Foreign Affairs Committee on March 23rd, 2017

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Zakydalsky and Mr. Michalchyshyn, thank you very much for joining us this morning and for making your presentations.

You mentioned the need to strengthen the Canadian sanctions. You brought up Magnitsky-type measures. The committee just completed a study where we included some measures of that kind. During the study, we unfortunately noted that the Canadian sanctions system was not always implemented in the most effective way possible.

I am still concerned by the fact that someone like Vladimir Yakunin is not on Canada's sanctions list, while he is on the U.S. list.

What do you think about the potential effect of Canadian sanctions? Beyond Magnitsky-type sanctions, how can we strengthen our sanctions regime against Russia?

[Orest Zakydalsky]

There are two things. One, Magnitsky gives Canada the tools with which to sanction human rights abusers in Russia, and I understand from listening to some of the testimony, it's probably broader. That is extremely important for showing these officials who support the Russian regime that they can't get away with it, that people are watching them. That, in turn, perhaps makes other officials think about whether or not that's a course they want to continue.

Unlike in Soviet times, Russian officials, Russian business people, keep their money in western banks, not in Russian ones, so we have an effective tool—or will have, once Magnitsky is, I hope, adopted—to put significant pressure on these people, and in turn on the Russian regime. There is a reason why, when the United States passed Magnitsky in 2012, the reaction from Russia was as severe as it was. It was because it's an effective tool.

The second issue is sectoral sanctions on the Russian economy. There have been quite a lot implemented in Canada, the U.S., and the EU and we believe these should be strengthened. These work when they are all implemented together.

One of the things we would very much like to see is for Canada to take a lead in this and argue for this with our American and European partners because if Canada does it themselves, that's good but it's not nearly as effective as when it's done in concert. I think that's something everyone in Canada, the EU, and in the U.S. understands, that these things have to be done together. We are hopeful that Canada will, in NATO, the EU, and the G7, continue to be a strong advocate for keeping the sanctions we have now because we have seen no change in Russian behaviour, and strengthen them as necessary to put more pressure on the Russian regime through the economy.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

You also mentioned the large number of

internally displaced people.

We are talking about nearly 1.5 million people.

Can you give us details on the general situation of those internally displaced people? Where are they? How are they living?

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

Indeed, the situation isn't well known. Because it's been going on for multiple years and involves multiple regions, it isn't easy to see where all these people are. We know that the Canadian government, through some partnerships in Ukraine with the International Red Cross and others, provides some level of support for crisis needs and some that are longer in term. We don't believe that is large enough in terms of a support program.

What we know about the situation is that more and more people continue to leave the areas of conflict, as they see no future for themselves economically. There are no systems of health and education, and as was mentioned, the economic situation there is not good. Unfortunately, the elderly are often left behind in these areas because they have nowhere else to go and they have no resources to transport themselves. They are most often the victims in these conflict areas.

What we have seen happen in Ukraine on the ground is that there have been civil society movements and government agencies that are trying to provide welcoming centres in other regions of Ukraine, and some assistance with housing, language, and job training. Again, the capacity of the Ukrainian government and civil society to do those things is not high. It's a new problem that they've been tackling for the last two and a half years. We would welcome any renewed attention on that. Of course, there are many successful international examples of the kinds of programs that do work.

I think the big question for these people right now—the ones we hear from—is how long they will be away. Are they going to rebuild a life for themselves somewhere else, or will they ever go back to their home town or home village? I think that uncertainty over the conflict and the length of time that it continues is the biggest factor that's causing this instability within the Ukrainian population, which is almost two million people. That is a significant number of people.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Ms. Laverdière.

We'll go to Mr. Saini, please.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Good morning to both of you, and thank you very much for coming this morning.

I want to talk about a situation in the Donbas. Right now, we have the special monitoring mission that's there, and the line of control has been established, I think for a couple of years now. I think there are only five border checkpoints that are along that line. Has that not become the de facto border now between Russian and Ukraine?

The reason I say that is that in other conflicts around the world—even if you look at Kashmir—the line of control, whether agreed upon or not, has been something fixed and has been accepted on both sides. Also, there's outside pressure to maintain some sort of equilibrium between the Russian-controlled and the Ukrainian-controlled.... Now, when you have border points, and when you have a situation where the line has been established and accepted, that becomes the line of control.

Has that not become, de facto, the border between Russia and Ukraine?

[Orest Zakydalsky]

Part of the Minsk agreements is that Russia obligated itself to withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory. It's worded in such a way that it's not Russian forces, but that is the meaning of it.

