Evidence of meeting #122 for Procedure and House Affairs in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was colleagues.
A video is available from Parliament.
Liberal
Dominic LeBlanc Liberal Beauséjour, NB
That might be one of the strategies there, but it's an interesting thing. Perhaps we could talk about that over the summer.
Liberal
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ben Carr
Thank you very much, Mr. Gerretsen.
Colleagues, that concludes the first panel for the day.
Minister LeBlanc, thank you very much for making yourself available and joining us here this morning.
Madame Drouin, thank you as well.
Colleagues, Madame Drouin will be staying with us for the next hour and—a friendly reminder—the next hour is not a continuation of this study. The next hour is a continuation of our study on the cyber-attacks, which we have been talking about previously.
We are going to suspend very briefly in order to turn over. We'll be back momentarily.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ben Carr
All right, everyone. If I could, I'll ask you to please take your seats.
Colleagues, we are going to continue with the second half of our meeting.
The second half of the meeting is a continuation of our study in relation to the question of privilege related to cyber-attacks targeting members of Parliament. Of course, we've been undertaking a conversation around this in recent weeks.
Carried over from the previous session, Madame Drouin, welcome back. Thank you for being here with us.
Madame Drouin, of course, is the deputy clerk of the Privy Council and the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister.
Madame Xavier, welcome back. It's nice to see you again. Thank you for joining us.
Madame Xavier is the chief of the Communications Security Establishment.
Between the two of you, witnesses, you will have just up to 10 minutes. You certainly don't have to take all that time if you don't feel it's necessary. We will then enter our usual rounds of questioning.
With that, Madame Drouin and Madame Xavier, I'll turn the floor over to you for upwards of 10 minutes combined.
Thank you.
Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council and National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, Privy Council Office
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today. I'll make a few opening remarks on my own behalf and on behalf of the chief of the Communications Security Establishment, whom I want to thank for joining me this morning. I know that she has testified a number of times. Her expertise is vital to the topic at hand.
I've been the deputy clerk of the Privy Council and the national security advisor to the Prime Minister since January 27. Recently, in the course of your committee's work, you heard from my colleague, as I said earlier. You spoke about cyber‑threats from foreign actors.
Cyber‑espionage programs sponsored by China, Russia, Iran and North Korea pose a real threat to Canada. These actors exploit our weaknesses in a number of ways. In doing so, they seek to undermine our democracy, as I said earlier this morning, in order to pursue their geopolitical objectives at Canada's expense.
While the PRC is not the only state that directs cyber-threat activity toward Canada, I must emphasize the far-reaching and sustained nature of the PRC's cyber-activities. PRC cyber-actors have targeted and continue to target the systems and networks of a wide spectrum of Canadian society, including all levels of government, private sector organizations and individuals. All of these aspects of Canadian society have information that could be considered valuable to the PRC. The scope of this threat is significant.
The more we discuss them, the more we understand how best to respond to these threats from a whole-of-society perspective. The Government of Canada has warned Canadians of the cyber-threat caused by state actors. Most recently, on June 3, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, National Defence and Public Safety issued a public statement warning Canadians of the threat caused by foreign states targeting Canada. The statement and the CSE's cyber-threat bulletin that were released highlighted the interference in our democratic system that has resulted from these efforts.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security has joined international partners in issuing public advisories to inform on techniques used by PRC state actors and, most importantly, how to mitigate those threats.
The use of cyber means by the PRC and other states to interfere in our political system will not stop. To address that threat, we must continue to take steps to reinforce Canada's overall resiliency to hostile cyber-activity. The government is in the process of renewing Canada's national cybersecurity strategy, which we anticipate will bring a wide range of initiatives over the course of its implementation.
When it comes to cybersecurity for parliamentarians, a number of changes have taken place in recent years.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security works closely with various partners, including House of Commons and Senate staff, to protect parliamentarians from cyber‑threats.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service also plays an important role in identifying and responding to threats to the security of Parliament.
In March 2023, the then minister of public safety issued a direction to CSIS on threats to the security of Canada directed at Parliament and parliamentarians. CSIS, the CSE and other departments and agencies have also undertaken a significant number of briefings to parliamentarians on a wide range of threats, including cyber-threats. Security clearances have been offered to party leaders to enable a more direct understanding of the threats facing parliamentarians and all Canadians.
