Foreign Affairs Committee on April 7th, 2014

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

We're going back to Mr. Dewar, for five minutes.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thanks again, Ms. Stein.

I want to talk about sanctions again. One of the questions that is important to raise, just to get your take on it, is that if we put in sanctions, as we all agree around the table, they have to be targeted. They have to be focused. They have to be smart, as you said, but they also have to have goals. If you don't lay out what your goals are for the sanctions, it becomes very confusing, not only for you but for the people with whom you are trying to engage.

What do you think our goals should be when it comes to sanctions? Should it be to get out of Crimea? Should it be to sit down at the table? What do you think is the best message to be sending because, I'll be frank with you, that might be a little lost at this point because events have taken over. I'm not being critical of any one actor, but some people have asked what the goals are for these sanctions. I'd like your take on that.

[Prof. Janice Stein]

That's an excellent question.

Just to take us back for one moment, the Ukrainian government has the right to feel an enormous sense of betrayal, because when it gave up nuclear weapons, to put this in the broader context of security challenges in the world, Russia, the United States, and Britain guaranteed the integrity of Ukraine in the Budapest Memorandum in 1994.

The reason I bring this up, Mr. Dewar, is that it's so important that we all understand the significance of this as we ask other powers not to develop nuclear weapons. This in many ways is a case that is obviously important to Ukrainians, but whose importance goes way beyond Ukraine as a result of the international guarantees it received. That then affects my view of appropriate goals for the sanctions.

I think the first goal is that Russia come to the table and enter into a diplomatic process with the Government of Ukraine, helped by others in which there is some agreement on a fair and appropriate political process to canvass the opinion of Crimeans that the process we saw was unacceptable. That's to me an important goal because we in a sense gave our word to the Government of Ukraine. We can't simply turn our back and legitimate the dismemberment of any part of Crimea without a fair political process. That to me is the core goal.

Obviously the events of the last 24 hours are alarming. Here we need to send a clear message again that any engineered referenda in any other part of Ukraine would inflame the situation past the point of no return. The more strongly we say that over the next 48 hours—not only we, but the United States and the leaders of the European Union—the more likely we are to avert behaviour that will push people beyond the point of no return.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you.

We've just received information that Russian diplomats or officials are being barred access to NATO headquarters. That's something that has just transpired. I put that on the record for people's information.

I want to touch on the importance of pre-election observers. We've talked here about having election observers and the government has supported that in the past and put in some significant dollars to help with that. Do you think there's a benefit and need for pre-election observers, and what would that be, in light of what's happening right now leading up to the election?

[Prof. Janice Stein]

Certainly if we could deploy election observers 10 days or two weeks before the election, they'd get a better sense of what's happening on the ground. They establish contact with the people that they need to. What I would not recommend right now, given the uncertainty in southern and eastern Ukraine, is that we deploy any civilian personnel into an environment that is frankly explosive, where they would not be able to secure their own safety. That is not something which I think the Government of Canada should do.

I think it's important that we not put Canadians in a vulnerable position because should their security be compromised, the Government of Canada would find itself frankly in a dreadfully difficult position.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

So would you recommend a multilateral approach, in which we and all our partners agree where we should go and go that route?

[Prof. Janice Stein]

The more we can coordinate with our allies, the more our impact would be. There's no question about it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

We're going to finish up with Mr. Goldring. Sir, you have five minutes.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

Thank you for appearing here, Ms. Stein.

I understand from my many visits to Ukraine that religion is supported by, they say, in the area of 80% of Ukrainians who would declare themselves as being somewhat religious or very religious. We know that among the major churches in Ukraine, one of them is the Russian Orthodox religion. They have a council of churches in Kiev that includes all of the major churches, Jewish and Russian and that. It's being chaired by a person of the Russian Orthodox church.

Given the scenario and circumstances particularly in the Russian border areas and the unsettlement through there, could the churches play a role in this? I'm thinking that if the council of churches, if they do have that power and sway, could put out a proclamation for every single church, every single parish, to support the concept of linguistic and cultural inclusivity. That might have, I think, some calming effect. As well, with the upcoming presidential election, if that were initiated, that would give the upcoming candidates for the presidential election...to reinforce and to be taken into the Rada by whoever was successful in the election.

