Foreign Affairs Committee on Oct. 23rd, 2025

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

I call the meeting back to order.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses for the second hour of testimony.

From the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, we have Dr. David Perry, president and CEO, appearing in person. Welcome.

As an individual, we have Dr. James Fergusson, senior research fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, appearing by video conference. Welcome, sir.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions.

I now invite Dr. Fergusson to make an opening statement. Please proceed.

[James Fergusson, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual]

Good afternoon.

In response to the spring 1972 North Vietnamese offensive, the United States retaliated with an unrestricted bombing campaign, including the mining of Haiphong harbour. At anchor and transiting to and from the port were Soviet merchant ships, which created the possibility of a major incident. At the same time, President Nixon was at the Moscow summit with General Secretary Brezhnev, signing the SALT treaty and ushering in a period of relaxed tensions or détente.

I raise this example—and there are many more—to remind the committee that in the world of great power politics, relations among the powers are generally a mix of confrontation, competition and co-operation, depending on the issue and the location. Nothing is more dangerous to international peace and security than when powers perceive the world in black and white terms. Polarization is the harbinger of a major war, which is in the interest of no one.

While the steps taken by the west and Canada since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and even earlier, are fully understandable, these steps should not colour areas of legitimate competition and co-operation. This should be the case for the Arctic and the security of the Canadian Arctic.

Security requires a mix of deterrence or defence capabilities and diplomatic interaction. Canada, along with its allies, has taken long overdue important first steps to provide enhanced defence and security for the Arctic and North America. However, the country and our allies have neglected the diplomatic side of the equation as a means of providing reassurance that defence initiatives are not perceived as aggressive or threatening, per se, by Russia and China. No one wants to stumble into war by misperception and accident.

Placing the Arctic Council on hiatus was an understandable signal or message to Moscow, but the time has come to return to a normal relationship with Russia, which includes ministerial meetings of the council. The return of working groups, albeit with Russian scientists engaging virtually, is a useful first baby step. This a way to begin normalizing and insulating relations with Russia in the Arctic from the Ukraine imbroglio, out of common interest.

Nonetheless, the time has come to begin the process of ministerial re-engagement. In no way would this legitimize Russia's invasion of Ukraine or undermine western and Canadian support to Ukraine. It would enhance co-operative security measures within the gambit of the Arctic Council.

At the same time, with existing and planned defence initiatives in the Arctic, consideration should be given to opening low-level diplomatic/military discussions, an Arctic security forces round table, to develop and implement confidence and security-building measures to avoid misperceptions and potential accidents that might be perceived as threatening.

Finally, it is important to recognize that the vital defence initiatives being undertaken by the government do not serve to undermine the economic and environmental security of the indigenous and local communities. These initiatives and the building of new defence infrastructure must not put a strain on these communities.

In conclusion, these considerations require bold and potentially unpopular leadership by Canada in cementing its place as the leading Arctic state.

I look forward to expanding on my comments and answering any other questions related to Arctic security.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much for your remarks.

I now invite Dr. Perry to make an opening statement.

[David Perry, President and Chief Executive Officer, Canadian Global Affairs Institute]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, members of the committee, for the invitation to speak to you today.

In the last three years two trends have connected in a way that they hadn't for a number of decades.

The first was a need for Canada to strengthen our Arctic defences to respond to ongoing actions by Russia and China to modernize their militaries and employ those modernized armed forces in concert with the other elements of state power in ways that threaten western and Canadian interests.

Given both those countries' demonstrated capability to take military action, either through the Canadian Arctic against targets in the rest of Canada or North America or against targets in the Canadian Arctic itself, there's an imperative for Canada to strengthen its Arctic defence arrangements. This is for our own national interests and to better help protect the wider North American continent alongside our American allies, both in the NORAD context and beyond.

This changed strategic circumstance and the threat picture offers, I believe, an opportunity for Canada to help our American allies enhance their defence posture at a time when the Americans are increasingly concerned about the defence of their homeland.

A second and very positive trend that we've seen over the last three years are several policies published by the Government of Canada that will improve our Arctic defence posture as a result of NORAD modernization, Our North, Strong and Free and Canada's Arctic foreign policy. These included funded projects to enhance northern defence infrastructure and modernize our aerospace capabilities, and smaller investments in satellite communications, enhanced Arctic logistics and maritime sensing.