The contact line that separates occupied Ukrainian territory in Donbas and the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and government-controlled Ukrainian territory isn't.... I wouldn't characterize it as a border exactly. It separates two armies from each other, the Russian and proxy army, and the Ukrainian army on the other side.

Russia doesn't formally acknowledge that is there. De facto, those are Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia. Part of the Minsk agreements is that they have stated they would withdraw and turn over control of the actual Ukranian-Russian border, turn over control of the Ukrainian side of it to Ukrainian authorities, although that was two and a half years ago and it hasn't happened.

Where our policy needs to be modified is to not only ensure a ceasefire but also ensure that sovereign Ukrainian territories return under the control of the Ukrainian government. That's why there's a necessity for increasing pressure on Russia.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

The reason I suggest that is that if you look at Minsk I and you look at Minsk II, Minsk II was initiated by the Normandy four, and one of the issues was that Crimea was not mentioned in that package of measures. There was this trying to de-escalate on both sides of the border, but also one of the aspects of the package of measures was to make sure there was a devolution of power from Kiev so that these regions would have some autonomy to some extent.

I'm trying to say that it seems to me that in Minsk II there has been a challenge in implementing Minsk II from whatever side. It seems to me that is now in a position.... If that has become the line of control and the de facto border, is there not a worry on the Ukrainian side that this may become a frozen conflict? Because Crimea has not been mentioned in this, what's the future? What are the steps going forward? How should we resolve this issue?

[Orest Zakydalsky]

The reason the political parts of the Minsk agreements haven't been implemented is that the security parts of them have not even begun to be implemented. The reason the security parts of Minsk have not begun to be implemented is that there are still thousands of Russian troops on Ukrainian soil, and they keep shelling the Ukrainian army.

I think the first step is to get Russia to stop doing that. The way to do that is to increase pressure on them. The reason Crimea was not part of Minsk is that the Russians refused to include that in any of these discussions. The occupation of Crimea is separate from the Minsk agreements and its de-occupation is a separate issue from the ongoing hot conflict in the east.

How to resolve this? It's not easy, but the way to resolve it is that there has to be enough pressure placed on Russia to make the cost of continuing the war in the east, continuing the occupation of Ukrainian territories in the east, and ultimately the continuing occupation of Crimea untenable for the Russian government. Probably the best way to do that is through economic means and to make those costs higher.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

The next question I want to ask is about the disinformation that's happening right now. The reason I say this, having visited Ukraine and Kiev, and having visited Latvia and Kazakhstan, is that there seems to be a fact that you have a significant Russian minority, an ethnic minority, living there. I don't know what the exact number is. I think it's around 20% in Ukraine.

You have media that emanates from Russia and is very predominant in certain parts of the country. The media ownership in Ukraine is not that high. It seems that there's this huge amount of disinformation. I've seen the disinformation, whether it be the fake tweets or Facebook posts.

How is that going to be resolved? What is the best way or approach to make sure the right information is being conveyed to the population? If you look at certain outlets, you'll see they're giving a very rosy picture of what's happening in the Donbas when that's not true. What do you think is the best way to combat that?

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

I'll break that up into two parts. I think that this disinformation, as we've seen, is happening not only in Ukraine. It happens on a worldwide scale. It happens in Canada. One merely needs to scan the television channels and certain Internet sites to get that stream of consciousness and thought.

Again, we can give you our observations of what's happening in Ukraine. There are attempts by media and civil society to support open media, to support independent journalism, and to provide counter-information. It's not a good idea to shut down media, but it's a good idea to provide balanced information both in Canada and in Ukraine on what's happening.

What we do at the Ukrainian Canadian Congress is put out a daily bulletin and a weekly bulletin. We do our best to inform our community here, and the diaspora does its best to inform itself of what's happening. We definitely see strong attempts to influence world opinion.

To your previous question, I was going to say that our concern is that there has been this talk of “Ukraine fatigue” and “Russia fatigue”. The most important thing, in our view, is to not accept these as borders and to not accept the current situation as “that's just the way it is, so let's move on”, so to speak. It's important not to accept the outcome of the disinformation as accurate or relevant.

Both at the community level in Canada and in working with our diaspora around the world, the Ukrainian government is struggling to figure out how to provide in Ukraine—and this goes back to the question of legitimacy and systems—accurate information to people in multiple languages, but I think this goes to the broader issue that we're seeing right now in Europe in terms of the electoral processes that are happening and the various ways that disinformation can happen through funding certain media outlets and political parties, and through civil society or NGO groups that are funded in murky ways.

I think all of us must remain vigilant. Not only is it a problem on the ground in Kiev, but it's something that is actively happening around the world, and not just on Twitter. All of us can be easily manipulated into thinking that everything's fine or everything is one point of view or the other. We support the balance. We support independent journalism. We support the sharing of information with multiple sources, broadly speaking, and we question anybody who doesn't, anybody who says it's a one-sided story, so “end of story”. This is where we welcome the interest of this committee and others in talking about Ukraine. I think that your trip and this kind of discussion balance the disinformation and show us that there is an international effort to find out what is actually happening on the ground.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Saini.

We'll go to Mr. Levitt, please.

[Michael Levitt, Liberal, York Centre, ON]

Thank you for being here this morning.

Can you talk about the situation being faced by Crimean Tatars?

Russia banned the self-governing body of the Crimean Tatars, the Mejlis, and our foreign minister has noted how deeply troubled she is by the politically motivated application of anti-terrorist and anti-extremist legislation, which has led to the harassment of human rights activists, arbitrary detentions and disappearances, and the persecution of Crimean Tatars and other minorities. An estimated 20,000 Tatars have left Crimea since Russia annexed it.

Can you shed some light on this ongoing and disturbing situation?

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

It's a very sad situation. It has its deep roots in history in terms of the situation of the Crimean Tatars in the forties, with forced deportation from Stalin, and then their eventual mass return to Ukraine post-1991.

The current situation is as you read it. It's easy to read terrible stories. It's a story of suppression and pressure. Many of the committee members here met Gennadii Afanasiev in the fall, a young man who was a photographer and a student who organized a small demonstration in Crimea. He was abducted, sent into the Russian prison system, charged with all sorts of offences, and tortured into writing confessions against his fellow citizens.

We believe that's what is happening now. As you mentioned in your question, many people have voluntarily left. They're proactively leaving because they're afraid of what might happen to them. There are people there, doing what they can in a repressive regime.

I think for all of us, it's the new front of human rights. We're watching Russia's approach to human rights live on the ground in Crimea. It's not good. It has religious, ethnocultural, and racial implications.

What can Canada do? I think, as you said, it's strong statements from our government, by our parliamentarians. As in the previous question, it's not accepting Crimea as part of the Russian Federation, which is sanctioning people who claim to be members of Parliament from that region; supporting further clampdowns on travel to that region; and putting pressure on Russia because Russia claims that Crimea voted in an alleged referendum to be part of the Russian Federation. We can see engagement with Russia as part of that process in terms of putting pressure in the Crimean situation, and in any engagement with Russia, we need to bring up the human rights situation in Crimea, because they are the current, alleged authorities there and have responsibility.

I think, thanks to Mr. Afanasiev and dozens of others, there are very good lists online in the newspapers of who exactly has been arrested, where they're being held. We're working with Amnesty International and other human rights groups to free them, to publicize their cases, and to really put pressure on the regime in charge there.

[Orest Zakydalsky]

I would add that every time someone is imprisoned or convicted on some ridiculous charge, there's a prosecutor, an investigator, and a judge who take those decisions. Their names are readily available. They should all be subject to sanctions. These are policies that emanate from the Kremlin. There are people who implement them, and they shouldn't get away with that. One thing we need to do is to look into these cases, to look at who has taken illegal decisions, what investigators and prosectors have done in these cases, how so-called judges have ruled, and hold them accountable for their actions.

[Michael Levitt, Liberal, York Centre, ON]

You mentioned the clampdown and the oppression against human rights defenders, which is certainly something we've seen, unfortunately, both in this committee and in the subcommittee on international human rights. We see the repression of human rights defenders by oppressive regimes in far too many jurisdictions right now. Civil society pushing back and a strong civil society are ways to make sure that message is getting out loud and clear.

Can you give us a bit of an overview on the state of civil society in Ukraine at the moment, and to what extent there are any organizations on the ground in Crimea, as well, that are lending support? We know that when there is a strong civil society and those voices are able to get out, it's also the most effective way for other countries to be able to help support, locally, the activities of human rights defenders. What is the situation at the moment?

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

There's not a huge ability for civil society to operate in Crimea. What we know is that many of the groups that were operating in Crimea have moved to Ukraine. The people have moved on, but their activities continue. CrimeaSOS, for example, is the group that publicizes the plight of individual prisoners who are held.

One of the more complicated factors is the issue of citizenship and passports, as with Mr. Afanasiev's case. He is a Ukrainian citizen with a Ukrainian passport who has been arrested and put into a Russian prison system. There is a very key element of jurisdiction and of pressure being exerted by people to accept the new normal.

One of the strongest things that we've seen is that, fortunately, the western media—BBC, The Guardian, and others—have gone into Crimea because they're allowed to travel into Russia and talk to people, though people are afraid to give their names or to take pictures.

