Foreign Affairs Committee on May 26th, 2026

[Scott Simon]

I would agree with that, but I want to add a few things.

A number of things have been going on since 2022. The first and most obvious one is the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The second one is the situation ever since October 7 and the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Then there's the question of Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, which shows us the danger of conflict in such an important waterway. The Taiwan Strait would be a much more serious situation, which is why it is an existential issue for Canada that peace and security be preserved in that region.

Finally, of course, there's the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. Some of the things he has done—for example, around Ukraine—are of concern. There are a lot of issues about trust with Donald Trump, and I think that is an issue until the next election. That being said, the people in power in Russia and China will be there for a much longer time.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Meanwhile, they threaten our sovereignty, prosperity and resilience.

[Scott Simon]

Absolutely.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

That is what I thought you were talking about, but—

[Scott Simon]

That is what I was talking about, yes.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Vina, go ahead.

[Vina Nadjibulla]

Thank you.

For me, it is fundamentally about the changes that have happened in the U.S.—the election of President Trump and the fundamental change to the way the U.S. exercises its power and its relationships with allies. Obviously, there is a change in the Canada-U.S. relationship, which is necessitating a new approach to foreign policy by Canada, and a change in alliances more generally.

We're seeing this much more immediately in Europe, but that change is also coming to the Indo-Pacific. There is a lack of reliance on the U.S. alliance structure globally, including in the Indo-Pacific. The way Canada now has to exercise its own foreign policy, from the perspective of gaining strategic autonomy, diversifying and reducing its overreliance, necessitates having a new look at how the Indo-Pacific strategy is positioned.

That came in at the time of the Biden administration, when the alliance structure was at its strongest in many years. We're no longer there.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Our committee just travelled to Washington. We were there when President Trump went to China.

What is your read on that relationship? It is full of hostile rhetoric, but we see something quite different from hostile rhetoric in practice. I'm wondering about your takes on that.

We will start with Vina and go in reverse order.

[Vina Nadjibulla]

The most important outcome of that summit was the new framing of the U.S.-China relationship as a constructive, strategic stability. China would like to make this a long-term strategic shift, which essentially establishes a peer relationship on China's terms. There are many in the U.S. administration who are hoping this is a tactical moment. Putting President Trump aside, because it's difficult to interpret and understand what might be happening for him, many in the administration see this as a tactical moment of stability, which both sides will use to reinforce their own positions and have more self-reliance and de-risking. For the rest of us, this means it's also a moment when we need to focus on our own resilience and strength.

The relationship will likely be more stable for the foreseeable future, but let's not mistake that for having the structural issues resolved. They are not.

[Scott Simon]

I can add to that.

There is reason to be concerned about some of the comments Trump has made about Taiwan—about delaying the sale of arms to Taiwan and saying that those 1982 six assurances of Reagan were “a long time ago”. There are reasons to believe Trump cannot be trusted on this file. We have to be aware of that.

That's why we need more Canada.

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

I agree that this G2 framing is a nightmare for many countries that are U.S. allies in the region—that the U.S. would acquiesce to the framing of a G2 with two great powers, the U.S. and China. Clearly, some of the atmospherics from this summit led to that impression.

The silver lining to this—and a caveat for those who are more concerned about it—is that there are multiple actors in the U.S., such as Congress, the Senate and different policy actors. I'm not convinced that some of the transactions that appear to have been made at that summit will be long-lasting. I think there's deep China skepticism in Washington.

If you want an example of this, the freedom of navigation operation that just happened in the South China Sea was a couple of weeks after the summit in China. There are examples of how the United States is not going to abandon all of its activities meant to deter Chinese adventurism in the region. I think that will continue.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We will next go to Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe for six minutes.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I think the three witnesses have told us just how important it is to keep security in mind when developing an Indo-Pacific strategy.

Mr. Miller, I think one of your recommendations—which was, in fact, one of the most important—was that we must keep national security in mind when engaging in international trade. That's what you were saying.

There was an agreement to purchase 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles in exchange for lower tariffs on canola. I'll give you a couple of examples of countries that have taken action regarding Chinese vehicles.

In Israel, the Ministry of Defense has suspended the use of Chinese electric vehicles for its senior officials. Furthermore, the country prohibits these vehicles from accessing military bases and confidential facilities for fear that the cameras and telemetry could transmit strategic data to Beijing.

In Poland, authorities have also put in place restrictions prohibiting Chinese electric cars from accessing military sites and critical infrastructure due to surveillance vulnerabilities.

In the United Kingdom, defence and security agencies have asked their staff not to park these vehicles near sensitive sites.

Here, several cybersecurity experts are saying that, with this agreement, Canada has prioritized commercial interests over national security.

Wouldn't that be extremely concerning? Shouldn't the government reconsider this kind of action when it enters into agreements with the Chinese Communist Party?

My question is for you, Mr. Miller, but I'd also like to hear what the other two witnesses have to say on this issue.

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

Thank you. It's an excellent question. Let me try to be very brief on it.

