Good afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee.
My name is Captain Tim Perry. I have been a professional pilot for over 22 years. I am presently a current and qualified Boeing 737 captain at WestJet Airlines and proudly serve as the ALPA Canada president. Our association represents over 13,500 professional pilots at 22 of Canada's airlines. This is equivalent to 95% of commercial pilots in Canada.
Today, I will address the government's recent routine use of section 107 and will offer two recommendations to help create a system where differences are resolved at the negotiating table.
Before I start, I must emphasize that the right to strike has been recognized as a constitutional right for over a decade. Government intervention to end labour disputes in the federal sector has now become commonplace. As a result, employers now expect the government to intervene and are no longer interested in bargaining in good faith.
More specifically, airline management has written letters to the minister, pleading for section 107 to be used, and have admitted publicly to section 107 intervention being part of their bargaining strategy, all of which occurs at the latter stages of bargaining and all of which is very negatively impactful to labour relations. ALPA Canada strongly believes that parties must be incentivized to bargain in good faith and not to seek government assistance to resolve labour disputes.
To be clear, the continued use of section 107 by the government has had a damaging impact on bargaining with our employers. Its continued use, as a routine tool, tips the scale towards employers and erodes the principle of fair and free collective bargaining in Canada. As such, we support the removal of section 107 from the code. Section 107 strips workers of their constitutional right to strike and is done by the minister, unilaterally.
In the Canada Labour Code, section 107 is entitled “Additional powers”, meaning that these powers are residual in nature. It should be noted that the minister also has the authority to appoint mediators, for instance, or to appoint an industrial commission or to order a vote of the union membership on the employer's last offer. Moreover, it is ALPA Canada's view that the continued misuse of section 107 represents a symptom of broader issues within the bargaining process under the code, and we propose the following for the committee's consideration.
First, any analysis of whether section 107 should remain in the code should not be conducted in a vacuum. While changes like replacing the term “expedient” with “necessary” or providing the board with specific authority to review a minister's decision under section 107 are worth considering, the committee should also examine part I of the code, specifically sections 48 through 90, to explore potential improvements to the bargaining process. Ultimately, any proposed changes will require a broader, longer-term tripartite consultation process that meaningfully balances the interests of industry, government and labour.
Second, consideration must be given to providing incentives to bargain collective agreements, without having to resort to the notice of dispute provisions within the code. Isn't that what we all want—fewer disputes?
To provide context, the bargaining period timelines in section 50 of the code currently only require the parties to “meet and commence” bargaining but puts no guardrails around what follows during the open bargaining period. We suggest that an initial bargaining period be established, four to six months, for example, which would then be followed by a 30-day mandatory mediation period with a minister-appointed mediator, prior to the notice of dispute. This would do two things.
First, it would oblige the parties to focus on bargaining during the initial period. Too often, employers show up to the bargaining table poorly prepared and unable to discuss the issues at hand.
Second, mediation would allow for third party involvement prior to the formal notice of dispute. It would help to reduce the number of open issues and would incentivize the parties to resolve issues before the formal notice of dispute stage. At the end of the 30-day period, the parties could either agree to carry on in open bargaining or agree to embark upon a conciliation process. This would reduce the ambiguity of when mediation will happen.
Should there be a notice of dispute, ALPA Canada suggests that the conciliation period be reduced from 60 to 45 days and that more powers be given to conciliators, including a requirement to provide a formal report to the minister and/or arbitrator, and/or consideration given to requiring the parties to withdraw proposals under certain limited circumstances.
Currently, the number of actual days spent bargaining in the conciliation process is limited, and overall, the process in the aviation sector is largely ineffective. Reducing the length of the conciliation period should incentivize the parties to focus on negotiations from the beginning rather than relying upon that time for everything to come together.
To summarize, section 107 should never have been normalized, and its misuse undermines constitutional rights and destabilizes labour relations. We urge the committee to recommend reforms that restore balance and incentivize good-faith bargaining to take place at the negotiating table.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.