What do you think? Do you think there could be a role for the churches if this were able to be put together?

[Prof. Janice Stein]

The role of any multi-religious or multi-faith or multilinguistic group is absolutely critical in these kinds of situations. What normally happens under these conditions, and we see it everywhere, is polarizing, where communities, able to live together in peaceful terms, as security is threatened and as passions are heightened will break apart. Neighbours who were formerly able to go to church together will all of a sudden look at each other with suspicion. The “us” and “they” kind of divisions deepen.

In Kiev right now, there is still time, with courageous leadership, for the council of churches to take a strong position. That would be deeply reassuring, especially to those who find themselves as minorities. Ukraine has minorities in different parts of the country, so were they able to summon that kind of leadership, that would be, I think, very reassuring.

Is there a role for church leaders in this country, in Canada, to be in contact with their fellow leaders in Ukraine and to urge that kind of action on them? Very, very much so; very much so.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

We see in regular elections the various churches marching with their candidates of choice, and they're actually campaigning there. We know that the Russian Orthodox is predominantly the blue and white, and the other orthodoxies are for the various other candidates too.

So if they campaign with them there, my feeling is that at a local church level their message to defuse the situation or bring about calm would be taken very, very strongly and would give the assurance in the regions themselves.

[Prof. Janice Stein]

Again, what's important to avoid is that Russian Orthodox church leaders campaign only in Russian neighbourhoods, among Russian populations, because if that happens, the signal is exactly the reverse of what you're talking about: it's divisive and it aligns church with language and ethnicity.

What you're looking to preserve is that multi-faith, multi-language forum that welcomes everybody and sends a message that they, as religious leaders in Ukraine, see the future of Ukraine as multilingual, multi-religious, multi-ethnic. That's the reassuring message.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

That goes back to the council of churches, then.

[Prof. Janice Stein]

Yes, and out of the campaigns, actually.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

You have 30 seconds left. Do you have a quick question?

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

No, I'll let it go at that.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

Ms. Stein, thank you very much for taking the time to be with us today. We also appreciate your flexibility in terms of rescheduling from the other week.

Thank you very much.

[Prof. Janice Stein]

I invite you all to come and visit Munk School in Toronto and spend some time with our students. They always benefit from meeting with members of Parliament.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you for the invitation.

I'm going to suspend the meeting until we get our next couple of witnesses up. We'll come back in about five or so minutes.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Welcome back everyone.

Welcome to our two witnesses who are joining us via video conference from Washington.

We have with us David Kramer, president, Freedom House. Welcome, David. We're glad to have you here today.

Also from Washington via video conference we have, from the McCain Institute for International Leadership, Kurt Volker, who is the executive director.

Kurt, welcome to you too, sir.

Why don't we start with you, Kurt. We'll start with your opening testimony. Then once we have both opening testimonies presented, we'll go back around the room with the members of Parliament to ask some questions.

Mr. Volker, we'll turn the floor over to you, sir. You have the floor for 10 minutes, please.

[Kurt Volker, Executive Director, McCain Institute for International Leadership]

Thank you very much for inviting me. It's an honour for me to be here.

I want to walk through a few framing points about how I think we need to be looking at the situation in Ukraine, and how we need to be looking at the options we as a transatlantic community, as a democratic community, should be pursuing.

The first thing I would say, and I had planned to say this before getting the news this morning, but it's even more relevant now, is that we have to be very clear that the crisis in Ukraine and the crisis in eastern Europe is not over.

There has been a tendency in the past week to think, oh well, we lost Crimea, but now that's it, and things will calm down again. I think it's quite the contrary.

I think President Putin in Russia has put a lot of tools on the table now. He has taken the military out of the box. He has put his special operations forces to work at agitating demonstrations. He has poked in Transnistria in eastern Ukraine, in Crimea of course, in South Ossetia in Georgia, even a demonstration in Tblisi in favour of Russia which had been unheard of a year ago. He's put a lot of chips on the table now, and I don't think he's going to put them away very lightly, particularly if he feels there is no penalty for him to continue to try to push. This is not a crisis behind us that we now analyze. This is a crisis that is still unfolding in front of us.

