Foreign Affairs Committee on June 4th, 2026

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

Welcome to meeting number 38 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Thursday, February 12, 2026, the committee is meeting to review Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy.

I would like to now welcome our witnesses for our first panel today.

We are joined by Professor Dominique Caouette, professor of political science and Asian studies at Université de Montréal; and Professor Stéphanie Martel, associate professor in the department of political studies at Queen's University.

Each witness will be given five minutes for their opening statements, after which we will proceed with questions and comments from members of the committee.

Ms. Martel, you have the floor.

[Stéphanie Martel, Associate Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair and members of the committee, for the invitation to appear.

I will deliver my remarks in English, but I can answer questions in both official languages.

I won't belabour points that have already been made effectively by several other expert witnesses on this committee, but I do want to amplify what I see as a pretty broad consensus within the expert community. The Indo-Pacific strategy already gets a lot of things right when it comes to increasing Canadian presence, and beginning to overcome our capacity, reputational and knowledge deficits in and on the region. This includes, of course, putting additional resources where our mouth is. It should be clear to this committee that the core objectives of the strategy cannot reasonably be expected to be met within a five-year period, but this first phase has no doubt moved the needle in the right direction on balance.

Still, there remains significant room for improvement of what needs to be, in my view, a flexible approach that not only sends a coherent message but also allows breathing room to adjust over time. I want to make two key points here that can hopefully inform this next phase.

The first one is that we should keep calm and carry on when it comes to more win-win, co-operative aspects of the Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly when it comes to our successes in security-focused initiatives, where we can actually make a difference, have added value to offer and can meet regional demand. Key examples for me include dark vessel detection, maritime domain awareness, combatting illegal and unregulated fishing, disaster relief, non-proliferation, countering violent extremism, capacity-building in peacekeeping, and conflict mediation, among others.

These are issue areas that have received far less attention than clean energy, technology, supply chains, food security or critical minerals, yet this is also where we've been able to contribute in very concrete and, I would add, more sustainable ways. This is also where we can better align the IPS with the comprehensive approach of our regional partners on national and regional security, cutting across those unhelpful divides among security, the economy and, I would add, social development.

These contributions may not make as great a headline or a photo op as Operation Horizon—although they could, with a little more effort—but they have way more impact than we think in the long term, not only for people's lives but also for the Canadian brand, and in a much more cost-effective way. In this context, I feel strongly that Canada's support for ongoing regional efforts associated with, for instance, the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda in the region should not be downgraded but instead carry over this next phase.

The second point I wish to make is that there is, in my view, some room for adjustment in the more zero-sum dimensions of the Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly when it comes to mitigating some of the effects of China's rise that may conflict with Canadian interests or values and with those of our key allies and partners. Obviously, this is where the most substantial change, from the initial formulation of the IPS to whatever phase 2.0 is going to look like, needs to happen. Also, of course, this is against the backdrop of our evolving relationship with the United States and the broader moment we find ourselves in.

Ultimately, as others have suggested, this is really about the way we approach like-mindedness in a broader sense. A value-informed, pragmatic approach to like-mindedness requires more than just categorizing each country as like or unlike overall, of course. It should also be more than adjusting that distinction to specific issue areas.

What we actually need to be doing is looking at what specific aspects of a country's behaviour within each particular issue area align or clash with our interests and values, and to what extent, and then locating where it makes sense for Canada to draw the line by coordinating with others. Describing China as an increasingly disruptive power then and as a strategic partner now creates confusion on the part of our partners that our foreign service is now painstakingly trying to clear up. That's only because we came out with that kind of oversimplistic labelling in the first place to speak to a very particular low moment in the relationship, and now we have to adjust to reality.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

Please wrap up quickly.

[Stéphanie Martel]

This is the exact opposite of the kind of granular approach, ideally, that we would need to take to distinguish facts from noise and to strategize accordingly, not just when it comes to China but, ideally, for every country we name more than once in the IPS. I hope the next phase of the IPS can do something to remedy that.

Thank you.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

Thank you, Ms. Martel.

Mr. Caouette, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Dominique Caouette, Full professor of Political Science and Asian Studies, Université de Montréal, As an Individual]

Good morning.

