Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 24th, 2014

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

That's all the time we have, but just a quick response, if you could.

[Jessie Thomson]

You're absolutely right that we have an issue of very low funding levels. Inside Syria it's only 7% funded; outside Syria it's 13%. Those are fairly recent numbers from the last couple of weeks from the financial tracking system. We have to encourage those donors, especially the Gulf donors that have made big commitments, but haven't necessarily transferred those funds to follow through on those commitments. I think the challenge is that the need keeps growing and the money is finite. So we have to prioritize, we have to coordinate to make sure we're meeting the needs of the most vulnerable, and that we're promoting self-reliance and livelihoods so people can take care of themselves.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

Madame Laverdière, then Mr. Dewar.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Can you come back, because we have so many things to discuss? I'd like to talk more about building local capacities and resilience, and things like that. It's all very important, but I don't want to miss this opportunity either. I think the ICRC has a project on water in Syria, about which I'd like to hear a bit more.

[Robert Young]

Maybe a simple way to illustrate the principles of neutrality and independence and impartiality is that the ICRC has been working closely throughout Syria with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to provide training to volunteers, as some mentioned, and supplies. In simple terms, in lay terms, it's truckloads of chlorine to keep water plants going and to repair plants. I was looking at minutes of meetings last week out of our delegation in Damascus, and they're talking about spare parts and generators for water pumps in cities across Syria.

I wanted to mention that because once the water is pumping, the water doesn't know if it's being drunk by civilians of whichever faith or whichever ethnicity of this fragmented country. It doesn't even know water pipes will go through a divided city, like Aleppo's homes, and will help everyone equally, so that makes a great deal of difference.

Last year the ICRC trained 60-odd volunteers from the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to a high level so they can do the repairs themselves, so they know how to install pumps and the latest, low-tech, easy-to-use equipment to keep municipal systems going. It's not very glamorous. It's not crossing borders with flags waving, but at a very local level keeping water flowing makes a huge impact on people's lives, and again creates the local capacity we all keep talking about.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you.

I just have two quick questions, hopefully. The first one is perhaps to the Red Cross on the UN resolution, which we were delighted to see pass. How are we going to see that operationalized? What are you hearing?

To CARE, we need to leverage money here, and we can do it at home as well. I'm wondering about your take on the idea of matching contributions. I know it's a bit different. I know the model for humanitarian relief is different, depending on the situation, but does CARE have a position on that? I know many Canadians like to donate and see matching funds from government. We've done that in the past to leverage money.

[Hossam Elsharkawi]

We're hoping that the most practical interpretation for this would be negotiated ceasefires that allow humanitarian access to goods, and people to move through, evacuation of the wounded, access for people who want to escape certain regions, and so on. Longer term, we're hoping it opens a window for dialogue. Of course, humanitarian response is never going to be a substitute for a political solution. We're still hoping for this political solution longer term.

In the short term, we're hoping our humanitarian mandate can be accessed, and what we call the humanitarian space can open up a bit more.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Did you get help from the UN to negotiate that?

[Hossam Elsharkawi]

The UN is on the ground in Syria, and they're negotiating access all the time. There's been a lot of talk about these corridors, which the Red Cross is not particularly in favour of because they tend to mask the problem, they tend to create a convergence where refugees may flow to certain areas, which we don't want to see. They also tend to give the impression that once you're in the corridor, that's it, you're protected, and if you're outside the corridor people tend to get neglected, so we're not in favour of that type of decision.

[Jessie Thomson]

The matching funds are an incredibly powerful tool for raising awareness and engagement with the Canadian public. We've really benefited from them, as CARE and as a humanitarian coalition, in recent years. I would say though that we have learned lessons in slow onset emergencies—sadly, this is a slow onset, a simmering emergency—that even with the matching funds it's very difficult to get the same kind of response as you would for a rapid onset emergency. That was the case in the context of the Sahel, where a matching fund was announced but the results were not particularly massive compared to a rapid onset emergency like the typhoon. It can't hurt, but I think we have learned that it doesn't always work as effectively in these kinds of emergencies.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Mr. Goldring, you're going to finish up with probably about two or three minutes.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

Thank you.

