Foreign Affairs Committee on June 8th, 2023

[Jean-Denis Garon, Bloc, Mirabel, QC]

Thank you.

Through Bill C‑41, Canada is in the process of amending the Criminal Code so that humanitarian organizations operating in Afghanistan can continue working on the ground without being seen as providing financial support to a terrorist group. Understandably, that has benefits. I'm curious about two things.

One, is that something Afghan civil society has called for?

Two, what risks might there be?

[Ali Maisam Nazary]

Of course we believe that international aid and assistance should be delivered to Afghanistan. Millions, basically three-fourths of the population, are in need of international aid.

In the past two years, billions have been delivered to Afghanistan. We haven't seen the humanitarian crisis alleviated; we've seen it exacerbated. There is a problem with how international aid and assistance is being distributed.

The Taliban, of course, have a role in how it's being distributed. We've seen discriminatory policies where aid isn't reaching every community that needs it. This allows the Taliban to exploit the assistance, as we've seen in many reports coming out from the U.S. Congress such as SIGAR. We've seen that aid isn't going to communities that are in need.

The National Resistance Front especially, for the past two years, because the international community hasn't been able to deliver aid to many of the communities, has taken up the responsibility. We've provided aid for more than 200,000 individuals within the country in communities where aid packages haven't been delivered and, basically, who are being deprived. Even when it comes to individual NGOs in Afghanistan, we've seen problematic mechanisms in place.

We believe that international aid should continue, but there should be better mechanisms in place to prevent terrorist groups from exploiting the aid that comes in and for aid to be equally distributed throughout the country.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Mr. Garon.

Mr. Green, you have five minutes.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Gallagher, I'm going to try to put three questions to you in a rather rapid-fire way.

In your remarks you said that the Canadian-owned Streit Group is skirting sanctions in South Sudan and Libya. Expert UN panels monitoring sanctions have condemned the Streit Group for this. Under the last Conservative government, Global Affairs awarded a sole-source contract to them. When New Democrats raised concern about the lack of enforcement during the 2017 study at this committee, the RCMP could neither confirm nor deny whether investigations were taking place.

Can you tell us more about this situation? Are there failures in Canada's sanctions enforcement or potential gaps in how we apply the Arms Trade Treaty when a Canadian-owned company is clearly contributing to international insecurity and skirting sanctions?

[Kelsey Gallagher]

To start off, with regard the RCMP, this is clearly another instance where there's not enough transparency. I'm assuming that it's the same instance of an RCMP investigation of this company. If my memory serves me, we only learned about this through the press. There should really be a greater degree of transparency when Canadian officials are investigating potential sanctions-busting, which I note other witnesses have suggested in this study.

In terms of sanctions under the ATT, the ATT states that parties cannot transfer weapons systems. Article 6 of the treaty prohibits transfers if a state is under a UN arms embargo—so a sanction, obviously.

This is where it gets more complicated: This company, the Streit Group, has insulated itself from Canadian export regulations, seemingly quite successfully, because the Canadian government is either incapable of doing something about this or is unwilling.

That's why we point to brokering controls. This is an instance where.... These are innovative sets of regulations that aim to address sanctions violators that exploit offshore export havens. If the current tool kit isn't working, then the tool kit has to be amended. We think that this is a place where Canada could be innovative in looking at how something like brokering controls could apply.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Are there any international examples that have stronger, gold-standard legislation on that?

[Kelsey Gallagher]

With brokering, it's hard to say. This is not a new problem, but it's a new set of controls. The Arms Trade Treaty, which made brokering a regulated act, at least for ATT-state parties, only recently celebrated its 10th anniversary since entering into force. This is relatively new stuff. At this time, I wouldn't be able to point to a gold standard.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Fair enough.

In August, it was revealed that the CBSA disrupted an attempt to send dual-use goods—you referenced that—to Russia in violation of sanctions imposed following the invasion of Ukraine. Last week, the CBSA confirmed to this committee that it has seized a number of shipments with Russia as the declared end destination. Could you tell us more about the problem of dual-use goods and whether there are problems with designated end-users?

