and always, Senator Jerry Grafstein.

I was delighted to see the administrative change allowing parliamentarians to include Washington in their travel authority. If I haven't asked today, I would ask that you extend this to all the United States, so you can also visit members in their districts. At its heart, successful diplomacy is all about relationships. In the American context, elected officials share a special experience. Your role is vital and important, and I cannot emphasize enough the value of the work you can do legislator to legislator.

In conclusion, we think it is possible to make major progress with full confidence in our partnership on important issues for Canadians and Americans. The only question, we feel, is whether there is a will to take the initiative and stick with it.

Crisis creates opportunity. Changes are already in motion, be it in the financial sector or in the auto industry. The Obama administration has opened the door, which Canadians can turn into a smart partnership that will move our relationship with the United States to a new and rewarding level.

Once again, Canadians can work with Americans as architects and engineers for new or renovated bilateral and global institutions. Protectionist forces are on the rise in a Democratic House and Senate, and the severity of America's economic crisis can easily lead to flailing that hurts those closest to the flying elbows.

The new President's sense of nuance and his true international concern are still untested and, in large measure, unknown. He's declared himself to be a citizen of the world, but given the pressures on him, we do not know yet how much attention he will be able to devote to the neighbourhood.

Events only underline the need for national leadership, initiative, and a permanent campaign, with parliamentarians playing a key role. The stars are in alignment: Canadians have a comfort level with Obama, and there is consensus among the provinces and on the part of business for engagement with the United States.

Geographic propinquity and a global network reflecting our pluralism gives us a unique sensibility and perspective on international relations. This intelligence is valuable diplomatic currency, especially in Washington. Played adroitly, we can realize for Canada a unique place and standing in a world where the rest want to know what America is thinking and America really wants to know and cares about the rest of the world.

In doing so, we can realize a smart partnership with the United States that we can play to national advantage and benefit. In fact, we must. With over three-quarters of our trade going to the United States, and our prosperity dependent on trade, anything less than a successful partnership will quickly be felt across the country. That should provide us with a sense of focus and determination that easier times might not require.

Merci, monsieur le président.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Robertson.

We'll move to Mr. Staples, please.

[Steven Staples, Chair, Rideau Institute on International Affairs]

Members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me here today on the topic of Canada-U.S. relations.

I'd like to focus today on two areas that are emerging as priorities for the Obama administration that offer Canada the opportunity to pursue our national interests through a more secure world. The first is enhancing space security; the second, supporting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Let's begin with space.

Canadians were reminded about the value of the government's investments in space when we were faced with the prospect of the sale of MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates' space division last year, including the remote sensing satellite RADARSAT-2 and all the intellectual property associated with it. It was a galvanizing moment when public opposition to the $1.3 billion sale to a U.S. defence firm arose quite unexpectedly. To great applause, then Minister Jim Prentice disallowed the sale under the Investment Canada Act, a historic first since the act was established back in 1985.

In the months that have followed, Canadian Space Agency president, Dr. Steven MacLean, has led the development of a new space strategy that will be released very soon. Underscoring how important space is to the delivery of effective services to Canadians, Dr. MacLean has consulted with nine different government departments, all of whom rely on space capabilities to meet their respective mandates.

The next step in terms of supporting our space capabilities and the government's benefit from them is on the international stage. Canada's national interests depend on international space security, which is defined by the space security index as the secure and sustainable access to and use of space and freedom from space-based threats. The index is supported by Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs.

The last two years have seen some hair-raising developments in space. China destroyed one of its defunct satellites using an anti-satellite missile, creating a huge debris cloud in space. The United States likewise shot down one of its own satellites with a missile designed for its controversial and destabilizing ballistic missile defence system, and only weeks ago, two satellites collided in space, a statistical near impossibility that shows how dangerous the space environment has become, and the resulting debris field poses a hazard for the international space station.

Debris, satellite weapons, and anti-satellite weapons all demand action from space-faring nations to preserve our space security.

The Obama administration is taking space security very seriously. President Obama has made a pledge on the White House website that says this:

The Obama-Biden administration will restore American leadership on space issues, seeking a worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites.

Their plan, by the way, goes on and includes other space security initiatives too.

Tomorrow the Rideau Institute and the Secure World Foundation are holding our annual round table on space, which engages experts, government officials, and industry representatives, and which will be attended by a key adviser to President Obama on space issues, Dr. John Logsdon. Logsdon is coming to Canada because the Obama administration will be seeking partners in the international community for its space security objectives. Some officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs have been working away quietly at space security problems, winning respect from our allies. This work must be intensified and expanded so we can contribute in a significant way.