On the fundraising between the Red Crescent and the Red Cross, are they completely independent or completely different? Some of the pledges that have been made, have they been from Arab countries? Is there identification of who's putting what forward? There are a lot of very wealthy Arab countries. Have they been contributing a fair balance? Have these been mainly pledges and they haven't delivered on the pledges? Does the funding go into one central organization or is it two separate ones that do their own form of fundraising and get commitments?

[Conrad Sauvé]

I'll let Hossam get into the details, but, first of all, they're not two separate organizations. The Red Cross and Red Crescents are all the same organizations that are all part of the federation, they are not separate organizations in that sense. There are 189 national societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent that are members of the federation. The ICRC is a separate organization and is part of the Red Cross movement. In terms of the participation funding....

[Hossam Elsharkawi]

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which is Geneva-based, issues an appeal, essentially a request for funding, and a plan of action for things like Syria. Member Red Crosses and Red Crescents contribute financially towards that appeal. Some members sometimes decide to go bilaterally and not contribute through that one pot of money. For example, the United Arab Emirates Red Crescent has set up a camp, and hospital, and so on in Jordan on the border with Syria, deciding not to go through the appeal. There are humanitarian activities that go sometimes outside of the pot, but mostly it goes through the pot.

Have Gulf States contributed? Yes, they have. Have they contributed enough? We still need more money.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

But is it decidedly unbalanced on the contributions, or is it just reasonably, some are not keeping the promises that they committed to?

[Hossam Elsharkawi]

It's difficult to tell. On a per capita basis, probably many of the richer nations can do more. We hope they do more. The ask is still out there for a lot more money and a lot more support.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

On this resolution that has just been mentioned here, I see here that it references another resolution calling some four months earlier for basically the same activity of restraint and access. Have there been more in the past, through the three years of conflict? In other words, how many of these suggested access resolutions and calling for action have had any disciplinary action put forward? And what can you do to encourage these to happen? If you don't have a methodology of encouraging, are there going to be more of these resolutions in the future that haven't been acted on?

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

We'll get a response. That's all the time we have, but I'd like a reply.

[Hossam Elsharkawi]

The leadership of the Syrian Red Crescent tells us that when they sit in these private government-to-government meetings, sitting with bureaucrats, and saying, we need to access this area and that area, they are actually able to use these resolutions and statements. Some bureaucrats actually want to do the right thing. Some are afraid, have directives not to do so. The Red Crescent actually uses them in a way as a veiled threat, saying if you don't do this, if you don't give us access, you may be accountable down the line. You will be accountable down the line at some point. Sometimes these things work. It's a hit and miss and we're hoping that this particular UN resolution will be more of a hit than a miss.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

Thank you very much.

That's all the time we have. I know we could go on longer. We appreciate both the Canadian Red Cross and CARE for being here today. Thank you very much.

We're going to suspend so we get our new witnesses up and we'll be right back. Thanks.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

If we can have all the members back to the table, we'll get started.

To our guests, I want to welcome, from the International Republican Institute, Mark Green, who is the president. Glad to have you here.

As an individual, we have Bessma Momani, an associate professor, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo. Welcome to you as well.

We'll start with your opening testimony, Mr. Green, then we'll go to Dr. Momani, and then we'll go around the room and ask questions for the remainder of the hour.

Mr. Green, I'll turn it over to you, sir.

[Mark Green, President, International Republican Institute]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I am honoured to be here today on behalf of the International Republican Institute. We thank the committee for its kind invitation to speak about our work in Syria, and are grateful for this opportunity to share our insights.

