Thank you, Chair.
Thank you both for coming.
I'm going to split my time with my colleague, which is regrettable since I would really like to pursue a conversation with you, Mr. Siebert. You know I've been a huge fan of Ploughshares for years and will continue to be so.
As you know, Mr. Fowler was here earlier this week, and he probably had the clearest thinking in certainly all of the testimony we've heard. Like him or dislike him, ignore him or accept him, he certainly was clear. The government has chosen, for whatever reason, to just dismiss him as a former diplomat who is somewhat obsessive because of his kidnapping.
Nevertheless, he does join the point with you on, if you will, the initial stages of the military response. The point is that you see this conflict as an insurgency, an insurgency being, if you will, a claim for political territory or a claim for geographic territory, or some ethnic dispute.
Mr. Fowler's point, on the other hand, is that this is not an insurgency, that this is a jihad and they actually don't care about the territorial integrity of Mali, they don't care about the politics of Mali, they don't care about anything Malian. They have a greater mission, and that is to spread some sort of 7th century Islam across the Sahel.
Therein lies the difference. Where you describe the military response as kind of whack-a-mole, Mr. Fowler would say the only point at this point is that you have to degrade and decapacitate al-Qaeda and all of their friends to such a point that they cannot pose a national, a regional, or an international threat, and that is your military goal. Without achieving that military goal, all else becomes fantasy, i.e., the road map to democracy, the restoration of any economic semblance of activity, etc.
I'd be interested to focus on that difference between responding to a jihadist threat versus responding to an insurgency that may or may not have territorial or political ambitions.