Good morning, everyone. It is an honour and a pleasure to come and testify today. This testimony will focus on two specific cases of businesses that have had to deal with the board of referees following a closing, a lock-out and the end of a labour dispute.
First, I will talk about Olymel in Saint-Simon, which shut down on April; 20, 2007. On September 24 following, 18 employees were called back to work, eight of whom were to resume their duties immediately, while the other 10 were on a recall list. The company, on the other hand, wanted to negotiate a new collective agreement for a distribution centre, whereas the business was a cutting plant. The union obviously refused. In response to that refusal, the company declared a lock-out on October 16, 2007. However, the plant had been considered officially closed since April 20, 2007.
The lock-out had serious consequences for the workers called back to work. When they applied for employment insurance, they were deemed ineligible because they were locked out. It must be said that, prior to being recalled to work by the company, these workers were either receiving employment insurance benefits or were working. This decision also applied to the 10 workers who had not yet returned to work but who were on the company's recall list. The union appealed the decision, and the board of referees unanimously allowed the claimants' appeal on July 18, 2008.
The problem arose when the Employment Insurance Commission subsequently appealed the decision. The case was to be heard on October 10, 2008, but, while preparing the workers' defence, the union lawyer realized that the cassette recording was inaudible and even that there was nothing on the B side of the cassette.
Furthermore, the commission informed the umpire that it could provide only a partial transcript. Consequently, the umpire asked for a new hearing with the board of referees to restart the whole process. The hearing took place on April 21, 2009. A request for a new hearing was made to the umpire. Then, without giving a reason, the commission told the umpire that it was withdrawing its action.
In the context of the appeals, what is most frustrating and most disappointing for the workers is when the board appeals when a decision is unanimous and well substantiated. It used its discretionary authority to appeal, whereas the workers involved in the dispute had between 15 and 20 years' experience.
These workers are the ones paying for these decisions. They are without any benefits and have been financially hurt by the commission’s decision to interfere with the labour dispute by challenging the board of referees’ unanimous decision and requiring the workers’ representative to return before the board of referees due to obsolete and faulty equipment.
The second case was a back-to-work case. On October 9, 2009, a strike began at the Olymel plant in Saint-Hyacinthe. The dispute ended on December 18, 2009 and the return to work was to take place on December 21, 2009.
When production resumed, obviously not all employees returned to work. Those not working went to Service Canada to complete an employment insurance application. They were surprised to learn that, according to section 53(1) of the regulations and section 36 of the Employment Insurance Act, which concerns labour disputes, they were not eligible.
More than 30 workers were thus deprived of employment insurance benefits. In this case, when they learned of the situation, both the union and the employer decided to challenge the decision before the board of referees. Service Canada has a somewhat esoteric interpretation of what constitutes the end of a labour dispute. For that agency, a labour dispute ends when 85% of workers have returned to work. I don't know who set that standard, but it has nothing to do with the end of a labour dispute.
As a result, the union and the employer challenged the decision before the board of referees. On September 28, 2010, the board of referees unanimously allowed the union and the company’s appeal, which set January 25, 2010 as the official date for the return to work, in accordance with the criteria of the Act. On October 15 following, the commission filed an appeal with the umpire. In early January 2011, the commission withdrew its appeal.
What is debatable about this case is that regulations were made for the application of section 36 regarding labour disputes. However, what is even more debatable is the discretionary authority of the commission, which in both cases, despite a unanimous decision by the board of referees and well substantiated decisions rendered by lawyers specialized in employment insurance, decided first to challenge the decision and, second, to withdraw the challenge.
But what compensation is there for the workers? What compensation is there for those who came to defend themselves? There is none. The commission alone decides arbitrarily what it has to do in this type of case.
There are costs associated with this kind of research: there are costs to the union and even costs to the Employment Insurance Commission. It abuses its rights by appealing to the umpire and subsequently withdrawing its appeal. These are costs that could be avoided and the amounts of which could be allocated to their rightful owners, that is to say the workers.
To complete my remarks, I will say that the commission could adopt the philosophy of one umpire, who drew on a Supreme Court judgement in CUB 61301. He held:
Since the Act is intended to provide the unemployed with benefits, it is justifiable to give a liberal interpretation of provisions pertaining to the re-eligibility for benefits, seeing that the Act was not designed to take away benefits it extends to the innocent victims of a labour dispute and that the employees contribute to the unemployment insurance fund.
And in the second case, the one in Saint-Hyacinthe—