Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for inviting me to speak to you today on behalf of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
The CCLA is a national non-profit, non-partisan, non-governmental organization that promotes respect for and observance of fundamental human rights and civil liberties. This year marks the CCLA's 50th anniversary defending the rights and freedoms of Canadians. It's in this capacity, as a defender of core rights, including the fundamental right to vote, that I am here to express our very serious concerns about certain aspects of Bill C-23.
I know that my time is short, so for the purposes of my opening statement I want to focus on those aspects of the bill that will have the most direct and immediate impact on the electorate, and in particular may erode the fundamental right to vote. CCLA has submitted a written brief to the committee that outlines a number of our concerns in more detail.
With this audience, I don't think I have to go on about the importance of the right to vote and how crucial it is to our democracy. The right to vote is protected in our charter, and it is excluded from those rights subject to the notwithstanding clause. As our chief justice has held, “In a democracy such as ours, the power of lawmakers flows from the voting citizens, and lawmakers act as the citizens’ proxies.”
With all due respect, it would substantially delegitimize our system if, in your role as proxies of the people, some of whom helped to elect you, you in turn denied some of them their constitutionally guaranteed right to vote.
CCLA's biggest concern about Bill C-23 is the proposal to do away with vouching and to preclude use of the voter information card as a form of identification. We know that over 100,000 Canadians established their identity by vouching in the last election. There are very strong reasons to believe that these individuals will be disenfranchised if Bill C-23 passes as it currently stands.
I appreciate that people in this room may have trouble understanding why vouching may be necessary. For many of us, myself included, having basic identification is something we take for granted. However, those people who don't have the ID necessary to vote are often from marginalized groups. In general, these are not people who will be testifying before this committee. In fact, I did have to show identification to get into this building.
Those people stood up and chose to participate in the last election. They chose to express their democratic will. Many of the people who rely on vouching are students, seniors, aboriginal persons. Many live in rural and remote communities. Please do not ignore those people, and please don't erect barriers to their ability to vote. It's a fundamental precept of our system that every vote counts. If the changes made in this bill disenfranchise a single person, in our submission that is one too many.
We appreciate that the basic purpose of the proposed change is to address concerns about voter fraud. I have to repeat what you have by now heard likely many times before, from a number of witnesses who have appeared before the committee, including those sitting next to me. There is clear evidence that vouching has resulted in administrative problems and irregularities, but there is no evidence that it has resulted in fraud. There is no evidence that individuals who were not eligible to vote were permitted to do so as a result of vouching. In fact, the evidence that we do have is to the contrary.
The appropriate response to a concern that something may be broken in the administration of our electoral system is to take steps to fix it. A response that results in disenfranchising eligible voters is simple indefensible. In our view, this is a problem from a public policy perspective as well as a legal constitutional perspective.
The safeguards that are built up around vouching—for example, the need for record keeping, the fact that one person can only vouch for one other person—are procedural safeguards. In a recent Supreme Court of Canada case, the court made the very important point that these procedural safeguards are not ends in themselves. They are provisions that help to ensure that only those who have a right to vote may do so, but they are part of the Canada Elections Act, and the broad purpose of that act is to enfranchise all persons entitled to vote. It's to facilitate the right to vote.
Furthermore, the court remarked that they apply a stringent justification standard when considering laws or actions that result in a denial of voting rights. In the absence of any evidence that vouching has resulted in allowing ineligible persons to vote, it is hard to see how this stringent standard could be met. The CCLA believes these provisions of the bill will disenfranchise voters, may cost taxpayers money in protracted litigation, and may ultimately, if tested, be found wanting from a constitutional perspective.
I'm just going to briefly mention a few of CCLA's other concerns with this bill, the details of which are laid out in our written submission.
First, we urge the committee to remove the proposed changes to section 18 of the Canada Elections Act, which place significant restrictions on the role of the Chief Electoral Officer. This provision undermines the important role that the CEO currently plays. If there are concerns that basic information is not being communicated, that should be addressed, but not at the expense of other important public education and outreach done by the Chief Electoral Officer.
Second, we are concerned about provisions that shroud in secrecy investigations into allegations of fraud or other electoral improprieties. We certainly recognize the importance of upholding the presumption of innocence and the need to respect privacy, but the current bill doesn't strike the right balance between these interests and the need for transparency and the public's right to know.
Finally, we're concerned about provisions in the bill that attempt to draw a distinction between fundraising activity and advertising, and that exclude some of the expenses associated with fundraising from the quantification of election expenses. A bright-line distinction between advertising and fundraising is simply not possible. In excluding fundraising costs from the calculation of expenses there's both the potential for unlimited spending and a lack of transparency with respect to what is spent.
The same applies to the provision that would exclude from election expenses the value of services provided to a party to solicit funds from those who have made prior contributions of $20 or more in the last five years.
To conclude, CCLA strongly urges this committee to reconsider and remove those provisions that I have discussed.
I welcome the chance to answer any questions, and thank the committee again for this opportunity to appear.