The second point I would make is that the approach we have taken as a western community through the G-7, through the United States, the European Union, has been one of incremental escalation of sanctions or travel bans in response to Russian actions. Thus far, the level of sanction or the level of pain we've been willing to inflict has not been commensurate with the steps Russia has taken, and they are in no way strong enough to provide a deterrent.

In fact, I think a proper approach would be to do exactly the opposite, which is to immediately put enough painful sanctions, and travel bans, and sanctions upon companies, sectors, and energy on the table, before Russia takes the next step, so there is then an incentive for President Putin and Russia to negotiate away from those sanctions and penalties, rather than feeling, “There is nothing here now. I'll take another step, and then see what happens.” He can always back down a little bit from that further step, although we have already ceded every step he has taken to this point.

The third point I wanted to make is that this is not only about Ukraine. It is about the order of Europe we helped to construct together after the fall of the Berlin wall. You can see pressure points emerging already in the Caucasus, in the Baltic States, of course in Ukraine, in Moldova, even in the Balkans. Everything we had done to build freedom, democracy, and market economy, rule of law, and human rights in a secure zone for a wider transatlantic community is being put under test right now to see how committed we are to advancing that vision—and right now Putin is concluding we're not committed—and how committed we are even to maintaining what has already been achieved. I think that is something we need to be very conscious of.

The fourth point I would make is that we should not take military instruments off the table. Putin has taken the military out of the box already and he has used it. He has used it to acquire territory, and the absence of any resistance has made it a relatively smooth process, just one Ukrainian soldier killed today, and I think there was one injured previously, but there has been no real military resistance.

As long as President Putin feels there is no military pushback and no potential military pushback, he's going to see an imbalance in the forces at work here, with our being willing perhaps to put on economic sanctions or travel bans, which he'll view as temporary, negotiable, and eventually they will be lifted, versus the physical acquisition of territory geography which will become permanent, a permanent part of the Russian empire, and an asset to Russia in the long term. He's willing to risk the temporary sanctions in order to make these long-term gains. We need to put into his mind some doubt that maybe, in fact, there would be some military pushback at some point.

Now, I would separate the military question into two categories, defence and deterrents.

On the defence side we have to be absolute. There can be no encroachment on the territory of any NATO member, and we should put in place every mechanism at NATO's disposal today to send the signals to make clear we will protect that territory and protect that country.

We've done some of that already. I want to give some credit to NATO thus far, but we do need to go further.

We need to complete all the contingency plans for the defence of every NATO member state, and we haven't done that yet. We need to increase air defences along the area bordering Russia, particularly in the Baltic States. We made some progress in air policing in the Baltic States, but we also need some ground-based air defences.

We need to do exercises with countries bordering on the territory of Ukraine and Russia, particularly Poland and Romania. These exercises need to include ground forces that would be ready in the case of a decision to use them, so that Putin would know that there is a capability there, because at this point, he doubts that we have both the capability and the will.

We need to put an arms embargo in place against Russia. We also need to be doing everything we can to support the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and the Ukrainian armed forces by providing, for example, better intelligence, advisers to the Ministry of Defence, and additional equipment, perhaps even on the basis of loan guarantees, so that we are increasing the potential pain that Russia would feel if there were to be any military incursion into Ukraine and to raise doubts about what the further western response would be should that happen.

That is a long list of steps that could be taken today, both on the non-military side, on sanctions, as well as on the military side. At this point, I believe that President Putin believes that he faces no real consequences and no real pushback, and that most of the steps I've just outlined will not be taken. As long as that's the case, I think we face a very dangerous window right now where Putin, having put all these pieces on the table, is going to be willing to use them to see how far he can get before he really needs to back down on something. Thus far, I think he thinks he can go very, very far.

I'll pause with those remarks. I would be delighted to take part in the questions and answers.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much, Mr. Volker.

I'll now turn it over to David Kramer from Freedom House.

Mr. Kramer, the floor is yours, sir.

[David Kramer, President, Freedom House]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is an honour for me as well to appear before the committee. I do want to pay tribute to the steps your government has taken in response to the crisis in Ukraine involving Russia and also your interest in holding this hearing. We appreciate it very much.

