Thank you very much, and thank you very much for inviting me. It's a great honour to appear before you.
I should say that I gave evidence to our own Parliament, to the House of Lords EU Justice Sub-Committee about two weeks ago, because they have been inquiring into various aspects of the EU's sanctions regimes. I would be happy to talk to you about that if it would be interesting for you to hear, perhaps in the questions.
I am a barrister; I am a litigator. I specialize in European law and public constitutional law, with a particular expertise and interest in sanctions regimes. I should say I am by no means an expert in Canadian law, so I will confine my remarks to what I know about, which is the European Union sanctions regimes. I know a little also about the United Nations, and of course the U.K.'s own regimes, to the extent that they have them, and I will come back to that.
I have a practice predominantly acting for listed parties, people and entities subject to sanctions, and I've litigated a very large number of cases in the European Court on their behalf, but I also do a lot of advisory work in other litigation related to sanctions for non-sanctioned parties.
What I thought I would do is briefly outline—and I hope it's not too basic—the EU system for imposing sanctions, and then I'll explain what I think are some of the challenges and problems in the European Union's system, which has given rise to a large number of court cases that you may be aware of.
The EU imposes sanctions as a group of states, as 28 member states—possibly 27 pretty alarmingly soon—as part of its common foreign and security policy, and decisions to impose sanctions have to be unanimous. That's very much the background to the EU sanctions regime, which is 28 member states trying to agree on what to do. To that extent, Canada has an easier job.
The decision-making body is the council of ministers in the EU, which is really all of the EU foreign ministers acting together. That's the executive body that decides on sanctions.
EU sanctions, like the U.S., the UN, and other sanctions regimes, consist partly of targeted asset freezes and travel bans, which are EU-wide, and partly of less-targeted sanctions, particularly in regimes like Iran, Syria, and, to some extent, Russia. In addition to targeted asset freezes and travel bans, there are broader prohibitions on, for example, certain kinds of business or financial transactions that can be done between the European Union and various states.
How does the court get involved? It's an exception to the general rule that foreign policy measures of the European Union are not subject to judicial review. There is an exception to that rule for individuals and entities that are the subject of targeted asset freezes and travel bans. This is because the EU Court has taken the view that, since these are restrictive measures that have an impact on the fundamental rights of people, whether they're EU citizens or not—and many are not—they should have access to judicial review to be able to challenge their designations. I understand that there is a system of that kind in operation in Canada. This judicial review must take place within two months of a sanctions listing in the General Court of the European Union, which is in Luxembourg. There have been literally hundreds of these cases in Luxembourg, many successful. I think, on average, about half of the cases that go to the European Court have succeeded.
Why? Well, originally when I first started doing these cases in about 2009-10, the practice was not to give reasons why people were designated on sanctions lists. The United Nations also was not giving reasons. So the basic initial challenges were due process challenges, where the European Court said that if you are going to impose restrictive measures on individuals and entities, you, the European Union institutions, have to comply with basic standards of due process. This means giving reasons why you have been designated; some basic evidence if you challenge the factual basis for your listing; some evidential support for what the institutions are saying as a justification for your listing; and some basic judicial review and proportionality analysis by a court.
Now we can come back to all of that, but the basic reason that so many cases were successful was an evidential reason. After these basic standards of due process were set out by the European court, there were then hundreds of cases—mostly Iranian cases, but by no means all; every different regime has brought cases—where, after initial cases that were lost by the institutions because of a lack of reasons, the focus of the court has been much more on whether the European institutions can substantiate with some kind of sufficiently solid factual basis, as they put it, the evidential basis for a sanctions listing. In many cases they haven't been able to do so, and again, we can come into that in more detail, if that would be of interest to the committee.
This basic reasoning and framework has been applied both to EU autonomous sanctions, those imposed by the European Union, and also to European Union implementation of United Nations Security Council sanctions. That has been very controversial. There was a famous case I was involved in called Kadi, in which the European court decided that it could review EU measures, even those that implement UN Security Council resolutions. That case was partly decided because of the lack of due process at the United Nations level, and that case led directly to the creation of the office of the ombudsperson for the UN Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, the first incumbent of which, Kimberly Prost, I'm sure is well known to you and I think may be giving evidence to your committee.
The result of these cases was that many won. Many were brought. They're tailing off a little now for reasons that I can go into after my opening remarks.
The system has had particular problems, I think, which are reflected in the case law, to some extent. First, there is a real absence, in my view, of a body capable of gathering evidence to a robust and rigorous standard in the European Union. Now the council of ministers is not, in itself, an evidence-gathering agency. It's a group of member states, and so its sanctions capabilities, and the degree to which it can gather robust evidence to support sanctions listings, depend entirely on the evidence that member states are willing to share with each other in the council, and which, then, the council is willing to share with listed people and with the court.
This has led to another very interesting topic that I'd be delighted to speak about, which is rules of procedure that now will permit the institutions to rely on classified material. So far the court has taken the view, unlike the U.S. courts in this area, that all material relied on must be open to all parties. That may be changing in Luxembourg because of the problem of open-source material, but some of the quality of the open-source evidence, in my view, is not robust; it consists of some press articles and Internet printouts, very often.
The second problem, in my view, is that the EU institutions are not responsive to people who are affected by being included in sanctions lists. It takes them a very long time to respond to correspondence, even in real cases of urgency, and there's a real lack of engagement on the substance in the correspondence. Again, I can go into this in more detail, but I think—and I said this to the House of Lords committee—there is a real case for a Kimberly Prost ombudsperson process in the European Union in order to analyze evidence and provide a real responsive system.
Third, the court system has its own difficulties. It's very slow, is expensive, and there have not been injunctions given in cases of urgency, quick hearings, or damages in cases of serious errors in listings. There has also been—if I can call it—a bit of a game of re-listing: almost every entity and person that wins a case in the European court finding him or herself or itself on a sanctions list the next day, with slightly different reasons given for designation. The lawfulness of that process is being litigated in the European courts at the moment.
Finally, and I'll end with this comment, in my view there is a particular concern about the misappropriation regimes, and that may also be of concern to this committee. These are the Tunisia, Egypt, and Ukraine regimes which freeze the assets of people said to have misappropriated state funds. Why are these of concern? Well, in the case of the European Union—and I don't know about Canada—the origin of all of these lists was a request by the then governing bodies in Egypt and Tunisia, post-Arab Spring, to the European Union to please freeze the assets of a list of what they themselves called the enemies of the state who may wish to punish—was the kind of language that was used.
Now, the European Union, without leaving any time for analyzing the basis for any of the evidence that the people on these lists had been responsible for corruption offences of different kinds, immediately imposed an EU-wide asset freeze on them. Of course, the standards of due process by which these people are often standing trial in absentia, or that judicial investigations have been opened and pursued against them in these countries, without standards that Canada or the United Kingdom certainly would regard as complying with the rule of law is, in my view, shocking. The European Union has simply relied on the words of prosecutors in those countries as being sufficient to show that because these people are being investigated for corruption offences, that should be sufficient to keep them on EU sanctions lists. Although they are called temporary precautionary measures, they have now been in place for a very large number of years. I should say, though, that the European court has upheld the legality of these measures.
There are many other topics I could touch on. One, of course, is the potential consequences of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union for sanctions regimes, but I'll leave my remarks there and look forward to answering questions.