Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 13th, 2023

[Cherie Henderson]

We established issues management notes probably back in 2015, about that period of time. The intention was, because we have a very robust process for sharing intelligence and, as Mr. Vigneault has indicated, we have what we call a raw intelligence product and we have an intelligence assessment product, but those go to a very different audiences. Those go to all of the individuals within the S and I community. The IMU note was then created, because we wanted to make sure that we could inform on a specific event at a specific time.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

That's understood very clearly now.

These notes are well established. This is not something new. They've been around since 2015. Nobody can reasonably claim that this is a new process or that they failed to understand how this process works.

Is there a higher way to signal importance? From my perspective, I'm seeing this as a red flag on an email. When we send emails to each other, we mark priority or importance on emails. This, to me, seems like a red flag on an email, from a layman's perspective, but I can also send a read receipt, so that if somebody opens the document, it tells me they've actually read it.

Are you aware of that? Do you have any signal to indicate whether or not the information that was sent in the IMU in question was opened and read? Basic email service offers this. Does our intelligence sharing have a similar type of guarantee or certainty that the information, which is important enough to be flagged, is actually read?

[David Vigneault]

This is a very important point. What I think is clear is that if we have put in place a process to flag.... Here, in this specific case, the minister was very clear: He did not get the information. It means the process that was put in place—the support he was receiving from us or from Public Safety—did not, in this case, work.

Yes, there were the conditions of the pandemic, which should not be overlooked, but more fundamentally than that, if there's something of importance, if it does not work for the minister—and again, the minister was very clear about that—it is incumbent upon us, ourselves, his office and the Department of Public Safety, to find the right tool to put in place to make sure that critical information is seen by the minister.

I think this is one of the key measures that we need to put in place, to have this ability to adapt our processes when they're not working.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mr. Fergus.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Mr. Vigneault and Ms. Henderson, thank you very much for being with us.

Ms. Henderson, I'd like to go back to you to talk a little about these issues management notes, or IMUs.

Could you continue with your response—to Mr. Calkins, I believe—in terms of how the IMUs work? I'm going to ask a couple of questions. How do they work? Who is on the distribution list? Can you give me, not who specifically, but a vague number of how many agencies, departments or people are on that list?

[Cherie Henderson]

One thing that is important to understand is how the dissemination of the sensitive information works. It is not like a regular email back and forth. We have a very tightly controlled top secret system, which allows us to send information.

Within our own organization, our full organization is a SCIF. We all can have that right at our desktop, but in the average department they do not have that capability. Individuals actually have to go to a special protected room within that department, and only individuals who have verified access to that system can access it, read the information and print it off.

When we send out an IMU note, we actually send it to the department. The department, therefore, is the one.... there are specific individuals who have an email account, and they receive it. It would have been a specific individual within, for example, Public Safety or within, for example, PCO who would have access to that, be able to print it and then provide that information.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you so much. That was very important.

It's a relatively wide distribution circulation, but under very specific and controlled access.

My question would be when you want something to be brought to the attention of a particular minister, how do you go about doing that with these IMUs?

[Cherie Henderson]

The requirement would be that we would send it to the department and we would then note on the note that this is to be shared with a particular individual. It could be the minister, it could be the minister's chief of staff or it could be the deputy minister.

They do not have access to that email system, but there are individuals within the department who would, and they would then be able to print it out.

[David Vigneault]

May I add something?

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Please.

[David Vigneault]

Just to add another element to this, of course there's a lot of attention put on the issues management note, but the overwhelming majority of the information that the service shares with other departments would be our intelligence products. That would be going to an organization within the department. That organization is the one that would curate what needs to go to a minister.

When we step back from all of this, one of the lessons, if I can put it this way, is that this system may not be working as well as it should be to make sure that each minister gets the right level of awareness of our intelligence products.

I think my colleague, the national security and intelligence adviser, spoke to this, that we are doing something different. It's important, in fairness, for people.

I took Mr. Berthold's question earlier about the number of documents and so on. It is true that it is a very large number of documents. It is incumbent upon all of us to find the right way of making sure that the right information goes to the right people at the right time. This is not a science. That means we are collectively learning that this has not worked very well and we need to do much better with this.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

My first question is this: Is the RCMP normally on this IMU distribution list?

[Cherie Henderson]

No, it is not normally. The IMU notes were originally designed in order to inform Public Safety and PCO. Recently we broadened that, and we look at it, as Director Vigneault has indicated, based on the need to know.

If there is something within a document that they need to know, we will share that, but it originally goes to Public Safety and PCO.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you. Because we didn't have a full understanding of how the IMU works, I think that is an important answer and clarification to have to explain some of the testimony that we had this morning from the commissioner or the deputy commissioner in terms of why they weren't brought in the loop or brought into the circle for some of these products.

