Number one, under the party general secretary, Xi Jinping, the Chinese regime has vastly expanded the resources of the Chinese Communist Party's United Front Work Department's foreign operations. Working alongside the Ministry of State Security, this apparatus actively employs covert, coercive and corrupt means to undermine Canadian democratic institutions in the favour of a hostile autocratic regime.
Number two, rapid advances in artificial intelligence and facial recognition technology are acting as force multipliers for China's subversive machinations in Canada.
This bill is about countering bribery, intimidation, misleading publications, unauthorized computer use and social media posting of deepfakes originating inside and outside Canada.
Looking at the specific language, we have, for example, the proposed amendment to section 282.4 of the Elections Act—in the bill it is clause 8, about general elections—which says that foreign entities or powers cannot “unduly influence” electors by knowingly incurring expenses to promote or oppose candidates, potential candidates, parties or leaders.
Then we have the proposed amendments to section 349.95, about the pre-election period, and section 358, about the election period, which in the bill are clauses 19 and 23: “A third party shall use only contributions from Canadian individuals to pay for regulated expenses and shall use, as regulated expenses, only property or services that are contributions from Canadian individuals.”
All of this is high-flown language, but the practical question remains: Once Bill C-25 becomes Canadian law, will it empower CSIS and the RCMP to successfully investigate and prosecute the strongly alleged illicit campaign financing and covert interference by Chinese diplomats and their proxies in ridings such as Vancouver East, Richmond East—Steveston and Don Valley North?
There is the CSIS report from December 20, 2021, cited by David Johnston in his report as independent special rapporteur on foreign interference.
Sympathetic donors are also encouraged to provide campaign contributions to candidates favoured by China—donations for which they receive a tax credit from the federal government. Then, the CSIS report from Dec. 20, 2021 says, political campaigns quietly, and illegally, return part of the contribution—“the difference between the original donation and the government's refund”—back to the donors.
To date, none of the individuals—a large number of individuals—implicated in these very serious allegations have faced consequences. None of the Chinese diplomats involved have been declared persona non grata, and non-diplomatic proxies for the Chinese regime have yet to be held accountable in a Canadian court of law.
In the absence of a robust foreign influence transparency registry, in these aspects, Bill C-25 risks being more performative than substantive. I wonder if these proposed amendments to the Canada Elections Act can effectively address the credible threat that agents of the People's Republic of China pose to Canada's electoral process.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Again, I thank the excellent committee interpreters for their work.