Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
That's a hard act to follow, but I'll give it a shot.
I appear today on behalf of Alex Prezanti of Artemis Chambers in London and myself to address our submission.
We focus on the two changes that Bill C-219 will make to the Magnitsky law as it pertains to transnational repression. The first is the inclusion of a definition of transnational repression, and the second is a new sanctionable ground targeting those who commit it.
Canada has already shown great leadership in using its existing Magnitsky powers to respond to transnational repression in its most visible forms; the sanctions imposed following the murder of Jamal Kashoggi are the clearest example. What Bill C-219 must now do is ensure that these powers extend to the less obvious, but far more prevalent and more insidious, cases, by which I mean the proxy networks, community infiltrators and criminal intermediaries who carry out the vast majority of transnational repression campaigns in Canada today.
As drafted, both provisions contain gaps that will materially limit what the minister is able to do. I hope that our amendments can help ensure this bill is fit for purpose.
On the definition, there are at least three gaps. The current draft defines transnational repression as “tactics used by a foreign state”, which excludes the proxies who carry out many of these campaigns. It fails to capture the full spectrum of tactics used to perpetrate transnational repression, including things like digital repression and abuse of Interpol mechanisms. Lastly, the current draft limits the purpose of transnational repression to silencing dissent, which excludes identity-based targeting.
Our recommended language is found within the written submission, but what I see as the more technical problem and where I want to spend the bulk of my time is the attribution standard in the sanctionable ground found at proposed paragraph 4(2)(e).
To sanction someone under the new provision, the bill will require that they act as “an agent of or on behalf of a foreign state”, meaning there will have to be a provable formal relationship between that person and the government directing them. This ignores the reality that proxy operations are the dominant model of transnational repression today. These operations are specifically designed to sever or obscure the evidentiary trail that the current drafting will require.
The standard in the current draft is therefore too high; it also creates an odd inconsistency with existing legislation. Canada's foreign interference act, which governs criminal prosecution of analogous conduct, uses the much broader test of “acting at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign” state. This means that the bill, as drafted, actually sets a higher attribution standard for sanctioning a transnational repression perpetrator than Canada already sets for convicting someone of such conduct as an indictable offence. That cannot be Parliament's intent. I note that the U.S. global Magnitsky order and the EU's equivalent regulations are broader than this.
Our proposed fix is straightforward. Per the language proposed in our submission, a person could be designated if they, first, acted at the express or implied direction of a foreign state; second, acted in association with a foreign state or its agents; or third—and most importantly—acted in a way that knowingly advances a foreign state's transnational repression. That third limb is critical because it would catch the perpetrator of transnational repression who knows what they're doing but who has no formal government relationship. The knowledge requirement operates as a proportionality check and a kind of safeguard, with the effect of excluding small fish who don't know what ends their conduct is serving. Because sanctions law requires only reasonable grounds of belief, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we believe this is a realistic standard calibrated to what the evidence can actually show.
I want to spend the remaining couple of seconds I imagine I have by reminding the committee that the victims of transnational repression are watching this process. They want to know that Canada can respond when a foreign state reaches into their lives, not just through official channels but through the proxies, community infiltrators and criminal intermediaries who are the primary conduits of transnational repression today. Bill C-219 is the right response to a real and documented threat. The amendments we propose do not expand its ambition, but they do ensure it can deliver on the ambition it already has.
Thank you very much. I welcome your questions.