The democratic community of the nations, I would argue, has never faced a graver threat since the end of the Cold War, and we might even have to go back as far as the Cuban missile crisis to find something which I think is as much of a threat as we are seeing unfold with Putin's Russia and the invasion and annexation of Crimea. Now it's the threats we see in the eastern parts of Ukraine, but also beyond the borders of Ukraine: the threats that Kurt mentioned with Moldova and Transnistria; the problems that Russia is able to stir up in Latvia with its ethnic Russian population, as well as in Estonia. In the latter two cases we're talking about countries that are members of NATO, that would invoke article 5 should the situation get uglier than what we've seen so far.

I would agree with Kurt when he said that so far Putin has not seen enough disincentive to stop the kind of behaviour in policies and actions that he has engaged in. I would also say it is now a mistake on the part of the west to withhold any further sanctions and make them conditional on Russian troop movements across into Ukraine's eastern and southern borders.

The point should be to pre-empt any possibility that Putin would send forces across the border into further parts of Ukraine, not to react to that step should it happen. So I would argue that the west needs to go forward and as soon as possible with what we call stage three sanctions that would include more individuals close to Putin. It would include state-owned enterprises, Russian banks. Start going after the Russian economy itself. I think anything short of that is unlikely to get Mr. Putin's attention.

Let me offer, if I may, a few thoughts about Putin's Russia, because I think that is central to what we're talking about, and about how to respond to the threat that Putin's Russia poses, and then how we should be helping Ukraine. I'll try to complement what Kurt said because I agree with virtually everything that he had offered.

Vladimir Putin, I would argue, oversees a thoroughly corrupt authoritarian regime and also combines a paradoxical if not dangerous combination of paranoia and insecurity along with arrogance, assertiveness, and self-confidence. We saw this paranoia really come to the fore after the colour revolutions starting in Georgia in 2003, and then in Ukraine in 2004.

Then if we look to events in the Arab world in 2011, Putin once again got rather spooked by these popular movements that were calling for and demanding better governance, transparency, rule of law, dignity, respect for human rights, all of those concepts alien to the system of government that Putin has put in place in Russia.

Fast forward to November 2013 on through to today and we see what has been happening in Ukraine as a further challenge to Putin, not only to his efforts and goals to try to establish an economic union, a Eurasian economic union, but also as a model for Slavic people demanding a more transparent, accountable government based on rule of law. That is a threat not only for the kind of government Putin would like to see in Kiev, but it also could pose a threat to Russia itself should Russians decide, if Ukrainians can do that and demand that, then shouldn't they be demanding the same thing from their own government?

The irony is that Putin has justified his actions in Crimea by saying he's going to the defence of Russian-speaking populations there. In reality, Putin shows no interest or concern for the welfare of Russians inside Russia itself; so he only uses this excuse for politically expedient purposes in order to fabricate a reason for sending Russian forces in. Putin, we have to remember, thinks in zero-sum terms, and what is good for Ukraine or what is good for the west must ipso facto be bad for Russia and bad for him. That's why he tries to block efforts by Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other countries to westernize and democratize, because he sees those trends and those movements as a threat to what he's trying to establish in Russia itself.

His foreign policy, I would argue, is in many ways an extension of his domestic politics.

Essentially, he tries to justify his way of governing in Russia by perpetuating the absurd notion that the west, particularly the U.S., is a threat to Russia.

If we look at the reality, Russia has the most secure, stable borders with those countries, namely, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland, that are members of NATO and members of the EU. Therefore, NATO enlargement really does not pose any threat whatsoever in real concrete terms to Russia, though Putin likes to perpetuate the psychology that it does.

Let's also not forget that while I've been talking a lot about Putin, Viktor Yanukovych also deserves a lot of blame for what happened in Ukraine.

I was there in Ukraine for both the January and February 2010 elections. He was elected democratically, but a democratically elected leader is not endowed with permanent legitimacy. I would argue that over the months and years that Yanukovych served, he forfeited that legitimacy through massive corruption on a scale much greater than we had seen in Ukraine in the past, through unconstitutional moves, and then not least by using force against peaceful protestors as early as November 30 and December 1 last year, and then of course with the killing of close to 100 people in February this year.

