Foreign Affairs Committee on March 23rd, 2017

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Yes.

Just to follow on from that, beyond the borders of Ukraine, I think everyone's reassured by the red line that's been drawn by NATO, Canada included, in the Baltics and in Poland, but we're seeing new demands for democratization in Belarus. Russia's responded with border controls. We see that Serbia is rushing to Russia's embrace without much encouragement, and their provocations with Kosovo and other former Yugoslav republics.

We know that the EU is becoming disenchanted with Serbia and we know that they're not very happy with Poland, given their resistance to EU refugee policies. Do you have concern that in fact western Europe is becoming somewhat fatigued and unenthusiastic about continuing and prolonging, and perhaps expanding, their defence of those who have chosen democracy in the former Soviet Union?

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

I think it's clear to see that there is.... I don't know that I'd say it is disinformation, but there is definitely a thread of thinking that the situation is at a stalemate, that nothing anybody has done, from the EU or the western, the Canadian side, is making a difference. We are concerned that this is not an accurate representation of the impact of what has actually happened on the ground.

Certainly, as we've said, there's no one solution. It isn't an easy situation to resolve in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. We can all understand the frustration of allies saying, “We've devoted so many resources. Why isn't it resolved?” That, I think, is not doing service to the many people who have been killed and the many people who have been injured.

The diaspora here in Canada and in Europe remains very vigilant to countering that argument. There are many positive examples of what has changed on the ground. We are on the path, with the judicial system, with police reform, to fundamentally change the lives of Ukrainian citizens, and, I think, provide an example to people in Belarus and Russia of what is a better future, what a democratic system with full freedoms of the press can be in a country that is ready to participate with the EU and Canada on free trade, on human rights, and on other such international agreements.

I think we are just on the cusp of getting over that argument about whether we have to pull out or do more. From our perspective, we're here to say, “Let's not be shortsighted about it. Let's continue the hard work.” Creating the Ukraine as a key ally for Canada and for the EU that protects European security, regardless of the question of NATO, is vital for global security. The Ukraine is really, historically and contemporarily, on the front lines of that conflict.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you very much, Mr. Kent.

We'll now go to Mr. McKay, please.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you both.

I want to have you speak to the elephant in the room, namely the Putin-Trump relationship. I'll just read you a sampling of the headlines that come up: “Ukraine Is Worried About The Cost Of Trump And Putin’s Special Relationship”; “Ukraine, first casualty of Trump-Putin Alliance”; “Ukraine clashes leave several dead and test Trump's Russia stance”; “'It's a pretty disturbing time for Ukraine': Trump's Russia ties unnerve Kiev”.

I'm sure you know these headlines better than I do.

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

I have one here.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Okay, there we are.

In the last 100 days, hasn't this long-term commitment just become a great deal longer?

[Orest Zakydalsky]

I'm sorry, whose...?

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

I mean the long-term commitment of the west to solving this. Given the budding relationship between Mr. Putin and Mr. Trump, doesn't this simply make this whole thing that much longer? Russia, as you have rightly said, only understands strength and resolve, and this relationship mitigates against both strength and resolution.

[Orest Zakydalsky]

A lot of what we're hearing is about ties between the Russians and people who worked for the Trump campaign, people in the administration. Paradoxically that lessens the ability of the administration to manoeuvre in the area.

Any overture to Russia is seen within the context of all of these things that are going on. That coupled with the fact that a sizable majority in both houses of Congress support the projection of American security to Europe, I think in the long run is going to mitigate a lot of this problem. Having said that, it's certainly not ideal that the one person that the U.S. President seems unable to criticize is Putin.

Again, I think the role of the United States in Europe and in global security transcends one administration or another. I think that this is an understanding that the world is a more secure and more peaceful place with a United States that is involved in the security architecture. Our hope, and it's not a false hope, is that understanding will prevail over any isolationism or these kinds of things.

I think that's it.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

That's an interesting answer from the standpoint of it being a paradox. That the more the relationship gets exposed, the less manoeuvring room the U.S. administration or Congress has and the more difficult it is for congressional and Senate members to be anything other than “strong on Russia”.

My question may be wrong. It may be in some respects that rather than lengthening this conflict, there might be some possibility that it contracts the conflicts. Maybe that's a little optimistic. I take your response. It's an interesting response. Certainly, I lived the paradox for the last three days. I was in Washington. A Canada-U.S. group met with 85 senators and congressmen. There was a lot of mumbling into the coffee cups when these kinds of issues arose.

