Evidence of meeting #13 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 44th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was russia.
A video is available from Parliament.
Liberal
Ali Ehsassi Liberal Willowdale, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Professor Snyder, you essentially teased us, because at some point you said you would not get into providing us with meaningful signs as to the fissures occurring in the Kremlin. Given that most of the commentary we've been hearing has been very general and at a macro level, I would be grateful if you could kindly provide us with some of the signs you have seen that suggest there is a lot of pressure on Mr. Putin—hopefully.
Professor of History, Yale University, As an Individual
I put this argument into 30 points on my Substack, if anyone knows what Substack is. That's my second tease for Canadian parliamentarians today.
Here are some of the lines of division. The number one line of division is Putin versus Putin, tactical Putin versus ideological Putin. Ideological Putin clearly has the upper hand. The man just seems less in control of his political impulses than he did before.
Number two, going the next step closer to the ground, is Putin and the military. The fact that General Shoigu disappeared for more than two weeks is not a sign that all is well. The fact that announcements of new Russian doctrine—which, of course, are not to be believed—are made by lower-ranking military officers and not by Shoigu and Gerasimov is a sign that something is amiss.
The third level is the FSB, the Russian secret state police. One of the heads of its departments, Sergey Beseda, is reportedly under house arrest. He's the one who would have provided the information about Ukraine before the attack. The mistakes are all Putin's, in my opinion, and he's trying to farm them out to the generals and the FSB.
Another issue here is that because this decision was apparently made in a very small group—a handful of people—that means that potentially there are a lot of people just outside that immediate inner circle who could say, “Actually, I didn't vote for this. I wasn't in on that conversation. I'm not a war criminal. I'm not genocidal. I had nothing to do with this bad decision.”
Another line of difficulty is between FSB, or the state police, and the Chechen irregulars who are fighting in Ukraine. There's historically been a lot of tension between those two groups. If Putin has to take the side of the Chechen irregulars against the FSB, that could also be a problem.
Another line of possible dissent is with the men versus the officers. There are a lot of deserters. There are reports of men turning on their officers. It is a bit mysterious how many Russian generals have died. I'd like to give credit to Ukrainians for all of that, but I'm not 100% sure it's the case.
Those are some possible lines.... People who are wiser than me about this suggest that there is a certain amount of tension. I think, give this another month of the Ukrainians performing very well and let's see. It's impossible to say where something will break. I think the hairline cracks at least are there.
Liberal
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
On a point of order, Mr. Chair, I wonder if it would be appropriate to ask the professor to provide, in writing, the link to his Substack with that information.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
We can do that, if he's willing to provide that, absolutely. It's on the record.
Thank you, Mr. Genuis.
Mr. Bergeron, you have the floor for one and a half minutes.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Dembińska, first, I commend you on your efforts to try to get Ukrainian female students from Kharkiv National University into Canada. If we can be of any assistance to you, please feel free to let us know. I understand that biometric testing issues are unduly delaying the process. We've already had the opportunity to speak publicly about it.
I'd like to hear what you have to say about the question left unanswered in my first round of questions.
We appear to be giving Mr. Putin carte blanche by not stepping in. Could this give him the opportunity to use biological, bacteriological or even nuclear weapons?
Full Professor, Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal, As an Individual
Thank you for the question.
Since I'm not a military expert, it will be hard for me to answer your question very accurately.
I'm fairly certain that Mr. Putin has no interest in deploying those weapons. However, that doesn't mean that he won't do it. The threat of using those weapons, the fact that he could deploy them, is dissuading the West from stepping into the war in Ukraine other than helping Ukrainians in the country. I feel it's a deterrent, because people believe he is capable of doing it. Many people say that Mr. Putin is behaving irrationally. Because some people believe he's capable of using those weapons, all Mr. Putin has to do is use that message.
Will he do it? I can't say.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.
Madam McPherson, go ahead, please, for one and a half minutes.
NDP
Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB
I'll try to be very quick, Mr. Chair. I can see this is very difficult for you.
