Evidence of meeting #55 for Procedure and House Affairs in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was information.
A video is available from Parliament.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
When you receive information on allegations involving potential candidates, do you inform the candidate in question?
Deputy Chief of Signals Intelligence, Communications Security Establishment
Thank you for that excellent question.
The way that SITE worked with political parties, which is the general way SITE works, is that we provided threat overviews. We provided information that was relevant to all parties. When there was specific information to provide to a particular party on a particular incident, SITE endeavoured to have separate meetings with those parties on sensitive issues, and they were with the SITE agency or SITE department that was responsible for that particular incident.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Do you make the decision about whether to inform the candidate about potential interference in their riding, or is that up to the panel?
Deputy Chief of Signals Intelligence, Communications Security Establishment
Maybe just to clarify, in my answer I was talking about the cleared political party representatives. Maybe you're asking about the individual affected by that. I might ask my colleague to answer that.
Director General, Intelligence Assessments, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Yes, absolutely.
There is a provision within the protocol that allows for outreach to an individual who we think is being targeted by foreign influence activity. My understanding is that the decision can be taken by the deputy head of the agency, but I stand to be corrected on that.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger
Thank you. We didn't put the timer on, so we went over our time. Somebody might be timing this online and saying that it's gone over.
Mr. Julian, you have two and a half minutes.
NDP
Peter Julian NDP New Westminster—Burnaby, BC
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Madam Tayyeb, I want to come back to your comments about the impact on local constituencies. You said that you wouldn't make a distinction about something that could potentially have an impact at the constituency level, so the information would be referred to the panel.
How would the panel be aware that this information could potentially be election-determining or could have an impact on the election at the local riding level?
Deputy Chief of Signals Intelligence, Communications Security Establishment
Thank you very much for that question and for allowing me the opportunity to clarify.
What I intended to say is that the agencies represented here reported any threat we saw to the panel. Whether it was something we saw locally or at a national level, all of that information went to the panel.
Insofar as how the panel makes its determination, I have to defer to the members of the panel to explain that.
NDP
Peter Julian NDP New Westminster—Burnaby, BC
I have one last question for you.
You talked about the amplification of content. We all know about the alleged Chinese interference. We also know of numerous claims of interference by Russia, for instance, when Trump was elected in 2016 and during the Brexit referendum in the U.K. The Conservative Party in the U.K. is said to have received direct funding from the Russians and agencies in Russia. It's also alleged that Russia and Russian agencies had a hand in the “freedom convoy”.
What do you make of the amplification at the hands of Russia and China? How do you measure the impact, precisely to protect us from Chinese or Russian interference?
Director General, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
Perhaps I can start, and others can add as appropriate.
You're right that ascertaining the impact can be challenging, but I think what this committee has heard is that we understand there is intent by many countries to interfere, and that we really take this seriously and do everything we can to address it.
A lot of the role we play is to understand what those threat vectors look like, so it's about constantly trying to learn. I can speak for the RRM. That's part of what we contribute. We're trying to understand what the threat against Canada looks like, but as you said, there are examples internationally, and the RRM aims to share that information.
Again, it's about a focus on continuously learning what the threat looks like. It's very difficult to ascertain impact, but we know there is intent.
Conservative
Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB
Thank you, Madam Chair.
In the 2019 or 2021 election, was the public ever informed of foreign interference in any media platform during the election? Was there ever a warning, was the public advised or was there an advisory in either of those elections? I'd like a yes or no.
Deputy Chief of Signals Intelligence, Communications Security Establishment
Insofar as it relates to the activities of the panel and the public announcement function it would render should it deem this required, the answer to that question is no.
Conservative
Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB
Nothing has met the threshold or test yet for the public to know.
In the discussion of amplifications, Ms. Denham, you said that you've witnessed amplifications of information or chatter—whatever the lingo happens to be—and you said that you could not confirm that it was foreign interference. That also implies that you cannot deny there was foreign interference.
Would you agree with my statement?
Director General, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
I wouldn't agree with the premise of it. I think it's really important, when you're talking about disinformation and the source of it, to note that just because we aren't able to fully confirm it's a foreign entity.... As I said, it's really important. It could be Canadians or it could be other entities having conversations, so I wouldn't want to imply that this means it is not foreign and that it is counter to that.
Conservative
Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB
If you can't confirm something, you can't deny something, and that's a very logical argument. I want to get you to clarify a statement that you just made in your testimony here today.
Through one of your answers, you said that you cannot tell if it's foreign or from within Canada. Does your definition of “foreign interference” mean it has to come from offshore? If it happens within the territorial confines of Canada, is it not considered foreign? That's how I interpreted your comment. Is that how you operate?
Director General, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
No, and thank you for that question so I can clarify what I meant to say.
What we look for are those tactics. When I said that we couldn't confirm whether it was a foreign entity, I meant it could be a foreign entity using proxies in different ways to amplify content. You need to find the link back to a foreign entity that's directing that. That's just to clarify the statement.
Conservative
Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB
Thank you so much.
Your responsibility is to monitor elections, but your responsibility would not extend to nomination races and leadership races. Is that correct?
Director General, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms and Inclusion, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
RRM's mandate is specifically foreign threats to democracies. We look at the threat landscape more broadly.
Perhaps Mr. Fisher would like to add to that.
Director General, Intelligence Assessments, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Sure.
Certainly, from a service perspective and mandate, any foreign influence activity is something we would be interested in and would investigate. That would potentially extend to party nominations outside of an electoral writ.
Conservative
Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB
There have been numerous conversations about turning intelligence into evidence. I think the Canadian public broadly accepts that there has been significant foreign interference in our democratic processes, and not a single individual has been hauled to the bar to account for any of this. There have been no charges laid by the RCMP. There have been no charges, to my knowledge, put forward by Elections Canada.
Where is the missing gap in turning intelligence into evidence so that we can actually prosecute those who the Canadian public broadly accepts are acting with impunity in our democratic processes?
Director General, Intelligence Assessments, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Thank you for the question. It's a very good one. It is something that I suggest the government has been wrestling with for some time now, and it's not just in Canada. An issue that all of our allies face is trying to find a way to transition intelligence into evidence.
Ultimately, a policy development and probably a legislative fix would be required in that space, but that's well beyond my remit. I know that our colleagues at Public Safety Canada have this on their plate as something they've been looking at and studying.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger
Thank you.
Mr. Fergus, I'll give you the same four minutes as Mr. Calkins.
Liberal
Greg Fergus Liberal Hull—Aylmer, QC
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'll try to keep it brief.
I'm going to have probably two or three uncomfortable questions. Let me just get right into them.
National security expert Jessica Davis tweeted this: “The leaks are a big concern for me. They appear quite partisan in nature. This might be the nature of the interference and their targets. It might be a function of the reporting. Or it might be selective leaking.” She then said, “We need to be very careful about considering the leaked information in context. We should probably all be paying a lot more attention to what's going on in committee when public officials are testifying. They're in a position to give better context.”
What is your reaction to that comment?
Director General, Intelligence Assessments, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
My reaction as an intelligence professional and an employee of the service, speaking just generally of leaked intelligence, is that it's something we take extremely seriously. Obviously, protecting our sources, our operations and our tradecraft is essential to being able to conduct our investigations and do our business. Anything that puts that at risk is something we take extremely seriously.