Evidence of meeting #109 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was passage.
A recording is available from Parliament.
5:05 p.m.
Senior Fellow, Carleton University and CIGI, As an Individual
As I say, my broader definition of sovereignty includes the economic and social development of the Canadian Arctic for the benefit of all Canadians as well as the people of the Arctic. To me it seems to offer tremendous opportunities in respect of transportation, resource development, fisheries, tourism, etc. It's part of one of the locomotives that could help the Canadian economy as a whole.
We're not really there yet because of all the obstacles—not obstacles on purpose but obstacles in fact—that we have that are slowing down Arctic development. Meanwhile, on the other side of the border in the United States and in Alaska, we're direct competitors with, for example, the stranded oil and gas of the Beaufort Sea. We're seeing the Trump administration going gangbusters to develop every element of offshore oil and gas that they can.
We're in a competitive situation. We should be investing in the Northwest Passage, even if we don't call it that necessarily, but we should be investing in the commercialization of the Northwest Passage under our terms, because, to me, there's a great strategic disadvantage to the Russians having sole hegemony over shipping in the Arctic Ocean 10, 20 or 30 years from now, which is going to happen unless we do something, and we don't easily do something.
5:05 p.m.
Mr. Michael Levitt (York Centre, Lib.)
Thank you very much.
Now we're going to go to MP Baylis.
5:05 p.m.
Frank Baylis Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.
Thank you, Chair.
I'd like to hear the contrast from your point of view, Ms. Conley, to that of Mr. Lajeunesse and Mr. Higginbotham, particularly where you're talking about the threats. You also mentioned Russia and China, and if we were talking Canadian, we would include the United States in that threat: Russia, China and the United States.
Are there activities that you're doing that are undermining Canada, which in turn assist China and Russia, if you follow my line of questioning? After you're done with that, we'll come to the others.
5:05 p.m.
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, Center for Strategic and International Studies
I have to say, it's a tragedy that you think that the U.S. somehow equates with Russia and China. We are allies and partners. I understand why you feel that way. I do. It's not that, but I think it's taking a step back and trying to position ourselves once again as strategic partners and allies at NORAD and at NATO. We share values.
My concern is that we, the United States and Canada, fail to appreciate that many of our policies that we've jointly done together vis-à-vis the annexation of Crimea and Ukraine have had the unintended consequences of pushing Russia closer to China, as Russia has had to have an alternative financing mechanism, which is why you see the Chinese investment patterns on the Yamal Peninsula in some of the infrastructure and pipelines. We're going to see, potentially, a nexus of Russian and Chinese interaction, and that is not in the west's interest. That is not in NATO's interest and that is not in the U.S. and Canada's interest.
That is my concern. We need to be very vigilant about what their growing presence in the Arctic means. We have lost a generation here in the United States that understands why our missile defence architecture is in the Arctic, why we have Thule Air Force Base in Greenland, our most northern air force base, and why we have and have worked so long and hard with NORAD, and our coast guards work together.
It is to protect North America. We need to return to that shared vision, but our policies vis-à-vis Russia and the sanctions policy are pushing Russia and China closer together, and the U.S. administration's policies on trade and other things are also helping Russia and China work together. We have to break that apart and return to a shared vision.
5:10 p.m.
Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.
You mentioned that NATO should have greater awareness of what's going on, but quite frankly, the position that we find ourselves in as Canadians has been set up by the present administration, which has questioned the value of NATO, number one, and then done things such as impose tariffication on national security grounds against Canada.
So that being a question mark, I'd like then to move over to you first, Mr. Lajeunesse. You have this concept of “use it or lose it”, if I understand you. If we're present, we're using it. It helps our argument. You also made a specific comment about the dangers of it coming to the attention of the present U.S. administration. What activity should we be taking right now to bolster our position?
5:10 p.m.
