Foreign Affairs Committee on April 21st, 2026

[Cleo Paskal]

It's not good, but I wouldn't overestimate how much people are looking at us.

In preparation for this hearing, I asked friends across the region—Americans, Indians, etc.—what they thought about Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy. My American colleague, who was in charge of planning for the Indo-Pacific at Camp Smith in Hawaii, said, “That's like a Trivial Pursuit question.” Our profile is not that high, which is why identifying niche areas—dark vessel technology is great—or specific countries, like those in the Pacific Islands, or the Francophonie push.... Identifying places where we can stand out would make people care more.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

Do you believe the Canadian government runs the risk of signalling to our Indo-Pacific allies that we're ceding soft power to Beijing? Further to that, are there domestic economic security concerns if we make stronger trade ties with China?

[Cleo Paskal]

Yes, and I would also note that the language around the U.S. is generally not light. You have countries like the Philippines putting their neck on the line with radical transparency and things like that, and to hear Canada harping about.... This new piece of strategic economic infrastructure the U.S. is putting into the Philippines is basically going to be sovereign U.S. territory within the Philippines to set up the Pax Silica and AI stuff. Canada should be part of that, but the way we're talking about our neighbour, which we obviously have the right to do, does not necessarily get heard the way we think it gets heard by the frontline states.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

That's fair.

The strategy itself recognizes China as “an increasingly disruptive...power”. Do you agree with that analysis? Also, I'm curious. Has your organization, or you as an individual, been consulted in the revamping of the strategy?

[Cleo Paskal]

I have not, except for you guys. Thank you.

The way the revamp should be done is how you're doing it.

Also, I'll quickly jump to a side topic about the U.S. There's going to be a new census in 2030. That's going to affect the apportionment of seatings. States like Florida and Texas are going to get a lot more seats. As you put together conceptualizations of how things will be, going forward, understanding how the census will affect politics in the U.S. in 2030—because the strategy has a long-term time frame—would be helpful.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington—Tyendinaga, ON]

My last question is for Professor Nagy.

In your opening remarks, you acknowledged that, within five to six years, we'll potentially have leadership changes in Russia, China and the U.S. Despite the challenges we're currently enduring, you also acknowledged being “strong at home”.

Indeed, we have a geographic connection to the U.S. In order for us to establish and then continue long-term security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific...how do you see that playing out? Could you elaborate a little more on that?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Give a very brief response, please.

[Stephen R. Nagy]

I believe in leveraging our comparative advantages in terms of geographic proximity and access to the United States' market. Our institutional overlap can be a window for Indo-Pacific countries to enter through Canada—to invest in Canada and the United States. We need to continue to be a bridge that benefits the United States, the Indo-Pacific countries and, most importantly, Canada and Canada's prosperity.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

I'll go next to MP Steven Guilbeault, who is sharing his time with MP O'Rourke, I understand.

You have five minutes.

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you to the witnesses.

Since I don't have much time, I would like to talk to you about climate change. You both talked about that. Canada's Indo‑Pacific strategy also mentions it. It's a very important issue in that part of the world because of the impacts of climate change, obviously.

We are coming to the end of the cycle of our five-year investment period under the Paris Agreement on climate finance. We have funded development and capacity-building projects as well as partnerships between Canadian universities and research centres in that region. We are preparing to renew our next five-year commitment period for climate finance.

My question is for both of you, Professor Nagy and Ms. Paskal. What would you recommend to the Canadian government in this regard?

[Stephen R. Nagy]

Thank you very much, Mr. Guilbeault.

Climate change is going to affect different parts of the Indo-Pacific differently.

If we look at the South China Sea area, the Mekong delta will probably be salinized. This will affect the food security of Southeast Asia—Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. It's hard to imagine this not cascading into a refugee crisis or instability.

When we think about Canada's investment in a place like the South China Sea and dealing with climate change, of course there's a global approach, but we ultimately have to work with partners on the ground to try to deal with the challenges they're facing domestically. This is not necessarily a big expenditure. It could be something as simple as education. It could be as simple as NGOs helping the local communities deal with local environmental problems. I think there are many different levels.

If we go to the Pacific Islands, these countries may not be around in 20 or 30 years. Of course, it will affect these people, but it will also affect how the United Nations works. These countries will disappear. How will they be affected? How will they be susceptible to corruption? As Ms. Paskal mentioned, their lives are on the line, and this will make them susceptible.

As we think about climate change, it's not as simple as thinking about it in terms of dealing with carbon. We must think about how we can change what's happening on the ground in these communities to prevent climate change from really damaging these countries and perhaps making them disappear.

There are a lot of things that Canada can do. Ultimately, if we are damaging our economy for the sake of climate change, that is probably an ill-considered strategy. We need to take the right balance, and everything is the right balance. How can we be prosperous, but how can we also deal with climate change in the short, mid and long term?

Thank you for the really thoughtful question.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Go ahead, Madame O'Rourke.

[Dominique O'Rourke, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Dr. Nagy, I have a quick question.