Circling now into Canada's response because this does create difficulties for both our military and non-military response. I can only see us as staying the course in the present context. What's your response, if you will, to the political turmoil? We have to rely on the Americans for leadership. We're standing up a brigade group in Latvia. We're re-upping in Ukraine. We're taking over missions in Iraq. We're thinking about what we could do that would be effective in Africa. Yet all of it is highly dependent upon the working assumption that the Americans will be taking the leadership.

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

I agree with your premise.

I think the best thing Canada can do, and has been doing, is to be consistent, outspoken, in many venues, whether it's parliamentary or otherwise. As you said, the biggest problem with the American involvement in this sphere right now is an inconsistency and an uncertainty as to which way it will go. I think it's part of that.

You also mentioned the timeline on the horizon. I think despite the current swirling uncertainty, we see Canada and other Ukrainian allies remaining steadfast on the path, knowing that if it's 100 days, 200 days, or four years, or whatever the timeline is, the reforms and the plans that Canada and its allies are undertaking, including the Americans, will over time provide fruitful results. Again, nobody knows exactly how long it will take. The current speculation is in many ways a test of where American lawmakers are prepared to go or not go, what the American public feels.

I think we appreciate the consistency and the support from Canada, from both the previous government and this government, and the position that this is beyond politics, that this is a strategic, key foreign ally. In every forum possible, I think it's incumbent at this time for Canada to play a lead role in perhaps re-convincing our American allies—the ones you met, the senators, the congressmen, and the other level of administration in the U.S.—that indeed their previous position is sound, and that they should, over time, return to some consistency in their position as well within the EU-U.S.-Canada alliance.

We have seen the Americans, in the last 25 years, pour as much money and resources as Canada into Ukraine and other allies to strengthen civil society and the military. I think we need to make that argument to them, as we have made here, that a withdrawal on that scale would not serve the American interests. It would be a poor strategic outcome to suddenly withdraw what's been a long-term commitment over 25 years, and longer in terms of the Cold War and that kind of effect.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. McKay.

We'll have one last question before we wrap it up, Madame Laverdière.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you very much for giving me the floor, Mr. Chair.

We are learning that former Russian MP Denis Voronenkov, a Kremlin critic who had to flee to Ukraine, was shot to death this morning on the streets of Kiev.

We are also learning that an arms depot on the military base of Balakliia, a city in eastern Ukraine, was the target of a series of explosions. The Ukrainian government is calling the incident an act of sabotage.

I know that you may not yet have heard the news and that my question may be sudden, but what is your reaction to the two events?

[Orest Zakydalsky]

The explosion at Balakliya was around 3 a.m. Kiev time last night, or rather this morning. Yes, it is being investigated by the military prosecutor as an act of sabotage. There are some reports that right before the explosion people had heard an unmanned drone flying over the area.

The surrounding area, within about five or six kilometres, has been evacuated. About 20,000 people have been evacuated. There doesn't appear to be any threat beyond the immediate fire and this kind of thing. Ukraine has gone to heightened alert around other bases, ammunition depots, and so forth. We'll see what the cause of this was. It is not clear yet.

Voronenkov was in Kiev. He had defected or fled from Russia, and he was testifying about former Ukrainian President Yanukovych in investigations into what role he played in Russian troops coming into Ukrainian territory.

A lot of enemies of the Russian regime end up dead: Litvinenko in London, Politkovskaya in Moscow. The list goes on and on. Vladimir Kara-Murza, who appeared before this committee and who was poisoned a couple of years ago, was just recently poisoned again. Thankfully, he is recovering, from what we've heard.

Again, this happened today, so we don't know the extent of it but certainly a lot of it has the hallmarks of things we have seen happen to other people in other places, in other cities. We'll gladly update the committee as this proceeds. That's what we know now.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you very much.

Colleagues, this wraps up our discussion with the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. We very much appreciate both of you coming and spending this time with us. Again, if there is any other information that you want to pursue with the committee, feel free to send it to us as we continue with the discussion of this very important subject matter that we are having today.

Colleagues, we are going to suspend for about five minutes, and then we'll hear from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Colleagues, I'd like to bring the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development back into session.

We have about half an hour to spend with the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Latvia, Mr. Rinkevics. We want to thank him very much for making the time and effort to be with us.