On the technical side of it, it's something we should be looking at very closely. It's something that is concerning to me, quite a bit—the potential that these vehicles could have elements that could be used for espionage and other purposes.

There's another element of this, though, which is looking at what the plan is post-47,000 cars. The idea that we need to make a transaction to get something else without a long-term plan for where we will be going forward—for example, with future potential imports of Chinese EVs—is a challenging thing, and I haven't heard a whole lot of articulation on this.

The final point is not to minimize the potential diplomatic costs of this. One example of this, I will say, is the relationship with Japan, which we have talked about before.

China is Japan's greatest geostrategic rival now, with some of the coercion that China is putting on Japan. Japan is one of our greatest and most reliable investors in Canada, including in Ontario. I don't think we want to minimize the potential to just say that we can mitigate that and can manage that risk. Increasingly, they will be watching moves like this, and that will impact and affect their potential investment flows into Canada.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

[Scott Simon]

I'll answer in English.

The electric vehicle issue is very important. It's important to underline the fact that we have a choice to make. We already have a good relationship with automakers from Japan. We should be deepening our relationship with Japan, which is a democratic ally, and we need to have good, solid security chains with them.

I want to bring up another thing, which is the issue of human rights, because it is unclear how clean the supply chain is that goes into these electric vehicles. It could be that there is forced labour, with some of the Uyghur people who have been put into forced labour regimes involved in that. I think we need to stay very clear from even the possibility of that. That's my main concern.

[Vina Nadjibulla]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I have one small point to add, which is similar to my colleague's.

I'm less worried about the 47,000 EVs that might be coming into Canada in the first year. I'm much more concerned about what else is being proposed by way of bringing in Chinese production to Canada, as well as China's role in the battery supply chain and even electrification more generally. I think this is part of a conversation that needs to go beyond that preliminary and provisional agreement.

There's been a lot of attention on 47,000 EVs versus canola. To me, that's just one small issue relative to what else is now potentially on the table: the attention that we need to pay to how our economic policies vis-à-vis China will fit into our overall industrial strategy and policies, what kind of economy Canada wants to have 10 or 15 years down the road and whether we want to have a manufacturing sector altogether.

Thank you.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

Dr. Simon, you raised an important point, because a study by the University of Sheffield clearly shows that, within the supply chains required to manufacture these vehicles, there is forced labour involving people primarily from the Uyghur region, so from East Turkestan.

You talked about the agreement that Canada almost signed with Taiwan, which is a democratic, reliable ally with supply chains free of forced labour. The Department of Foreign Affairs representatives responded with a long silence when I asked them if the only reason we still haven't signed this agreement yet is to keep from upsetting Beijing. They didn't answer me. I think the silence was deafening.

I would like you to tell the committee how entering into an agreement with Taiwan would send a clear message. In addition, we wouldn't be the first to do so, because I think the United Kingdom already has a similar agreement with Taiwan.

[Scott Simon]

I think you've highlighted a number of very important points.

I completely agree with you: Silence speaks volumes here. It's crucial that the government sign this agreement very soon. We can't wait. It's very important for Canada.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you.

Ziad, you're next. You have five minutes.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you.

Thanks to the witnesses for appearing today.

If I heard correctly, you all talked about being strategic more than being tactical, and we have to walk into the relationship with China with eyes wide open. After the Prime Minister's visit and the announcement of increasing economic ties with China, including the 47,000 EVs coming into Canada and the other details that we don't know, do you believe that we are walking into this relationship with eyes wide open?

[Vina Nadjibulla]

I can start.

I think the rhetoric is correct in terms of having eyes wide open and having the various guardrails. The issue is going to be implementation and the kind of work that is under way to make sure that those guardrails exist and to make sure that we have the capacity and the resources to implement them.

Some of the early signs are not encouraging. We've spoken about Taiwan and what happened with the two Liberal MPs who were recalled. We've spoken about the Taiwan arrangement for trade that's still on the books. We've spoken about the issue of forced labour and how that has been handled when it comes to China.

I think we have to be careful not to change pragmatic engagement or selective engagement into basically complete acquiescence to everything that Beijing puts on the table. If the mark of success is that we have a relationship with no friction, that we basically try to manage it quietly, then we will be in dangerous territory, because the red lines will continue to shift. We will be at risk of undermining our long-term interests and values for the sake of potential short-term economic gain.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Mr. Simon, I'd like you to weigh in on this, please.

[Scott Simon]

Yes, I would like to add something to that, because I think something is going to happen very soon that will tell us where this government is heading. It is that HMCS Charlottetown has just left Vietnam, and in past years, when it's been leaving these exercises in the south, it's gone up through the Taiwan Strait. I think we need to watch carefully where the Charlottetown goes in the next two weeks. If we see a Taiwan Strait transit, it's a good sign that the guardrails are there and that the government has its eyes open, but if it makes a detour around the other side of Taiwan or through Japanese waters to get to Korea, then that would send us a sign that Canada is trying to appease China, and that would be very dangerous.