Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 1st, 2023

[Jody Thomas]

Our security agencies collect somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 pieces of intelligence, sovereign intelligence, a month. That's then compounded and multiplied by the intelligence we receive from Five Eyes.

I have a reading file in which I follow very specific issues. Obviously, I follow what is going on in Ukraine. I follow what is going on in China and foreign interference. I have a reading package put together for me, based on either subjects or geopolitics, or where we have, for example, Canadian Armed Forces troops stationed. My reading package on any given day can be somewhere between 50 and 100 pieces of intelligence. Sometimes it's smaller. Sometimes it's larger. There's no regularity to it.

Some pieces of intelligence that are sent to me in PCO only I can read, and then I make the determination on who it will go to. We are working to ensure that when there are pieces that must be seen by somebody, the client relations officers who work in departments for CSE and distribute intelligence make sure that the intelligence is seen and that it is acknowledged that it has been seen. I think that was a breakdown in process previously, that it was not seen.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Perhaps you could walk us through this. You receive intelligence that can be very vast with respect to anything with respect to our Canadian Armed Forces, with issues abroad or with domestic issues as well. How is that packaged and gotten to you? What kind of apparatus is sending you this kind of information? We know that obviously it's CSIS and CSE, but are you receiving it from multiple parties? How does that get to you in terms of your package?

[Jody Thomas]

There are people who are certainly far more capable of explaining the system to you, because they work in the system. Essentially, it is put into a system called Slingshot, or it is sent through a TS or secret method to certain addressees. In my case, it is printed for me. I can access it myself, but generally it's printed for me. I get a reading package every day, and I read that package.

There is a range of types of pieces of intelligence. We can get assessed pieces. The intelligence assessment branch in PCO does assessed pieces. That means they take the raw intelligence and they use the techniques they've been taught and the analytical methodology that they refine here in Canada and with Five Eyes to tell us what the raw intelligence means.

We also get single-source, uncorroborated pieces that say that X may have happened.

The intelligence agencies keep all of that. Their holdings are substantial. What they share is not everything that is in their holdings. It is critical to understand that they try to ensure that senior leaders in the intelligence and security world are aware of what they're capturing and they identify its credibility. They'll say, “We think you need to know this, but it's not yet credible.” That will become the basis for potentially more reporting. It builds a dossier on any particular file or person.

It is rare that a piece of intelligence is a smoking gun. It is a story. It is built over time. It requires analysis and judgment on what to do with it.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you so much.

In that regard, it's like a puzzle piece. You have a small piece of the puzzle, so what may be interesting at first glance may not be a situation in which it needs to move up.

I'm assuming that when we have the other witnesses coming, we can ask them to explain to us how that judgment is made for when that meets the level of needing to send this up to the next level. I'm assuming they are making those decisions based on the little pieces of the puzzle they have and once they have a more accurate picture...unless of course, as you said, there is something very significant, very credible and very imminent that would require immediate attention.

Would that be correct?

[Jody Thomas]

Yes, I think that's a very good summary of how the system works.

What we have now done, based on the Prime Minister's direction, is ensure that anything that mentions foreign interference and an MP gets briefed up, regardless of its credibility or how confident we are in the reporting.

We also then take that intelligence and ask CSIS or CSE for what else they have on that particular thread, to try to build a bigger picture and give advice to the government. Sometimes that advice will be that there is nothing to do yet. Sometimes that advice is that we should not brief yet. Other times it will be that they think we need to take action.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

That's something new that you've just put in place. Is that correct?

[Jody Thomas]

Yes, that's correct.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Madame Gaudreau.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I just heard that the Prime Minister gave a direction. One has to wonder why we are here, despite the measures put in place to try to increase the flow of intelligence.

What direction did the Prime Minister give regarding the level for alerting members? I'd like to know more. You may not have had a chance to talk about that during our first two meetings.

[Jody Thomas]

The Prime Minister, I think, was quite unequivocal. He directed the intelligence agencies to ensure that MPs are briefed and that he is to be briefed on any information and intelligence that is received about foreign interference that targets a member of Parliament.

Minister Mendicino then further put that into a formal document that is called a ministerial directive. The ministerial directive tells CSIS that regardless of the credibility of the threat, if there is something that comes in on an MP, he is to be briefed and that MP is to be briefed.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Am I to understand that's how it will work going forward, but that it didn't work that way previously?

[Jody Thomas]

Yes, absolutely. That is going to happen from now on.

It wasn't the case previously, because there is a range of information that comes in. Some of it isn't credible. It is concerning. It would worry the MP, if they were told.

I think the lesson learned out of this is that early reporting is better, even if the piece of intelligence that has arrived is not a credible piece or cannot be verified.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I fully appreciate that between 3,000 and 4,000 reports or memos come in a month, as you said, but what I'm finding out today is deeply troubling. We thought the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs had better things to do, but it turns out that the work we are doing is extremely important.

Previously, communication and reports weren't handled the same way. All the witnesses the committee heard from talked about the epidemic of over-classification by Canada's intelligence agencies, even describing it as a culture within the intelligence community. In fact, we are only talking about it now because someone was brave enough to bring it to the media's attention. Otherwise, we wouldn't be trying to put things right as we speak.

How did we get to this point? I'm giving you an opportunity to answer frankly, in order to restore people's confidence.

[Jody Thomas]

I would say, first and foremost, that the evaluation of the panel of five, based on the information given to the SITE task force—the two post-election reviews, the work done by NSICOP and the analysis by the independent special rapporteur—assures us that the elections were free, open and safe, and that the outcome of the elections should not be questioned. I think that's really important.