Following our normal process, the minister will start off with some opening comments, as long or as short as he likes, as our guest, and then we'll get right into questions from committee members. As most of you will recall, we were in Latvia for a short period of time in January and had an opportunity to talk to a number of people. This is a good opportunity to follow up on that, and we're looking forward to it.

Minister, welcome. I will turn the floor over to you for some opening comments. Then we will go right to questions.

[His Excellency Edgars Rinkevics, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia]

Mr. Chairman, honourable members of the committee, thank you very much for having me this morning. I'm really delighted to be here.

As I told you, Mr. Chairman, I miss the foreign affairs committee back in Latvia so much that I decided that during my visit to Canada, I should show up for some questioning. If you don't get questioning once a week, you lose a little bit of sharpness in discussion and the spirit of Parliament.

Mr. Chairman, really, I very much appreciate this opportunity to address the committee, especially taking into account that you recently visited my country, Latvia, and that we have now a very special bond through NATO. I want to use this opportunity one more time to express our gratitude to Canada and the Canadian government for the leadership taken back at the Warsaw summit, agreeing to lead a NATO-led battle group in Latvia.

I will discuss the practical issues of deployment, logistics, and legal issues with both the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs later today. I think that what the Canadian government has done so far, and the relations we have now developed over a couple of months and that we continue to develop, show that the spirit of solidarity and the allied spirit in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are very much alive. I will not really make long comments, because I very much enjoy questions and answers. Those are more lively debates. I just want to make a couple of points.

First, as you know, starting from the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 and followed by the illegal annexation of Crimea back in 2014, there is a developing situation in the east of Ukraine. We are witnessing enormous change and enormous challenge, not only in Europe but also on the global stage. We have a revisionist power, Russia, that really wants to review and revise the results of the Cold War. We have seen that international law as we know it is being challenged. It's not only the United Nations Charter on the illegal annexation of Crimea; the Budapest memorandum that was signed by Russia, Ukraine, the U.K., and the U.S., which guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine, has also been thrown away.

From that point of view, taking into account our historical background, the occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union back in 1940, and our struggle for freedom, where we also had the support of Canada—Canada was home for many Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians during the Soviet occupation, and still is home for many Latvians—I believe that it is of paramount importance that we stand united in full solidarity against those attempts to revise history.

From that point of view, our approach to Russia has been twofold. One is to deter and contain, and I think that the presence of NATO troops in the Baltic states, as well as in Poland, sends a very clear message that no further possible provocations by Russia will be welcomed.

I will go from Ottawa back to Washington, to meet Secretary of State Tillerson. Along with my Lithuanian and Estonian colleagues, we will also have meetings in the U.S. House of Representatives, with Speaker Ryan, and with members of the U.S. foreign relations committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. We will also discuss the approach of the new administration, but I already feel that despite what the press sometimes writes and reports, we have both Canada and the United States very committed to European security.

We also understand that we have to do our part. We are increasing our defence budget, and next year it will be the famous 2% of GDP. This year it's already 1.7%. We are working very closely with our Canadian friends and partners within the defence realm, as well as in foreign affairs, to address those practical issues.

I also believe that we should not forget about assistance to such countries as Ukraine, Moldova, or Georgia, which are implementing sometimes very painful but necessary reforms. We have to uphold their territorial integrity, both in symbolic statements but also in very practical terms. I think that continuous support for the reform process in Ukraine will actually be of benefit not only to Ukraine but to Europe as such.

I also believe that we have to understand—this is my conviction—that taking into account the steps taken by NATO in both NATO summits, in Wales as well as in Warsaw, the probability of military provocation against NATO members such as Latvia is very low.

Then, we also understand that we are in the 21st century, and so-called hybrid warfare is actually going on. I believe there are two very sensitive areas, which I'm prepared to address in detail, if you have some questions, but which I will mention.

One is cybersecurity. We are witnessing many attempts to penetrate our IT systems, whether it be of the foreign ministry or defence ministry. Those attacks occur almost on a daily basis.

We are also witnessing unprecedented—and this is the second dimension that I want to refer to—propaganda warfare, to some extent. I would say it's nothing new to us in the Baltics. Even before our colleagues in the European Union—France, Germany, and the U.K.—were subject to the unprecedented attacks, the propaganda warfare against their governments, we already had those. We have been developing necessary responses for years.