Mr. Chairman, tragedy is really the only word that adequately describes the situation in Syria. With a bitter sectarian war now in its third year, jihadist fighters in the ascendancy, and no end to the killing in sight, the conditions could hardly be worse. According to the United Nations, 9.3 million Syrians, or 44% of the population, need assistance; 6.5 million Syrians are internally displaced. Nearly 2.5 million refugees are dispersed throughout the Middle East in tent camps, abandoned buildings, or other makeshift conditions. The latest estimate is that more than 140,000 people have been killed in this conflict. Sadly, the international community has proven largely ineffective in this crisis. No wonder Syrians have little faith in the Geneva negotiations; they have failed to reduce the violence, let alone produce a political solution.

As the civil war has become steadily more sectarian, it has polarized the conflict inside Syria and is having a destabilizing effect outside the country's borders, most notably in Lebanon and Iraq. Equally troubling is the new generation of jihadist converts the Syrian conflict is producing, converts with battle-hardened fighting experience. The intelligence community estimates there are between 75,000 and 115,000 fighters in Syria, including more than 20,000 affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, an al-Qaeda affiliate. All told, there are up to 11,000 individuals from 74 outside nations fighting in Syria. Most of these extremists come from elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. We haven't even begun to understand the long-term impact of their eventual return home and the destabilizing effect they may well have on their countries of origin.

The security vacuum left in Syria has allowed al-Qaeda to establish a new geographic base of operations on the borders of key western allies like Israel, Jordan, and NATO-member Turkey. In short, I cannot think of a more urgent crisis in the world today. If the war goes on for another year or two or three, one is hard-pressed to adequately capture the immense human suffering that will be left in its wake.

As for IRI, we are a non-partisan, non-profit organization that was founded in 1983 along with our sister organization, the National Democratic Institute. Our mission is to advance freedom and democracy internationally by developing political parties, civic institutions, open elections, democratic governance, and the rule of law. We currently work in over 80 countries and maintain offices in more than 30.

IRI empowers men and women working to bring liberty to their lands. We know that they, not IRI, will make their countries free, but as many we have worked with will attest, IRI can help. IRI does not export or implant western democracy. We understand that nations will adopt and adapt democratic methods to fit their own unique historical experiences and culture. It's for this reason that we offer global experiences and knowledge. This has included sharing the Canadian experience through a number of highly qualified IRI staff who call this great country home and a number of election observers who have come from this country, including members of Parliament.

With the terrible situation I've described in Syria, you might think a democracy NGO like ours has no place in the midst of a civil war, however our Syrian program is one of our most active in the entire region. Often at great risk to themselves, the Syrians we work with consistently tell us they want and need our partnership. We have found that there's a strong constituency for democracy inside Syria, but one that is under extreme pressure and deserving of more support.

IRI currently helps in four ways. First, a schools of politics program provides political know-how to grassroots moderate leaders, those who oppose both the Assad regime and radical Islamists. We help them build strong political and civic movements. Second, a democratic governance program helps improve the ability of local councils in opposition-held areas to inform citizens of their important work and to work together in a unified way.

Third is our efforts to build the credentials of women leaders in Syria so that when the “day after” comes, there will be a broad network of women who take part in decision-making. Fourth, we support the Syrian Youth Congress to encourage collaboration among student and youth groups.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to focus briefly on our work with Syrian women, a demographic that has been disproportionately impacted in this conflict. IRI's Women's Democracy Network has trained and supported nearly 500 Syrian women, first by providing tools to ensure that women's equality and rights are enshrined in all levels of transition decision-making, and, second, by building the skills of local women to initiate peace-building and reconciliation efforts. These efforts have led to the development of the Syrian Women's Network, a unified umbrella organization committed to ensuring that women have a place at decision-making tables. SWN coalesces women from opposition and citizen movements that represent a cross-section of Syrians. Currently, SWN is actively campaigning for the release of detainees by raising awareness about the number of detainees, as well as their specific locations. SWN representatives have taken this cause to Geneva several times, and plan to continue utilizing every opportunity to engage decision-makers on this issue.

At the local level, women-led peace-building circles, trained by IRI, exist in eight of 14 provinces. They are another effort to promote women's inclusion in local and provincial decision-making. In a Damascus suburb, for example, a women-led peace circle negotiated and achieved a 20-day ceasefire. WDN also initiated a hotline to Geneva to connect Syrian women with international negotiation and mediation experts.