I'd like to follow up on that. In terms of the nuclear risk we are facing, what is the message that other rogue countries can take from the success Putin has had using nuclear as a deterrent, and what are the impacts on future arms control or arms prohibition discussions that we know are coming up, even just this summer?
Perhaps, Dr. Snyder, I can start with you.
Professor of History, Yale University, As an Individual
That's a wonderful question. I think what Mr. Putin has done since 2014 has been to promote nuclear weapons more than any other leader has done before in history.
As everyone here will know, in 2004 Ukraine, by the numbers, had the third-highest number of nuclear weapons in the world and agreed to give them up. Since that time, Ukraine has been invaded at least twice, depending on how you count it, by the neighbouring country to which it actually gave the nuclear weapons back in 1994. I misspoke earlier—it was 1994.
That, along with the fact that Russia refers so often to nuclear weapons, is an argument for nuclear proliferation. It's an argument for little countries to arm themselves against big countries.
It will also be, if we let it go this far, if we don't think of our coherent response, an argument for all countries to say, “Oh, I can block the west, not by using nuclear weapons but by pretending to be unhinged and talking about nuclear weapons.” That will give western politicians an excuse to do nothing. I think there is a long-term danger of this scenario.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Ms. McPherson, thank you very much.
Mr. Genuis, go ahead, please, for three minutes.
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to ask a couple more questions.
I wonder, Professor Snyder, if there is anything you want to add in terms of those fissures within the Putin regime and if you see any ability to assign time horizons and probabilities.
Also, I'll ask again a similar question to the one I asked in the previous panel, just around the chain of command and nuclear weapons. What is the risk of a nuclear weapon being used in the context of a palace coup or the threat of a nuclear cataclysm being used internally against other internal factions?
That's a lot of speculation I'm asking you to do, but....
Professor of History, Yale University, As an Individual
I'm going to link the two questions and try to minimize the speculation by telling you what I think the scenario would like look. I think that when we imagine the palace coup, we imagine it kinetically, three-dimensionally and very dramatically: the army storms the Kremlin or the FSB storms the room. I actually don't think it's going to look like that. I think it's going to look like late Stalin.
I think it's going to look like Stalin in 1951, 1952 and 1953. Nobody actually turned against him. People just stopped doing what he said to do, or they did what he said when it was counter to his own interests. I think that's what it's going to look like with Putin. I think what's going to happen is that the things he says are suddenly not going to convert into action. He's going to realize that and he's going to be afraid, and that's the moment when we get peace talks.
I'm less worried about the violent scenarios, because I don't think the institutions of the state are set up like that. There aren't really institutions in the way we're used to thinking about. There's a person and there are people who are intimidated by or dependent upon that person. The moment they are slowed down by whatever factor, and he ceases to be the leader he thinks he is, is the moment things start to turn.
That's the best I can do.
On the chain of command, I would suggest that you speak to someone who is actually a technical expert on those kinds of issues, which I'm not.
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
That's really fascinating.
Institutionally, in terms of the Russian state, how similar is it to the structures that have existed in Russia for hundreds of years? What are the notable similarities or differences between tsarist Russia, the communist structure and today?
Professor of History, Yale University, As an Individual
Honestly, the communist structure looks like a bounteous flower shop of institutions compared to what we have now. When the Chinese try to understand Russia, they have trouble, because in China they at least have a party with party organs. In Russia, there really are no meaningful institutions. The party is the president's party—United Russia—and the parliament is the president's parliament. The only institution that meets regularly is his security council, and the security council is basically there to receive orders from Mr. Putin.
The Russian way of talking about it as the “power vertical”, I think, is more useful than our way of talking about it as institutions. The way it all stops is when the people one rung down on the vertical slow down, stop doing what Mr. Putin says and give him something to think about.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Genuis. I'm sorry.
Our final intervention this afternoon is from Mr. Sarai for three minutes.
Please go ahead.
Liberal
Randeep Sarai Liberal Surrey Centre, BC
Thank you.
Professor Snyder, this has been extremely interesting, with all the facts you've been giving us.
