Thank you very much.
Thank you for inviting me to be a witness and to give some ideas, but very, very briefly; I don't know what I can develop in eight to ten minutes.
I was twice the special envoy in Iraq and once in Syria. In Iraq it was immediately after the war in 1991; it was mainly for the humanitarian side and the exchange of prisoners of war; and then in 2006 and 2007. I developed a relationship with all parties—everybody except al-Qaeda, which was the only one because they have an agenda going beyond Iraq—until I resigned at the beginning of 2007, protesting the designation of the agendas. Then I was in Syria from September 2012 until last May, and again I did resign protesting the designation about what was done, even if it was done in the name of the UN.
I can say very briefly that we have to take into consideration that the crises in Iraq as well as in Syria have some commonalities. Both crises have to be addressed at three levels: the local one, the regional one, and the international one, because there are so many actors.
The second remark I would make is that both societies have very deep problems, but mainly two problems: they are strongly fragmented societies such that I cannot tell you how many actors there are in both cases; and the second one is the very high level of mistrust between the people themselves, between Iraqis as well as between Syrians. They don't even make a distinction between dialogue and negotiation. So you have to dialogue without even knowing the framework, and it's very hard. I can give witness to a lot of things about when I was there and talking. I developed, and I'm still developing, a relationship with everybody. Just last week I was in Istanbul to meet with both the Syrian opposition as well as the Iraqi opposition and to see where things are moving.
There are also some differences that are historic. Ibn Khaldun talked about the asabiyya and the difference between the tribal mentality and the commercial mentality, which is Syria and Iraq. The way it is addressed...I witnessed even the development of Daesh. What I have to say about ISIL prior to that is that al-Qaeda is not an organization; al-Qaeda is an ideology that is becoming like a franchise. It's like a McDonald's. The ideology is there, and there are so many groups claiming part of this ideology and looking for the same objectives.
How should we address that internationally? How should Canada be a part of very seriously addressing this? It's not only a matter of security. I think one of my predecessors spoke about education.
I think one thing that's missing—I tried very, very hard on this when I was in Iraq—is some changes in the constitution; that, when they were discussing the constitution, the constitution in this part of the world should be based mainly on two principles: equal citizenship and respecting pluralism. This is strongly missing from there.
In the way it was addressed, especially during the time of President Bush, there were so many mistakes. When I was asked to meet with Secretary James Baker, and the Hamilton committee in Baghdad, I told them the way they were working here reminded me of what Winston Churchill said in his memoirs: that the Americans, before doing the right thing, have to exhaust all other alternatives. Unfortunately, again it's the case in the way of fighting ISIS. If we cannot develop a culture of respect and if we cannot address things that push a lot of people into frustration.... If we have one, two, or three boys in their twenties blowing themselves up to kill others, it can be abnormal, but if it is repeated, then there is something wrong. We have to go very deeply to address all kinds of problems.
When I was in Iraq in 2006 and 2007, it was the beginning of ISIL when it was just the Iraqis with...and al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006. Then when I moved to Syria, al-Nusra, which is the branch of al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, the guy who established al-Nusra, was asked by Daesh, by the Iraqi people, because he was in Iraq with them, to come to Syria to have a branch of al-Qaeda. He came, but he didn't do it the Iraqi way, the tribal way; he did it the Syrian way, or the commercial way.
I can give you some examples. In the beginning, in the area that was controlled by al-Nusra they used to do like the policy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. They tried to help people, to bring doctors, and to work with other armed groups, even the most secular ones, that the enemy is the government, to target only intelligence and military buildings—until the Iraqi al-Qaeda came. They came for another objective. They had two things to control: oil in the eastern part, and the smuggling areas especially along the border with Turkey. Then they had problems.
This is the time immediately after the meeting of France and Syria in Marrakesh in which Moaz al-Khatib, the leader of the Syrian opposition at that time, condemned the Americans for putting al-Nusra on the list of terrorists, because, you know, those are our brothers. It was very complicated, and many people didn't know. When problems arose between al-Nusra and the Iraqi al-Qaeda, then came the fighting.
The ideology is the same, but it's the approach; as the French proverb says:
“It is the skill of the chef that is the most important thing, not the ingredients that go into the pot”.
