Procedure and House Affairs Committee on March 1st, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I welcome back members and welcome our witnesses.

For the second panel this afternoon, we have with us Adriana Poloz, executive director, intelligence and international policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Tara Denham, director general, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development; Adam Fisher, director general, intelligence assessments, Canadian Security Intelligence Service; Greg O'Hayon, acting director general, strategic intelligence, federal policing intelligence and international policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and Alia Tayyeb, deputy chief of signals intelligence, Communications Security Establishment.

I understand that Ms. Tayyeb will be bringing us opening remarks on behalf of all our guests today.

The floor is yours.

[Alia Tayyeb, Deputy Chief of Signals Intelligence, Communications Security Establishment]

Hello, Madam Chair, and thank you very much.

Thanks to the members of the committee for the invitation to reappear on the study of foreign election interference.

As was noted, my name is Alia Tayyeb, and I am the deputy chief of CSE's signals intelligence branch.

I appreciate the invitation to appear here alongside my colleagues from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Global Affairs Canada and the RCMP, the departments and agencies representing Canada’s security and intelligence threats to elections task force, known as SITE.

We are here to discuss SITE’s activities related to foreign election interference. These activities demonstrate our strong commitment to working with our partners to protect both the integrity of Canada’s elections and Canadians’ trust in our democracy.

I'll provide an overview of the SITE task force.

The SITE task force brings together operational leads and experts from CSE, CSIS, GAC and the RCMP with the aim of improving awareness, collection, coordination and action in countering foreign interference in Canada’s federal elections. Each task force member plays an important role in addressing foreign interference in electoral processes. We work together, operating with our own distinct mandates, to address this threat.

CSIS collects and analyzes information about threats to the security of Canada, including information about foreign-influenced activities, and it provides advice, intelligence reporting and intelligence assessments to the Government of Canada about these activities.

GAC provides open-source research and data analysis on foreign state-sponsored disinformation and coordinates with the G7 and other international partners to respond to threats to democracy.

The RCMP has the primary responsibility for preventing, detecting, denying and responding to national security-related criminal threats in Canada and investigating criminal offences arising from foreign influence.

My organization, CSE, provides advice, guidance and services to help ensure the protection of electronic information and systems of importance, and collects foreign intelligence for the Government of Canada on threat actors.

CSE was the chair of the SITE task force between 2018 and 2022. As chair, CSE was responsible for convening and coordinating the task force, including joint products and briefings.

I will now turn to the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, which was created ahead of the 2019 general election as part of the plan to protect Canada’s democracy.

As part of this protocol, for both the 2019 and 2021 general elections, a panel of five senior public servants was formed.

Part of the SITE task force’s role was to brief the panel on foreign interference or other threats to the electoral process. The SITE task force advised the panel of any relevant information, and the panel was responsible for determining whether the threshold for informing Canadians was met.

SITE briefed the panel on several occasions before, during and after the elections of 2019 and 2021. These briefings ensured panel members had a shared understanding of the threat landscape. SITE also provided daily classified intelligence updates, which went to all SITE task force member organizations and the panel.

In addition to providing information to the panel, SITE was part of the Elections Security Coordinating Committee, which brought together members of the security and intelligence community with representatives of Elections Canada and the office of the commissioner of Canada elections. This group met on a regular basis to ensure communication flows, exercise responses to potential events and discuss any potential threats to the electoral process. In that context, SITE provided regular threat briefings to this group.

The third set of regular briefings SITE conducted consisted of meetings with representatives from political parties, who had been provided secret-level security clearances, to build awareness of foreign threats to Canada’s electoral process and provide any relevant foreign interference information. SITE briefed these representatives on several occasions before and during the 2019 and 2021 elections.

Meanwhile, throughout the election period, CSE and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security provided points of contact to all 16 federal registered political parties for further discussion on cybersecurity challenges related to Canada’s democratic process. In so doing, political parties or candidates were provided with points of contact should they encounter any suspicious cyber-activity, and CSE designated a quick response point of contact for them.

In addition to our contributions through SITE, CSE has also issued numerous unclassified publications, advice and guidance to inform Canadians about current trends.

I can assure you that all the SITE members here take all allegations of foreign interference very seriously.

Although Canada’s electoral system is strong, foreign interference can threaten the integrity of our institutions, particularly by sowing doubt and undermining confidence in the process.

We will continue to work within our respective mandates to protect Canadians and raise awareness about the serious threat of foreign interference to our country.

Thank you again for the invitation to appear. I welcome any questions you may have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you very much for those comments.

We'll start with six-minute rounds, beginning with Mr. Cooper, followed by Mrs. Romanado.