I wanted to know if you can shed some light on the negotiations that are happening right now. My understanding is that there are six issues. Four are related to neutrality and security in the region, and two are territorial. Is this a tactic for Russia to just buy time, or is it the endgame that Russia's been trying to get to all along?
Professor of History, Yale University, As an Individual
I would be misleading you if I said that I or anybody else in the world were sure about the answer to that question. My own feeling is that Mr. Putin still believes that the big victory is within reach.
I think he's mistaken about that, and he'll find out within the next month that he's mistaken about that, but I think that from the Russian point of view this is still a distraction, because they think the big victory is within reach. I think he still thinks that the fall of the Ukrainian state is within reach and, at the very least, that something like the Black Sea is within reach. I believe he's mistaken. I don't believe the Ukrainian army will allow that to happen, but I think he is still in that mode.
As for the Ukrainians, I also don't believe that they're particularly ready to negotiate at this stage. I think they are also trying things out at this stage, because I think they believe they can also do better than the present set-up.
As for the issues, I agree with you. I think the issues have never really been the problem. You and I and a couple of other reasonable people could probably come up with something that involves territory, neutrality and security, and end this war.
The issue is that Mr. Putin was never actually fighting a war about NATO. He was never fighting about that. He was fighting a war to destroy the Ukrainian state. Now, where he climbs down to from that is something that is difficult for us to ascertain, which is why I think there has to be more of a push on him, so that he feels vulnerable before we get into that reasonable territory where we can talk about neutrality plus territory plus security.
As I say, I don't believe those issues are actually in themselves all that difficult. Zelenskyy, basically from day two of the war, has been talking about how these things are within reach. I think Putin still believes he can gain more from war than from talking at the present moment.
Liberal
Randeep Sarai Liberal Surrey Centre, BC
Last, really quickly, on sanctions, we've been reading that some sanctions.... They obviously anticipated a level of sanctions, and some say that Putin himself is not hearing about the damaging effects of the sanctions. Can you tell us if there's truth to that? Also, what's the magnitude of the sanctions' effect on the regime itself?
Professor of History, Yale University, As an Individual
It will be a while before Mr. Putin understands the effect of the sanctions. I can say that the Russians were surprised by the scale of the sanctions. They were not prepared for this level of sanctions. Their idea was that the war would be over so quickly that we wouldn't really have a chance to react. I think they also underestimated how quickly North Americans and Europeans could get together on these issues.
I think it's affected the Russian economy quite significantly. Again, as with many other things, I think a month from now it's going to be more significant than it is now.
Mr. Putin is very much isolated from all of this, so it will take a while for this to reach him personally. As with everything else, he doesn't care about the effect of the sanctions, until by some vector it seems to weaken him personally. The Russian economy is going to look quite bad for a while before it becomes a factor that Mr. Putin actually takes into account.
That's not a reason not to sanction. From my point of view, it's a reason to sanction harder and more, and to try to help the Europeans get away from Russian natural gas and hydrocarbons in general as quickly as possible. I think the only way to end this war is for Mr. Putin to feel the pressure.
I would like to avoid this stagnation paradigm, in which we say, “There's nothing else we can do. We just have to stagnate for a while.” I think we have to give the Ukrainians as much help as we can, so that a month from now we can have a conversation about ending this war.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sven Spengemann
Thank you very much, Mr. Sarai.
Colleagues, collectively I'd like to thank our two expert witnesses for their time with us this afternoon and for their insightful, tremendous testimony.
We're very grateful to them.
We will let you disconnect.
Colleagues, if I can keep members back for a few minutes—
Liberal
Rob Oliphant Liberal Don Valley West, ON
If you could indulge me for five seconds.... If we were in an old-fashioned meeting, I'd go to the witnesses and shake their hands and thank them, like we always did.
To Professor Snyder, even though you probably sometimes think you're just writing out to the universe, you have been a tremendous guide all the way through this conflict for me, from that very important lecture you did on the history of Ukraine. It was about 17 hours long, I think. I listened to the whole thing. I am a subscriber. I would commend it to our whole committee, because you've been a tremendous help to me.
Professor of History, Yale University, As an Individual
Thank you, Mr. Oliphant.