Foreign Affairs Committee on March 23rd, 2017

[The Chair (Hon. Robert Nault (Kenora, Lib.)), Liberal, Bob Nault]

Colleagues, let's bring our meeting to order today, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), on the study of the situation in eastern Europe and central Asia 25 years after the end of the Cold War.

Before us today is the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, represented by Mr. Michalchyshyn and Mr. Zakydalsky.

As usual, we'll give our witnesses an opportunity to make some comments, and then we'll get into some questions and dialogue.

We'll turn it over to Mr. Michalchyshyn or Mr. Zakydalsky.

[Ihor Michalchyshyn, Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer, Ukrainian Canadian Congress]

We're going to split our time, but I'll start.

It's an honour to have the opportunity to testify here today. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress is the umbrella organization for our community, which brings together our national, provincial, and local Ukrainian Canadian organizations. We have six provincial councils, 19 local branches, and 29 member organizations across the country. Since 1941, we've been leading, coordinating, and representing the interests of our community across Canada.

We are a member of and work closely with the Ukrainian World Congress, as well as ethnocultural communities across Canada. Through the Canada-Ukraine stakeholder advisory council with Global Affairs, we provide consultations with the Government of Canada on Ukraine-Canada relations. We meet regularly with government officials, politicians, stakeholders, policy-makers, as well as leaders in our community.

We're here today to talk to you about the situation in eastern Europe as you are undertaking what we feel is an extremely important study on the situation 25 years after the end of the Cold War.

In the last decade, we have witnessed the rise of an aggressive and imperialist Russian Federation, which seeks through force to return Russian hegemony to regions formerly part of the Soviet Union. For example, in 2008 Russian troops invaded South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. In 2014, Russia invaded and occupied Crimea in Ukraine and parts of the eastern Ukrainian oblasts or provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. Provocations against the Baltic states, such as the kidnapping of an Estonian intelligence officer from Estonia and the seizing of a Lithuanian ship in September 2014, suggest that Moscow is testing NATO's commitment to its easternmost members.

For the first time since World War II, a state has attempted to change the borders of Europe by force. A Europe whole, free, and at peace is under direct threat from Russia. Russia seeks to replace the principles outlined in the Helsinki Final Act with the principles of Yalta, a Europe based on spheres of influence.

In Russian-occupied Crimea, Crimean Tatars, ethnic Ukrainians, and indeed anyone who opposes the occupation are subject to a regime of terror. Russian occupation authorities have banned the Mejlis, the representative assembly of the Crimean Tatar people, and have been persecuting its leadership. Dozens of Ukrainian citizens are currently illegally imprisoned in Russia or in occupied Crimea.

The House of Commons citizenship and immigration committee heard the testimony this fall of Gennadii Afanasiev, a young man who was illegally arrested, tortured, and imprisoned for two years before his release in 2016. I encourage members of the committee who are not familiar with his testimony to review it. His experience outlines the methods Russian authorities employ against those who dare voice dissent in any form.

In the eastern Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, Russia's war against Ukraine has led to the death of over 9,900 people, over 23,000 wounded, and over 1.4 million internally displaced. Thousands of Russian troops are on sovereign Ukrainian territory, including over 700 tanks, 1,250 artillery systems, 300 multi-rocket launch systems, and more than 1,000 armoured personnel carriers.

Russia's war against Ukraine is very much an active war. Russian and proxy forces shell Ukrainian positions and residential areas on a daily basis. Since the end of January, shelling and violence by Russian and proxy authorities have increased, particularly in the areas near the town of Avdiivka in the Donetsk oblast.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is currently the subject of a case brought by Ukrainian authorities to the International Court of Justice with regard to alleged violations of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. On March 6 at the ICJ, the deputy minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine Olena Zerkal stated:

The attacks on Ukrainian civilians are the logical conclusion of the Russian Federation’s support for groups that engage in terrorism. The destruction of Flight MH17 with a Russian Buk system did not stop Russian financing of terrorism.