Canada is signing an increasing number of trade agreements in the Indo-Pacific, including with Indonesia, which is the world's fourth-largest economy, and has a clean energy partnership and an MOU on AI safety with Australia, to name just a few.

Our Prime Minister has been very—

[Stephen R. Nagy]

I'm sorry, but I can't hear Ms. O'Rourke. Is there a volume issue on my side or your side?

[Dominique O'Rourke, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

The mic is on.

Can you hear me now?

[Stephen R. Nagy]

I can hear you now. I apologize.

[Dominique O'Rourke, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

All right. Thank you.

As you know, our Prime Minister has been very aggressively signing trade deals globally, including a comprehensive economic partnership with Indonesia, and we have a clean energy partnership and an MOU on AI safety with Australia. With all these trade and defence partnerships in the region, are these actions in line with the substance you were calling for during your appearance before the Canada-China relations committee in 2022?

[Stephen R. Nagy]

As I think about how our new Prime Minister—he's not so new anymore—is engaging in the Indo-Pacific, I can't help thinking that he brings dignity, thoughtfulness and technocratic skill to the prime ministership.

At the same time, as we think about diversifying our trade towards India and Indonesia and building clean-air partnerships with Australia, are these the best uses of our comparative advantages to tackle the real challenges in the region? The real challenge from my standpoint is, again, China's pursuit of what we call hegemony in the region—dominating and reshaping the region. If it reshapes the region along rules that show preference to China, this will obviously negatively affect Canadian interests.

As I watch the Prime Minister, I think the engagement with China needs to be thoughtful. As he says, the guardrails need to be high. We need to be very realistic about China's willingness to use force against Taiwan, which will fundamentally disrupt the global economy, and about its interest in dominating what we call the Indo-Pacific. This would fundamentally affect trade agreements, AI regulation and how we use sea lanes of communication.

In this case, the priorities of the Prime Minister should be focused on understanding these issues and building relationships through trade agreements, energy agreements, critical mineral agreements, security agreements and disinformation agreements that actually tackle those issues, which I think are the priority for Canada and Canadian interests.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We go next to Monsieur Brunelle-Duceppe.

You have two and a half minutes.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Dr. Nagy, I asked this question of the previous witness group and I'd like to hear your thoughts on it as well.

Everyone is talking about a possible Chinese military offensive, especially after the various abuses that have taken place at the Central Military Commission, where Xi Jinping has cleaned house.

Clearly, there are issues. If Beijing gets its hands on the production of 90% of the best semiconductors in the world, that means it will have control over artificial intelligence, among other things, not to mention the fact that we will no longer have access to those products.

How important should it be in Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy to keep that in mind? How important is the defence of Taiwan and its democratic environment going forward as it relates to Canada and Quebec?

[Stephen R. Nagy]

Thank you for your question. That's great.

As I think about Taiwan, I want to put it in a perspective that we can understand very clearly.

A conflict across the Taiwan Strait would cause between $10 trillion and $15 trillion U.S. in damage to the global economy. It would devastate the production networks in China. It would dramatically and negatively affect Southeast Asia and India. Southeast Asia and India's biggest FDI providers are Taiwan, China and Japan, the economies that would be devastated.

This is not to mention, as you said, the damage to semiconductor supply chains, as well as control of the first island chain, which would basically allow China to put submarines along the trench, keeping the United States, Canada and any other countries out of the Indo-Pacific region to ensure that those sea lanes are open for trade and energy. This is a priority, but as Canada thinks about the Taiwan issue, we should continue to invest in Taiwan as an international public good.

Avoid the “one China” question. What happens to Taiwan matters to Canada, matters to Germany, matters to Palau—it matters to every single country on the planet. We need to invest our diplomatic resources from that perspective to build alliances and partnerships that have a similar thinking about Taiwan as an international public good.

We also want it to have peace and stability, and we want to make sure that whatever happens to Taiwan is decided by the Taiwanese people. I want to reiterate this: Avoid talking about Taiwan through how China talks about Taiwan. Let's talk about Taiwan on our terms, and I think the terms we should be using include thinking of Taiwan as an international public good. We should invest our resources there, just as we invest in the Great Barrier Reef or invest in other international public goods.

Thank you very much for the question.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you to the witnesses.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

Madame Paskal, would you like to make any concluding remarks? We skipped over you twice.

[Cleo Paskal]

Quickly, there's a lot of talk about multilateral organizations, and we should be aware of how successfully China has gamed multilateral organizations, including the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. When you're talking about infrastructure projects in places like the Pacific Islands, you'll often see China winning the bid, but it's effectively subsidizing the belt and road initiative, or the BRI, which I like to think of as the “bribery and repression initiative”, because that's functionally what's being spread out along the BRI.

Before you go jumping fully into the multilateral organizations, it's useful to do a risk analysis of exactly how much they have been gamed by China, to make sure that Canada isn't actually funding Chinese operations.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much for your remarks.

Thank you to both witnesses for your statements, presence and testimony.

Colleagues, our next meeting will be this Thursday, with the appearance of the Canadian ambassador to the United States, Mr. Mark Wiseman.

Yes, Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe.