Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 16th, 2026

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

It's just that I find it odd that we're conducting a study where we don't have the main stakeholders around the table, Mr. Aubertin‑Giguère. I don't mean to downplay your importance, but I think it's a bit of a waste of the committee's time today.

I might have a question for you. It has been noted that the act that puts in place the commissioner to oversee the registry to monitor foreign agents received royal assent on June 20, 2024. That is very close to two years ago. Why is it that, two years later, it's still not in place?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

As I said, similar regimes in allied countries took over two years to implement.

We're not outside the standards for implementing this kind of regime, which is complex. It's a new regulatory entity. Therefore, implementing it is complex. We are still making good progress. There is no significant delay and we are very close to the finish line. In my opinion, the implementation should be completely consistent with international standards.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

If I understand correctly, a commissioner has been appointed, but he isn't in office. You were telling me that he currently plays an advisory role with the government. Therefore, he is active.

You also mentioned that you had recruited 20 or so people who will subsequently take up their duties. What is the role of these 20 people when, if I understand correctly, the system is still not in operation and the act is still not in force?

Those 20 people are floating around a bit. How are people recruited when no one knows when they will start working? If I were an employee of a company that said it was hiring me but didn't know when I was going to start, I would be asking myself some questions. How is that managed?

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

There's time for a very quick answer, please.

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

I need to clarify some things. These people are full-time employees and work on the implementation of the regime. They're not waiting for anything.

We have a group called the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner's Office, or FITCO. These people create the regulations and implement the administrative processes and protocols. They are in the process of setting up the office itself. They are working full time to operationalize the regime. What will change is that, once the act is implemented, they will fall under the authority of a commissioner and—

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

I'll have to cut it off there. We're well over time.

Monsieur Barsalou-Duval, I know you're subbing in for Madame Normandin, but Minister Anandasangaree was here before this committee back in February. It was on the study of foreign interference, but that's just to give you that context.

We'll now go to Mr. Van Popta for five minutes, please.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley Township—Fraser Heights, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Assistant Deputy Minister, for being here with us.

I too am disappointed that the minister couldn't be here, and likewise Mr. Boegman.

That said, you are more than welcome at our committee. Thank you for taking our questions.

I too will lodge my concern about the apparent delays in getting this foreign influence transparency registry set up. Mr. Jeneroux noted in an earlier line of questions that it's been two years. You've said, and we've read elsewhere, that two years isn't unusual, but I would point out that it is two years and we're still not set up.

The concerns around delays go back further than that. I'm reading from the report of Justice Hogue from the Hogue commission, which she submitted about a year and a half ago. She'd been working on it for several years. This is on page 4 of her report. She noted that, “trust in Canada's democratic institutions has been shaken, and it is imperative to restore it.” I'm sure you agree with that. The government agreed with it at the time.

Our concern isn't whether the government is concerned but whether the government is acting swiftly enough.

I say that in the context of something else that the commissioner noted. I'm reading at the bottom of page 3 of her report:

I also note from the evidence that Canada has responded to attempts at foreign interference with measures and mechanisms to better detect, deter and counter them.

She goes on, at the top of page 4:

That said, the government’s response has been far from perfect:

I have observed that the government has sometimes taken too long to act, and that coordination between the various players involved has not always been optimal.

She goes on to say:

Processes by which information had to be passed on to certain decision-makers, including elected officials, have not proved as effective as they should have been.

At a third bullet she states:

In addition, the government has proven to be a poor communicator and insufficiently transparent when it comes to foreign interference.

The measures implemented over the past two years, along with several statements made on the matter, suggest that the government is now prioritizing the fight against foreign interference. This must continue.

This is what Justice Hogue said a year and a half ago. She was reflecting on evidence that she had received over the previous two years.

This has been going on for at least four years. You can see why there's a concern among some parliamentarians that there appear to be further delays.