The goal of IRI's Syria programs is to help emerging leaders represent the needs of Syria's moderate middle, the plurality that subscribes neither to the regime's propaganda, nor radical Islamism. It also ensures that marginalized groups, especially women and youth, can participate fully in decision-making. Many of our Syrian partners have come to view IRI as a lifeline to the outside world. They literally risk their lives to take part in our programs, but they do so because they believe we can help their voices be heard.

Canada has already made a major contribution to Syria's future through its generous $353.5 million contribution to humanitarian assistance, as well as assistance on security and development. Yet, as we would all agree, more help is needed. IRI has several recommendations.

The international community provides extensive humanitarian assistance, but it must do more to recognize the importance of the day after. We must help prepare Syrians who do not aspire to the world view of al-Qaeda and other extremists by providing the skills and resources moderates need to positively impact Syria's transition.

Going forward, to further build the foundations conducive to a democratic Syria, we believe support for local and provincial councils should be increased. These councils can serve as working models of democratic governance in areas outside the regime's control.

As a bulwark against jihadist recruitment, we think efforts in teaching democratic values to young Syrians should be strengthened. We also think additional support for inclusive peace-building is needed so that equal opportunities are presented to all Syrians, especially women, to take part in rebuilding their country.

IRI's chairman, Senator John McCain, recently noted that, “The Assad regime has accelerated its attacks against the Syrian people with more Syrians killed in the three weeks since peace talks began than at any other time during the conflict.”

Mr. Chairman, a negotiated settlement at this point is as elusive a prospect as ever, but it does not preclude efforts to develop democratic values and institutions that are worthy and necessary. We need to give the moderate opposition a better chance to succeed on the day after Assad. At IRI, we believe the best way to achieve this is additional support for democratic governance in the areas outside the regime's grip.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank you for this opportunity and for your attention, and I look forward to any questions you may have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you, Mr. Green.

Now we'll turn it over to Ms. Momani.

[Dr. Bessma Momani, Associate Professor, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo, As an Individual]

Thank you for the invitation.

I'm very happy you were all privy to the testimony of the humanitarian organizations first and foremost, because that's the most important element in understanding Syria. We've heard a lot of numbers, but the few numbers I haven't heard, I have to reiterate. I hope you don't mind. Of that 130,000, there are 11,000 children who have been killed by this conflict. We have six million internally displaced within Syria. What does that mean? That means they're living outside, in parks, in schools, in backyards. Families of about 40 people are crammed into a single apartment. It is a catastrophe and it continues. These three years have been very hard on the Syrian people, so I appreciate that must be first and foremost on everyone's mind.

If I may, I'd like to talk a little about the dynamics on the ground because it's also very important to know where things stand. The Syrian army is still very much in control of the centre and western parts of the country, they have been refreshed with ground troops from Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The Free Syrian Army, which the west hoped was to be the secular army that we could support, so to speak, has been in control of parts of the south and most of the north. That said, as Mr. Green has noted, we've seen the encroachment of two new actors, particularly the ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq, as well as the Islamic Front, which have taken over the eastern part of the country. Both ISIS and IF, one has to point out, are not al-Qaeda, and this is really important. ISIS is perhaps, let's call it an affiliate or has affinity to al-Qaeda. Islamic Front, which is the much larger group, does not and does not pledge allegiance. That's not to say they are the most open-minded people, they are still very much Salafist conservatives, but if they want to grow their beards and have their pants short, that's up to them. The point is, they're not a threat to the west, and I want to point that out.

The Kurds are in control of the northeast. And as was pointed out earlier, based on some of the assessments to you all as noted by Professor Landis a few weeks ago, he did raise concerns about the Kurds. They have gained a lot of autonomy, they are set to claim some sort of autonomy, and I'm going to talk about the consequences on the region, because that's an important part of the fallout of what will happen with Syria. Although I disagree with Landis on this point, the rest of the country is not up to be fragmented. The rest of the country is not homogeneous and is pretty heterogeneous. Look at cities like Hama and Homs. All major religious, ethnic, and sectarian groups are represented. It's not easily divisible per se.