In terms of informing the Prime Minister, ministers and relevant MPs about particular pieces of intelligence.... Previously, CSIS has been very strict in interpreting their act about defensive briefings and threat reduction measures. Minister Mendicino has given them very stringent direction about how they are to move forward. I think that is reassuring.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

We now know that at least three of our fellow members were targeted, and that's why we are here today. Is it not? We are here to consider a question of privilege related to the intimidation campaign against the member for Wellington—Halton Hills. Something was done because it came out publicly.

That makes me think that, ultimately, the government wasn't able to adequately protect parliamentarians before. Do you agree?

[Jody Thomas]

First, it's an important point that you're making. It's important to note that the physical security of any of these MPs has not been in question, and there is no physical threat.

I understand completely that the information that has been leaked to the media, or now briefed to members of Parliament, is shocking and disturbing to hear. It should not have happened in this manner. I acknowledge that.

I cannot speak about what happened previously. We are going forward in a completely different direction, which I think will assist the government, all members of Parliament and all Canadians in understanding the threat that is foreign interference and how we are going to deal with it. It will be through more transparency and more discussion about what is actually happening.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Were you missing something in order to do your job and better understand the reports or threats themselves?

Our last witnesses talked about the large volume of information and the way it was analyzed to identify what required urgent or more urgent attention.

Were you missing something, or on the contrary, were you told that, because there was so much information, it was necessary to focus on what was most serious?

[Jody Thomas]

I think what is important to note is that we should not be relying on any single individual to read intelligence and decide it's going to move up, and that if it's not read by that individual, it falls by the side of the table. If I miss my reading package for one day because I'm travelling, that should not mean that information is not shared with the Clerk of the Privy Council, ministers or the Prime Minister.

We now have a more robust process to ensure that actionable intelligence and non-actionable intelligence, particularly in the foreign interference space, are discussed and moved to ministers, the Clerk and potentially the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister’s Office—not only the raw intelligence, but advice on what to do about it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mrs. Blaney.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you, Chair. I thank you, Ms. Thomas, for being here with us today.

I'm listening and really trying to wrap my head around this, because this is incredibly serious. The impacts are profoundly concerning. The way in which people are learning and the timeline on which they are learning are highly concerning. I think when we look at this whole process, what I'm seeing is an increase of distrust in Canadians and parliamentarians. I think, hopefully, that's something we would want to see avoided.

I just have to go back to a couple of things. You're saying that the Prime Minister and you only found out about this two or three weeks ago. Then you're saying that now we are strengthening the process of intelligence receiving, reviewing and providing advice.

Are you really telling me that this was completely broken, and in two or three weeks you fixed the problem? That's what it sounds like to me. I just can't put that together. Can you explain how that works?

It just doesn't make sense, because if it was this simple to fix, then why on earth was it not fixed earlier? Why are we here today?

If you could explain that, it would be very helpful to me.

[Jody Thomas]

As I said, I was not in this job in 2021. I was the deputy minister of national defence. In July 2021, I was most concerned about Afghanistan. I didn't read the intelligence on foreign interference. As I said, everybody has their reading packages, and there are things that are relevant to them.

As the national security and intelligence adviser, I certainly have to have a broader view and see different and more intelligence than I did in the past.

What my predecessors did.... They will be here. You will have to speak to them.

My observation, even before the foreign interference issues were in the press and were a priority discussion, is that we collect and assess a lot of intelligence. What we don't do a good job of is giving advice to government. The intelligence agencies don't give advice. The deputy ministers give advice to ministers, to the Clerk of the Privy Council and to the Prime Minister. I felt that was a gap. We were moving forward on, for example, advice on what to do on intelligence that we saw on Ukraine, in a different way. It wasn't significantly different from what I've described to you in terms of assessing the intelligence—deputy ministers and the chief of the defence staff, in the case of Ukraine, having a discussion about what the intelligence means and what the government should do with it. What you do with it is the critical part of intelligence.

Sometimes the answer is nothing, because you need to continue collecting, because you need to investigate further. Sometimes it is—

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

I'm sorry. I have only a few more minutes.

I guess that your answer is, yes, we've fixed the problem. I'm really interested in seeing how that works. I don't know if you're going to tell us as clearly as I was hoping you would.

You keep saying as well that you can account...and I hear that the folks previously in this role will be here for us.

My question to you, then, is this. When you arrived on the scene, did you have discussions with your predecessor? When you had those discussions, was there no moment where there were discussions about intelligence and how it might be impacting parliamentarians? There were no concerns brought forward to you. Did you just come with a clean slate, and all of a sudden these things erupted?

I'm hoping you can clarify that.

[Jody Thomas]

The director of CSIS certainly spoke to me about foreign interference, and not only threats against parliamentarians, but foreign interference writ large. These sorts of activities that are taken on by adversaries are much broader than just elections.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

I understand that, but we're actually talking about a point of privilege, so I think it's important that we stay clear on that.

Was there any passing on...? Again, it feels like this was a bit of a surprise. Emails were sent out to ministers. They didn't know how to open the emails.

It's just so confusing, but the impacts are profound. It does create a sense of distrust. I think when we look at this, perception matters. We can debate a whole bunch about what this and that means, but perception matters. In our systems right now, parliamentarians are feeling concerned that they don't know. I remember asking a question several weeks ago in which I said that I could happily be walking down the street doing my job as a member of Parliament, as a candidate in an election. I could be targeted, and no one would tell me.

How do you fight something that you don't know is happening to you? What I'm trying to understand is how this got left behind. How is it that all of these things have happened? They've been reported in the media. We can talk about the source of those reports and where they're coming from, but the real issue for me is why this was not caught as an issue.

Why do we have to be here? How are we going to fix it moving forward but also take accountability for the history?