There's also the direction in Our North, Strong and Free for the defence team to explore a range of additional investments that would further enhance our Arctic defence and contribute to an improved defence of North America overall, if they were actually funded. This includes the exploration of a conventionally powered submarine fleet, which I'm happy to see that we're pursuing with remarkable vigour and speed. I hope to see soon that same enthusiasm reflected in the exploration of those other initiatives directed to be explored, including integrated air and missile defence, Arctic vehicles, embarking maritime helicopters on our Harry DeWolf class ships, ground-based air defences for critical infrastructure and drone and counter-drone technology.

I would offer the committee three recommendations for consideration as it undertakes its study.

First, we should fully fund all of our Arctic defence-related initiatives, as well as whatever requirements are identified as needed to give the Canadian Coast Guard a meaningful national security role, particularly when it comes to maritime domain awareness. As well, to the extent possible, the ongoing effort to reduce spending across the Government of Canada should protect relevant spending in other departments as much as possible.

Second, the Government of Canada collectively needs to focus on the implementation of these initiatives. Historically, we've been far better at publishing policies than we have been at actually delivering on the commitments they make. I would note that 17 years ago, the Canada First defence strategy committed to purchase three platforms that would significantly enhance our Arctic defence: new fighter aircraft, new warships and new maritime surveillance aircraft. As we sit here, not a single airplane or ship has yet been delivered to the Canadian military.

I hope the timeliness of future delivery improves significantly with some of the initiatives the Prime Minister has put forward, including the creation of the Defence Investment Agency. I hope to see a similar focus soon placed on our ability to modernize our Arctic defence infrastructure at the speed we need it as well.

Third, the committee should consider how our Arctic initiatives will impact our American allies. We should improve our defences for our own national interest, to be clear. However, given the current strategic circumstance where our north sits between the rest of North America and the most likely conventional and strategic military threats to the continent, much of what we do will be of interest to the United States. As we make these investments, we should be as mindful as we can that these initiatives can also help defend Americans.

There may be significant opportunity to use these initiatives to help construct the new defence relationship with our American allies that the Prime Minister has stated is needed. The opportunity to use these efforts to the benefit of both of our countries will be maximized by meaningfully accelerating the pace at which we can actually implement and deliver them.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much for your remarks.

I will now open the floor to questions, beginning with MP Michael Chong.

You have six minutes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question is for Professor Fergusson.

You drew an analogy between two events going on at the same time in 1972, the U.S. mining of the entrances to a harbour, which could have led to an escalation between the U.S. and the Soviets and, at the same time, the détente that was initiated through the talks between Brezhnev and President Nixon.

Can you think of any non-great powers that have successfully initiated a détente between great powers, because that example is not analogous to our situation here in Canada?

[James Fergusson]

The status of lesser, weaker or middle powers—whatever label you want to use—is always problematic. However, if you want to go back to the 1950s, in the context of the beginnings of the Cold War, Canada, partially under the leadership of Lester Pearson in the St. Laurent government, made initial steps, partially because the Europeans were still recovering from the Second World War, to try to act as a mediator or interlocutor between the United States and the Soviet Union as this devolved, so there are steps that lesser and weak powers can make to facilitate it.

In the case of Canada and the Arctic right now, these are steps we need to consider. There are steps, for reasons—with regard to politics in the United States as well as our western allies—which they cannot or will not take, but we can. That's the most important thing.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

I got the point, thank you. I would just point out that, in the 1950s, Canada was a great power, arguably, then, but we are not now. We represented a much greater percentage of the global economy and, only a mere decade later, we were among the top five militaries in the world. That, clearly, is no longer the case, but I appreciate your explaining that.

I have a question now for Dr. Perry. You mentioned the need, as your second recommendation, on execution.... Can you explain why it is that we cannot execute in this country? I note that both Finland and Canada purchased F-35 jets in the same month, in the same year. Finland announced the purchase of 64. We announced the purchase of 88 F-35s. They have 5.5 million people. We have 40 million people. We are almost 10 times their size. Their jets will be fully operational, with airbases in the Arctic, in 2030. The Auditor General indicated to us that, at the earliest, we would be operational in 2033-34, and likely not at that point because of likely further delays. Why can we not seem to execute on anything, with respect to military procurement, in this country?

