Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Feb. 3rd, 2026

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Madame Drouin, I'll let you continue, but—

[Nathalie Drouin]

If I can, Mr. Chair—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

I'll let you continue, but I have a limited amount of time, and that is entirely the point, presenting in a factual way. What arguably is contained in the backgrounder is reporting that was not factual in the sense that it did not provide a full and complete picture. It completely downplayed what, on the whole, were generally positive narratives about Mr. Carney. That was the conclusion of the National Post. The Toronto Sun headline, upon reviewing the materials, stated “China actively promoting Carney Liberal campaign”. Yet, if you just read the release, you'd have no idea of that. You'd likely draw the opposite conclusion of that.

[Nathalie Drouin]

I will give a chance to my colleague to respond.

As I was trying to say, what we report is when we see an attempt from a foreign actor or a non-state actor to influence in an unauthentic way. This is what we are giving as information to Canadians.

David, can you please add?

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

I'll cut you off there. We are over our time. Perhaps you can get that answer in through one of our other questioners.

Madame Brière, you have six minutes, please.

[Élisabeth Brière, Liberal, Sherbrooke, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here.

Ms. Drouin, would you like a bit of time to finish what you were saying in response to the question?

[Nathalie Drouin]

Yes, thank you.

Mr. Chair, I'd like to give the floor to my colleague.

[David Morrison, Deputy Minister and Member of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Just to clarify on the past question, I think the RRM group, led by Saliou, found two occasions of articles linked to the platform that has been raised. One we judged to be sort of positive. One was much more negative. Those are the only two that we found.

We called them out because of the nexus to the foreign state rather than because of what they said. There were two articles only, at slightly different times. I believe one was before the election was called and one was during the election. There was a different tenor to each article and that was it.

Thank you.

[Élisabeth Brière, Liberal, Sherbrooke, QC]

Thank you.

Ms. Drouin, in your opening statement, you said that you did observe foreign interference activities during the last election, but that none met the threshold for bringing the issue to the public's attention, if I can put it that way.

To the extent you're able, can you explain how you assess the degree of threat that a foreign interference activity poses to our electoral process? Could you also explain how you determined that the threshold required to inform the public was not met?

[Nathalie Drouin]

Each incident is assessed on a case-by-case basis; we consider a wide range of factors in determining whether the threshold has been met.

First, we check whether the news is circulating widely on social media. We try to figure out whether the ecosystem—other media outlets, non-profit organizations or Canadian intelligence agencies—was able to address and correct the situation, and whether Canadians were made aware before casting their ballots. Those are the things we take into account.

As I said at the outset, at no time during the 45th election did we determine that elections were not fair and informed, either generally or on an individual riding basis.

[Élisabeth Brière, Liberal, Sherbrooke, QC]

You also mentioned the high level of transparency and resilience, saying that you communicated with the public on a more regular basis, I believe. What feedback did you receive from the public? Did people appreciate that?

[Nathalie Drouin]

I think people really appreciated the weekly televised briefings held by the SITE task force. I think that helped raise Canadians' awareness level regarding foreign interference, cybersecurity and transnational repression, and thus their resilience.

However, I could also ask my colleague from Public Safety Canada to comment. She and her department work very hard on building resilience among Canadians.

[Tricia Geddes, Deputy Minister and Member of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

This is one of the functions that my colleague here, our counter foreign interference coordinator, who has appeared before, takes very seriously. We're trying to build greater resilience in communities. There are vulnerabilities across this country every single day—not just during elections.

I think that the feedback we have received from our briefings during that time period was that the information promoted specifically about the elections was extremely beneficial to the communities. It helped them to better understand the ecosystem in which the elections were taking place. I think it is something we need to continue to do, though.

One of the lessons we took from this election period is that not only the continued technical briefings to media and to communities, but actual direct engagement with the communities most affected is a hugely important step that we can be taking.

[Élisabeth Brière, Liberal, Sherbrooke, QC]

Artificial intelligence, deepfakes and such, are responsible for a lot of disinformation. Is that the source of people's concerns, according to what you heard?

In the face of this new and rising challenge, how can you protect or ensure people's confidence in the electoral process?