To achieve this, I would like to make the following suggestions: that this committee call upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs and department officials from the non-proliferation and disarmament division to share with the committee members how Canada can support international space security efforts; number two, that parliamentarians establish an all-party informal network on space to consider the challenges faced by Canada and hear solutions from experts and stakeholders and to foment parliamentary cooperation on these issues; third, that the government be encouraged to establish a national space policy that will guide a whole-of-government approach to space, putting principles of peaceful uses of space, international cooperation, and Canadian scientific and technical excellence at its core.

In the few minutes that I have remaining, let me address the second area where I think Canada and the U.S. share a joint interest, and that is nuclear disarmament.

What example could more clearly demonstrate the potential dangerous consequences of maintaining nuclear weapons than the collision of those British and French ballistic missile submarines at the bottom of the ocean a few weeks ago? It's one more reason why many security experts are calling for the scaling down of the more than 20,000 nuclear weapons that remain in global stockpiles. People such as Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry, and Sam Nunn were issuing joint statements calling for the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Like his administration's commitment to prevent the weaponization of space, President Obama is seeking a renewed commitment for the reduction of nuclear weapons. In his famous speech in Berlin during the election campaign, then Senator Obama actually expressed support for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Now President Obama is wasting no time. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Moscow last week, and after her first face-to-face visit with her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, both agreed to improve U.S.-Russia relations. Their starting point will be a new nuclear disarmament treaty to be completed by the end of the year.

Momentum is building, and Canadians should be part of it. In an important address to the upper chamber last month, Senator Hugh Segal reminded members of our traditional role in supporting nuclear disarmament. He said that avoiding nuclear war has been a pillar of Canadian foreign defence policies since the late 1950s, and he called on Canada to play a lead role in avoiding a nuclear catastrophe with Iran.

The Middle East presents us with one such opportunity, but so does Europe. This year marks the 60th anniversary of NATO. This alliance continues to adhere to a strategic concept that relies on nuclear weapons that has really not been updated for a decade.

Indeed, Canada sits on the Nuclear Planning Group, and the remarkable fact that Canada sits on any body with such an odious name as the Nuclear Planning Group would come as a surprise to many Canadians.

Many organizations, such as the Middle Powers Initiative, until this year led by a former Edmonton Conservative member of Parliament and independent Senator Douglas Roche, have been busy preparing the ground for nuclear policy reforms in NATO by working with many other non-nuclear states like Canada.

Other groups such as the Nobel Prize winning Pugwash Conference, named after that village in Nova Scotia where they first met, and Canadian Physicians for Global Survival, are calling on Canada to reaffirm Canadians' commitment to nuclear disarmament during this NATO anniversary year.

In addition to upcoming meetings at NATO, the United Nations will be preparing for the next scheduled review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2010. This provides us with another opportunity.

In conclusion, I would like to make the final recommendations building on the first three. Number four would be that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade use this coming year to explore how Canada can contribute to nuclear disarmament, and, as Senator Segal put it in the Senate, “bring fresh thinking, new ideas and Canadian engagement to geopolitical risks we share” with the United States.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Staples.

We will move to Monsieur Roussel. You have 10 minutes.

[Professor Stéphane Roussel, Professor, Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy, Canada-U.S. Relations in the Arctic, Université du Québec à Montréal]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I really appreciate the invitation, since I started my career here 19 years ago during the Gulf War. I was doing an internship at the foreign affairs committee.

My remarks will essentially focus on one aspect of Canada-U.S. relations, the issue of Arctic governance. This is an important issue. I believe that, at this moment, Minister Cannon is making a statement on the subject in Yellowknife.

I want to emphasize that the thoughts I will be sharing with you today stem in large part from research that I have conducted with my colleague Samantha Arnold of the University of Winnipeg. However, I accept full responsibility for making them.

By way of introduction, I would say that the problems facing the Canadian government in the Arctic are of three kinds. First, it must manage the immediate consequences of climate change on wildlife, plant life, human communities and the environment.

Second, Canada is facing four land challenges, and thus four instances where sovereignty is involved. Two of those conflicts are absolutely insignificant: they are the conflicts with Denmark, one over Hans Island and the other in the Lincoln Sea. However, the other two conflicts are more significant and involve the United States. One concerns the Beaufort sea, and the other, more important, is the quarrel over the status of the Northwest Passage.