I was just reading a BBC article. Two weeks ago was the celebration of Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's national poet. This BBC article mentioned that there were people in Sevastopol, I think, placing flowers at the monument and Russian security services were filming every single person that came to place flowers and asking for their name. Again, there's a sliding scale from the extreme torture and repression, to everyday persecution and pressure.

We've been told of the pressure to switch documents, to become a Russian citizen. To participate in the health care system and to work for what is largely now a military economy in Crimea, one has to be a Russian citizen. So there's the unspoken pressure of accepting the new level of oppression and not speaking out against it for fear of economic exclusion and non-participation in health and social services. That's a very big concern.

As I mentioned, the international human rights groups are very active in Russia. They've been active in Russia for many years. They've put pressure on many cases in the Russian court system. This is the newest element for them, to see Ukrainian citizens being put into the domestic Russian system for a variety of charges. We're pleased that they're taking that seriously.

There are many Russian activists who are also in similar situations, but because their situation may not have the international profile, they're not getting that kind of support.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

You'll have to leave it there for now.

Thank you, Mr. Levitt.

I'll go to Mr. Allison, please.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses today.

I know one of the things you suggested is that we continue raising the issue. With my involvement with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, we always raise the issue and raise resolutions. I know you probably follow that as well, but I wanted to say that. When we're at international forums, it's something we do as a country all the time.

I have one question. I want to follow up on what Mr. Sidhu was talking about to try to get your thoughts on where Russia is headed with all of this. When we were in eastern Europe, this was the topic of debate with every country we were with. We talked with OSCE officials, those on the ground, monitoring missions, NATO strategic communications centre. Everyone has an opinion on this.

We've also heard testimony at committee that Russia has all these wars and fronts going on, but they're really in disarray at home economically and they can't afford to be in every place. The best job they can do is to create mischief and problems everywhere.

Based on the relationships you have in Ukraine, where do you think they're heading in the long term? We've heard this whole issue of hybrid warfare, which is a new term for me. People said that maybe they're sending people there to train to go to other places.

My sense was that I didn't think they were going to try to take more territory, but are they prepared to be there forever? Where is their headspace? I know that's like asking where Trump's headspace is, almost an impossible question.

Based on your relationships and who you talk to, what are your thoughts anecdotally?

[Orest Zakydalsky]

I think they'll try to get away with as much as they're allowed to get away with, to put it simply. I think what you see is a pattern where, when the Russian regime meets significant resistance, they tend to back off. There has been international resistance to what Russia's doing. In our view, it can be much stronger and more effective if some of the policy options we're talking about are explored and implemented.

In terms of where Russia is economically at home, sure, it's not a healthy economy, but that is something that war distracts from. Just the fact that they can't afford to be doing some of this stuff and that it's hurting them economically is not a reason for the regime not to do it. What would work, I think, would be to make the cost of doing these things much higher. Perhaps some of the Russian policies would then be rethought. Structurally, the Russian economy is an oil-based economy. The energy sector is probably the most effective to be targeted for sanctions. The second is banking and financial. A lot of this money that comes out of Russia goes to us in the west—

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Is this a distraction for back home? I mean, we know it is, but do you see them, if left unchecked, trying to take more territory? To go back to Mr. Saini's point, they've moved the boundaries, and it doesn't look like they're trying to advance them as much as they're just trying to create as much chaos as possible.

I guess if the allies or whoever don't push back, is there a chance, in your opinion, that they would take more territory, or would they continue to use this as a distraction in terms of dealing with their issues back home?

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

This is all speculation, but I think it's safe to say that if the Ukrainian armed forces moved back from the line of control significantly, when they withdrew, there would be no question that there would be further incursions and territorial gains. There's a variety of thoughts about what the ultimate end goal of that is from a military perspective.

Further to earlier questions, I think if western countries, Canada and the EU and American allies, decide that they've had it in Ukraine—we've done our bit, and it's time for all of us to pull out and let them solve it themselves—we would see a scale of military intervention to political and social intervention that we have not yet seen. I think it would be on the scale of what we're seeing in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine, actually, with that kind of government system, that kind of disrespect for human rights and political and journalistic freedom. Our concern is that we don't have the short view of....

The current situation is in many ways a stalemate, but that doesn't give full credit to the Ukrainian armed forces in terms of what they're doing to hold back what is a desired further territorial invasion. It takes a lot of effort. Even though the current situation is not good in terms of Ukraine, in terms of military or social civil society, corruption, and other things, the situation is much better than it would have been had there been no assistance from Canada and other allies. That's a very important point to emphasize.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Thank you.

Do I have more time?

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Sure.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Do you want to ask a quick question?