If I may, I would just add that I believe past witnesses have brought this up, but, yes, building on what Canada has now, a good addition would be some regime of post-shipment verification. Other countries that have done this recently, I believe, are Germany and Switzerland, and they have found their arms being misused, including small arms, which frequently fall victim to diversion. This is something that Canada could, and we think that it should, look at implementing. It's not a radically new idea. We can talk to allies and figure out how they've implemented it and move forward with tracking Canadian weapons.
On top of that I would echo the sentiments of my colleague Cesar in saying that Global Affairs Canada should be more proactive.
Mr. Bergeron, you correctly bring up the report by the UN panel of experts on Libya and the situation in 2019. Why or how Canadian officials were not aware of that report and not aware of the fact that Turkey was sending TB2s to Libya in violation of the UN arms embargo is beyond us. On top of that, we now know as a result of these documents that have been released that Canadian officials knew these sensors were being used on TB2s at the time. Again, that's the Turkish drone. Officials really should have put two and two together and come to the conclusion that there was at least substantial risk that Wescam sensors were being diverted to Libya. However, they didn't and we would chalk this up to more of reactive approach rather than a proactive approach.