Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for the invitation to present here today.
My name is Kelsey Gallagher, and I am a researcher with Project Ploughshares, where I focus on Canadian military exports and the international arms trade. My intervention today will focus on transparency and regulatory gaps facing Canada's export of dual-use technologies and military goods.
Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the need for effective regulations on transfers of dual-use goods. Despite the efforts of western states, dual-use goods have been found integrated into numerous weapons systems that Russia has deployed in its ongoing assault on Ukraine. A Norwegian risk consultancy firm recently found that, since last February, eight billion euros worth of sanctioned products had entered Russia, rerouted through third countries. Much of these goods were reported to be dual-use.
In February, 2022, Canada revoked export and brokering permits to Russia for controlled goods, which included conventional weapons, dual-use goods and all other categories of technology listed under Canada's export control list.
Although not without its flaws, Canada's reporting record on arms exports is relatively transparent. However, it publishes almost no information on its actual export of dual-use goods, unlike a number of like-minded states.
Canada's export of dual-use goods requires greater scrutiny and transparency. To this end, Global Affairs Canada should begin publishing comprehensive data on Canadian exports of dual-use goods, as it does for other military goods. This information, at the very least, should include the value of those exports, descriptions of the goods, and their authorized end users. Such data, particularly on transfers to destinations that have been identified as conduits to bypass export controls, would provide greater insights on the potential proliferation of sensitive Canadian technology abroad.
An examination of the extraterritorial application of Canadian sanctions could also reveal other weaknesses in Canada's regulatory regime. Of particular interest are alleged sanctions violations by companies with deep Canadian roots that also perform operations abroad.
The Streit Group, an armoured vehicle manufacturer established in Toronto in the 1990s, is perhaps Canada's most controversial arms supplier. It now claims to be one of the largest privately owned armoured vehicle manufacturers in the world.
While maintaining a Canadian headquarters in Innisfil, Ontario, it has established parallel manufacturing centres in several countries with weak export control regimes. The largest is in the UAE. It has been suggested that the Streit Group engages in jurisdiction shopping to identify export control havens that it uses to supply military goods to its most problematic customers and evade arms embargoes.
The Streit Group has openly breached arms embargoes by shipping weapons to Libya, Sudan and South Sudan. In 2020, its vehicles were used by Belarusian security services to quell internal democracy protests. It has exported military goods to a host of other problematic locations.
The company's activities have drawn scrutiny and led to investigations by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the United Nations. While an RCMP investigation was reportedly launched in 2016 following allegations of sanctions violations, no findings have been made public and there is no public record of any subsequent action.
A 2017 publication by the Rideau Institute determined that “there is no doubt that the Streit Group's sale of armoured vehicles to Sudan violated Canadian sanctions” and that “the Canadian owner of the Streit Group, Guerman Goutorov, should have been investigated and—if sufficient evidence of law-breaking emerged—prosecuted under the United Nations Act.”
The Streit Group stands as an example of significant weakness in Canada's export control regime. It appears that companies that want to circumvent sanctions only need to establish supply routes in third states, while making the tenuous claim that there is no connection between Canadian and foreign facilities.
This case study illustrates a significant issue that must be addressed, and this issue is not location or company specific. As a prolific Canadian sanctions violator, the Streit Group provides a road map for other arms suppliers who may wish to dodge Canadian export controls and sanctions.
The Government of Canada must double down on its efforts to confront the offshoring of arms production and maintenance, which allows for free flows of weapons to sanctioned states and actors. Efforts could include a study on the extent of this problem. Another recommendation would be to conduct a review of the effective enforcement of Canada's brokering controls, which were incorporated into the Export and Imports Permits Act in 2018. These controls aim to regulate the extraterritorial trade and transfer of conventional arms by Canadians and Canadian entities.
I look forward to any questions. Thank you very much.