[Kelsey Gallagher]

Dual-use goods are somewhat of a hot topic right now. It's because of the war on Ukraine. Russia and other states are seeking dual-use goods because their supply chains have been cut off.

Going back to our recommendations.... We really don't know the extent of this problem because there is almost zero transparency on Canada's export of dual-use goods. The only type of information that we have is when Global Affairs Canada has authorized permits for dual-use exports. However, we don't have the end-user; we don't have values. The only specific type of information that we have on dual-use permits is when they've been denied.

We know that last year Canada denied 22 permits to Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, but over the prior five years, there was only one permit denied, which does suggest that dual-use goods were, indeed, flowing to Russia. We, obviously, can't say that for sure, but that's what the data would suggest.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Briefly, beyond transparency, what would we be doing to prevent Canadian-made weapons or systems of dual-use goods from getting into the wrong hands?

[Kelsey Gallagher]

I would say that Canadian officials should look at systems right now that are actually not deemed to be dual-use but certainly are. These are sometimes referred to as “commercial off-the-shelf” items or COTS items. These are actually marketed as such to suppliers because suppliers know that these are not caught up in red tape.

There are, certainly, military goods made in Canada that are not deemed to be dual-use, and we would absolutely argue that they should be.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We now go to the second round of questioning.

We start off with the honourable MP Chong. You have four minutes for this round.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Through you, Mr. Chair, I'd like to focus on enforcement as it relates to the machinery of government.

Currently, as you know, applications for permits under the Export and Import Permits Act are done by a specific unit within Global Affairs Canada, the Export and Import Permits Act unit—I don't know the exact title.

Then, separate and distinct from that is the criminal, security and diplomatic law division within Global Affairs, which handles permits or certificates under the Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act and other acts.

There have been suggestions that these two entities should be combined into one unit within Global Affairs. What's your view?

[Kelsey Gallagher]

Thank you for the question.

It's the export controls division that was referenced.

I don't know the current size of the latter enforcement mechanism mentioned. It—

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Well, the Government of Canada has announced $75 million for beefing up this particular unit—the criminal, security and diplomatic law division. Some of that is going to the RCMP, but I understand the bulk of it is going to this division, separate and distinct from the unit that handles permits under the Export and Import Permits Act. It seems to me there would be economies of scale in combining the two, and also better coordination.

[Kelsey Gallagher]

Sure, there is merit in the suggestion, particularly as they would sometimes be looking at certain things. The export controls division doesn't operate vis-à-vis sanctions the same way that other organisms of the Canadian government do. When Canadian officials are looking at whether or not to authorize an export permit, the first thing they look at is whether or not the proposed destination or actor is sanctioned. If they are, then that permit is obviously not approved.

There could be merit to the idea that they could be combined. That's all I would have to say.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I don't have any other questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

You have a minute remaining.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

It's okay.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I can take it, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Okay.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you.

Perhaps I can give the additional time to Mr. Nazary. He was speaking about something going on in Vienna at the end of my last question around the work of the NRF, and a coming together there.

I wonder if you could share a bit more on that.

[Ali Maisam Nazary]

Of course, Mr. Chair. Thank you.

Because of our assessment that the Taliban haven't been able to form state institutions, haven't been able to provide for the people and haven't been able to provide security and stability in the country, we foresee that their disintegration will happen much sooner than anticipated. Once this happens, it will create power vacuums throughout the country. It is very important for us to start preparing politically for the future, to politically unite the opposition, the democratic forces, whether inside or outside Afghanistan, and to create the political consensus that can lead to a democratic alternative that can fill the power vacuum once it is created in the next year or two, or whenever it does happen in the foreseeable future.

So, in Vienna, Austria, we have started a political process to unit the opposition. We had our second round last month, and we are very much on a trajectory to achieve a democratic alternative for Afghanistan's future.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Mr. Nazary.

We next go to Mr. Sidhu.

You have four minutes.