At the moment, the breach is that all of a sudden, there is a sensitivity by some access to information coordinators in some departments that some information under their control has originated from Parliament, at whichever source, and in some cases they have a sensitivity to the point that they have sought advice and given notice, and probably acted on such advice, not to disclose.
My point is if that had come to the knowledge or suspicion of the requester, the requester could complain. His complaint probably would have been withheld and it would have gone to court, and so on.
The status quo is that if you have enjoyed some formal notice, this is going to disappear very quickly because you have no right to it, as matters now stand. You can stop the flow so there's no longer any information shared with government institutions, knowing that if it is shared, then it comes under their control. That’s one way you may want to go; it would probably be unlikely, because there is communication that takes place, and if it does, how do you protect that?
You can also go against the grain, against the grain the purpose of the act itself, which as a quasi-constitutional statute is to enlarge—I'm citing—the “access to information under the control of government”. You can exclude it and say that not unlike the client-solicitor privilege, not unlike other privilege that applies, we will simply not release anything that bears a stamp, or is identified, or is authored by Parliament. It's excluded. If it is, then the decision is simple: we simply don't release it. It doesn't come under the ambit of the act.
Another way is that you could exempt it. An exemption could be discretionary, as Mrs. Legault said, or mandatory, as I say. You try to reduce the debates that would take place each time such information comes to be reviewed for disclosure, but unless you go through an exclusion or an exemption, the problem will remain.