The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence is based in Riga. We are analyzing not only the propaganda warfare of Russia but also the propaganda warfare by extremist groups such as ISIS. We understand that we are actually under attack by multiple agents. It's not only Russia or government propaganda; it's also extremist groups that are trying to undermine our way of living. One of those is ISIS.

We take things, then, in a bit broader context, but talking about the propaganda warfare we have seen right now, yes, we are indeed still in the process of trying to assess all mechanisms and tools and to work out effective countermeasures. Among those I could mention is media literacy. I think that journalists could probably.... It's very dangerous to teach journalists what to do and how to think; however, I think the development of critical thinking.... Verifying sources is something that should be put high on the agenda. It's actually, in a broader sense also, the raising of awareness in our societies that not everything you read in social media or on the net is really true.

We have also in the Baltics the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, where journalists analyze methods of propaganda and how to find what is right, what is wrong, and how to address those issues.

Secondly, I don't frankly consider Russian-owned state media propaganda tools as free media that are subject to the same rules as the normal media. That's why we sometimes take some harsh measures when we see that some law is broken. Our respective authorities suspend for some definite period of time—subject to court review, of course, afterwards—the broadcasting of that or another Russian media outlet that is actually financed and governed by the Russian government.

From that point of view, I would also like to stress we are aware that when Canadian troops arrive later this year, there will be attempts to challenge them. That is not so much in a military way, but to try to influence both our society back home, saying that we really don't need those Canadians, but also Canadian society here, saying, why are you spending so much money in a faraway country where nobody has interest? I think that we should be aware of that. We are addressing that also, as are our Canadian counterparts.

I will stop here. I don't want to make this a 30-minute lecture and leave. I would be very glad to answer any questions you have on any subject I have mentioned, or any I haven't mentioned. I haven't mentioned many things just because I want to have a more interactive discussion.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you very much, Minister.

I will go straight to questions then, and to Mr. Kent.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Minister, for fitting our committee into what I know is a very busy schedule.

I'd like to thank you for the hospitality that our committee received during our visit in January to Latvia, and for Latvia's enthusiastic support, economically, with regard to CETA and the early endorsement ratification of that important agreement.

I'd also like to thank Latvia for the words from your ambassador to Ottawa in countering some of the discouraging words from the ambassador of Russia here, saying that Canada's participation in the NATO mission was part of a general threat of security in Europe and that, as you just said in terms of disinformation, Latvia doesn't need those Canadian soldiers.

I would like you to amplify on the IT and propaganda threats. During our visit to Riga, we were powerfully enlightened by briefings at OSCE headquarters on both of those issues, not only with regard to IT penetration and threat or Russian television propaganda, but also from the internal work of agents of Russia— retired military, Russian military, or retired KGB agents—who will be working, as you say, to stir up and provoke internal controversy about the NATO mission.

[Edgars Rinkevics]

Thank you.

First of all, thank you very much for those kind words about your visit. I will pass them along to the chairman of our foreign affairs committee, Mr. Kalnins. I think he was also delighted to host you.

In answer to your question on Russian retired KGB or military officers as active agents to stir up some controversy, frankly, I do not expect direct provocations against Canadian troops or soldiers from other countries. Canada will be leading multinational forces, from countries including Albania, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, and Poland.

Here is what we have seen so far. Since 2014 we have many American soldiers coming and spending time with exercises in Latvia. We have had many exercises. We haven't had examples of attempts to make direct provocations against them, such as engaging in some kind of activity in the bars or pubs after they have finished their working day or their service and have some free time. Actually, there have been only one or two incidents reported by the press so far. I think that we are quite well prepared to disseminate whatever occurs and to make sure that any incident is correctly related.

We have already witnessed at least one example in Lithuania with the German troops, because Germany is leading a NATO battle group in Lithuania. As German troops arrived, all of a sudden, over one weekend, there was some fake news in the media that German troops were raping a young boy in one small Lithuanian village. That's why I believe we all have to be prepared for such absolutely fake news. There were no grounds for that.

Thank God, both Lithuanian and German authorities were quick to verify and to set the facts straight. Actually, what may well have been intended as provocation ended up in disaster for those intending that provocation, because it was not a story about German troops harassing Lithuanian children; it was a story about the propaganda machine failing.

From that point of view, we are aware that there could be some attempts, especially at the beginning, to discredit the whole mission. I also know that both ministries of defence take this seriously, and some plans are being put in place.