Canada and Canadian foreign policy support the values of freedom, democracy, self-determination, and the right of sovereign states to choose their own alliances. These values are under threat by the renewed Russian imperial spirit. Canada has a vital national security interest in ensuring the return of peace and stability to the region, to the European continent, and a vital national security interest in opposing and deterring Russian aggression.

We share a long border with Russia in our north, and Russian actions represent a direct challenge to Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic. Experts have repeatedly pointed to the fact that militarization in the Arctic is likely to remain a top priority for Russia's military in the coming years.

I'd like to turn it over to my colleague, Orest Zakydalsky.

[Orest Zakydalsky, Senior Policy Analyst, Ukrainian Canadian Congress]

Canadian foreign policy with regard to eastern Europe and central Asia must focus on two strategic objectives. First, opposing and deterring Russian aggression, and second, supporting the strengthening of democracies and democratic institutions in the region. The best way to ensure the return of peace to Europe is to ensure the success of a democratic, prosperous, and strong Ukraine, whose territorial integrity and sovereignty are respected.

Canada's policy to deter Russia, taken in close consultation and coordination with the United States, NATO allies, and the European Union has arguably had the effect of slowing Russia's aggression. However, our policy has not to date reversed that aggression. Time and again, Russia has shown, through its actions, that it responds only to strength. Canada has several foreign policy options that, taken in coordination with allies, would simultaneously and significantly raise the cost on Russia of further aggression, and also assist Ukraine in more effectively defending itself.

The UCC calls on the Government of Canada to implement the following policies in these three spheres: first, security and defence; second, sanctions; and third, international assistance.

First, with regard to security and defence, the UCC welcomes the recent announcement by the government to extend Operation Unifier until the end of March 2019. We believe that the Canada-Ukraine defence co-operation agreement should be signed. This agreement will help to continue to improve interoperability and deepen co-operation between our two militaries. Ukraine should also be added to the automatic firearms country control list. We should continue to support the reform of Ukraine's military through the NATO-Ukraine trust funds. Finally, Canada and NATO allies should provide Ukraine with defensive equipment, most importantly, anti-tank, anti-artillery, and surveillance systems.

With regard to sanctions, Canada, in co-operation with the EU, G7, and other like-minded allies, should significantly strengthen economic and sectoral sanctions against Russia, including the removal of Russia from the SWIFT international payment system. Canadian members of Parliament should adopt a Magnitsky amendment to the Special Economic Measures Act to allow Canada to impose sanctions in the form of travel bans and asset freezes on individuals responsible for human rights violations. The Government of Canada should designate the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic as terrorist organizations, and the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terror.

With regard to international assistance, Canada should ensure that Ukraine remains a country of focus for Canada's international assistance and a key foreign policy priority. We should continue and increase technical assistance to the government of Ukraine and assistance to Ukraine's vibrant civil society to ensure the success of the government's reform process and the continuing consolidation of democratic institutions.

The implementation of the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement will provide for increased business and investment opportunities. Canada should continue to support economic development in Ukraine, most importantly, for small and medium enterprises. Canada should continue to provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by Russia's invasion, both through international institutions and bilaterally. Finally, Canada should continue to advocate for Ukraine in international forums such as NATO, the OSCE, and the UN, and support Ukraine's further integration with the EU and NATO.

Canada has a vital national interest in ensuring that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace. This goal cannot be attained without a democratic, sovereign, and territorially whole Ukraine.

We thank you for the opportunity to appear here, and we welcome any of your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you very much to the Ukrainian Canadian Congress.

We'll go right to questions. We'll start with Mr. Kent.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to both of you for attending. Your insight is always welcome here at committee.

We were told by the OSCE this week that ceasefire violations are down along the line of contact, although both sides are still very close. Russian armour and mobile armoured artillery are still too close to the line to allow anything close to a normalization along the line of contact.