What can you tell us and what can you tell Canadians to assure us that the government is not only taking this seriously but is also acting on it as promptly as is reasonably possible?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

There is a broader set of efforts that have been made to improve Canada's response to foreign interference, whether it is the sharing of intelligence or how we're structured internally. Different mechanisms in the new legislation of Bill C-70 have been put in place.

The FITAA is one element in a broader ecosystem of measures that have been implemented to improve our response.

What I can say is that FITAA is a new regulatory regime that needs to be constructed. We worked as fast as we could. We are very close to the finish line. The implementation will be done, from my perspective, within international norms in terms of the speed of delivery.

It also needs to be done carefully. The commissioner will have powers that have an impact on privacy and public life, so it needs to be established in a proper setting. We need to do it with proper consultation, reasonable efforts and due diligence in doing so.

I don't think we are late or delayed in any step by any means.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley Township—Fraser Heights, BC]

Thank you.

Canada is not the first country to set up a foreign influence transparency registry.

What lessons have you and your department learned from Australia and the United Kingdom—there may be others, but those two in particular—who are close allies of ours with similar legal structures and similar political structures? What lessons have we learned from them that could have sped things up a bit for us?

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

That's a tough question, but give a very brief answer. We are over time.

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

Similar to my response to Mr. Jeneroux, we've learned quite a lot. I think it was helpful in shaping the legislation itself.

Things that we've learned include the credibility of enforcement measures; flexibility in the compliance regime so that you have many tools at your disposal to be proportional and flexible; the necessity of doing a lot of outreach to educate the non-Canadians; and shaping what type of exemptions we have done.

It was really helpful in doing the right thing from the get-go. It doesn't take away the necessity of doing due diligence as we construct and implement the regime in Canada.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

We're well over time. I'm going to have to cut you off. My apologies.

We'll go to Ms. Fancy, please, for five minutes.

[Jessica Fancy-Landry, Liberal, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

Thank you very much.

I would like to welcome the assistant deputy minister.

I'd like to follow this line of questioning from a different slant.

As a former educator who's done a lot of policy development and program development, I'm looking at a lot of what we've done here with the registry in preparation for today. There's a thing on the education side of programs and policy development called backwards design, where you look at your co-created criteria with goals. What's our goal? How do we assess those goals? What are those regulations, or, in this case, the registry, as we call it, the lesson plan? What's the plan? Then you roll back to how to staff for that plan, how to create those regulations and how to follow the policy. In this case, our first step was appointing that commissioner.

Based on where we are and what I'd call the backwards design plan, we Canadians want confidence that decisions affecting our communities are being made openly in Canada's interest. As this registry is implemented, how do you measure success? What are those indicators that will demonstrate we're improving transparency and public trust in our democratic institutions?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

That's a big question.

The key element of this regime is transparency in public affairs. It's not a regime of prohibition; it's a regime of transparency. Influence is a natural component of democratic life. What's problematic is when certain individuals conduct influence activities on behalf of foreign states and they fail to say that they are working for a foreign entity. It's to bring transparency to public affairs.

The key measure of success would be the capacity to highlight the transparency of these arrangements with foreign powers. Another key success would be that the public is really clear about what the obligations are to register and that there's minimal confusion around the regulatory obligations and the system is easy to use. Then, though I do not wish it, one measure of success would be the capacity of the regime to identify individuals who do not wish to be compliant and make sure that adequate measures are taken against these entities.

[Jessica Fancy-Landry, Liberal, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

Thank you very much. I appreciate that answer.

Now I'd like to look at this through a community lens. I am from a riding that's quite rural and a coastal community. We rely heavily on things like agriculture, fisheries, aquaculture, natural resources and transportation.

How will this registry help deter foreign interference in targeted sectors like those in my riding?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

The law creates an obligation to register for influence activities, informing public decisions and public policy decisions at all levels of government.

That means when entities in Canada are doing influence work on behalf of foreign powers, there's transparency around these arrangements and these links so that there's more clarity for the individuals, whether it's the civil servants, the politicians or any sort of public officials, and understanding about who is really speaking on this issue. There is more clarity, more transparency and more information available for decision-makers at all levels. That includes your constituents and individuals who are making decisions around economic investments or just policy-making in general.