The third type of problem facing Canada is the potential growth of human activities in the region, particularly increased navigation, the exploitation of natural resources and even the potential increase in criminal activities. Here I want to emphasize the word “potential”. We are dealing with scenarios here. We do not know what will happen in the next 15, 20 or 30 years. These are threats or problems that may eventually arise. I will mainly focus on these last two problems because they are related to the greatest degree to governance issues.

Since 2004, the Canadian government has taken a number of initiatives to reinforce its presence in the High North, particularly by building ice-breakers, buying helicopters, building port and training infrastructure, increasing the strength of the ranger corps and the conduct of regular military exercises in the High North. These are welcome initiatives. Canada has long been too absent from the High North. They will enable the government to ensure an effective presence in this region and to meet its responsibilities.

However, I will take the liberty here of making a comment. I am cautiously optimistic in this regard. Obviously, all the announcements that have been made are still announcements, not yet concrete measures deployed in the field. It takes 10 to 20 years to put an ice-breaker in service. The problem is that the financial crisis we are currently facing could well lead the government to reduce its efforts and make cuts to some of the programs announced, as was the case in 1989 in particular.

The other problem is that the war in Afghanistan requires considerable financial, human and material resources. I do not believe in the current context that Canada can afford to intervene in both Afghanistan and the Arctic. Sooner or later, the government will have to make important choices.

However, even assuming that these initiatives will in fact be implemented, another question arises: are these essentially unilateral measures enough to achieve the objectives the Canadian government has set in the North? In my opinion, these unilateral initiatives will not be enough if they do not include a diplomatic offensive. They must be accompanied by the signing of agreements with other governments so that Canada's claims are recognized and government services are offered in the most efficient manner possible.

A number of my colleagues and I feel that there is a window of opportunity. Colin Robertson clearly expressed this. There is probably a possibility of improving relations with the U.S. government and, in particular, of establishing new institutions. The diplomatic initiatives I was referring to can be of two kinds: there are multilateral initiatives, which I won't discuss here for the moment, and bilateral initiatives.

Canada has excellent relations with the United States, which we tend to forget when small conflicts arise between the two countries. In the past, the two governments have shown considerable ability to resolve their conflicts in a satisfactory manner and to reach compromises that serve their mutual interests. There is thus reason for moderate optimism in this instance as well over the possibility of resolving conflict in the Arctic.

However, I want to emphasize one thing. The most important factor in Canada-U.S. relations is the bilateral institutions put in place by the two countries. In defence alone, there are more than 850 agreements between the two countries. In my view, those institutions have gone a long way to improving and maintaining good relations between the two countries.

In the past two years, many researchers have suggested establishing a new bilateral Canada-U.S. institution to manage problems and challenges in the High North.

Very briefly, those proposals are consistent with three existing models in Canada-U.S. relations. The first model is that of the organizations for managing and maintaining marine transportation corridors, such as the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation, the U.S. counterpart of which is the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. This is a Crown corporation responsible for maintaining navigation infrastructure in the St. Lawrence and ensuring the safety of ships that use the seaway.

The second type of organization is NORAD, a joint defence organization of the two countries. Two years ago, NORAD was given a marine mandate. I am quite skeptical about the possibility of NORAD being able to provide adequate services in the High North, but this model is often referred to.

The third model—which is perhaps the most promising and useful for our purposes—is that of the conflict and cooperation management institutions. The two best known examples are the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the PJBD, which was formed in 1940, and the International Joint Commission, founded in 1909. These two organizations work very well. They are responsible for making recommendations to both governments in their areas of jurisdiction. They conduct studies and can avoid overpoliticized issues.

If one model were to be adopted to manage Canada-U.S. relations, both conflicts and joint challenges in the High North, it should be the PJBD model.

In closing, we will have to meet a certain number of conditions if we want to establish this kind of bilateral institution in the High North.

First, we must set aside sovereignty issues, which poison Canada-U.S. relations and give rise to needless debates. There is no urgent need to resolve the sovereignty issues immediately. On the contrary, merely raising them can cause discussions between the two countries to break down.

Second, this institution must be functional and very technical in nature. It must focus on problems that are not political, but rather concrete, such as surveillance and aids to navigation, search and rescue and environmental protection.