Irving Shipbuilding Chair in Arctic Marine Security, Mulroney Institute of Government, St. Francis Xavier University, As an Individual
The activities we need to be taking right now are not a significant break from what we've been doing, frankly, since the 1970s at least. It's important to recognize a certain subtlety to the phrase “use it or lose it”. Simple presence in the Arctic does absolutely nothing to buttress Canada's position. An icebreaker sailing back and forth does nothing to strengthen Canada's legal position.
Assets in the Arctic need to be doing something useful. They need to be exercising effective control. It is important to exercise control in the region for legal reasons but also for very practical reasons. We need that capacity to control Chinese, Russian and foreign shipping as they increasingly enter into the region.
October 17th, 2018 / 5:10 p.m.
Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.
I would assume you would agree with that, Mr. Higginbotham, from what I've heard of your testimony.
5:10 p.m.
Senior Fellow, Carleton University and CIGI, As an Individual
I would just go a little bit further. I believe in the long-term commercialization of the Northwest Passage, certainly in the first instance, sticking to our position of internal waters, but what I would particularly like to see would be a higher level of direct co-operation with the United States in the development of the Northwest Passage—United States, Alaska, the territories, and Greenland—because that's where ships have to go. I believe that we should take the issue of U.S. recognition of Canadian sovereignty off the table and develop a very strong, practical—
5:10 p.m.
Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.
If we had a river running right through the middle of Manitoba, say, and the U.S. wanted to use it, why would I have to sit down and discuss with them sovereignty over my river in the middle of Manitoba?
You say take it off the table because they feel like using it. I struggle with that, to be honest.
5:10 p.m.
Senior Fellow, Carleton University and CIGI, As an Individual
We do that under NORAD. We do many things with the United States.
5:10 p.m.
Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.
We do it under NORAD, but there is no question that, if they're using a river in the middle of Manitoba, it belongs to Canada.
5:10 p.m.
Senior Fellow, Carleton University and CIGI, As an Individual
Right, but I think there is a real challenge over the longer term of how we co-operate with the United States and, in our own interest, develop the Northwest Passage. I would start with the fundamental fact of Canadian foreign policy that you have to get along with the United States.
5:10 p.m.
Mr. Michael Levitt (York Centre, Lib.)
Thank you, Professor Higginbotham.
Now we are going to MP Blaikie, please.
5:10 p.m.
NDP
Daniel Blaikie NDP Elmwood—Transcona, MB
Thank you very much.
Ms. Conley, I just want to follow up on some of the comments you made about Russian remilitarization of the Arctic. I want to heed your advice not to sensationalize that, but I am curious. We heard earlier today, and we've heard throughout the course of the study, that Canada has very good situational awareness in the Arctic but our response capability is not very strong.
I am wondering, in light of what you were telling us about what's going on in Russia, what the appropriate response for Canada is, and not just for Canada but also for our allies, whether it's the U.S. or our NATO partners. How much of an interest should we have in developing a stronger military presence in the Arctic, and what does the potential competition mean for the state of affairs in the north as well?
5:15 p.m.
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, Center for Strategic and International Studies
This is such an opportune moment because of the major NATO exercise centred on Norway, beginning this month and going into November. The U.S. has deployed, on a rotational basis, 700 forces to Norway. We didn't do that during the Cold War. We are growing increasingly concerned about the potential for Russia to demonstrate and surprise us with some capabilities that could perhaps question or jeopardize Arctic co-operation and security.
In some ways this is the puzzle, because as much as Russia very much wants to develop the Arctic economically, the last thing they should be doing is challenging or making the security picture look very dynamic, because that would in fact scare investors and potential economic activity away. It's hard to understand why they're doing this and for what purpose, but I'm growing increasingly concerned that we're seeing a robustness, and that NATO needs to develop a response. In some ways NATO is, without having the strategic discussion at the North Atlantic Council about it.