The skill of the chef
was totally different for the two of them.
I remember also, since my predecessors are religious leaders—I'm not—that I did a report when I resigned from Iraq and came back home to Canada. I joined CIGI, the biggest think tank in Waterloo. They were very supportive, and I did a report that I called “Minorities in Iraq: The Other Victims”.
I did it as a reaction to the report that was done by a colleague in Congress in which he was stating that we have to put pressure on the Iraqi government to have three representatives: one from the Christians, one of the Yezidis, one of the Kaka'is. I was strongly against it. There has to be equal citizenship. Every single Iraqi has the right to be prime minister or president. It is very hard—it is like a dream now—but there is no other solution.
I presented this report also in the British Parliament. Unfortunately, now things are getting bad. I remember one thing that was very shocking for me when I was doing this report. Many people moved in 2006 and 2007 from Iraq to Amman, and I went to meet a lot of people. Some, because they didn't have money and nobody was helping, were going back home. I was verifying with UNRRA and the UNSR to see these people who went back from...and when I'm talking minorities, I'm not talking only about religious minorities but also ethnic minorities; that's a huge problem as well. No one from the minorities went back to Iraq, and that was very, very sad; very sad.
How should we address these issues? There's a huge difference between Iraq and Syria ISIL. Many people couldn't even understand what the differences were. Why was ISIL in Syria? Everybody was against this; even the other branch of al-Qaeda was fighting against it; the Islamic Front—everyone. They had no one. In Iraq, no, they counted very strongly in the six Sunni provinces. What I know about the six provinces is that with a sectarian government, especially during the time of Maliki, who was very strongly sectarian.... I personally had a lot of problems with him about these issues when I was there.
The Iraqi army in Mosul, when Daesh came, in these six provinces was seen prior to that as an occupying army. No one was looking to the Iraqi army as a national army. Some very high-ranking people in the army even told me—it's very hard to verify—that the current army, even with the pressure of the Americans after the Awakening forces in 2006 and 2007 defeated al-Qaeda in this area, has fewer than 5% Sunni and fewer than 2% Kurds. They are backed by some Shia militia that are at least as dangerous as ISIL. Now they are fighting together against ISIL. We saw it after the Awakening forces, when the Americans were trying to push Maliki to make the 150 fighters who fought—and defeated—al-Qaeda at that time part of the Iraqi army. Maliki just refused, because for him, before being fighters against al-Qaeda they were Sunni, and he didn't want them.
So if we don't go back, what I used to tell the Americans.... Just last June I was invited to Washington, and I insisted: don't consider the train that left and think that you can order what they call “national reconciliation” in one of the coming stations; it's not going to work. And we saw that. After 11 years, it's not working; the train has to go back, to agree about the constitution, to agree about this.
They cannot do it alone. They have to be helped as well as forced internationally. If not, it's just going from....
I know my time is running out, Mr. Chair.
Maybe Canada was also leading the humanitarian side in catastrophes and also some political approaches. Last week when I was in Istanbul I met some of the members of the military council of Iraq. This is the old resistance against the American occupation. I'm not talking about al-Qaeda, those are Iraqis who were against the occupation and took arms. Now there are a lot of changes. Suddenly they feel strongly between two things they hate—a government sectarian that they're fighting, and from the other side, especially in their area because there are many Sunni, ISIL.
They said, well, you have to be very clear about ISIL. This is a human problem, and it has to be condemned. They said they are killing us, but nobody is talking to us, and we don't want to repeat the experience of the Awakening forces. When the Americans asked our tribe to fight against al-Qaeda, and we did, al-Maliki America rejected us.
I think we can help these parties to talk to everybody, to develop a dialogue. Canada can be a leader and can help. I know that some of the Nordic countries are doing that. They are inviting people, listening to to everybody, and trying to explore some possibilities of national reconciliation proposals as well as bringing some points to the Security Council, to Washington. I think it's time for Canada to do something. I don't want Canada to be a prisoner when it comes to signing a cheque or humanitarian things or whatever.
I think there are a lot of things to say, but I will stop here and will endeavour to answer any questions.
Thank you very much.