[Jessica Fancy-Landry, Liberal, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

I think I have time for one last question.

As a former educator, I know that transparency is only effective if people understand it. What public education efforts are being planned to help Canadians distinguish legitimate advocacy from foreign interference activities that should be disclosed? Has that been part of the backwards design program plan?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

Yes, but to be clear, all arrangements with a foreign power to conduct influence activities need to be registered, so even arrangements from a national security perspective would not be considered as problematic. The idea is that all arrangements with foreign powers for influence activities need to be registered.

In that sense, it creates a level playing field in terms of transparency. It also creates a deterrent against malign influence, and for those who do not wish to be compliant, there's going to be consequences. It creates the capacity for the state to intervene.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

Mr. Barsalou‑Duval, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Aubertin‑Giguère, a number of the cases of foreign influence that have been discussed publicly seem to come from India and China. It even seems that the Chinese Communist Party has developed an argument that creating a foreign agent registry would be an attack on the Chinese community in Canada.

Prior to a recent visit to China, the Canadian government recalled Liberal MPs who were visiting Taiwan. We see that Chinese influence seems to be taken into account in government actions. We also see that there is a long delay before the registry will be put in place. To what extent do activities or pressures from China have an impact on your activities?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

First, I don't necessarily agree with your premise that there are long delays. The time frame for implementing the regime is in line with international standards.

Second, I can assure you that there is no influence by the Chinese government in the implementation of the regime. We're talking about implementing a regulatory regime with a new commissioner—

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

I'm glad to hear that. It reassures me. I didn't assume anything like that, but it still makes people wonder when the government seems to comply quite often with China's threats.

I personally find that worrisome. I feel that our national security should take precedence over our desire to develop ties with dictatorships around the world. That doesn't mean we shouldn't have a dialogue with them.

That leads me to my next question for you.

It seems that in Australia, issues have been raised about the effectiveness of the regime that was put in place. It's as if they were just catching people who registered, meaning people who were clearly foreign agents, such as ambassadors and consular staff, who were pretty much already known to be agents.

How, then, do we ensure that people register proactively and sufficiently, given the flaws and weaknesses we have seen abroad? Also, how are we going to catch people who won't comply in the future?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

I don't want to comment on the regime of my Australian colleagues. That would be inappropriate on my part. However, they clearly indicated the lessons they learned from the implementation of their regime, which dates back to 2018 and predates ours by a few years. They were kind of pioneers in this area.

We took those lessons into account to create our own regime and the powers of the compliance measures. What's also important is that we are setting up information-sharing relationships with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and other security agencies.

That way, the information gathered by the commissioner can be shared, under certain conditions, with security agencies. The sharing will go the other way as well. Cases of non-compliance sometimes stem from information provided by intelligence and security agencies, which is a huge benefit.

As you say, cases of non-compliance will definitely be quite hard to find, but we can count on the support of Canada's security and intelligence agencies.

[The Chair, Liberal, Chris Bittle]

Thank you so much.

Thank you, Monsieur Barsalou-Duval.

I gave the Bloc an extra minute, so I will give an extra minute to the Conservatives and the Liberals.

Mr. Cooper, you have six minutes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mark Carney's so-called strategic partnership with the Beijing dictatorship includes an agreement on law enforcement between the RCMP and Beijing's Ministry of Public Security.

This agreement has set off alarm bells, particularly amongst diaspora communities, given that the Beijing regime does not respect the rule of law and uses law enforcement as a tool of the state to advance the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. It has an atrocious human rights record and is the most active perpetrator of foreign interference in Canada. Indeed, this law enforcement co-operation agreement is with the very Beijing ministry that has been responsible for operating illegal police stations on Canadian soil.

Given these very serious concerns, why has the Carney government kept this law enforcement agreement secret?