[David Perry]

I'm not sure how much time you have left in your questions.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

I have three minutes, and it's all yours if you give us specific answers to that question.

[David Perry]

In that circumstance, I think part of it is that we've had a difficult time sticking with a good decision, and that dates back a long time. I think another component to that is we had a difficult time articulating clearly and more broadly, outside government circles, the rationale for making some of those key decisions, so transparent and open communication has been a missing aspect in some parts of our procurement.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

I would note that the decision, which has not be prevaricated upon, was made at the same time, in February 2022, by both countries. Finland's on track to be fully operational by 2030: We are not. We're years behind. Why is that?

[David Perry]

Well, that was another decision Canada made, because we made previous ones on the same aircraft.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

I agree, but once the decision was made in February 2022.... I understand all of the delays leading up to that decision, but why is it, when the decision was made in 2022, that they are able to execute and deliver in eight years something that we can't seem to do in a much longer time frame?

[David Perry]

Part of that are different schedules of when, in the phase of the purchase orders, we made those actual decisions. I think that, in a broader sense, we have difficulty aligning shortages of human talent in the air force to get trained and maintain...as well as infrastructure.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

We have 40 million people in this country. They have 5.5 million. We're not talking about thousands of pilots who need to be trained. We're talking about enough pilots to pilot 88 jets or thereabouts. We should have nine times the pool of talent here. We—all around this table, I think—don't understand why we can't seem to get things done in this country, and it's not just with this particular procurement. There's a much broader problem and we've been talking about it for years, yet it continues to go on.

[David Perry]

I would offer that it's, in part, a function of past choices to not prioritize investments like these in a way that other countries have. I think we've seen some positive evidence that we are making this an appropriately significant priority, in a way that we were remiss in the past. By putting only such a small focus on this, we're trying to take a very small group of trained fighter pilots and retrain them on new aircraft, when other countries, which are much smaller, put more emphasis on this and, from the start, have a much bigger pool to draw from.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Is it potentially a need to bypass competitive bid processes entirely, under law, and instead go to ministers' making direct decisions on what contracts will be signed, what things are going to be done and at what time, like C.D. Howe did many decades ago? Is that where we're at right now? We have yet another agency being created and needing to be stood up.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Give a brief response, please.

[David Perry]

Yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Next we will go to MP Rob Oliphant.

You have six minutes.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to both of our witnesses. All your comments are well taken and thoughtful.

I have a question I want to dwell on a little bit. We are talking about protecting our sovereignty, and I want to delve into what we mean by sovereignty. I'm looking for a definition, and this may be beyond what you can do in this meeting, but I'd like to talk a little bit about what we mean when we're talking about protecting our sovereignty.

Is that the same as protecting our territory? Is that the same as engaging with the peoples of the north? I'd like to just poke around with this a little bit, even theoretically, and hear from both of you.

[David Perry]

Maybe I'll leave the comment about sovereignty to my former university professor colleague appearing here today.

I personally think the focus needs to be much more stringently placed on security and defence. I think that is the real challenge that Canada faces, which is less than a sovereignty challenge per se. I think we need to orient our activity, our diplomatic efforts as well as our investments in different defence and national security instruments on security and defence.

We do not currently have adequate provisions to defend our country and our part of North America on our own or with our American allies and, to me, that is the key area that needs focus.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I'll come back to that, but I'll go to Professor Fergusson first.

[James Fergusson]

I would agree with my colleague.

Sovereignty has become a very emotional issue in Canada, a very touchy point that everyone wants to press but, when you look at the realities of Canada in the Arctic, its territory, its archipelago and its territorial waters, there is no sovereignty challenge at all. There's no contesting. There is contesting about the status of the Northwest Passage. There's a bit of contesting with our American allies about the Beaufort Sea but, by and large, no one contests our sovereignty, which is our authority to make decisions over what is to be done or not to be done with regard to our territory and the adjacent waters.

There is no sovereignty issue here, and it's time we stopped talking about that. My colleague Dr. Perry is dead right. This is really about defence and security in the areas that are beyond our sovereignty, territorial and territorial waters and how we deal with this problem. My suggestion to this committee is to drop this problem, because it doesn't get us anywhere. It assumes that there's some challenge, and there is no challenge.