Regarding all other kinds of possible provocations, I don't believe we are going to see mass demonstrations, and so on. What is also important—and our current experience shows it—is that there be a very strong and broad public outreach program. It is important that there be some kind of public diplomacy, and that Canadian troops go to schools and play some sports with children—in summer, it's probably not going to be hockey, but in winter, certainly—so that we also put a more positive spin on it.

I know that both defence ministries are currently working on that, but I don't expect some retired KGB or military guys going down the streets and doing nasty things.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Kent.

I'll go to Mr. Fragiskatos, please.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here. You'll be happy to know that Canadian hockey fans have long appreciated the Latvian contribution to our great game—Arturs Irbe and Sandis Ozolinsh. I just wanted to mention that. I know you've ratified CETA, but there are other reasons our countries have such good relations, Minister.

I want to ask you a question about spheres of influence in Russia. It is not uncommon to come across views within media, within academic circles, that go something along the following lines. If we want global stability, as we should naturally, then we need to recognize that Russia wishes to have a sphere of influence, and like it or not eastern Europe is seen, at least from the Russian perspective, as being in its sphere of influence.

I disagree with that view because I think that the democracies—I emphasize that, the democracies— of eastern Europe deserve to be free, secure. Could you counter that view, though, and speak to it from if not an eastern European's perspective, then from a Latvian's perspective?

I know you can't speak for the region as a whole. I think it's very easy to dismiss the security interests and democratic interests of countries like Latvia and to simply say that Russia's sphere of influence is eastern Europe, and if we want international stability then we ought to recognize that. I think it's very dismissive. I wonder, Minister, if you could touch on that point.

[Edgars Rinkevics]

The last time that spheres of influence were agreed upon was back in 1939, under the Hitler-Stalin or Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. We unfortunately directly suffered from that, but I think we all saw that it didn't help prevent what happened afterwards. The first big tragedy of World War II was the attack against Poland, and it ended with the big war between Germany and the Soviet Union after all.

I think there is a temptation to think that if we divide the world into spheres of influence—actually, the more modern expression for it is a multipolar world system—understanding that there are countries that have legitimate interests in other countries and that those legitimate interests are contrary to what the people of Ukraine, for instance, or Moldova or Georgia probably want to do, and that Russia has the right to stop them from reforming themselves and putting the values that we all share, such as democracy, human rights, the market economy, the rule of law in place, and if we follow what is currently known as the system in Russia, which is an authoritarian, a very, I would say, “conservative”, to be diplomatic, set of values and so on....

From that point of view, I earnestly believe that if we don't uphold the kind of liberal world order that means promotion of democracy, rule of law, and free trade as part of it—because I believe that nations who are trading fairly and freely are not aligned in spheres of influence, politically or militarily, but are aligned in the direction of more prosperity, more human rights.... That kind of liberal order, which really authoritarian regimes in the world do not like because it undermines their very existence, has prevented us from experiencing major military conflicts in the last 70 years.

Yes. There was a huge struggle between a totalitarian communist regime and the free world throughout the Cold War years, which ended with the collapse of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. In the last 25 years, even with all the deficiencies we have seen, we have at least in my country experienced years of living standards rising consistently, during which we have become part of both NATO and the EU. Actually we have seen an expansion of stability and peace in Europe.

I believe that if there are attempts now to neglect smaller countries, to go back to 19th-century diplomacy with spheres of influence, with inevitable clashes at some point among those great powers, at the end of the day we will all suffer. I think that in general it would be in Russia's genuine interests that neighbouring countries, from Finland and the Baltics in the north to the Caucasus and Ukraine further down to the south, develop freely and in a way such that democracy and market economy and rule of law flourish. That would be the best security guarantee for Russia itself.

Unfortunately we missed an opportunity and Russia missed an opportunity back in the 1990s or the beginning of the 2000s for genuine reforms. Unfortunately, the country has run in a direction that I personally disapprove of.

Unfortunately the noise you hear from many is that the best way to maintain peace and stability in Europe and indeed in the world is to let them have what they want. If they get what they want today, they will demand more tomorrow, and at one point—nobody can say when—we are going to stop. That very much reminds me of the history, unfortunately, of the 1920s and 1930s.

We are the huge beneficiaries of those 25 years of freedom right now. I would say that defending what we have is the only way to actually maintain the core of our own existence, as your Atlantic or western world.