At the same time, we see a deepening economic crisis as a result of the blockade. On the one hand, for very logical reasons, Kiev has said, as of this week, that the blockade will be absolute and there will be no cargo in or out of eastern Ukraine, but that has caused a number of domino-like impacts. Industrial production is down, I understand, by half. The IMF has delayed delivery of $17.5 billion in economic stimulus and aid. The Russian-backed separatists are now pushing for a referendum, a Crimean-style Russian referendum, for accession to Russia.

I wonder if you could offer some insight and advice on exactly how this blockade will be managed given the variety of ways in which it's exacerbating the situation on the ground.

[Orest Zakydalsky]

With regard to the blockade, the national bank yesterday came out with revised economic data that revised the GDP growth for 2017 from 2.5% to 1.9%, somewhere around there. I mean, it has an impact, but it's not catastrophic by any means on the Ukrainian economy.

With regard to the IMF, I think once these numbers have been turned over to the IMF, the next tranche should be in the next few weeks. Of the $17.5 billion, this is $1 billion out of that.

In terms of what happens in the occupied territories, these so-called people's republics are under complete control of the Kremlin. They are marionettes. Basically, they will do what Moscow tells them to do. We have to remember that Kiev stopped trade with these regions because these republics seized Ukrainian enterprises that were working in the area. This blockade is very much the result of actions taken by Russia and its proxies.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Given that it's the industrial heartland, and given the very strong negative impact it has on the Ukrainian economy in the west, would you say that the only way this blockade could be lifted would be full and complete compliance with the Minsk agreements by the separatists, and respect by the Russians?

[Orest Zakydalsky]

That is what Kiev has said, and I think that is accurate. With Minsk, what we've seen is that since they have been signed, these agreements have been routinely violated by Russia. Not a single point of them has ever been implemented. I mean, there have been some periods of relative calm for a week or two, here and there, and then Russia, when it wants to, ratchets up violence and pressure again. Part of implementing Minsk is getting western countries to put more pressure on Russia to meet those obligations.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

I have a quick question, and it's a big question regarding reform. When the committee visited Ukraine in January, we saw and were told there were any number of very encouraging signs with regard to civil society and police reform, media training, and legal aid assisted by the Canadian National Judicial Institute. But we were also told that many, if not most Ukrainians still believe that corruption is an everyday reality, and that you don't get by in life without corruption in either minor or major forms.

I'm just wondering what your thoughts are on the sense of urgency and how, from top to bottom, through the judicial system, through Parliament, through civil society, a greater sense of urgency for realistic reform can take place sooner rather than later.

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

Absolutely. We agree with what your committee saw, which is that, as much as there is progress in highly visible areas of policing and justice, every time there's progress in those areas, it can also uncover more corruption. That's been one of the paradoxes that the Ukrainian judicial system has been dealing with. The more resources they place into anti-corruption, the more they discover deep corruption within their ranks.

Obviously, a free and open media will report on these things, so there is a simultaneous, growing distrust by members of the public. Both of us have family members we talk with, so while there is this parallel track of both fighting the corruption and cynicism, we see that there needs to be a sustained, long-term effort to fight this systemic corruption. It's as small as this. The medical system is not funded properly, or the school system, so parents or patients will bring funds to their doctor or their teacher to give their patient or their student extra support. That's not seen as the same thing as an official skimming off of percentages of a loan or a government program, but there are many levels of corruption.

We've been working through the Ukrainian World Congress and with our partners there, with many NGOs, to build a sustainable base of funding for these groups to allow them to see multi-year plans, and that it's not a flash in the pan. This will all not be resolved in three years or five years. This took a long time to develop, and it's about social values, citizenship. We're seeing some progress in those areas, but I guess our main point is to say to you, as parliamentarians, and to Canada that we can't allow those small setbacks and those shocking stories of corruption that are uncovered to cause us to withdraw our support. All of those things actually point out that we're working right in step with the right partners in Ukraine, who are mostly of a younger generation that has not participated in the government system to the degree that other people have. A lot of those former regime folks have fled.

Again, Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze was here, the vice-prime minister of Ukraine, formerly a civil society activist, formerly a journalist. These are the people who have inherited this mess. We believe, in the majority of cases, that things are going in the right direction and that a sustained, long-term vision is required to get past this large problem that envelops both official and non-official Ukrainian society.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Kent.