Then, we will go to Ms. Normandin, followed by Mr. Julian.

Mr. Cooper, the floor is yours.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank you to all the witnesses for being here.

My first question is for Ms. Denham.

An open data analysis by the rapid response mechanism, dated September 13, 2021—that would have been during the 2021 election, to provide some context—was entitled “GE44: Chinese Communist Party Social Media Accounts Spreading Negative Narratives about the Conservative Party of Canada”. This analysis, which we've obtained through access to information and which I will table before this committee when I have a translated copy, includes the following key findings:

RRM Canada has observed what may be a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) information operation that aims to discourage Canadians of Chinese heritage from voting for the Conservative Party of Canada.

A further key finding is that “[t]he narrative has...grown in considerable scale”.

Was this analysis shared with the CEIPP election panel?

[Tara Denham, Director General, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you for the question and for that report.

Yes, any of the reports that the RRM produced were shared with the panel. What I would like to just note is that in that report, it says that it “may” be. Again, what we do is open source analytics of the information environment.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much for that.

Around the same time, there was disinformation that was tracked on certain Chinese-language social media platforms, such as WeChat and Weibo. Some of the themes included disinformation about then member of Parliament Kenny Chiu's private member's bill around a foreign agent registry. It's noted in the Rosenberg report.

In the face of the key finding in the analysis of September 13, and given the additional disinformation about Conservative candidates that was being spread on social media platforms, at any point did the task force provide any warnings on any of these Chinese-language social media platforms that there was misinformation being spread around, to warn the public?

[Tara Denham]

Thank you, Chair.

If I understand your question, it's on whether or not any information was shared with the public.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Was there any warning about misinformation or disinformation in the face of the fact that such disinformation had been monitored and identified by the SITE task force?

[Tara Denham]

Thank you for that clarification.

As I said, in that report what we were indicating that we were noticing was that there “could” be. We were seeing amplification, and that's what we look for—artificial amplification of content in the social media landscape.

We were flagging the reality that there was that amplification, but in that report we were not able to ascertain whether it was directed by a foreign—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

I don't mean to cut you off, but my time is limited and my question was specific: Was any warning issued to alert the public about disinformation that had been identified?

I would note that when we talk about, for example, WeChat, there are 600,000 WeChat users in the Lower Mainland. That's a lot of people on WeChat. It gives an idea of the magnitude to which this disinformation was spreading around throughout the Lower Mainland and causing voters to be misled about Mr. Chiu and about the Conservative Party. That's a big deal.

Was any warning issued—yes or no? I take it that the answer is no, but can you just confirm that?

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I'm going to pause really quickly. I get to do this every so often, as I just did in the last session.

I respect that it is your time, Mr. Cooper. We have asked our guests to come, and we have to provide them some opportunity to provide some information.

Ms. Denham, I turn the floor to you.

[Tara Denham]

The role of the RRM is to identify potential tactics or campaigns to amplify information. As well, as it has been explained, our role is to brief the panel on that information. The panel then takes into consideration not only information we are seeing, but the full spectrum of information that they're being provided, and it is the panel that then makes a decision.

What I can say in this instance is—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

To clarify, are you saying that it would be up to the panel to make a decision such as issuing a warning?

[Tara Denham]

In terms of the protocol that is in place during the writ period, it is the panel that makes the assertation if any public announcement is made. Again, in this instance, what I can say is that without an ability to identify that it was a foreign entity—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much—

[Tara Denham]

—it could have been amplification from Canadian content—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

You've made that point very clear.

I want to ask—

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

On a point of order, Madam Chair, with all due respect to my colleagues here, we're trying to give people the space and time to answer legitimate questions. We're undertaking a really important discussion, as you've said, Madam Chair. I would really appreciate it if we could give our witnesses ample time to answer the questions, instead of talking over them.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

With the hybrid capacity, it's also harder for people who are watching to hear what's happening, so I think we should be mindful of that.

I am going to give the floor back to Mr. Cooper.

You have 10 seconds.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Okay. I guess my time has expired.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Ms. Denham, did you want to finish the point? You were just saying something.

[Tara Denham]

For the purposes of clarity, because of the hybrid nature, as you said, the main message here is that, yes, we saw the amplification of content, but we were not able to ascertain if it was from a foreign entity or within domestic sources. That is our role. We flag what we're seeing for an analysis.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Mrs. Romanado, up to six minutes go to you.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Through you, I'd like to thank the witnesses for being with us today.

My first question is for Ms. Tayyeb.

You mentioned in your opening remarks a bit of the overview of the task force. Can you confirm when the task force was created?

[Alia Tayyeb]

Absolutely. The task force was created in 2018.