I will deliver my presentation in French.

I'm very happy to answer questions in either of the two official languages.

What I'd like to present today is very much in line with what my predecessor, Stéphanie, mentioned.

I'd like to discuss the context that led to the emergence of this Indo-Pacific policy in 2021.

In 2021, while Mélanie Joly was Minister of Foreign Affairs, my colleagues and I identified five challenges for Canada.

First, delivering on the promise that Canada is back.

Second, managing Canada's relationship with the United States.

Third, promoting feminism internationally.

Fourth, revitalizing Canada's multilateralism.

Fifth, rethinking relations with China.

This was in 2021, before the Indo-Pacific strategy was unveiled the following year.

As previous speakers have mentioned, the idea was to allocate a substantial $2.3‑billion over five years to implement a five-pronged strategy: promoting peace, resilience and security; expanding trade and investment; investing in and connecting people; building a sustainable and green future; and making Canada an active and engaged partner in the Indo-Pacific region.

Let's look at what has been accomplished. I think Ms. Martel's presentation touched on these same ideas.

Canada has substantially increased its visits to and presence in the region. It has also increased the number of high-level visits. This was one of the recommendations because, for Canada's Indo-Pacific partners, the presence of high-level representatives is important both symbolically and perceptually.

Canada has also increased its presence in regional forums, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, forum.

Another objective of the strategy was to build stronger relationships and strategic partnerships. This was touched on earlier.

It also sought to create trade and investment opportunities. Missions were established.

Canada also wanted to increase its national defence presence, particularly through participation in joint exercises and initiatives to detect illicit vessels.

Lastly, the strategy was designed to promote collaboration on combatting climate change, supporting civil society initiatives and protecting Canada's sovereignty and security.

What outcomes have we seen? How is Canada being perceived? First, I should point out that, in this region, outcomes matter, but perceptions are important. Perceptions are particularly important in Asia and the Indo-Pacific because people there have long memories. Diplomats and governments in the region remember what was done in the past. This means perception is truly relevant and significant.

Canada has participated in military exercises and in the detection of illicit vessels, but we remain a lesser partner. I'd be curious to see if the value Canada brings to the table is well understood. I'd say it remains limited, not because there's a lack of engagement, but because that engagement is a bit too fragmented.

There's also trade and investment. We've seen a rapprochement with Japan and South Korea. Over the past 12 to 15 months, Canada has been able to revitalize economic relations with India and China. This was important because, as Canada was launching its Indo-Pacific strategy, there were significant tensions with China and renewed tensions with India, the two regional superpowers. Canada has also strengthened ties in Southeast Asia, although the trade balance still favours the region by a ratio of about two to one. On the plus side, Canada's exports to the region are growing slightly faster than its imports. All in all, there's been slow but steady progress in the right direction.

Regarding the objective to invest in and connect people, it should be noted that there have been numerous delegation visits, but the impact is difficult to assess. For example, in November 2024, the then-minister of international trade travelled to the Philippines accompanied by a delegation of 300 businesswomen. Was it really necessary to have 300 people? That's quite a large delegation, after all. Why not send a more select delegation? Shouldn't we be taking more targeted actions?

Furthermore, when it comes to perceptions, contradictions have sometimes emerged over the past two years between our Indo-Pacific strategy objectives and immigration policy changes regarding admission thresholds. When I visited Indonesia and the Philippines, many people asked me what was going on with Canada and whether the country would remain open to immigration.

As to the building a sustainable future objective, people have talked about green and sustainable development initiatives. I would point out, however, that Canada's credibility is eroding both domestically and internationally due to policy shifts and reversals on the environment and the fight against climate change.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

Please wrap up, Mr. Caouette.

[Dominique Caouette]

Certainly, I'll wrap up.

Being an active partner in the region is important, but there are sometimes inconsistencies, and that's a challenge.

In conclusion, how should we proceed? I think Canada must stand by the position it took in the Davos speech—that Canada is a middle power. That means it must forge alliances, uphold international standards and embrace this role.

