Mr. Chair, perhaps I could just say something before Monsieur Bard goes into the more technical aspect, if he has anything to suggest. He certainly, as the CIO, and I are extremely preoccupied at all times with security and we have a lot of discussions about technological security, especially given the proliferation of devices, and so forth. But as the WikiLeaks business indicates to everybody, regardless of the level of security attached to particular documents, ultimately it comes down to the integrity and the trust of people who are using the system.
One of the things we are always trying to balance is to have security of the system but at the same time to leave it sufficiently flexible so that members are not impeded by many protocols to get through to do their daily business. You can go overboard where you have so many protocols in place that it impedes business but it doesn't actually make that much difference to the security.
We think we have a secure network. Perhaps Louis, as the CIO, and his officials could come up with some suggestions for the committee in terms of better approaching these confidential documents, but it becomes a question of how far we can go without locking down the whole system.
As Monsieur Mulcair has been pointing out, the fact is that for the distribution of this document, on the very first page it says in black and white to everybody that this is a confidential document and any kind of distribution might leave you open to a charge of contempt or a question of privilege. That is a big warning right there. As I see it, the value of this committee and of its eventual report is really to sensitize both the members and the staff of members and staff at the House to how seriously we have to take this business of secure information and the confidentiality thereof.