We'll go to Mr. Sidhu, please.

[Jati Sidhu, Liberal, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you both for showing up in front of the committee.

You mentioned in your opening remarks that the western world needs to keep the pressure on. As you know, Canada is a leading advocate for Ukraine on the international stage, with the latest decision to extend the military mission in Ukraine to 2019. We've been there on the ground since 2015. About 200 personnel are training the Ukrainian military. Up to 3,200 Ukrainian military members were trained.

In your view, does training support the Ukrainian army in an effort to defend yourself on the ground?

[Orest Zakydalsky]

Sorry, has the training supported the Ukrainian army in defending itself?

[Jati Sidhu, Liberal, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Yes.

[Orest Zakydalsky]

Very much so. What Unifier is focusing on is a lot of small team training, bomb disposal, land mines, and these sorts of things.

What we've heard is that these were the kinds of things that are very much needed—this sort of small, lower team coordination command, that kind of thing. Certainly, everything we've heard from people in Ukraine is that this training has had an enormous impact.

Secondly, the other thing to remember is that it's not a one-way street. Our Canadian personnel is actually learning a lot as well about Russian hybrid tactics and so on from their Ukrainian counterparts. I think Unifier is an example of a win-win for both us and Ukraine.

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

I can add one more specific example. The area of first aid training and certification is something that.... I know that the Canadian military mission there has been working to provide higher standards of first aid response training to soldiers who didn't have it. That's another example of something our community has been working with through the world congress, providing first aid kits—or what we would call a proper first aid kit—and front-line training, because that's something they were lacking.

That's a direct decision by Canada and by our community to cause fewer people to die from injuries on the front line that shouldn't have caused hospitalization but should have been treated right on the front. That's what we're seeing as a direct impact of Canadian training there.

[Jati Sidhu, Liberal, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

It really is helping then.

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

Yes, absolutely.

[Jati Sidhu, Liberal, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

My second question relates to the landscape change in the United States, and the United States' “soft power”, if you want to call it that, arguably being on the decline. Do you see a potential change in Russia's future course, particularly in regard to the intervention efforts in Ukraine?

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

Sure. In terms of the United States' policy on Ukraine, I would say traditionally the American position has been to support Ukraine through NATO, through the EU, and directly. There are definitely strong allies in Congress and in the Senate, who have visited Ukraine and who understand the situation in the contemporary setting.

We haven't seen Russia change tack through any of the interventions that have taken place thus far. Certainly the Canadian military mission is one of many training missions by other militaries from the NATO countries that are training troops in Ukraine as well: Poland, Latvia, the Americans, and the Germans. None of it has yet been enough to convince Russia to change course. The current U.S. administration and its views on this topic are under close scrutiny, both in Ukraine and Canada, as they are everywhere in the world. We don't really know what to speculate will happen next.

[Jati Sidhu, Liberal, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Mr. Zakydalsky, you mentioned a few times that we need to keep up the pressure from the western world. Do you think the intervention is increasing or decreasing for the last year or six months? Where do you see this going?

[Orest Zakydalsky]

I would say that any attempts to weaken sanctions, weaken western resolve, will result in increased violence and increased military operations by Russia. At a minimum, the level the pressure is at now, the sanctions that are on Russia now, seem to be keeping Russia where they are, in the sense that the front line in Ukraine hasn't moved significantly.

There have been individual efforts in Avdiivka, a couple of years ago in Debaltsevo. Part of that is that Ukraine's military is much stronger, much better equipped, much better prepared than it was when the invasion started, and part of that is, I think, a successful and unified European, American, and Canadian response. But any weakening of that will result in further attempts by Russia to seize territory. I think the past experience is that Russia responds to being dealt with from a position of strength, so our position is that the pressure on Russia has to be increased in order to get them to de-occupy eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

[Jati Sidhu, Liberal, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Zakydalsky.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Sidhu.

We'll go to Madam Laverdière, s'il vous plaît.