[Nathalie Drouin]

I'll start by saying that one of the findings of the foreign interference commission clearly indicates that disinformation and misinformation are two of the biggest risks to our democracy. As I see it, the work to address that never ends. Ceasing all those efforts would be a bad idea.

You mentioned deepfakes. We're actually about to deliver a training session to MPs on how to counter deepfakes.

Canadians are also sharing their concerns in relation to AI. It holds tremendous potential, but with that comes the concern that it will amplify the phenomenon. Canada is working on ensuring that the new technology is secure. We are front and centre in our ecosystem when it comes to AI-related standards. Canada is putting a huge number of initiatives in place, but as I said, the work is constant and ongoing.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

Madame Normandin, you have six minutes, please.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being with us.

Ms. Drouin, I'd like you to talk about how you decide whether to inform the public of information relating to a threat. How do you decide that it meets the threshold?

I realize that experts assess the information against various criteria, such as the degree of confidence they have in the information or intelligence provided, the potential of the information to undermine the credibility of the election, and the extent to which the incident could affect the outcome of the election. Certain criteria are very objective, for instance in relation to how credible a piece of information is, but other criteria strike me as rather subjective.

How does the panel decide that the threshold has or has not been met? Is it a collective decision? Is it done by consensus, or does one person have the final say?

[Nathalie Drouin]

To begin with, the panel is made up of five independent public servants. The panel is active during the election period, when the caretaker convention is in effect and the government has a duty to exercise restraint in its decision-making. It is a consensus-based approach, so a determination requires that all panel members come to a particular conclusion.

In practice, gathering information is often the first thing we do when an incident is brought to our attention. The intelligence agencies are tremendously helpful to us in that regard, and organizations such as the rapid response mechanism, the ecosystem and academic groups help us determine our response. The first step is really to gather information.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I understand that you work by consensus, but I'd like to discuss the other aspects.

Is it fair to say that, if the panel doesn't reach a consensus, the information isn't communicated to the public? As such, each of the five panel members has a veto of sorts on whether to communicate the information to the public. Is that a fair assessment?

[Nathalie Drouin]

Here's something interesting. In my opening remarks, I mentioned that we had 17 meetings in preparation for the election. One of the things we did most was working on scenario exercises. We worked extremely hard on incredibly difficult scenarios, to build our understanding and shared analysis of the protocol, and that was tremendously helpful. I can tell you that, during the day to day, we never encountered a situation where there was total disagreement. On the contrary, each member's input resulted in a better decision.

One of the benefits of the last protocol—and I don't really like to refer to it this way, but for illustrative purposes, I will—was communicating with Canadians, even in situations that fell below the desired threshold. That is why weekly briefings were held and specific situations were addressed.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I have the sense that there is a suitable level for the public. I can appreciate not wanting to communicate information that would alarm people unnecessarily or cause them to lose confidence in the electoral process. I appreciate that, but shouldn't there be some threshold in the middle for the political parties and candidates? The threshold would be different from the one for informing the public.

Is that something that's missing? Candidates could have a different assessment of what's happening on the ground, a different take in relation to the more subjective of the three criteria for determining whether the threshold has been met. Isn't there a problem in that regard, specifically parliamentarians' and candidates' own confidence in the electoral process?

[Nathalie Drouin]

You've opened the door for me to mention that numerous briefings were provided to the political parties. Each of the parties had representatives with the appropriate security clearance to be briefed. You're right; we can provide more information to those representatives than to the public at large. I think we made very good use of that mechanism during the last election.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Given how short the election period is—the last one was pretty quick—I'd like you to talk about the time frame for communicating the information. About how long is it between when the information is brought to your attention—information that must then be analyzed—and when you decide that the threshold for the public has not been met but that the political parties should still be informed? How long are we talking?

[Nathalie Drouin]

It can vary. During the last election, panel members received an assessment every morning, sometimes throughout the day as well, indicating whether intelligence teams or the SITE task force had detected an issue.

I think we can all think of a time when a meeting was convened and, right away, we jumped online via secure virtual systems to discuss the situation on the table. It can be extremely quick. The decision to trigger the measures at our disposal can be made quickly; then it becomes a discussion with members of the political parties. The information can go out to the appropriate people in a matter of hours.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you. We're a bit over time, so again, perhaps you can get that answer in to a different question.

We'll go to Mr. Calkins for five minutes, please.