As a result, the level of information sharing and transparency regarding threats to parliamentarians is much higher now than it was a few years ago, and we continue to learn and improve our system. I would be remiss if I did not underline the important work of NSICOP and NSIRA—Chair, allow me to use those acronyms, because I think you know them well.
As illustrated in their recent reports on foreign interference in Canada's elections, those two organizations enrich the public understanding and debate regarding national security and intelligence in Canada. These reports highlight the use of cyber tools by threat actors to interfere in democratic institutions and to undertake espionage campaigns against political parties and parliamentarians.
In its special report, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians said that a cyber‑actor led by the People's Republic of China unsuccessfully targeted members of the Inter‑Parliamentary Alliance on China.
In conclusion, I cannot change how the incident in question was handled in 2021. However, I can say that the Government of Canada is very focused on how to best inform parliamentarians of national security threats.
In a democratic society, addressing the threat to national security requires informed and non‑partisan public debate involving the government, the public and parliamentarians, a process that we're engaged in here today. This type of debate is vital. It helps us to better understand the threats that we face as a country. It also helps us to strengthen our ability to respond to these threats as part of a whole‑of‑society approach.
My colleague and I look forward to answering your questions.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ben Carr
Thank you, Ms. Drouin.
With that, we go to our first line of questioning.
Mr. Genuis, the floor is yours for six minutes.
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
Thank you, Chair.
Ms. Xavier, we had three rounds of questioning previously. I'm going to follow up on some of those questions, because I reread our exchange, and there are some things I noticed that I want to probe a bit more.
First off, in my third round, I asked about caveats in terms of information that was shared with the House of Commons. I think you said you had to get back to us. I assume you have that information now. Were there any caveats in the information shared with the House of Commons, in terms of limitations on who they could then share that information with, etc.?
Caroline Xavier Chief, Communications Security Establishment
When we share information with anybody, especially when it's pieces of intelligence, it is—
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
It's just a very specific question. Were there caveats in this case?
Chief, Communications Security Establishment
It is very possible that there were caveats. In terms of the briefings, because we held many briefings with the House of Commons, it is very possible that some of the documentation that we shared with them—
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
Ma'am, I asked you this question previously. I wasn't asking if it was possible. I asked if there were caveats.
Chief, Communications Security Establishment
Because I wasn't in the meetings myself, I don't know exactly which documents were shared with the House of Commons, but I expect that some of the documents that we did share with the House of Commons would have had caveats, especially based on classification. Having said that—
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
Would those have limited their ability to share information with others?
Chief, Communications Security Establishment
Mr. Chair, it is possible that, had there been caveats on the documentation provided, those caveats would only be able to be shared with people with similar opportunities and classification to receive that documentation.
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
Okay, thank you.
You're saying it's possible, but you're not willing or ready to confirm.
Bloc
Liberal
Bloc
Marie-Hélène Gaudreau Bloc Laurentides—Labelle, QC
I can follow the discussion in French only. However, the person interpreting into French often says that it's inaudible. I think that my colleague is talking too fast.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ben Carr
Okay. I understand.
Mr. Genuis, just in terms of allowing the witness the opportunity to respond, I will be generous with the time. We gained a bit of time throughout the course of the meeting, so if the concern is about rushing, don't worry: The quality of the question and answer is more important.
Madame Xavier, if you can, do your best to speak more slowly.
Mr. Genuis, if you can, do your best to speak more slowly and also try to ensure that we're not speaking over one another.
Bloc
Marie-Hélène Gaudreau Bloc Laurentides—Labelle, QC
I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.
What was Mr. Genuis' question? I'm missing that information, Mr. Chair.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ben Carr
Mr. Genuis, can you please repeat the question? It seems that Madame Gaudreau did not hear it, so I stopped the clock.
Ms. Gaudreau, if there are any other issues, please let me know.
Mr. Genuis, we go back to you, to continue. Can you just repeat the question, though? There seems to have been a translation issue.
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
Sure, but let me know when you're starting the time.
To summarize the round—if there were translation problems so far—I asked if there were caveats that limited the House of Commons from sharing information with parliamentarians. The response we're getting is it's possible that there could have been, without confirmation that there was.
Conservative
Garnett Genuis Conservative Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB
Thank you.
We can make this easier for ourselves and for interpreters just with clear questions and answers. Are you prepared to tell us whether or not there were caveats—not whether it was possible that there were caveats, but whether there were? If you're not prepared to tell us, is it because you don't know or because you don't wish to share that information?