We must therefore ask ourselves the following questions: Does Canada have the resources necessary to achieve its ambitions? Will renegotiating the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement with the United States divert Canada's attention away from the Indo-Pacific? I advise Canada not to turn its back on the region. As my colleague, Ms. Martel, said, Canada must continue to invest, in a more structured and targeted manner, in the military, trade and civil society spheres.

We've proven ourselves and made a comeback, but we need increasingly targeted policies and we must avoid contradictions, such as those on environmental and immigration issues.

I'll stop here. Thank you.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

Thank you, Mr. Caouette.

We now have 44 minutes for questions and comments from members of the committee.

We're going to start with Mr. Aboultaif.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Welcome to the witnesses.

Thank you very much for the presentations you made.

When we talk about the Indo-Pacific, it's a beautiful, short name for a very powerful region geographically, politically, economically and demographically. It's a region we deal with, where we must consider setting a ground that is going to make it good for Canada and for the region to continue to have those relationships. It's very crucial. We have some calls to evolve, to have an evolution rather than a reinvention as far as our approach to the Indo-Pacific goes.

We know that there is an Indo-Pacific strategy set by our current government. The question for both of you—and maybe I'll start with Dr. Martel—is this: Are you convinced that the base point of starting the strategy and looking into the region is good enough? Is that set for reinvention, or is that set for evolution?

I would like comments from both of you, but I'll start with Dr. Martel.

[Stéphanie Martel]

Evolution is probably the right way to put it. As I and others have mentioned, there are a lot of things that the IPS, as it is, does right.

I'll amplify the comment made by Professor Caouette. This is also about evolution in a way that allows for more flexibility to adjust to changing conditions and a complex reality, instead of being so focused on the short term.

A way to also approach the evolution of the strategy to reconcile inconsistencies within the strategy is to have a better grasp at how the various sub-regions and various parts of the strategy are interconnected. One initiative that might go very well in one particular sub-region or that might be very well received in one particular country or by one particular group of stakeholders might not have the same effects elsewhere and with another group of stakeholders.

This is where weaning ourselves off the kind of blanket characterizations of certain countries might actually be somewhere where we can adjust. The kind of signalling this sends is something that is not needed for the Indo-Pacific strategy in Canada to define the facts around a particular relationship but without creating unnecessary burden that needs to be backpedalled after the fact.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Professor Caouette, go ahead, please.

[Dominique Caouette]

I would agree with what has just been said, but I would say that I think there's a part of reinvention that is also there. It's mostly evolution or specialization, I would say, that is most important, but I think we now have to partly reinvent our relationships with China and India. We need to be consistent with the idea that the world as we know it, as we've known it since the end of World War II, has changed. Tectonic plates have moved, and we are in a different setting. That's part of why I'm using the expression “reinvention”.

For evolution, I would agree with what you have said, but I would say that we need to make sure there's consistency in our policy. This is what I was mentioning, because of the idea of perception. Perception matters in diplomacy, and the perception of inconsistency or contradictory policy is something that people might bring up. This is about the diminishing number of inconsistencies or contradictions, and this first phase allowed us to discover more affinities with certain countries. I think these should be reinforced, for example, with Japan and South Korea.

Also, we need to learn. Reinforce affinities, but learn that, for example, in Southeast Asia you have a country like Indonesia, which is quite close to Canada, that conducted military exercises with Russia two months ago. It seems incredible or very contradictory, but it makes sense within the Indonesian context. Malaysia took a strong position in supporting Palestine, which was very strongly.... It was not the only one doing it but one of a few in the region.

We need to understand the contexts we're dealing with. The action may not mean the same thing if you're based in Canada or if you're based in the region. I think that learning and deepening our understanding of these different societies and blocs are crucial. I think that's what Stéphanie Martel was just saying.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Besides putting more effort and resources in there, how can Canada best navigate this relationship in a very complex, very diverse and very rich region?

I have about 10 to 20 seconds left.

[Stéphanie Martel]

Who should go first?

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Professor Martel, go ahead.

[Stéphanie Martel]

Thank you.

I think one thing we can do is find a way to better leverage the higher education sector. I speak or I preach for my own domain here, but there are several ways we can do that and support the IPS better.