How should the west respond? I do give credit to the west for imposing sanctions in a rather short period of time. Ratcheting up the sanctions has been helpful. But I also agree with Kurt when he points out that we can't simply be in reactive mode; we actually have to be proactive and try to pre-empt the aggression and assertiveness that we've seen from Putin. That's why I feel it is important to move ahead now with more sanctions, and not simply to wait for Russian forces to trip a wire by crossing into Ukrainian territory.

I would say that the Russian economy is vulnerable to tough hard-hitting sanctions. We've seen the ruble fall and the stock market drop, and we've seen capital flight reach a level beyond all of last year's numbers, estimated at some $70 billion. Russia is much more integrated in the global and western economies than it has been in the past, and therefore, it is much more vulnerable and exposed to tough measures by the west.

I do commend Canada, the United States, and the EU for what they have done, but they need to do a lot more and they need to do it now.

Last, there is of course the issue of helping Ukraine. Aside from the measures that Kurt has identified, I would argue that there are a few issues we need to keep a focus on.

First, we should continue the policy of non-recognition of Russia's annexation of Crimea. We should not simply accept it as a fait accompli and think there is nothing we can do about it. We took this position with Russia's absorption of the Baltic States in the 1940s, and it turned out to be the right position. We should not simply write off Crimea and say that all is lost.

We need to move as quickly as possible with disbursing funds to help Ukraine's poor economic situation. I am heartened to see the fast progress in negotiations between the IMF and Ukraine and also by western governments in providing assistance.

I would say that it's equally important to help Ukraine recover the estimated tens of billions of stolen assets that Yanukovych and his circle took from the country.

It's also important to help Ukraine with energy reforms, and also for the west itself to re-examine its energy dependence on Russia, which I tend to think is exaggerated and can be rather quickly changed.

We should look out for the welfare of the Crimean Tartars and the ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea itself. Essentially we have close to 800,000 people in Crimea who have been disenfranchised as a result of Russia's annexation of Crimea, and their welfare is, I think, something we should keep on our radar screens.

We should insist that May 25 be the date of presidential elections in Ukraine. There are efforts both inside Ukraine by certain political forces and by Russia to postpone these elections so that Russia can argue that there continues to be, in its mind, an illegitimate government in Ukraine. May 25 is the date that has been targeted for elections. That's when elections should be held. We should be doing everything we can to help Ukraine conduct an election that will be deemed free and fair so that they can have a legitimately elected president leading them into the future.

We should also work with independent media in Ukraine and with civil society groups, all of whom have played a really key role in developments in the past few months and even in the past few years. When all hope looked lost, I would argue that civil society in Ukraine really stepped up and showed that it is a very powerful force in the country.

Last, I would say that we need to do everything we can to assist development of real democratic institutions in Ukraine so that the country does not squander yet another opportunity to move in a more positive direction. We saw this after the Orange Revolution of 2004, when the orange forces blew an opportunity to really solidify Ukraine in a more democratic, westernized direction. We have to do everything we can to make sure Ukrainians don't miss yet another opportunity.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, it's remarkable to me that so many Ukrainians churn down the streets in Kiev and elsewhere throughout the country demanding democracy, dignity, rule of law, human rights, a western orientation, not to the exclusion of good ties with Russia. So many people did it again, and in the worst of all weather, after they did it almost a decade ago. That they continue to persevere and demand that for their country is impressive to me. It also makes it incumbent upon all of us in the west to help them as much as we can.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you, Mr. Kramer.

We're going to start questions now, and we're going to start with Mr. Dewar for seven minutes, please.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you to both our guests.

I want to start off with a question for both of you. I had asked a previous guest today what are the goals for sanctions. As you know, we've all supported sanctions—Canada, the U.S., and the EU—and that they be smart, targeted sanctions, but the question which I think we have to focus on is to what end. In your opinion, what should the sanctions be for? Is it for immediate withdrawal from Crimea? Is it to get the Russians to the table? In your opinion, what should be the clear message we put out vis-à-vis the sanctions and what we're putting them in place for? Sometimes that message gets lost.

I'll start with Mr. Kramer, and then Mr. Volker.