Procedure and House Affairs Committee on May 26th, 2026

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

On the same topic, Bill C‑25 removed something from the elections act. I am referring to the requirement to give advance notice of an activity. That was changed because people did not want to announce the location of the activity in question in the interest of protecting people. They might hold an event at their home, for instance.

In your opinion, should all that information be kept nonetheless, particularly with the potential monetization of access to decision-makers?

Should the date of the event and the guest list be published, at the very least?

Should there be at least one kind of advance notice?

[Duff Conacher]

Yes, I think advance notice is helpful. I understand that there were some protests in front of some people's homes. That information can come out afterwards, but at least knowing in advance that the event will happen is important.

There's another small change that I didn't address in my recommendations. I also find it incredible that a provision has actually been put in place that, if a contestant riding association party or candidate does not follow these disclosure requirements after the fact, they're allowed to keep the donations raised at the fundraising event. Why you would allow them to do that, after they violated the law, is just another ridiculous step backwards by the Liberal government in proposing this. This secrecy and these steps are, again, a recipe for corruption.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

In other words, someone could raise money to pay a fine they might have received for violating the elections act, but keep the money nonetheless.

Is that correct?

[Duff Conacher]

Yes, that's correct. The fine would likely be less than the amount raised, and there would be no disclosure of who was at the event or who organized it.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I want to go back to fixed election dates quickly.

Is the solution you propose intended to prevent snap elections or to provide a better framework for funding in the case of snap elections?

[Duff Conacher]

Well, it's very difficult to cover the pre-election period in a snap election, because no one knows, exactly, that it's coming. To take the last election as an example, people were fairly sure that, probably, an election would be called after the leadership race. It wouldn't wait until the fixed election date. We saw people spending, against both the Conservative Party leader and the Liberal Party leader, enormous amounts of money, with no disclosure of who they were because, again, we don't cover this.

Fixed election dates are more fair for everybody. All the parties, people who want to run, volunteers can arrange their lives. We should fix election dates like the U.K. had them fixed: The only time an early election would occur would be if there were a resolution passed in the House saying that the House did not have confidence in the government. That's—

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

I'll have to cut you off there.

We will turn to Mr. Calkins for five minutes, please.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Ponoka—Didsbury, AB]

I'll let you finish that thought, actually, Mr. Conacher, because my question to you was going to be about how there are two circumstances, generally speaking, in Canada, during which you would have an election that doesn't follow.... I mean, there are political ramifications. There's no constitutional requirement to follow the fixed election date, but there are political consequences for not following a fixed election date when you have a majority Parliament.

In a circumstance of a minority or hung Parliament, as it's traditionally called, either the Prime Minister can call an election or there can be a vote of non-confidence in the House. Those are two different things. I would suggest to you that a Prime Minister would have advance knowledge in his own mind and, therefore, it is to the benefit of his political agency, whatever that happens to be. When it comes to knowing what spending could or should happen in an undisclosed pre-writ period, for example, only the Prime Minister and people close to them would know that. Generally speaking, the public gets a sense when there is going to be a vote of non-confidence that could actually topple the government. How would you manage the pre-writ spending in what seem to be three completely different scenarios?

[Duff Conacher]

Again, if you fix election dates or there has to be a resolution in the House, passed by a majority, saying the House does not have confidence in the government, as it was in the U.K.—the U.K. also said that this resolution could then be repealed within a couple of weeks if there were something negotiated between the parties to continue Parliament—you would know that the resolution had been introduced. There would be, at least, some advance notice to everybody. All the rules could kick in at that point in time, so you would cover that period, at least.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Ponoka—Didsbury, AB]

How do we deal with a Prime Minister making that...? That's a completely different thing. Are you suggesting that we remove the ability of a Prime Minister to use his or her discretion to call an election?

[Duff Conacher]

Yes, and New Brunswick actually did that. They had more specific language than the federal election law. Democracy Watch challenged the snap election called by Premier Higgs in New Brunswick, and the New Brunswick Court of Appeal said he violated the law.

It is possible to do it under our system and to allow an early election only when there is a vote of non-confidence. The Brits have it right: A specific resolution of non-confidence is the only thing that would cause an early election.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Ponoka—Didsbury, AB]

After the 2015 election, I was the chair of the ethics committee for a while, and I was actually pursuing the government on cash-for-access. It was called the cash-for-access scandal back in 2016-17. The law was subsequently changed when it came to the disclosure of political fundraising events and so on. Do you foresee now, with these changes being relaxed, that we're going to find ourselves in cash-for-access types of scandals again?

[Duff Conacher]

Yes, I think so, because the disclosure is coming after the event, and only in the municipality. That makes it very difficult to determine whether someone's holding a fundraising event in their own home, which was the site of the cash-for-access scandal. It's a huge step backwards in transparency and ethics to do this.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Ponoka—Didsbury, AB]

Okay. Thanks.

I'm now going to switch to Mr. Tenove. I don't know how it would all work, insofar as regulating AI-generated content. Wouldn't the more valuable aspect of dealing with AI be ensuring there's disclosure, so that people know when they're consuming AI-generated content, rather than actually trying to regulate the content itself?

[Chris Tenove]

One challenge—and regulators have experienced this in other jurisdictions—is that we use AI to do so many things on a spectrum, from lightly modifying to significantly changing or completely fabricating material. Determining where something is on the spectrum is difficult. Quite often, it's clear that synthetic content is being fabricated, so it's not problematic.