In addition to that, I would like to talk a little about the Free Syrian Army, which, as I said, was our hope; they have been shortchanged. Senator McCain has brought this up, and he's absolutely right. We have shortchanged them in terms of weaponry, while the Syrian army continues to be replenished by the Russians, by intelligence from Iran, particularly its Revolutionary Guard. I have to point out this is not against any international law. Because there is no UN Security Council resolution to prevent them from doing so, the Russians are allowed by international law to continuously replenish the Syrian regime with arms. ISIS and IF have been getting some weapons, much of this is private through individual donors from the Gulf. Some Gulf countries are directly supporting these two factions, but a lot of this is private money. In some cases it is almost a competition between ISIS and IF for the most gruesome videos as a way to get paid by their paymasters. So this is also blazing a new fight online to get donors, and often these donors have very radical views themselves.

The situation of the neighbourhood is something that those who testified noted, and it needs to be pointed out. Lebanon is the size of Connecticut; it has taken the influx of a population that's about 20% to 30% of its own. Lebanon is extremely fractured, it underwent its own sectarian and civil war, very similar to the fault lines we see in Syria. They refuse camps, we did not hear this in the earlier panel. They refuse to have camps, they do not want to have a permanent fifth column based in their country. So we're seeing the craziest things. Many Syrians are not allowed to create four walls because that creates a camp. So we're seeing teepees created throughout Lebanon to circumvent the rules of creating a camp. There are plenty of camps, they're just squalid slums. They're not organized camps as we see in other parts of the region.

Jordan, one of our free trade partners, has taken on more refugees than it has citizens in some cities, as has been pointed out. Putting this into the bigger context of Jordan I have to point out that it's still a catastrophe. Syrian refugees today account for 10% to 20% of the population. Why is there this range? We have everything, from those who have been accounted for, who have been documented by the UNHCR, to many who are making their way through undocumented, crossing through a very porous border, but most importantly, they are not reporting to the UNHCR. They must do this voluntarily to be identified as a Syrian refugee. We're not getting all the numbers. Palestinians still account for 50% or more of the population. Do the math and that means Jordanians are the minority in their country.

What does this mean for Jordan and Lebanon? These are two very taxed economies in the sense that they are very much under high public debt. As you can see, the influx of all this labour that's undercutting local wages means that we have high unemployment. We have inflation because the price of everything has gone up, from food to rent, to all basic goods and services. These countries are both under IMF loans today. That's just an example of how stressed they are.

I'll talk about their political situation because that can't be ignored. Iraq has taken about 500,000 refugees, 98% of whom are Kurdish. They are not feeling nearly the same kinds of challenges partly because they are going into Kurdish communities and they don't have a financial burden per se. Nevertheless, it only strengthens what we're going to see as the resolve of the Kurdish people in Iraq to eventually call for their autonomy, which I will talk about.

In Turkey, 300,000 are in camps and 700,000 are outside of camps. Turkey felt very strong financially three years ago. It had a current account surplus. I don't know if you are watching the financial news but Turkey is in a huge crisis today. It's become an enormous financial burden. The southern part of Turkey is facing the same kinds of issues that we see in Jordan and in Lebanon, i.e., high unemployment, inflation, and very much a sense of resentment. I have to point out that all these countries have been so gracious. The local people have been gracious to the refugees in bringing them into their home in many cases but three years is a lot to expect of anyone. Keep that in mind. These are really welcoming societies that have been so giving but it's been very taxing.