In many ways and for many years, Canada has prevented the North Atlantic Council from having a discussion about the Arctic. Those days are over. It's not about whether NATO would be useful in the Arctic. NATO is in the Arctic. It is exercising today and through the next several weeks. We have forces committed there. It is an essential strategy for reinforcing Europe, so we need to focus on this more and have a NATO capability that is able to respond to it.
We need greater transparency, confidence-building measures, exercises, and I would argue a code of conduct, not dissimilar to what we're trying to do with the Chinese in the South China Sea, to prevent accidents and mishaps. We have a good pattern of co-operation at the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and on search and rescue, and the Russians are participating in that. But on the military—the hard end, the security end—this is where I am concerned. We need a NATO response and Canada has an important role to play in that.
5:15 p.m.
NDP
Daniel Blaikie NDP Elmwood—Transcona, MB
Thank you very much.
Mr. Lajeunesse, I want to follow up on an idea that we heard in testimony earlier, in the previous panel. You talked about how one of the motivations of the U.S. position with respect to the Northwest Passage is fear of setting a precedent. We heard earlier today that one way to circumvent that might be to have some kind of bilateral agreement with the United States that allows them, on a non-precedent setting basis, to recognize Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.
Do you think there would be interest there and enough advantage for the U.S. to have a trusted friend and partner manage the Northwest Passage? Might they be interested in that approach? Do you think that might be a good approach? Do you think it might be realistic to think that's an avenue worth exploring? Do you think there isn't really any potential there?
5:15 p.m.
Irving Shipbuilding Chair in Arctic Marine Security, Mulroney Institute of Government, St. Francis Xavier University, As an Individual
We've tried that exact thing, actually. In 1987-88, during negotiations with the Americans, the then Department of External Affairs tried precisely that, to establish a bilateral agreement in which the Americans would recognize Canadian sovereignty on a non-precedent basis. Different wordings were attempted to try to make sure we could do this without setting a precedent, and it simply fell flat. Times have obviously changed since then, but my personal opinion is that's probably a dead end.
If I may, I just want to mention very briefly something you spoke with Ms. Conley about. It's important to make a certain clarification when you're talking about military forces in the Arctic. The fact is that there is no single Arctic with a common military issue. There are multiple Arctics. The Canadian Arctic exists on a very different level from the European Arctic, with very different security requirements.
When we say there is Arctic militarization, that Arctic militarization is taking place in Eurasia, and the forces being deployed—primarily Russian—don't normally have the power projection capability to threaten the Canadian Arctic. Theoretically, even if they did, the Canadian Arctic is really not the first place we need to worry about Russian aggression. If it is, we're in a third world war, and investing in Arctic defence is an inefficient use of our resources.
5:20 p.m.
NDP
Daniel Blaikie NDP Elmwood—Transcona, MB
Mr. Higginbotham, just really quickly, when it comes to economic development in the Arctic, how important do you think it is that it be Canadian capital that drives that investment as opposed to Chinese or other capital driving that development?
5:20 p.m.
Senior Fellow, Carleton University and CIGI, As an Individual
I think foreign capital can be welcomed provided we set the rules for it. It doesn't bother me in the slightest. It's not like the third option period back in the 1970s with the deep, deep Canadian concern about the U.S. investment in Canada. I don't think that's a big issue now.
I think Chinese investment is of concern to people, but you can't run away with a mine. It's not as big a question mark as Huawei or something like that. We should welcome all investment on our terms, but the regulatory framework prevents that investment, for example, the blockage of our Canadian Arctic oil and gas development in the Arctic Sea. There was a fatwa issued against that after the Obama-Trudeau summit, which of course was abandoned by Trump immediately, a complete divergence in an area potentially competitively interesting for Canada.
5:20 p.m.
Mr. Michael Levitt (York Centre, Lib.)
Thank you very much.
With that, I want to thank our three guests for joining us for our second panel, which was also exceptionally insightful. We are going to go in camera now. We have one piece of committee business to handle.
With that, I just want to thank you again. We shall suspend for a minute while we clear the room. Thank you.
[Proceedings continue in camera]