Beyond limited ad hoc support for one-off specific initiatives, being able to develop a kind of bridging the gap network that is dedicated to the IPS and brings in a broader panel of experts and people from government, the business sector and civil society, having those conversations we're having right now in a more sustained way, would be a great idea.

Another very concrete initiative that we could consider, building on the successes of the Canada-ASEAN scholarships program, would be to offer scholarships to graduate students or post-doctoral researchers to come and study in Canada and, therefore, not only build understanding across Canada and the region but also contribute to building the kind of expertise we desperately need in this country, in this moment. That would be a much better way than to support a few undergraduate students to enjoy the Canadian winter for a couple of months.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

Thank you.

Mr. Clark, you have the floor.

[Braedon Clark, Liberal, Sackville—Bedford—Preston, NS]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for being here today and for offering your expertise on this really important subject.

Professor Martel, I'll just mention that I appreciated the end of your last answer there. I'm an MP from the Halifax area, and we have one of the highest rates per capita of institutions and students in the country. I certainly take your point on the value there.

One of the commonalities between both of you on your opening statement, I think, was the need for more granularity in this evolution of the strategy, and the idea of not looking at things with a binary, black-white, good-bad type of approach, which makes a lot of sense to me.

I'll start with you, Professor Martel, and then go to Professor Caouette. Could you give us some examples of areas that stand out to you, where we might be able to be a bit more fine-tuned on this as we evolve this strategy?

[Stéphanie Martel]

I'll probably draw from China-specific examples, because I feel as though this committee is particularly interested in those. To preface my comments, I'm not a China expert, but there are a lot of really good ones in this country whom you should be tapping into beyond the immediately digestible but perhaps not as nuanced type of analysis that has fed into the IPS so far.

When it comes to China, any serious research that really narrows in on the actual granularity that you're describing will identify a broad spectrum of patterns, even within particular issue areas. In some ways, China will be, of course, trying to shape the rules in accordance with its own interests and values in ways that will clash with our own—that's for sure—but there are also particular aspects of China's current positioning as a global power where it is actually upholding the rules against other actors—I'm thinking of the U.S., in particular—who may be attempting to revise or usurp those.

It's important to make room and have the cognitive flexibility to allow for those possibilities. Of course, in between those, you'll have a full array of grey areas in terms of particular strategies and tactics. If we're able to better distinguish the facts from the noise here and really pinpoint exactly where we should be coordinating with others to either ward off or find ways to actually coexist or even co-operate with China, I think that is the way we should be approaching the relationship.

[Braedon Clark, Liberal, Sackville—Bedford—Preston, NS]

Thank you very much.

Professor Caouette, can we have your thoughts on this topic as well, please?

[Dominique Caouette]

I think the idea of taking a so-called granular, more targeted approach is excellent. Having a greater diplomatic presence is important, but it would also be helpful to have researchers in residence at Canada's consulates and embassies. We need to leverage the expertise of Canadian researchers who can be based at embassies or spend time there. The region is extremely complex, as has been pointed out.

I also think it would be worthwhile to focus on supporting Indo-Pacific researchers and think tanks, which possess considerable expertise, and to ensure reciprocity.

Speaking of reciprocity, last year we launched a fellowship for Canadian students, student researchers and post-doctoral researchers to conduct research in the region. There was supposed to be something called the connectivity envelope, which would have facilitated bilateral exchanges enabling student researchers from the region to come to Canada to specialize, but the project was scrapped for financial reasons, apparently. Initiatives like that are crucial, though. The relationship must be based on reciprocal exchanges.

Third, high-level delegations are important, but I would urge Global Affairs Canada, or GAC, to establish an Indo-Pacific research centre within GAC itself, just as it did with the China research centre. The goal would be to develop in-house expertise and plan missions with regular civil servants, not high-level officials, to cultivate rapport and foster better understanding, because senior civil servants are the ones who implement policies and put proposals into action.

Strengthening this rapport between decision-makers and foreign affairs representatives in the region would allow for a more targeted approach and greater expertise.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

Mr. Clark, you have two minutes remaining.

[Braedon Clark, Liberal, Sackville—Bedford—Preston, NS]

That's more than I thought. It's a gift. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Michael Chong]

The chair is using his discretion.