Third, we must favour a gradual approach. We should introduce limited initiatives which could eventually serve as a basis for building a more ambitious organization.

Fourth, we absolutely must ensure that local governments, that is to say the government of Alaska, the representatives of the Canadian territories and those of aboriginal groups, are adequately represented in that institution. They are the parties most concerned by what goes on in the Arctic.

Lastly, we must ensure that the mandate of this future organization does not conflict with the multilateral commitments of Canada and the U.S. government in the High North. That mandate must be worded in such a way as to enable other players to be invited or to add other areas of cooperation. The organization must therefore be flexible in both its membership and scope.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Mr. Roussel.

Moving to the first round, we have Mr. Pearson and then Mr. Patry.

[Glen Pearson, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you for coming. We appreciate it very much.

Mr. Robertson, a couple of weeks ago we had Thomas d'Aquino here, who's the head of our consulate chief executives. He's been around for a long time. We talked about some of the dislocation that takes place between Canada and the U.S. as far as trade, business, and corporate things go. I asked him what main things could be done to help us round off the rough edges of that to facilitate things more quickly. I was surprised when his first answer was a strengthened public service in Canada. He also talked about a strengthened diplomatic service in Canada for Canada and U.S. relations.

I'd like to know if you agree with that assessment. Because of your own rich experience in this area, how would you suggest we do that?

[Dr. Colin Robertson]

Mr. Chairman, I'm still a serving member of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I'm on loan to Carleton University. I think we have a strong public service, but I think the steps to increase our capacity are always welcome.

[Glen Pearson, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Okay, thank you.

Mr. Staples, I know you were on the CBC recently, and I'm sorry this isn't in the field you were talking about here, but you were speaking about Afghanistan. You had pretty strong views on Afghanistan, as I remember. You don't believe we should be in there much longer; we should be pulling out, if I have you correctly.

I would like to know if you agree with a negotiated settlement about how to do that. Obviously, in your head you have some ideas about how we would go about doing it, if we have to extricate ourselves. Could you give us some enlightenment there?

[Steven Staples]

Sure, I'm happy to. Thank you for the question.

I think you had former Prime Minister Joe Clark appear before the committee as well. We had him at our annual dinner, and he gave an absolutely gripping presentation outlining the spending reductions that have been incurred by the Department of Foreign Affairs. So if it's any wonder how we are punching far below our weight instead of above it, follow the money, as they say in the movies.

In terms of a negotiated settlement, it was actually back in 2006 that I participated in the first press conference here in 130-S, calling for a negotiated settlement. It was clear what was happening in Afghanistan was in fact a civil war that was going on that had never been resolved properly. On September 11, the war on terrorism was laid over the top of it. Really, what we needed to do was to address the local grievances of many of the aspects of the insurgency.

The strategy had to be one of peeling off those elements within the insurgency that we could bring under the government, by trying to redress some of the complaints and issues they had, which are mostly local. There would probably be some spoilers, as they say, and maybe by training the Afghan national forces—the police and army—they would be able to deal with that and provide enough security for the country that then we could get the development and aid going.

I'm still firmly a believer in that, that a negotiated settlement is the way to go, and I think it has been remarkable that the discourse around this issue has slowly come around to that over the last few years, to the point now where we even had President Obama taking a fresh look at the situation and identifying this.

So I think a negotiated settlement is definitely the way to go.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

I just want to interrupt here. Our terms of our discussion today are more specific to Canada-U.S. relationships. Although negotiations with whoever it might be on the other end in Afghanistan may be of interest, perhaps the comments could be more directed to what the American response might be if we did leave Afghanistan right now.

I'm not certain if that's exactly what Mr. Pearson was after, but—

[Glen Pearson, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Mr. Robertson threw me off, and I didn't answer--

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

I'm not certain, Mr. Staples, if any of us knows exactly who the negotiators on the other side in Afghanistan are, but let's try to keep it specific to the United States' response to that type of discussion.

[Steven Staples]

Yes.

Just very briefly then, I think it's clear that the U.S. is going to be moving down this road. At the same time, there's going to be a buildup of troops there. They are going to open up a diplomatic front. That is the tone that's being put forward.

Canada should actively participate in the review of strategy that's going on right now in the United States, and I think we need to show quite clearly that this is not going to be a military solution, and help find ways—give them the benefit of our experience and our diplomatic know-how—that we can move to that reconciliation, as some people have called it, or negotiation, however you want to describe it there.