I'll continue very briefly.

When you want information brought to a particular minister's attention or a chief of staff's attention, what is the process?

I'll ask an easier question, because I don't want to go over the time. I will just be very quick.

There was a framework that was set this morning. They said we had developed our intelligence and security systems on the basis of responding to terrorism attacks. The world has changed. Some of the challenges for us are homegrown, and some others are from state actors or non-state actors.

Would you agree with that assessment in terms of how our system was designed, and that it has now changed?

[David Vigneault]

Very quickly, I think it's important, yes. I would say that, yes, it has been very much influenced. I think the evolution has been ongoing for some time about how we have to adapt our different processes around intelligence, sharing and focus, but I think we have done some of that work already. It's not over; it's not done yet.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you so much.

I guess sometimes confessions are good, and I think all of us know that I come from the Waterloo region. Last night the Denver Nuggets won the championship, and Jamal Murray was right there. He was born and raised in Kitchener, Ontario, as I was, so I am in the process of drafting an S.O. 31. I would appreciate it if members would keep their comments tight, so that I can do some of my other work while also paying attention to this work.

We'll make sure that all the time balances out, but kudos to Jamal Murray for bringing home the NBA championship for the Denver Nuggets.

Ms. Gaudreau, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Last week, we met the Sergeant-at-Arms because we're concerned about the protection and safety of parliamentarians. He told us that a memorandum of understanding was being developed between CSIS and the House of Commons regarding all intelligence-sharing matters. The purpose of that memorandum is to prevent what we've just experienced from happening again and perhaps to avert any potential incidents of the kind. The Sergeant-at-Arms added that a few details remained to be determined.

What kind of protection can we expect, since we're specifically talking about protecting MPs here?

[David Vigneault]

Protection from foreign interference is provided at various levels. I'm thinking in particular of protection for IT systems and physical protection. As I mentioned, we generally don't receive intelligence to the effect that parliamentarians are physically threatened. If that were the case, you could be sure that intelligence would be immediately forwarded to the authorities, and they would have been in the same situation as Mr. Chong.

Under the MOU that the Sergeant-at-Arms discussed with you, intelligence from CSIS and other government security and intelligence agencies will have to be merged in the best way possible to enable the right people to take the necessary protective measures. Those measures would include screening the people who work in your offices and providing increased support for MPs in doing that work. That's an example of the kind of information that has to be taken into consideration.

The work of the Sergeant-at-Arms will thus be to use intelligence from CSIS and from a number of other organizations to ensure that MPs are protected.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I'm particularly concerned about artificial intelligence, cyber attacks and all that. My sense is that this is all moving faster than the machinery of our government.

Can you reassure us on that point?

[David Vigneault]

I'd like to reassure you, but unfortunately I have to say that technological capabilities are developing at a pace that, in some instances, outpaces our agencies' resources.

To increase awareness on this subject, our stakeholder engagement group recently had a meeting with a few hundred people, including journalists, on artificial intelligence and deepfaking.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Madam Blaney.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you.

I'm going to come back to the stakeholder engagement groups. You ended at a perfect place for me to continue my questions.

I'm curious about how people are selected for the stakeholder engagement group. What are the criteria, and do they change to reflect any sort of threat we might see from other countries? If a new country is becoming a threat, is there the flexibility to respond to that and make sure that the stakeholder engagement group is reflective of the issues we are facing?

[David Vigneault]

I have a couple of reflections on this. The group is a small group of dedicated professionals, and they rely on the support of the rest of the CSIS organization, and other organizations as well.

Specifically to the question, if there were to be a new specific threat vector, they would have the ability to get support from any other experts inside the organization to get the information and to find the right vehicle, the right venue, understanding also the sensitivity of some of these groups, including their nervousness to meet with an intelligence service and finding the right way of engaging. That sensitivity is one of the reasons they have been effective. They are trying to understand the situation, the specific reality of the group they will be engaging with and the individuals they will be engaging with. This is something that we continue to learn and try to get better at.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Following up on that, does the diversity of the stakeholder engagement group reflect some of the groups that you're trying to reach? When I think about the testimony we have heard so far from some of these groups, they have talked about the fact that there is often a high level of fear preventing people from coming forward. They are concerned about their loved ones overseas. They are concerned about their own safety and that of their family.

We know a lot of those communities have a very poor relationship with previous governments and police in terms of the authoritarian governments.

How is this outreach? I think of these groups. They have been ringing the bells. They have been saying that this is happening and they weren't heard, so I want to make sure that the systems you are putting in place actually bring them in instead of just pushing them further away.