In addition, we do not currently have great and reliable detection systems in order to identify these things, so it could be very difficult for a regulator to figure out when someone is transgressing a requirement to reveal synthetic content.

For these reasons, I think it could very well be that this is something for which we want to further develop the capacity to ensure that we can identify manipulated or fabricated content. However, I think that the way the content is being used and what it is aiming to achieve are more critical, whether that is making false claims about how to vote, harassing candidates during an election and so forth. That's why I think the emphasis should be there.

I doubt that there are even—

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

I apologize. I am going to have to cut you off.

We will turn to Mr. Jeneroux for five minutes, please.

[Matt Jeneroux, Liberal, Edmonton Riverbend, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Holly Ann, Duff and Chris, for being with us today.

I'm going to stick with you, Chris, if that's all right. You previously made a statement that I'd like to get a little more information on from you, if possible. You indicated that, and I quote, “an insult or false accusation from Trump, Musk or others with huge, hostile followings can expose politicians and others to a blizzard of online threats and abuse.” You also wrote, and I quote, that “foreign interference can occur by...promoting misinformation.” Do you think the provisions in Bill C-25 that prohibit false information, where it is shown that the person knew the statement to be false and it was made with a goal of undermining trust in the election and its results, can help with these kinds of challenges?

[Chris Tenove]

I think that Bill C-25 is focusing pretty narrowly on content that may jeopardize section 3 rights to participate in elections, but there are broader categories of harmful content that can certainly affect how campaigning is done—whether it's fair, whether it's trusted and so forth. I think that some of those broader issues are more likely to get addressed in broader platform regulation, rather than through specific electoral law or, in the case of harassment and threats, through criminal provisions. Bill C-16, which was introduced and looks to address non-consensual intimate images, is part of the mix too, so I do think there's a range of regulatory and statutory approaches needed to address these issues.

[Matt Jeneroux, Liberal, Edmonton Riverbend, AB]

I'll try to get in two more questions. We'll see if we have time for them.

Going back to your quote database, you've expressed in the past that “foreign interference can occur by providing money for electioneering. Rather than a single bundled sum offered to John A. Macdonald, funds are more likely to come through online donations, possibly including crypto-currency transfers that are difficult to monitor.”

Given that, can you share your thoughts regarding the provisions in Bill C-25 that will seek to prevent anonymous and hard-to-trace contributions by prohibiting political entities and third parties from accepting contributions in the form of cryptocurrency, money orders and prepaid payment products? In short, do you think this measure will help ensure transparency in our political financing regime?

[Chris Tenove]

I think Bill C-25 is a real step forward on that issue by specifying those forms of contributions. I'll admit that I do not have the background on the kind of mechanics to be able to track those in order to know how effective they will be.

I just want to highlight that I agree with what Professor Loewen mentioned in the last session. We are entering an era when the attempt to regulate the unfair production and dissemination of speech, including by foreign actors, by focusing entirely on spending for that speech is really jeopardized in the information system we have. That's partly through, as I talked about, AI agents and their ability to push speech that may appear organic. It's also partly through some of the unclear regulation around influencers, which Ms. Gaumond mentioned in the last session.

[Matt Jeneroux, Liberal, Edmonton Riverbend, AB]

Finally—hopefully within the next minute—can you talk about some of the enforcement powers of the commissioner? In the past, you've expressed that it's challenging to enforce laws against people who live abroad, and that, in addition to measures in the Canada Elections Act, there needs to be a strong international framework in place as well. Bill C-25 contains several measures that strengthen the enforcement powers of the commissioner. These include enabling her to enter into formal arrangements with international counterparts and national security agencies.

Can you comment on how this increased enforcement power can help with some of the concerns you have previously expressed?

[Chris Tenove]

Sure.

I think it's simply that often one requires assistance from other jurisdictions to address cross-jurisdictional issues. I'd say that given these real challenges, sometimes it may be necessary to have other processes to address speech that threatens people's democratic participation. That's why I suggested such enforcement as cease transmission orders that the commissioner could adopt.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

Ms. Normandin, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Tenove, my next question is perhaps philosophical. You have talked a lot about AI-generated content, chatbots and robots. Those technologies are evolving very quickly, and it always seems like a game of cat and mouse, according to what witnesses say.

In that regard, I would like to hear your thoughts on the need for us to consider two things as elected officials. On the one hand, we always have to go back to the drawing board quickly and review the act in keeping with the pace of evolving technology. At the same time, we must never lose sight of the fact that the weakest link is ultimately the person, the voter, and that great emphasis must be placed on the educational aspect.

[Chris Tenove]

I think it is very difficult to keep on top of every new mechanism that technology enables for political communication. We are in a situation in Canada where we lack independent regulators and frameworks, really, for both platforms and artificial intelligence. I think that conversation about how we want to address these quickly evolving technologies really needs to direct its energies toward those developments. Key to that will be forms of transparency that allow us as societies to understand what these services, often companies, are doing and what they are sharing with Canadians, including during election periods.

I think the kinds of transparency provisions envisaged in an online harms act and in attempts at regulations for artificial intelligence are really critical, because the first step will be understanding what is happening and what is being produced by these technologies.