What's the worst-case scenario? I hope we recognize that Syria is not just imploding, it's exploding. If we start thinking about it exploding, the status quo is just not acceptable. Lebanon, as I pointed out, has these fault lines of sectarianism. We've already seen the result of that, which is tit-for-tat bombing. The city of Tripoli, for example, has some of the most awful kinds of fault lines. Literally, there is a street, which, ironically, is called Syria Street. It is now a battle zone. If you cross that street from one to another community you will be killed by sniper fire. That will not end well. The country is slowly on its way to a political collapse. Add to that the economic burden. Jordan is also facing this. The Jordanian population that is native to the country is sick and tired of being the hotel, if you will, for all these international refugees from Palestine, from Iraq, and now from Syria. They are calling on their government and their king for an enormous number of reforms that not only include liberalization, which I would encourage, but more importantly eliminating some of the rights given to some of the other minority groups there. That is not a healthy situation. Kurdistan, the northern part of Iraq, is one of the most enormously successful economic beacons of Middle East prosperity, and it really needs to be encouraged. It is sick and tired of being attached to a dead weight. That's the rest of Iraq today; the central government is a mess, the rest of the country is a mess, and it would only take time for Iraqi Kurdistan to ask for independence.

When do we watch for this? This April we will have presidential elections in Iraq, which I think are going to be very important. Chances are the Malaki government has been continuing its grip on much of the country, and corruption is at an all-time high. Why does this matter for Syria? He's taken this out on the province of Anbar, which has been taken over by ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. They have an affinity for each other. Now he is asking the Americans to give them as much weaponry as possible to blast Anbar away. I can tell you there is going to be a lot of blowback. If anybody remembers anything about Iraq, Anbar province does not go down quietly.

How can Canada help? Global resettlement. We need to come to terms with the reality that this is a refugee crisis that is not going away. People are not going to go back. How can you know? It's simple. Just look at the aerial pictures that we've seen of Syria today. There are no homes to go back to in many of these rebel areas.

So for parts of Dara'a, in the southern part of Syria—much of the Zaatari camp in Jordan today has many of its people—there is no Dara'a to return to. There needs to be a real global international refugee resettlement, and Canada can help. Canada has claimed that they will take 1,600. Only 200 have come. That is a pitiful amount.

I have to point out.... I have written a book on this, so please bear with me here. The Syrian immigrants who came to this country in the 1800s built parts of Montreal. They are an important fabric of this society. We have maybe 100,000 Syrian Canadians who have businesses, who are open and wanting—I meet many of them in my day-to-day interactions—and who say, “Please, how can I bring my family?” They say, “I do not want a thing from the Canadian government. I just want to bring them here.” We need to start seriously thinking about that and to open our arms, as we did so many times to many immigrants throughout the world.

We need to open our doors to students. That's the best dollar that you can invest in public diplomacy. I've tried to work with an agency called Jusoor to try to get some recognition in my university for Syrian students. It's such an uphill battle. Basically, we need to have a million dollars in a bank account for our university to accept a foreign student. That's unacceptable. We need to do something about that. Again, it's the best form of public diplomacy you could ever invest in.

We need to expedite applications for skilled labour and for family reunification. We need to support the human corridor. I disagree with the previous panel. I think this is unfortunately an important reality. If we want to alleviate the stress on the neighbours that Syria has...we need to start making the Syrian government responsible for the territory that it is going to have to give up for those refugees. Let's not forget that the Syrian regime is very happy to basically kill another 21 million people to stay in power. That's the essence of the problem.

Finally, if we're going to do some things that I think are useful, we need to have the doubling, the matching funds. It is a signal that our government cares. It's not just about the dollars earned. It's to say that, yes, we care. If you just put the numbers on the map, it's absolutely vital that we think about that.

I just came back from Washington recently, where I was looking at how we, as a civil society, can support counter-narratives against hate speech. We need to invest in this. There is an enormous amount of sectarian hatred in the Syrian Canadian community, in the Syrian community writ large. It has spilled over into the Arab community. We can invest money. There are some fantastic programs, which I'd love to talk to people about if they're interested, on how to support counter-narratives to counteract all that awful hate speech, that sectarianism that's brewing in the region today as a result of political dynamics, not as a result of people who have not been able to coexist. Quite the contrary, they've coexisted very nicely for thousands of years.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much, Ms. Momani.

We're going to start with you, Mr. Dewar. You have seven minutes, sir.